Federal Reports

The CSB has not consistently implemented its information security program’s policies, procedures, and strategies.

The CSB has not consistently implemented its information security program’s policies, procedures, and strategies.

We investigated allegations that U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) or National Park Service (NPS) officials may have improperly influenced two hiring actions. The first hiring action resulted in the promotion of an NPS employee from a GS-9 to a GS-11 supervisory position in 2018, and the second action resulted in the promotion of the same employee to a GS-12 supervisory position in 2020. We also investigated an allegation that an NPS official who was related to the employee may have influenced both hiring actions.We did not find evidence substantiating the allegations of impropriety related to the 2018 hiring action. We also did not find evidence substantiating the allegation that the employee’s relative influenced either hiring action. Further, we did not find evidence that any other DOI or NPS management officials improperly influenced the promotion of the employee or that management instructed the human resources (HR) officials to grant an advantage to the employee. We did not investigate the employee’s actual eligibility or qualifications for a promotion.We did find, however, that NPS HR officials involved in the 2020 hiring action intentionally recommended a hiring process that granted an improper preference or advantage to the employee in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(6) and that the HR officials’ actions did not follow merit system principles and the NPS Merit Promotion Plan. Specifically, HR officials advertised the position competitively but intentionally restricted it in a way that granted an advantage to the employee because doing so was perceived as easier and faster than promoting the employee noncompetitively based on an accretion-of-duties promotion, which was themethod that NPS management originally proposed.

We determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) training approach and execution do not fully support the canine teams’ mission to detect smuggling of illegal narcotics, agriculture products, and humans at and between ports of entry. In fiscal year 2019, CBP decided to realign its Canine Academy, which contributed to a decrease in canine teams trained in the first two quarters of FY 2020. Office of Field Operations (OFO) canine teams used pseudo narcotic training aids past the recommended replacement cycle. Both Border Patrol and OFO canine teams used outdated actual narcotic training aids during proficiency training in the field. Additionally, OFO canine team files did not have required documentation for proficiency training. Furthermore, CBP’s inadequate governance of canine team operations led to outdated Canine Program policies and procedures, inconsistent retention periods for training documents, and an absence of Canine Tracking System policies and procedures. We recommended that the Office of Training and Development (OTD) Assistant Commissioner develop a comprehensive assessment of the Canine Program realignment to ensure implementation according to OTD training standards. Furthermore, we recommended the Border Patrol Chief and OFO Executive Assistant Commissioner ensure their Canine Programs have enough certified canine instructors and adequate training aids to provide proficiency training for canines after they are deployed. In total, we made four recommendations that, if implemented, should help CBP improve oversight of its Canine Program, formalize and implement a realignment plan for the training academy, provide proper training capabilities, and update and standardize program guidance. CBP concurred with all our recommendations.