Federal Reports

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) faces limitations detecting and preventing entry of aliens carrying fraudulent documents, increasing the risk that criminals, terrorists, and other national security threat actors may enter the United States.  Although CBP has capabilities to help officers identify fraudulent documents, unclear training requirements and unresolved technology gaps hinder detection, especially at land port of entry vehicle lanes where CBP has not fully implemented facial comparison technology.   We found that CBP officers did not consistently report incidents of aliens using fraudulent documents.  In some cases, officers allowed individuals presenting fraudulent documents to enter into the United States, although aliens who present fraudulent documents are inadmissible and subject to detention and removal. • We reviewed a sample of 60 immigration files and found 28 (47 percent) were missing available information about the use of fraudulent documents, which precludes U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services from having necessary information to properly adjudicate immigration cases. • We reviewed 60 cases where aliens encountered at and between ports of entry were suspected of having fraudulent documents and, although inadmissible, 47 (78 percent) of aliens were allowed to enter the United States. Data Access: CBP denied OIG’s request for direct, read-only access to its BorderStat application and ACADIS training database and administrative website, instead only providing data extracts. 

OIA did not ensure Insular Areas complied with regulations. Single audits were late, and not all Insular Areas submitted FY 2022-2023 reports. 

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) owns and operates more than 16,400 miles of transmission lines to deliver electricity to 10 million people in the Tennessee Valley.  TVA has delivered 99.999 percent reliability since the year 2000 and continued investment in its transmission system helps TVA meet the daily challenge of moving power to where it is needed.  Due to the importance of transmission assets to system reliability and the risk associated with the degradation of transmission assets, we performed an evaluation to determine if Transmission (1) is assessing the condition of its transmission assets and (2) has plans in place to address asset degradation. 

We determined Transmission is assessing the condition of its assets and has plans in place to address asset degradation.  However, according to the fiscal year 2024 Transmission Long-Term Asset Study, TVA faces increased risk to reliability over the next 10 years based on planned spending levels.

Co-CEO of Chinese publicly traded technology company and financial advisor indicted for over $100M securities fraud scheme

Peace Corps OIG conducted an evaluation of Peace Corps/Madagascar’s programs, operations, and activities from October 2021 to May 2024. OIG evaluation activities included: Volunteer and post staff surveys; interviews with staff, Volunteers, and stakeholders; document collection and analysis; and in-person observations and inspections. The evaluators performed on-site work at the post in May 2024, where they closely collaborated with post leadership and staff to learn more about past and present operations. During this review, OIG traveled to Volunteers’ homes and work sites for in-person observations and interviews.  

On April 26, 2024, the Office of Inspector General received a complaint alleging that Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) management at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) approved the transport of a supplemental pilot from Tennessee to RSL-Joint Base Andrews (RSL-Andrews) using a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)-owned aircraft. Additionally, during a subsequent discussion, the complainant also alleged that MSTS did not list the supplemental pilot on the flight manifest.

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding the alleged flight concerns at the RSL.

We substantiated the allegation that MSTS management approved the transport of a supplemental pilot from Tennessee to RSL-Andrews using an NNSA-owned aircraft. An NNSA Nevada Field Office official verbally authorized the flight to address a pilot availability issue. However, we questioned whether the supplemental pilot’s role on the flight was needed. In addition, there were differences in understanding by MSTS aviation personnel about how readiness (availability of assets to rapidly respond to incidents) was tracked in the system. Contributing factors for the issues we identified included the lack of: (1) a documented policy on readiness scores and aircraft availability requirements; (2) documented communication between the Nevada Field Office and MSTS officials; and (3) guidance pertaining to NNSA public aircraft operations.

We also substantiated the allegation that the supplemental pilot was not added to the flight manifest. This occurred because of the lack of a formal written RSL policy to verify personnel on flights.

Improving transparency and access to information helps ensure Government aircraft are used solely for official purposes. Accurate flight manifests are also critical for timely responses in aviation emergencies.  

We have made five recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that NNSA-owned aircraft are used for Government purposes and that manifest information is accurate.