Federal Reports

In January 2023, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that a portion of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Chattanooga Office Complex (COC), which consists of five buildings (Signal Place, Lookout Place, Missionary Ridge (MR), Blue Ridge (BR), and Monteagle Place), was being considered for the site of a new federal courthouse.  In anticipation of a possible move, TVA created a stand-alone project to vacate MR and BR and consolidate (Vacate and Consolidate) into the other three COC buildings.  In March 2024, TVA requested public input on four alternatives identified for the COC as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.  Public input was to inform TVA decision makers about expected environmental consequences related to each alternative.  On February 13, 2025, the TVA Board approved MR and BR for surplus and in July 2025, TVA made the decision to remain in three buildings at the COC.

We determined that TVA’s analysis of the options for the COC could have been improved.  Specifically, (1) TVA did not compare the financial impacts of the four alternatives identified in the National Environmental Policy Act process to determine the best course of action before starting a project, and (2) the economic analysis for the Vacate and Consolidate project was flawed because it did not include all relevant costs and included an inaccurate input that was not reviewed for reasonableness by TVA.  During TVA’s process for evaluating alternatives for the COC, we informed management of our findings.  Subsequently, TVA took interim actions to address the concerns before making a final decision. 

The U.S. AbilityOne Commission Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation in response to an anonymous complaint alleging that a sole source contract was improperly awarded.

OIG contracted an Independent Public Accounting firm to review the Rural Utilities Service’s process for evaluating and prioritizing the level of service provided for its broadband program, as well as how the current mapping software addresses previously identified programming errors.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts minimal secondary inspections on passengers and crew disembarking cruise ships to prevent illicit drugs and contraband from entering the United States.  As a result, CBP may be missing opportunities to interdict these items, which could adversely affect public health and safety. 

We examined two of six pillars identified in the April 2022 DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness aimed at preparing for anticipated increases in migration after the end of Title 42, which prohibited introduction into the United States of certain people from foreign countries traveling from Canada or Mexico, regardless of their countries of origin.  We found that the Department of Homeland Security generally implemented the two pillars we reviewed, which focused on surging resources to the Southwest border and increasing efficiencies for migrant processing.   • DHS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) increased personnel resources through CBP agent and officer details, support from DHS components and Federal partners, contract support, and the DHS Volunteer Force.   • DHS also expanded ground and air transportation capacity through agreements and contracts, and CBP increased its holding capacity through expanded or new soft-sided facilities.   • CBP developed a medical support plan and added contract medical support personnel.  To expedite the movement of aliens out of CBP custody, DHS co-located personnel, tested new technology, and streamlined and digitized alien processing. We found the Department can prepare more efficiently and effectively for future alien surges.  Although DHS and CBP preparations helped CBP generally meet detention standards, during our on-site inspections we found that two sectors experienced overcrowding in single adult male holding rooms.  Although not specified in the DHS plan, CBP did not consistently use the designated system to manage resource requests, which resulted in unfulfilled requests.   Data Access: CBP denied us access to CBP One, Unified Secondary, and e3.  CBP instead provided data extracts, which limited OIG’s ability to perform comprehensive assessments and delayed the review.