Federal Reports

We completed an evaluation to determine if the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) has fulfilled its responsibility to assist the oil industry’s preparation for oil spill response. Our evaluation focused on the Oil Spill Preparedness Division (OSPD).We found that while BSEE has made significant progress in its oversight role and has procedures in place to fulfill this responsibility, opportunities to improve exist. We identified issues that impact the effectiveness of the OSPD’s oil spill preparedness efforts. These issues include weaknesses in oil spill exercises, as well as outdated regulations and agreements that hamper response management.We made eight recommendations to help BSEE achieve its oil spill response mission through the OSPD. We also identify four practices that could improve certain functions of the OSPD and possibly other BSEE program areas. BSEE fully concurred with six recommendations and only partially concurred with two recommendations. We consider one recommendation resolved and implemented, and seven recommendations resolved but not implemented.

The OIG investigated allegations that a Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) manager violated Federal procurement laws and regulations by improperly influencing recommendations made by procurement source selection committees and by inflating Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCEs). We also investigated allegations that the manager’s supervisor also improperly influenced the committee’s recommendations and obtained protected source selection information.We found that the BSEE manager and her supervisor mishandled source selection information by altering source selection reports, which are used to prioritize vendor ratings, and by influencing source selection committee members to change their vendor recommendations. In addition, the manager released protected source selection information to BSEE employees not authorized to receive it. We also found that the manager’s supervisor requested and received protected source selection information that he was not authorized to receive. Finally, we found that the manager also directed staff to increase the IGCEs to meet predetermined budgets, which contradicts the objective and independent nature of an IGCE.

In March 2017, the President of the National Border Patrol Council testified to Congress that Air and Marine Operations (AMO) flew “very little” at night and that United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) pilots had to fly missions for U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents in the Rio Grande Valley sector. We initiated an inspection in July 2017 to determine whether AMO and Coast Guard supported USBP Agents at night in the Rio Grande Valley sector. CBP should improve its air coordination to respond to the highest priority of USBP requests. During our inspection, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) established an operations center to improve air coordination at night in the Rio Grande Valley sector, but the operations center did not establish metrics to gauge the effectiveness of air coordination. If CBP continues to implement the operations center and develop metrics to gauge the effectiveness of air coordination, those efforts should improve the effectiveness of air support in the Rio Grande Valley sector and enhance unity of effort among CBP components.