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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Agriculture
Security Over Select USDA Agencies' Networks and Systems FY 2019
Inspector General (OIG) performed an audit of four mission areas within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide an assessment of the management and security of the Department’s information technology (IT) resources as they pertain to access management and logging controls. We reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and industry best practices in order to gain sufficient knowledge to evaluate USDA’s IT security posture.
On May 28, 2020, we initiated a non-audit service to identify U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) funding. Our objective was to identify the funding streams USDA used to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as of May 31, 2020.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) cannot ensure its Entry Reconciliation Program reporting is accurate or complies with requirements. Specifically, CBP did not always validate importers’ self-reported final values of imports when it assessed duties and fees because it did not require importers to substantiate self-reported merchandise values with source documentation. In addition, CBP did not always follow its policies when conducting reviews of reconciliation entries because its Standard Operating Procedures had been implemented differently across all ports of entry. Finally, CBP missed opportunities to collect additional revenue when it did not assess monetary liquidated damages for importers that filed reconciliation entries late or not at all. This occurred because CBP’s controls were insufficient to ensure the ports properly assess liquidated damages for importers who file reconciliations late or not at all. CBP’s actions compromised the integrity of the Entry Reconciliation Program and, as such, may have put approximately $751 million of revenue, in the form of reconciliation refunds, at risk. We made four recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of the program. CBP concurred with three of our four recommendations.