Federal Reports

This audit was performed by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) on behalf of the Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General and examined Jefferson Science Associates, LLC’s (JSA) costs incurred and claimed for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility, under management and operating contract No. DE-AC05-06OR23177.

The audit’s objective was to determine if costs charged were allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and contract terms.

The DCAA performed the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  

The DCAA identified one audit finding and questioned approximately $6.3 million in performance award fees included in the General and Administrative pool. The performance fees represented a contractual incentive paid by the Department and were questioned by the DCAA because JSA included the fee as a cost in the General and Administrative pool. The DCAA reconciled the proposed fee amount to performance evaluation reports, and the Department determined that the contractor was entitled to the earned fee.

If the issue identified by the DCAA are fully addressed, it should help ensure that costs charged to the Department are allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with contract terms. We recommend that the contractor coordinate with the contracting officer to resolve the questioned costs identified in this report.

The Udall Foundation did not adhere to NIST standards, hindering its ability to devise a viable approach for managing its information security risks.

This audit was performed by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) on behalf of the Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General and examined UChicago Argonne, LLC’s costs incurred and claimed for fiscal years 2021 and 2022 at the Argonne National Laboratory, under management and operating contract No. DE-AC02-06CH11357.

The audit’s objective was to determine if costs charged were allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and contract terms.

The DCAA performed the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  

The DCAA identified four audit findings and questioned over $13 million in indirect and direct costs, including $11,487,044 in performance fees. The performance fees represented a contractual incentive paid by the Department and were questioned by the DCAA because UChicago Argonne, LLC included the fee as a cost in the General and Administrative pool. The DCAA reconciled the performance fees to the general ledger, and the Department determined that the contractor was entitled to the earned fee. The DCAA also questioned: (1) $1,176,949 in Board of Governors expenses that were greater than the final approved expenses; (2) $47,183 in executive salaries that were more than the statutory compensation ceiling; and (3) $511,724 of direct laboratory purchase order/subcontract costs with universities because the costs were not incurred specifically for the contract.

If the issues identified by the DCAA are fully addressed, it should help ensure that costs charged to the Department are allowable, allocable, and reasonable in accordance with contract terms. We recommend that the contractor coordinate with the contracting officer to resolve the questioned costs identified in this report.

UChicago Argonne, LLC did not concur with the questioned costs and stated that like all management and operating contractors, it follows longstanding practices and Departmental guidance on performance fees and handles Board of Governors expenses per its contract.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a healthcare inspection at the Richard L. Roudebush VA Medical Center (facility) in Indianapolis, Indiana, to assess allegations and concerns related to the availability of on-call interventional radiology services. In May 2024, VA clarified that fee basis provider duties must be related to direct patient care activities, which prevented VA from paying providers for being on call and available to provide patient care services. In response, the facility halted on-call interventional radiology services, which were later resumed intermittently using facility providers.  

The OIG did not substantiate the allegation that a waiver request should have been submitted prior to the reduction in coverage. However, the OIG substantiated that confusion and deficient communication of intermittent on-call coverage led to a patient being unnecessarily transferred after developing a gastrointestinal bleed, despite services being available at the facility. The resumption of coverage on an intermittent basis was communicated to staff and leaders through emails and daily calls. However, the patient’s intensive care unit (ICU) attending physician and the ICU director were not included in the email communication and did not participate in the daily calls. Further, the ICU fellow who transferred the patient did not consult with the ICU attending physician and the gastroenterology fellow did not document assessing the patient as required. 

The OIG determined that a clinical or institutional disclosure was not conducted, facility leaders did not conduct a comprehensive review of the event to understand staff’s involvement, and quality management staff did not process a related patient safety report in accordance with VHA policy.

The Facility Director concurred with the six recommendations and shared plans and actions taken to address communication, documentation, disclosure, patient safety reporting, mitigation of risks that contributed to the transfer, and rejected patient safety reports. 

Our objective was to assess the Space Weather Follow-On (SWFO) program’s progress in preparing the SWFO-L1 satellite for launch and operations. To meet our objective, we reviewed SWFO-L1 satellite environmental testing, planning for integration onto the launch vehicle as a rideshare, and operational readiness reviews. We also reviewed the extent to which NOAA had policies governing the launch of space weather satellites. Additionally, we compared the program management of risk, cost, and schedule against programmatic plans. We found that the SWFO program made adequate progress in preparing for launch and operations. However, we also found that the SWFO Program Office did not conduct vibration testing using the actual flight separation system, nor did it receive a formal waiver for this deviation from “Test-As-You-Fly” (TAYF) standards. This occurred because NOAA oversight officials, as the mission sponsors, did not provide sufficient oversight to enforce TAYF requirements during vibration testing. As a result, NOAA did not have assurance that the system would not fail during launch and that the government’s interest was adequately protected.