Federal Reports

Inspector General’s Assessment of the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission FY2021

We conducted this engagement in coordination with the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) to gain an understanding of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) fraud risk management practices and develop an inventory of fraud risks that HUD had not already identified for the funds appropriated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG) programs.We identified five overall risk factors that contribute to the risk of fraud for the CDBG and ESG CARES Act funds.  We used these risk factors and the results of brainstorming sessions; interviews; and reviews of audit reports, investigations, and press releases to develop a fraud risk map containing 31 fraud schemes that can be used to misappropriate CDBG and ESG CARES Act funds.  We also identified opportunities to improve HUD’s fraud risk management practices, including clarifying roles and responsibilities, performing fraud-specific risk assessments, and raising awareness of fraud and fraud risks.We recommend that the Office of the Chief Financial Officer coordinate with Office of Community Planning and Development program staff to clarify the roles and responsibilities for fraud risk identification, assessment, and mitigation.  We recommend the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development 1) complete program-specific fraud risk assessments and risk profiles for the CDBG and ESG programs, 2) consider OIG’s fraud risk inventory to improve their fraud risk assessments, 3) implement efforts to increase the awareness of fraud at all levels, 4) develop and implement a fraud risk checklist or other instrument to be completed as part of each monitoring review, and 5) develop and implement a fraud analytics strategy using available data.

The OIG was interested in examining the views of career and non-career postal workers — temporary employees who do not receive the same benefits as career employees — regarding the Postal Service as an employer. The OIG analyzed ratings and reviews from current and former postal workers on popular job-related websites, as well as results from official USPS internal surveys and data.Like those of comparable organizations, USPS’s ratings have stayed the same or declined over the past six years. The OIG found that, for example, career employees on Glassdoor rated the Postal Service more favorably than non-career employees did for each of the years between FY 2016 and FY 2021. Among non-career employees, low ratings (1 or 2 stars out of a possible 5) outnumbered high ratings (4 or 5 stars) every year. In addition, non-career employees indicated they were less likely to recommend the Postal Service as an employer compared to career employees for each of the past six fiscal years.

OIG data analytics identified offices with potentially fraudulent Voyager card activity. The Raspeburg, MD, Station had 1,110 Voyager card transactions from October 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021, totaling $68,194. This includes 374 (34 percent) transactions totaling $29,958 that FAMS flagged as high risk.The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Raspeburg Station.