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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
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Department of Defense Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' Banking and Financial Infrastructure Development in Afghanistan and Iraq: Audit of Costs Incurred by aXseum Solutions, LLC
The Office of Inspector General evaluated NASA’s development of the SWOT mission, a space-based satellite that hopes to produce the first global survey of Earth’s surface water, observe details of the ocean’s surface topography, and measure how water bodies change over time.
OIG conducted a healthcare inspection in response to allegations regarding the Release of Information (ROI) section at the C.W. Bill Young VA Medical Center (facility) of the Bay Pines VA Healthcare System (system), Bay Pines, FL. The complainant alleged that the facility had a backlog of ROI requests, including one pertaining to a patient who died before the non-VHA provider received the records; the Business Office Services (BOS) Chief took ROI requests “off-station” and lost requests; staff working on ROI requests were not trained; and BOS staff did not comply with policies and procedures to process ROI requests.OIG did not identify patient harm attributable to delays in processing the ROI requests. However, OIG found that the facility Patient Advocate Office did not adequately capture ROI complaints. OIG substantiated a ROI request backlog of which system leaders became aware in 2014. OIG also found that ROI staff did not communicate the backlog status to requestors, and that facility managers did not monitor staff productivity accurately. OIG substantiated that the BOS Chief approved transfers of hard copy ROI requests from the facility to an off-site BOS location in an effort to reduce backlog. However, VHA policy authorizes certain managers to remove records from the facility. OIG substantiated that managers were unable to locate 547 ROI requests which were logged into the tracking system from approximately January 2014 through June 2016. Further, OIG found that ROI managers did not fully implement corrections in response to missing authorizations. OIG did not substantiate that staff were not trained to complete assigned ROI tasks. OIG substantiated that ROI staff did not comply with VHA’s prioritization policy and that longstanding workplace culture challenges in the ROI section contributed to the difficulties in resolving the backlog and sustaining effective processes. We made eight recommendations.
Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) Chief Business Office (CBO) misused approximately $3.1 million of Medical Support and Compliance (MS&C) appropriations when they funded the Debt Management Center’s (DMC) development of the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) system enhancement. The former Deputy Director, Finance and Logistics for the CBO Revenue Operations, stated she thought she could obligate the MS&C appropriation because it was the only funding available and the DMC recovers costs through its customers. However, public law states that MS&C appropriations are only authorized for necessary expenses in the administration of medical, hospital, nursing home, domiciliary, construction, supply, and research activities—not information technology (IT) development. As a result of our work, in June 2016, the Office of Management reimbursed the VHA the approximately $3.1 million inappropriately used from the MS&C appropriation. We also found that VHA used the MS&C, Medical Services, and IT Systems appropriations to finance five mobile health application development contracts. Public funds may be used only for the purpose for which they were appropriated. However, when an agency has two appropriations available for the same purpose, the agency must select which one to use. The agency must continue to use that appropriation for that purpose unless the agency informs Congress of its intent to change appropriations. VHA’s use of multiple appropriations for the same purpose occurred because it had not updated its financial policies to include how VHA should fund mobile health application development. As a result, VHA lacked consistency and transparency in the execution of its appropriations. We made three recommendations. VA concurred with the recommendations and has taken acceptable corrective actions. The OIG considers the recommendations closed.
To combat money laundering in the U.S., Congress enacted a series of laws, collectively referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), requiring financial institutions, including money services businesses (MSB), to deter and detect potential money laundering, and report suspicious activities to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Under the BSA, the U.S. Postal Service, defined as a MSB, is required to comply with the law. Our objective was to determine whether the Postal Service anti-money laundering program is adequately designed and implemented to ensure compliance with the BSA and to identify opportunities to enhance the program.
We inspected whether the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM’s) implementation of its 2012 Idle Well Review and Data Entry policy reduced its number of idle wells in accordance with policy. Specifically, we assessed whether BLM: (1). maintained an accurate inventory of idle wells; (2) developed a clear strategy for reviewing idle wells; (3) ensured required idle well reviews, approvals, and tests were performed; and (4) maintained reliable idle well data.Based on data received from BLM, we determined the Bureau did not reduce the number of idle wells from 2013 through August 2016. The number of reported idle wells in BLM’s inventory at the end of FY2013 was 4,546 and, as of August 2016, it was 4,618. These numbers, however, are hardly reliable because of BLM’s deficient implementation of IM 2012-181.We found various program management issues that have contributed to BLM’s inability to reduce the number of its idle wells. Specifically, BLM has not applied the correct definition of an idle well, which makes it unable to maintain an accurate inventory of its idle wells. BLM also does not have a clear strategy for conducting idle well reviews, and has an ineffective process for monitoring the required well reviews and approvals. Further, BLM has not established all the guidance needed to manage its idle wells. Finally, BLM monitors its idle wells using a database that is unreliable due to inaccurate well status and absence of necessary data fields.We made 11 recommendations to help BLM better determine, manage, and reduce its idle well inventory, thus reducing the potential liability.
We conducted a review of the Bureau of Reclamation’s (USBR’s) administration of transfers and conveyances of water. Our objective was to determine whether the transfers and conveyances facilitated by the USBR were done in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.We could not make a determination because a legal opinion on application of the Warren Act of 1911, which governs conveyance of non-project water through Federal facilities, is needed. In a review of water data for California’s Central Valley Project (CVP) for 2012 to 2015, we found that contractors charged other contractors more than they paid the USBR for water conveyance. Specifically, we found that contractors potentially generated revenue between $192 million and $1 billion on water conveyed under the Warren Act.We found no formal legal opinion on whether the USBR is entitled to revenue generated through water conveyance under the Warren Act, but the language of a subsequent law says that “all moneys or profits . . . derived from the sale or rental of surplus water under the Warren Act . . . shall be credited to the project.” Thus the USBR may have the opportunity to recoup millions of dollars that could be applied toward repayment of the Federal investment in water projects such as the CVP.We recommend that the USBR obtain a legal opinion from the Department’s Office of the Solicitor to determine whether (1) contractors are allowed to collect revenue in excess of costs and make a profit on the conveyance of non-project water through Federal facilities, and (2) any moneys or profits derived from such conveyances must be credited to the project or division of the project to which the construction cost has been charged or to the U.S. Treasury.
OIG investigated allegations of theft from the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma (SNO) through counterfeit checks associated with an account that may have contained Federal funds.Our investigation determined that multiple individuals from the Wichita, KS area cashed counterfeit checks totaling more than $20,000. The checks were made to look like they had been issued by legitimate Wichita businesses, however, the routing and bank account information printed on the checks resulted in the funds being withdrawn from an SNO bank account.The U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Oklahoma, declined prosecution. We forwarded our report of investigation to the Wichita Police Department, Financial Crimes Section and closed our investigation.
The OIG investigated whether National Park Service (NPS) management appropriately handled sexual misconduct complaints at a National Recreation Area (NRA) in Texas. The initial complainant reported that an employee at the NRA exposed himself to her and sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions between 2012 and 2014. The complainant alleged she reported the incidents to NPS management when they occurred, but they failed to take any action.Our investigation did not find any evidence that the complainant reported the incidents to her supervisor as she reported in her complaint. We determined that once management learned of the allegations in 2016, they took swift action to address the issues and handled the complaint appropriately.During our investigation, another employee reported that she had also been a victim of sexual misconduct by the same NRA employee. She acknowledged that she did not report the incident to management when it occurred. Again, we determined that management took decisive and immediate action as soon as they learned of this additional allegation.We also found that NPS management had received three additional allegations of sexual misconduct at the NRA in previous years that were unrelated to this employee. Our review concluded that those previous incidents were reported and appropriately handled.A criminal investigation into the actions of the NRA employee is ongoing by the NPS.