Federal Reports

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed key aspects of VA’s spina bifida program in response to congressional and other concerns that eligible individuals may not be receiving the compensation, healthcare, home services, and other benefits to which they are entitled. Monthly payments under this relatively small but critical program (serving more than 1,000 beneficiaries) exceeded $20.8 million in 2019, with medical reimbursements of over $45 million.Spina bifida occurs when a fetus’s spine and spinal cord do not form properly. Children born with spina bifida may receive VA benefits such as monthly payments, home services, and health care if one of their biological parents is a veteran presumed to have been exposed to herbicides during the Vietnam War.The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) determines eligibility for spina bifida benefits and issues monthly payments. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) covers all medically necessary health care.The OIG found VBA staff generally decided spina bifida benefit claims accurately. However, program offices in VBA and VHA did not adequately communicate or share data, contributing to beneficiaries receiving improper payments after their deaths and delays in new beneficiaries being enrolled in health care. Further, individuals with spina bifida and their caretakers did not receive needed information about benefits because VA did not consistently reach out and accurately communicate with them.The OIG made four recommendations related to preventing payments to deceased beneficiaries through better coordination between the Denver VBA regional benefits office and VHA’s Office of Community Care, ensuring all eligible beneficiaries are promptly enrolled in health care, making certain that agents for national call centers consistently provide accurate and comprehensive benefits information, and engaging eligible beneficiaries who are not aware of or using services.

Service standards are the Postal Service’s stated delivery performance goals for each mail class measured in days from point of entry into the mailstream to final destination. These standards are one of the primary operational goals or benchmarks against which the Postal Service measures its performance. The Postal Service defines misrouted or missent mail as mail sent from an originating facility to the wrong destinating facility. For example, mail originating in Albany, NY, that is addressed to Tampa, FL, but is received in San Francisco, CA. Our objective was to determine why there is misrouted mail and its impact on the Postal Service.

In response to Executive Order 13767, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented new tools and technologies that have enhanced Border Patrol’s surveillance capabilities and efficiency along the southwest border. However, these upgrades are incomplete as CBP has deployed only about 28 percent of planned technology solutions, even after receiving more than $700 million in funding for new technology since fiscal year 2017. Consequently, most southwest Border Patrol sectors still rely predominantly on obsolete systems and infrastructure with limited capabilities. CBP faces additional challenges that reduced the effectiveness of its existing technology. Border Patrol officials stated they had inadequate personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology or maintain information technology (IT) systems and infrastructure on site. Further, we identified security vulnerabilities on some CBP servers and workstations not in compliance due to disagreement about the timeline for implementing DHS configuration management requirements. CBP is not well-equipped to assess its technology effectiveness to respond to these deficiencies. Overall, these deficiencies have limited CBP’s ability to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens who may pose threats to national security. Deploying adequate technologies to complement the physical wall and infrastructure will be essential for CBP to ensure effective operational control of the southern border. We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s border technology, enhance situational awareness of the southwest border, and address potential IT security vulnerabilities. CBP concurred with all three recommendations.

What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has historically maintained an excellent safety record. However, two fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019 involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 raised concerns about FAA's oversight and certification of civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States. At the request of Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao and several members of Congress, our office has undertaken a series of reviews related to FAA's certification of the MAX and its safety oversight, including the Agency's oversight of Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA). Our overall audit objective was to determine and evaluate FAA's process for certifying the Boeing 737 MAX series of aircraft. In this report, we focused on assessing (1) the effectiveness of FAA's guidance and processes for managing the certification of the 737 MAX 8 and (2) FAA's oversight of the Boeing ODA.What We FoundWhile FAA and Boeing followed the established certification process for the 737 MAX 8, we identified limitations in FAA's guidance and processes that impacted certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the flight control software identified as contributing to the two accidents. First, FAA's certification guidance does not adequately address integrating new technologies into existing aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete understanding of Boeing's safety assessments performed on MCAS until after the first accident. Communication gaps further hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA's ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA. For example, FAA has not yet implemented a risk-based approach to ODA oversight, and engineers in FAA's Boeing oversight office continue to face challenges in balancing certification and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, the Boeing ODA process and structure do not ensure ODA personnel are adequately independent. While the Agency has taken steps to develop a risk-based oversight model and address concerns of undue pressure at the Boeing ODA, it is not clear that FAA's current oversight structure and processes can effectively identify future high-risk safety concerns at the ODA.Our RecommendationsWe made 14 recommendations to improve the Agency's aircraft certification process and oversight of the Boeing ODA. FAA concurred with all 14 of our recommendations and provided appropriate actions and planned completion dates.