Federal Reports

To receive Federal funding for child welfare services, States are required to have a plan for overseeing and coordinating health care services for any child in foster care placement, including medications prescribed for the children. Psychotropic and opioid medications are among those that may be prescribed for children in foster care. Medications can have serious side effects, and ineffective monitoring may increase the risk for inappropriate dosing, frequent medication changes, or the use of inappropriate medication combinations. In recent audits, we found that children's case records did not always contain documentation to support that the required health care services were provided.

We determined that the city of Houston has adequate policies, procedures, and business practices that comply with Federal procurement regulations and FEMA guidelines to expend FEMA grant funds. We found Houston may have inappropriately included the $73.8 million cost of Houston First Corporation’s (Houston First) disaster damages in its damage estimate, even though it was not an eligible applicant for them. We did not examine procurement policies and procedures related to Houston First because the entity was outside the scope of our audit. During the audit, FEMA acknowledged it would reiterate in writing to the City of Houston the importance of proper oversight for all procurements executed by Houston First. This report contains no recommendations.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not demonstrated the acquisition capabilities needed to effectively execute the Analyze/Select Phase of the Wall Acquisition Program. Specifically, CBP did not conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to assess and select the most effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions to obtain operational control of the southern border as directed, but instead relied on prior, outdated border solutions to identify materiel alternatives for meeting its mission requirement. CBP did not use a sound, well-documented methodology to identify and prioritize investments in areas along the border that would best benefit from physical barriers. Additionally, the Department did not complete the required plan to execute the strategy to obtain and maintain control of the southern border, as required by its Comprehensive Southern Border Security Study and Strategy. Without an Analysis of Alternatives, a documented and reliable prioritization process, or a plan, the likelihood that CBP will be able to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the southern border with mission-effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions is diminished. We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s ongoing investments for obtaining operational control of the southern border. DHS concurred with recommendation 2 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 3.

Due to the risk of personnel injury from arc flash hazards at nuclear plants, we performed an evaluation to determine if (1) TVA’s arc flash procedures were being performed as required, (2) required personal protective equipment was available and properly maintained, and (3) required training was completed. We found some requirements of TVA’s arc flash procedures were not being performed. Specifically, (1) arc flash hazard analyses were incomplete, not reflective of current plant operating conditions, and not reviewed timely; (2) identified hazards were not communicated accurately to workers; (3) plants had not adequately evaluated and implemented controls to reduce exposure to high hazard incident energies; and (4) hazards and mitigations were not routinely documented.In addition, we determined arc flash training needs improvement. TVA’s identified population of individuals required to have arc flash training had completed initial training; however, the trainee population was incomplete and not a reliable indicator as to who is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to receive the training. TVA has also not implemented retraining at the frequency required by its procedures. Also, while personal protective equipment was generally available and in good condition, its management could be improved with an inventory listing and preventive maintenance.

The Columbus Processing & Distribution Center is in the Ohio Valley District of the Eastern Area. In fiscal year (FY) 2019, the Postal Service reported 2.1 million late trips nationwide due to contractor failure. From October 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020, the Columbus P&DC had the second highest number (10,948) of originating late trips due to contractor failure for P&DCs. The average time a trip was late was 43 minutes. There were 41 contractors with originating late trips due to contractor failure at the Columbus P&DC. Two contractors accounted for 61 percent of the failures. Our objective was to assess the management of HCR irregularities due to contractor failure at the Columbus P&DC.