Federal Reports

Former SEC Contract Specialist falsely claimed Virginia residency while living in and working from 
Florida, collecting higher locality pay for years

Veteran Readiness and Employment (VR&E) is a VBA program that provides job training and other services to rehabilitate veterans who have an employment handicap, which federal law defines as a service connected disability limiting the veteran’s “ability to prepare for, obtain, or retain employment consistent with [their] abilities, aptitudes, and interests.” The goal of VR&E is to help veterans live independently and, as much as possible, help them become employable, find a suitable job, and stay employed.

The OIG audit team reviewed claims processed from April 1, 2023, through September 30, 2023, and found that, although the program manual and staff training generally capture the regulatory requirements for determining eligibility and entitlement, VR&E counselors—staff who conduct comprehensive initial evaluations to make an employment handicap decision and process the claims—did not clearly document their decisions. Sufficient documentation is necessary to ensure consistent and accurate decisions by counselors. The evidence available to the OIG to support claims was insufficient to assess the accuracy of entitlement decisions, resulting in $309.5 million in questioned costs. VR&E’s executive director acknowledged that VR&E has not asked VA’s Office of General Counsel to comprehensively review VR&E processes, meaning the program may not be conforming with all legal requirements.

The OIG recommended that the under secretary for benefits coordinate with VA’s Office of General Counsel to assess and, if necessary, update the eligibility and entitlement decision process to ensure veterans’ eligibility periods are properly verified and entitlement decisions are sufficiently clear. Other recommendations to ensure that only veterans eligible and entitled to VR&E receive these benefits included developing a standard documentation method for deferrals, extensions, and overall eligibility decisions; making sure VR&E staff are appropriately trained; and ensuring VR&E develops a process to monitor eligibility decisions for accuracy. VA concurred with the recommendations.

This report presents the results of our audit of Postal Service Management of Overtime Hours.

Background

The Postal Service designates overtime hours as any workhours an employee has worked in excess of a standard workday and/or workweek. The Postal Service generally categorizes overtime hours as either regular overtime or penalty overtime. Regular overtime is paid at time and a half to eligible employees, while penalty-overtime is paid to eligible employees at double the employee’s hourly rate under specific conditions spelled out in collective bargaining agreements. Facility management is required to manage overtime hours efficiently, as overtime hours represent a significant cost for the organization. During fiscal years (FY) 2021 through 2024, the Postal Service paid $24.3 billion in total overtime costs.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service’s management of overtime hours and assess whether the corrective actions taken in response to prior overtime audits sufficiently addressed the issues identified. For this audit, we analyzed nationwide overtime data and compared actual overtime to planned overtime hours during FY 2021 through FY 2024. We reviewed overtime hours of 20 judgmentally selected facilities and held interviews with headquarters, district/division, and local officials to gain an understanding of the overtime documentation process including unauthorized overtime.

What We Found

Overtime hours have declined from 172.9 million in 2021 to 117.8 million in 2024. Even with this decline, opportunities continue to exist to improve the management of unauthorized overtime in the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS) and further reduce overtime hours. Specifically, facility management did not always properly identify, categorize, and document regular and penalty overtime transactions in TACS by the end of the pay week, as required. Additionally, although total overtime hours declined by more than 30 percent from 2021 to 2024, the Postal Service used 5.7 million overtime hours, or 5 percent more than originally planned, in FY 2024.

OIG conducted an evaluation of the Volunteer Delivery System to assess the challenges Peace Corps has recently faced in recruiting, selecting, and placing Volunteers. To perform this evaluation, OIG reviewed the agency’s strategic planning and performance documents, recruiting and hiring data, and documentation related to various recruiting strategies. OIG also conducted in-person and virtual interviews with headquarters-based and regional recruitment staff. The evaluation also included an overseas staff survey and a review of relevant documentation. The report contains seven recommendations along with a summary of the effectiveness of Peace Corps’ recruitment strategies and approaches.

The objective of our review was to determine whether the U.S. Department of Education (Department) complied with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under appropriations laws. To achieve our objective, we identified the Department’s transfer and reprogramming activities from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025, and the extent to which these activities complied with applicable appropriations laws.  We found that the Department did not fully comply with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under applicable appropriations laws. We identified a total of six transactions, consisting of five transfers and one reprogramming, that occurred from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025. We determined that two of these transactions—one of the transfers and the one reprogramming—were made using authorities granted under applicable appropriations laws. For these two transactions, we found that the transfer was compliant with applicable requirements; the reprogramming was not. Specifically, we found that the Department did not consult or notify Congress of the reprogramming as required by the appropriations laws. The remaining four transfers were appropriately made under other statutory authorities. The Department’s failure to comply with applicable statutory transfer authorities and reprogramming requirements may result in Federal funds not being used as originally intended by Congress, funds being deemed unavailable for obligation, and potential violations of the Antideficiency Act. Additionally, failure to notify Congress of transfers of funds and reprogrammings hinders congressional oversight of how agencies execute their budgets and fulfill their missions. We recommended that the Department establish appropriate controls to ensure that transfers of funds and reprogrammings comply with all applicable statutory authority requirements, including notifications to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 

Our objectives were to determine whether the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (Wisconsin) designed and implemented (1) application processes that adequately assessed nonpublic schools’ eligibility for Emergency Assistance to Nonpublic Schools (EANS)-funded services or assistance and complied with other applicable requirements, and (2) oversight processes to ensure that EANS-funded services or assistance were used for allowable purposes. Although we found Wisconsin’s processes to assess nonpublic schools’ eligibility for EANS-funded services and assistance ensured that funds were obligated within 6 months of receipt and that applications for the EANS programs were generally approved or denied timely in accordance with Federal regulations, we found that Wisconsin allocated ARP EANS funds to nonpublic schools that did not meet program eligibility requirements and did not verify some information that nonpublic schools provided in their applications for EANS funds. Additionally, Wisconsin’s oversight of its contractor’s administration of EANS expenditures and inventory processes could be improved. Specifically, Wisconsin did not effectively monitor its contractor to ensure that expenditures were properly accounted for, supporting documentation was maintained, and assets purchased with EANS funds were tracked. Further, Wisconsin’s processes did not ensure that fees charged to the nonpublic schools’ EANS funds were reasonable and appropriate. However, Wisconsin’s oversight was adequate to ensure that EANS-funded services and assistance were for allowable purposes.  Wisconsin’s improper approval of ineligible nonpublic schools’ applications resulted in providing over $20 million in ARP EANS-funded services and assistance to 184 nonpublic schools. Further, because Wisconsin did not verify certain information in nonpublic schools’ applications, it provided $838,829 for EANS-funded services and assistance to one ineligible school and did not have assurance that all schools that were approved to participate in the programs had a nonprofit status. We made seven recommendations to address the issues we identified in Wisconsin’s administration and oversight of its EANS programs.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether West Virginia Department of Education (WVDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated WVDE’s processes for implementing selected components of West Virginia’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022.  We found that WVDE generally implemented selected components of the statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s State plan and amendments and WVDE’s policies and procedures and correctly allocated additional funding to local educational agencies (LEA) with schools identified in the fall of 2022 as needing additional support. However, WVDE incorrectly identified for additional support and improvement 12 schools that were not eligible for additional support services. Additionally, WVDE did not always keep records showing that it provided additional support services, such as planning and collaboration, diagnostic and monitoring activities, and technical assistance, to LEAs with schools identified as needing additional support. We made three recommendations to strengthen WVDE’s implementation of selected components of its statewide accountability system.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with Connecticut’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated CSDE’s processes for implementing selected components of Connecticut’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022. We found that CSDE implemented two (student academic achievement and school success indicators and annual meaningful differentiation) of the three selected components of the statewide accountability system and provided additional funding and support services to local educational agencies with identified schools in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan and CSDE’s policies and procedures. However, its implementation of certain aspects of the third selected component (identification of low-performing schools) of the accountability system deviated from the plan. As a result, CSDE did not identify all schools for comprehensive support and improvement that it should have identified in the fall of 2022. Additionally, CSDE did not always identify or correctly identify the student subgroups needing additional targeted support and improvement in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan, which it attributed to a system coding error for additional targeted support and improvement. We recommended that CSDE amend Connecticut’s State plan by updating its procedures for identifying schools for CSI to ensure they align with the procedures in CSDE’s “Using Accountability Results to Guide Improvement” and the definition of a school identified for CSI in the ESEA and provide support to the five Title I schools that should have been identified for CSI. We also recommend that the Department verify that CSDE implemented corrective actions to fix the system coding error to ensure that it correctly identifies student subgroups needing ATSI in the future.