Federal Reports

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, authorized $1 billion in appropriations for the purchase and installation of renewable energy, energy storage, and other grid technologies. The Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office (GDO) will administer the $1 billion through the Puerto Rico Energy Resilience Fund (PR-ERF) Program, which focuses on energy resilience investments to grow Puerto Rico’s clean energy economy, while pursuing the goal to meet 100 percent of its electricity needs with renewable energy by 2050.
We initiated this inspection to determine the GDO’s readiness to implement the PR-ERF Program.

We found that the GDO was not fully prepared to implement the PR ERF Program, as it had not developed the requisite oversight tools and resources to conduct separate and appropriate oversight to ensure that it will meet its intended goals and objectives. We identified six areas related to the GDO’s implementation of the PR-ERF Program where additional oversight and resources are needed.

The lack of preparedness and planned oversight occurred due to the GDO’s reliance on other entities. Specifically, while the GDO delegated management and execution duties to other entities, it did not assess the readiness and ability of these entities to oversee the PR-ERF Program, nor prepare a plan to oversee the work performed by these entities.

The GDO’s ability to achieve PR-ERF Program objectives is vulnerable without the establishment of independent, robust oversight, and resources.

To address the issues identified in this report, we have made one recommendation that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that the GDO’s oversight tools and resources are adequate for the PR-ERF Program.  

What Was Inspected
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection of two DFC loan finance agreements. The agreements reviewed involved the FS India Solar Ventures Pvt. Ltd. (First Solar) and Biological E Limited (Bio E) projects, which are both based in India. DFC’s loan agreements with First Solar and Bio E totaled $500 million and $50 million, respectively. The OIG’s inspection objective was to evaluate each project’s compliance with agreement terms and progress with established impact metrics. 

What Was Found
The OIG found that DFC officials did not receive the annual environmental and social (E&S) reports for Bio E required under the finance agreement. Additionally, DFC’s oversight of the First Solar project could be strengthened to monitor ongoing E&S compliance with deliverable requirements under the finance agreement. The OIG found mixed progress on the impact outcomes for both projects. Both the Bio E and First Solar agreements required the submission of specific document deliverables 
throughout each project’s lifecycle and annual reporting on established impact outcomes.

The OIG inspection determined that:
•  DFC did not adhere to established internal policies and procedures, resulting in insufficient E&S monitoring of the $50 million Bio E investment.
•  DFC officials did not receive the annual E&S reports for Bio E required under the finance agreement, and one deliverable was received three months after the deadline specified in the finance agreement.
•  DFC officials did not follow policies and procedures for maintaining the required project deliverables within Insight.
•  DFC did not obtain required annual audits from several of First Solar’s supply chain material and component supplier vendors, nor did it verify that identified monitoring procedures for the construction of the First Solar facility were followed with respect to labor and working condition standards.
• The Bio E project made progress meeting two core impact projections, while the First Solar project is still in the process of achieving its impact projections.
 

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to determine whether leaders and staff followed required procedures related to suspected elder abuse of a community living center (CLC) resident at the St. Albans VA Medical Center in Queens, part of the VA New York Harbor Healthcare System (system). 

The OIG determined leaders and staff failed to follow procedures to report suspected abuse. A nursing assistant witnessed another nursing assistant allegedly abuse a resident but failed to immediately notify a supervisor, due to being “scared.” Nursing leaders and staff did not immediately ensure the resident’s safety, and did not report the suspected abuse to a unit social worker, VA Police, the resident’s family, and the New York State Department of Health. A nurse practitioner evaluated bruises on the resident and did not document a complete physical exam, consider whether the bruises were related to abuse, or inform the resident’s family. Staff described a culture of silence in the CLC in which staff generally did not report, or underreported, patient safety incidents due to fear of reprisal or administrative burdens. 

Leaders conducted two factfinding investigations into the alleged abuse; however, neither factfinding was thorough, which led to inaccurate conclusions. Factfinding 2 was completed approximately five months after the alleged abuse, exceeding a 14-day completion requirement. An accurate conclusion would have indicated the allegation of patient abuse was plausible and required system leaders to conduct an administrative investigation board. 

The OIG found additional reporting deficiencies related to other incidents of suspected resident abuse; insufficient staff training; substandard documentation by staff, which hindered reviews and investigations; and omissions in Veterans Health Administration and system abuse-related policies. 

The OIG made one recommendation to the Under Secretary for Health, who concurred in principle, and six recommendations to the System Director.
 

Our objectives were to determine whether the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (Wisconsin) designed and implemented (1) application processes that adequately assessed nonpublic schools’ eligibility for Emergency Assistance to Nonpublic Schools (EANS)-funded services or assistance and complied with other applicable requirements, and (2) oversight processes to ensure that EANS-funded services or assistance were used for allowable purposes. Although we found Wisconsin’s processes to assess nonpublic schools’ eligibility for EANS-funded services and assistance ensured that funds were obligated within 6 months of receipt and that applications for the EANS programs were generally approved or denied timely in accordance with Federal regulations, we found that Wisconsin allocated ARP EANS funds to nonpublic schools that did not meet program eligibility requirements and did not verify some information that nonpublic schools provided in their applications for EANS funds. Additionally, Wisconsin’s oversight of its contractor’s administration of EANS expenditures and inventory processes could be improved. Specifically, Wisconsin did not effectively monitor its contractor to ensure that expenditures were properly accounted for, supporting documentation was maintained, and assets purchased with EANS funds were tracked. Further, Wisconsin’s processes did not ensure that fees charged to the nonpublic schools’ EANS funds were reasonable and appropriate. However, Wisconsin’s oversight was adequate to ensure that EANS-funded services and assistance were for allowable purposes.  Wisconsin’s improper approval of ineligible nonpublic schools’ applications resulted in providing over $20 million in ARP EANS-funded services and assistance to 184 nonpublic schools. Further, because Wisconsin did not verify certain information in nonpublic schools’ applications, it provided $838,829 for EANS-funded services and assistance to one ineligible school and did not have assurance that all schools that were approved to participate in the programs had a nonprofit status. We made seven recommendations to address the issues we identified in Wisconsin’s administration and oversight of its EANS programs.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether West Virginia Department of Education (WVDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated WVDE’s processes for implementing selected components of West Virginia’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022.  We found that WVDE generally implemented selected components of the statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s State plan and amendments and WVDE’s policies and procedures and correctly allocated additional funding to local educational agencies (LEA) with schools identified in the fall of 2022 as needing additional support. However, WVDE incorrectly identified for additional support and improvement 12 schools that were not eligible for additional support services. Additionally, WVDE did not always keep records showing that it provided additional support services, such as planning and collaboration, diagnostic and monitoring activities, and technical assistance, to LEAs with schools identified as needing additional support. We made three recommendations to strengthen WVDE’s implementation of selected components of its statewide accountability system.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with Connecticut’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated CSDE’s processes for implementing selected components of Connecticut’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022. We found that CSDE implemented two (student academic achievement and school success indicators and annual meaningful differentiation) of the three selected components of the statewide accountability system and provided additional funding and support services to local educational agencies with identified schools in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan and CSDE’s policies and procedures. However, its implementation of certain aspects of the third selected component (identification of low-performing schools) of the accountability system deviated from the plan. As a result, CSDE did not identify all schools for comprehensive support and improvement that it should have identified in the fall of 2022. Additionally, CSDE did not always identify or correctly identify the student subgroups needing additional targeted support and improvement in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan, which it attributed to a system coding error for additional targeted support and improvement. We recommended that CSDE amend Connecticut’s State plan by updating its procedures for identifying schools for CSI to ensure they align with the procedures in CSDE’s “Using Accountability Results to Guide Improvement” and the definition of a school identified for CSI in the ESEA and provide support to the five Title I schools that should have been identified for CSI. We also recommend that the Department verify that CSDE implemented corrective actions to fix the system coding error to ensure that it correctly identifies student subgroups needing ATSI in the future.