Federal Reports

The OIG substantiated an anonymous allegation that an employee at the VA Regional Office (VARO) in Little Rock, Arkansas, established and decided claims for disability benefits inaccurately. The review team found that 11 of 19 claims and decisions were in error because the employee granted benefits that were not warranted, the required forms were not provided to establish a claim, or both. Furthermore, the employee should only have decided on claims, not established them, in his position as a rating veterans service representative. As a result, the Veterans Benefits Administration made nearly $311,000 in improper payments to beneficiaries. The team did not find that the employee benefited financially from the inaccurate processing. The review team noted that the erroneous decisions might have been prevented if staff had followed the required internal controls to ensure the accuracy of decisions. These controls include second signature reviews, informal quality assessments, and third signature reviews for certain types of decisions. The allegation also mentioned a possible conflict of interest in the employee’s website for his nonprofit organization. The site provided information about the VA disability claims process, and the review team found that it created the appearance of and potential for ethics violations. However, the team determined that the employee did not use the site to assist veterans on claims that he processed. Following the team’s review, the employee resigned from his VA position to work in a different field, thereby reducing the potential for conflict of interest. The OIG recommended that the director of the Little Rock VARO review and correct the employee’s rating decisions. The director should also ensure that the proper authority approves rating decisions that are intended to resolve clear and unmistakable errors, and that rating veterans service representatives cannot establish claims in VA’s electronic system.

The Waynesville (owned), Lake Junaluska (leased), and Clyde (leased) Post Offices are in the Mid-Carolinas District. The Postal Service is required to maintain a safe and healthy environment for both employees and customers in accordance with its internal policies and procedures and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) safety laws. Our objective was to determine if Postal Service management is adhering to building maintenance, safety, and security standards, and employee working condition requirements at post offices.

The Greenfield (owned), Maxwell (leased), and New Palestine (leased) Post Offices are in the Greater Indiana District. The Postal Service is required to maintain a safe and healthy environment for both employees and customers in accordance with its internal policies and procedures and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) safety laws. Our objective was to determine if Postal Service management is adhering to building maintenance, safety, and security standards, and employee working condition requirements at post offices.

For our audit regarding the management of fee payments from AT&T Inc. to the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). Our audit objectives were to determine whether FirstNet’s processes for setting, collecting, and managing fees, and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA’s) processes for reviewing and approving fees, are consistent with legislative and contractual requirements.We found that (I) the NTIA and FirstNet fee review standard operating procedures is incomplete and (II) FirstNet received approximately $830,000 in interagency services without a signed agreement.

For our final audit report on the U.S. Census Bureau’s (the Bureau’s) 2018 End-to-End Census Test, with specific attention paid to the testing of peak operations, our objectives were to determine whether (1) the test included data quality components identified as success criteria in the test plan, (2) the Bureau designed the test to inform the 2020 Census, (3) nonresponse followup (NRFU) systems are included in the test and function as designed, and (4) the Bureau performed non-ID processing and unduplicated responses in a timely manner to reduce the NRFU operation’s workload.We found the following: I. The Bureau has not fully tested some activities designed to ensure the quality of 2020 Census respondent data. II. The Bureau’s reengineered approach to NRFU closeout has not been adequately tested. III. Potentially unqualified field staff completed cases during NRFU. IV. Unresolved NRFU alerts may not help the Bureau maintain or improve the quality of decennial census data.In addition, and noted in an “Other Matters” section of this report, we discuss how (1) NRFU quality assurance lacks segregation of duties and (2) the Bureau must still improve its training for NRFU operation proxy procedures.

As required under the Grants Oversight and New Efficiency (GONE) Act of 2016, Public Law 114-117, we conducted a risk assessment of FEMA’s grant closeout process to determine whether a full audit is warranted in the future. We identified risks in three overarching areas: Unreliable Systems of Record, Lack of Integration in Grant Closeout Policies and Guidance, and Delays in Grant Closeout and Deobligation of Funds. As a result, we may conduct a full audit of FEMA’s grant closeout process at a future date. DHS and FEMA concurred with our risk assessment results. We made no recommendations to FEMA.