Federal Reports

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What We Looked AtBetween fiscal years 2013 and 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) awarded over $17 billion in contracts. Within FAA, three key categories of acquisition professionals work together to award and manage contracts critical to meeting the mission of the agency: Contracting Officers (COs), Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs), and Program/Project Managers (P/PMs). However, our prior work has raised concerns about the adequacy of FAA's acquisition workforce certification and warrant practices. Given the importance of a high-performing acquisition workforce in managing FAA's multibillion-dollar contract budget, we conducted this audit. Specifically, our audit objective was to assess FAA's oversight and compliance with Federal and Agency requirements for acquisition workforce training, certification, and warrants.What We FoundFAA faces challenges in tracking its acquisition workforce and ensuring compliance with training, certification, and warrant requirements. First, FAA lacks effective processes for identifying, tracking, and assessing its acquisition workforce. For example, FAA relies on six separate information systems to identify and track its COs, CORs, and P/PMs, making it difficult to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the Agency's workforce-related data. In addition, until recently, FAA had been using the Federal Acquisition Institute's Acquisition Training System (FAITAS) as its system of record for tracking whether acquisition professionals have required certifications. Yet, more than 5 years after adopting FAITAS, FAA did not fully implement nor ensure its use. Second, FAA does not ensure its acquisition workforce meets all certification and warrant requirements. For example, FAA grants COs varying levels of warrant authority authorizing them to obligate funds on the Government's behalf. However, we found that 6 of 46 COs were assigned to contracts without the required certification level to support their warrant. Further, almost half the CORs in our sample (32 out of 69) were uncertified and yet had been assigned to contracts totaling $184 million. As a result, FAA may be putting Federal funds at risk by allowing its acquisition workforce to manage contracts without the experience, training, and certifications required to manage highly complex, costly, and mission-critical acquisitions.Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with our eight recommendations to improve its oversight and compliance with certification, training, and warrant requirements for COs, CORs, and P/PMs. We consider all recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

What We Looked AtThis report presents the results of our quality control review (QCR) of an audit of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Enterprise Services Center (ESC) controls. ESC provides financial management services to DOT and other agencies, and operates under the direction of DOT’s Chief Financial Officer. The Office of Management and Budget requires ESC, as a management services provider, to either provide its user organizations with independent audit reports on the design and effectiveness of its internal controls, or allow user auditors to perform tests of its controls. We contracted with KPMG LLP to conduct this audit subject to our oversight. The objectives of the review were to determine whether (1) management’s descriptions of ESC’s systems are fairly presented, (2) ESC’s controls are suitably designed, and (3) ESC’s controls are operating effectively throughout the period of October 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021. KPMG will do additional testing and issue a follow-up letter to our office for the period July 1, 2021, through September 30, 2021. We performed a QCR on KPMG’s report and related documentation. What We FoundOur QCR disclosed no instances in which KPMG did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted Government auditing standards. RecommendationsDOT concurs with KPMG’s four recommendations. The quality control review and attachments have been marked as For Official Use Only to protect sensitive information exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. To receive a copy of the report, please contact our Freedom of Information Act Office.

The objective was to determine to what extent CBP conducted searches of electronic devices at U.S. ports of entry in accordance with its standard operating procedures. OFO continues to experience challenges managing searches of electronic devices, similar to those identified in our first audit report, CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry, issued in December 2018.

We determined how RBCS implemented the B&I CARES Act Guaranteed Loan Program and made modifications to help guaranteed lenders with existing borrowers experiencing cash flow issues.

OIG performed agreed-upon procedures for assessing information reported by USDA’s NFC.

We issued this management alert to advise the Department of Homeland Security and United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) of a risk to the health and safety of personnel posed by using functional firearms (emptied of ammunition) during Digital Versatile Disc (DVD)-based simulation training. After receiving our draft management alert, the Coast Guard took immediate corrective actions to discontinue the use of functional firearms during DVDbased simulation training.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection at the Fayetteville VA Coastal Health Care System in North Carolina to assess concerns related to the quality, coordination, and timeliness of care, and the impact of COVID-19 on a patient with unintentional weight loss who was later diagnosed with oral cancer and died at another VA medical center.The OIG substantiated that the primary care provider and dietitians did not provide quality care to the patient. The primary care provider’s failure to follow-up on an earlier finding and not place an order for a medical test may have led to a delay in the patient’s cancer diagnosis. Dietitians conducted incomplete nutritional assessments given the patient’s declining nutrition status and may have contributed to a delay in diagnosis.The OIG determined that the patient’s PACT nurse and dietitians failed to coordinate care by not communicating the family’s request for a face-to-face appointment and the patient’s declining nutritional status to the primary care provider. The lack of care coordination may have contributed to a delay in examination and diagnosis.The OIG found that incorrect scheduling resulted in the patient not being seen by a dietitian for a follow-up appointment, and that a delay in scheduling a non-VA dental appointment occurred. The OIG concluded that COVID-19 impacted the care provided by dietitians because of the use of telephone visits, which did not allow dietitians to visually assess the patient’s physical characteristics caused by a declining nutritional status.The OIG made six recommendations related to completion of nutrition assessments, care coordination between PACT nurses and primary care providers, guidance on care coordination between dietitians and primary care providers, scheduling of dietitian and non-VA dental appointments, and evaluation of COVID-19 scheduling practices and impact on patient care.