Federal Reports

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated concerns related to Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 10 staff’s care and treatment coordination for a patient who died. The OIG reviewed the sufficiency of Veterans Health Administration (VHA) leaders’ actions prior to and following notification of the patient’s death.VA Ann Arbor Health Care System (Ann Arbor VA) staff adequately considered a posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis and assessment for the patient and screened for toxic exposure and traumatic brain injury. However, inpatient mental health providers failed to sufficiently address the patient’s mental health condition, treatment needs, and discharge care coordination.Due to absence of documentation, the OIG was unable to determine whether a Battle Creek VA Medical Center (Battle Creek VA) staff member inaccurately verified the patient’s treatment eligibility status. Battle Creek VA staff responded appropriately to non-VA staff’s inpatient mental health unit inquiries regarding the patient’s transfer request; however, the transfer was not considered due to unavailability of beds. Battle Creek VA leaders implemented recommendations from a workgroup to improve transfer coordination.A Battle Creek VA residential treatment standard operating procedure was inconsistent with the VHA requirement to allow self-referral or non-VA agency referral. VHA leaders responded within 24 hours when notified of the patient’s transfer request and took actions to identify the patient’s treatment needs and options. VISN 10 leaders established an Interagency Reconciliation Council (IRC); however, the IRC lacked defined objectives and processes to monitor outcome progress.The OIG made one recommendation to the Ann Arbor VA Director to review the patient’s care; four recommendations to the Battle Creek VA Director regarding eligibility verification procedures, transfer coordination, and the residential treatment standard operating procedure; and one recommendation to the VISN 10 Director related to the IRC’s identification of clearly defined objectives and processes to monitor progress.

Sean Langston, a former Amtrak supervisor based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, pleaded guilty and was sentenced for his role in a wide-ranging pandemic fraud scheme on July 30, 2024, in Chester County, Pennsylvania State Court. Langston was sentenced to 6 months in prison, 6 months home incarceration and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $295,418. Our investigation found that Langston fraudulently applied for and received two Economic Injury Disaster loans and a Paycheck Protection Program loan totaling $268,487.The employee was previously terminated for falsely claiming and accepting payment for regular pay, overtime pay, and compensatory time for days he did not work and for using his company-owned vehicle for unauthorized purposes during work hours, including personal business.

Objects orbiting Earth such as satellites and debris continue to increase in number, making space contested and congested. Preventing collisions is crucial to protecting the safety of space activities and assets.In June 2018, the White House issued Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy (SPD‑3), acknowledging that the number of space objects was increasing while the activity and architecture to ensure space safety, including existing traffic management activities, was becoming inadequate.Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing basic space situational awareness data and potential collision notifications to space operators. SPD‑3 directs the transfer of certain responsibilities for providing data and services from DOD to the Department of Commerce, specifically to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Office of Space Commerce (OSC), which is responsible for the coordination of space-related issues, programs, and initiatives within the Department.Our audit objective was to assess OSC’s progress in providing space situational awareness data and space traffic management services in accordance with SPD-3. We found that (1) OSC is behind schedule in providing basic space situational awareness data and services and (2) a new approach to space traffic management is not yet defined and remains a distant goal.We made five recommendations to help OSC develop a realistic program timeline and meet its SPD-3 responsibilities.