Investigative Reports

On December 5, 2021, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) responded to our investigative report titled, Opportunities to improve Controls to Detect and Reduce eVoucher and Ticket Fraud. Our report focused on investigations that involved the use of fraudulent company eVouchers and tickets that were not detected by the company, causing significant financial losses. We identified internal control weaknesses and other vulnerabilities that exacerbated the company’s fraud risk.The company’s response recognized multiple challenges with the eVoucher program, and it subsequently conducted a detailed analysis to identify existing practices that led to the greatest risk and loss to the company. As a result, the company made two improvements in an effort to remedy the issue. First, the company announced that the expiration date of the original eVoucher will be enforced. Previously, when an eVoucher was modified or partially used, the remaining balance was issued as a new eVoucher with a new expiration date. The enhancement ensures that the expiration date of the original eVoucher is applied to any subsequent eVouchers and is valid for one year from the issuance of the original eVoucher. Second, the company is prohibiting any name changes or transfers of an eVoucher and only the named original purchaser of Amtrak travel can use and retain the value of the eVoucher, eliminating potential sales to third parties.

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated aninvestigation on June 3, 2021, at the request of the Office of the Staff Director concerning an incident on June 1, 2021 that involved a potential information systems breach associated with agency-provided employee identification cards. The OIG identified two findings and developed five recommendations to the Commission.

Chanh Van Le, aka Kevin Le, a resident of Chino, California, was sentenced on November 22, 2021, in United States District Court, Central District of California, to eight months in prison, three years’ probation, and was ordered to pay $1,150,000 in joint restitution. Kevin Le previously pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Our investigation found that Kevin Le opened bank accounts for Thu Van Le, a.k.a. Tony Le, a California pharmacist, and allowed Tony Le to deposit funds into the accounts knowing they were proceeds from reimbursements paid by Tricare for medically unnecessary compounded medications. Tony Le was previously sentenced to 70 months in federal prison and ordered to pay $10,982,759 to Tricare and $768,488 to Amtrak’s health care benefit plan. Tony Le’s pharmacy submitted more than $13 million in fraudulent claims for unnecessary compounded medications, of which $929,000 was billed to Amtrak’s health care benefit plans.

We substantiated allegations that an oil and gas company submitted inaccurate royalty reports and claimed improper transportation allowances.

We found that a senior political employee’s communications with a former employer did not comply with paragraph 6 of the Federal ethics pledge.

The OIG’s administrative investigation examined whether the deputy executive director of VA’s Office of Construction and Facilities Management (OCFM), during his tenure as acting executive director, failed to respond appropriately to a 2018 audit by the office’s Quality Assurance Service (QAS). The QAS audit found that an unsubstantiated assertion was used to justify a lease acquisition by OCFM’s Central Region Office. The audit was deemed a “special review,” for which the service lacks a governing policy. Consequently, there was no process to track the audit’s findings and recommendations, unlike routine compliance reviews. The deputy executive director took 11 months to respond to the audit and did so only to OCFM’s executive leadership, leaving some OCFM personnel with an impression that he had ignored it. Although the OIG did not find that the deputy executive director failed to respond to the audit, it determined that OCFM lacks a policy relating to special reviews and made a corresponding recommendation.The OIG also investigated whether the deputy executive director, while the acting executive director, falsely attested to the effectiveness of OCFM’s internal controls. The deputy executive director signed statements of assurance in 2019 per governing requirements, attesting that OCFM’s controls suffered from no material weaknesses. At a February 2020 meeting, he commented on concerns he had with OCFM’s controls and assessment process, which some attendees viewed as an admission of a past false statement. The deputy executive director’s interview responses, his contemporaneous statements, and an informal inquiry by his successor indicated that the February 2020 comments referred merely to nonmaterial weaknesses in OCFM’s controls and assessment process. Thus, the OIG did not substantiate that the deputy executive director made false statements.VA concurred with the OIG’s findings and its recommendation.

We did not substantiate allegations that an oil and gas company manipulated inspections, bypassed safety procedures, and falsified reports.

We reported on allegations of safety violations and mismanagement that pose serious risk of harm to personnel, infrastructure, and the environment.