Federal Reports

The Office of Inspector General examined NASA’s management of its historic property, including the processes used to identify, account for, and maintain real and personal property; the extent to which historic property is used to further NASA’s current missions; and the challenges in managing historic property and aging facilities.

We initiated this investigation based on information we received while investigating U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) Secretary Ryan Zinke’s use of noncommercial aircraft for U.S. Government travel. This investigation focused on whether Secretary Zinke abused his position by having his family members travel with him in Government vehicles, whether he asked that his wife, Lolita Zinke, be appointed as a DOI volunteer to legitimize her travel, and whether he requested a Government cell phone for her. We also examined Secretary Zinke’s use of his protective service detail, including during a vacation the Zinkes took to Turkey and Greece in August 2017. In addition, we reviewed his office’s purchase of secretarial challenge coins (small coins bearing an organization’s emblem or logo, given as tokens of recognition or appreciation), and an allegation that a DOI employee resigned because he made her walk his dog while at work.We determined that the DOI Office of the Solicitor’s Division of General Law approved Lolita Zinke and other individuals to ride in Government vehicles with Secretary Zinke. Although this violated a DOI policy prohibiting non-Government employees from riding in Government vehicles, officials we spoke to noted that the Secretary was in a unique position because he was required to use security vehicles and could not use a personal vehicle if he wanted his wife to travel with him. The Zinkes reimbursed costs associated with Lolita Zinke’s travel in DOI vehicles when required.In addition, Lolita Zinke ultimately did not become a volunteer. While Secretary Zinke confirmed that his staff had researched the implications of making her a volunteer, he denied that it was an effort to circumvent the requirement to reimburse the DOI for her travel. We also did not find that he had requested a Government cell phone for her.While we found no prohibition against a security detail protecting Secretary Zinke on his vacation, we learned that the U.S. Park Police had no finalized policy governing the detail’s activities. The detail, which was unarmed, cost the DOI over $25,000. In addition, Secretary Zinke told his detail on one occasion to drive a non-Government employee to the airport, but he was later told that this was not appropriate and it has not happened since. The remaining allegations were unfounded.We provided this report to the Deputy Secretary of the Interior.

We completed an evaluation to determine if the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) has fulfilled its responsibility to assist the oil industry’s preparation for oil spill response. Our evaluation focused on the Oil Spill Preparedness Division (OSPD).We found that while BSEE has made significant progress in its oversight role and has procedures in place to fulfill this responsibility, opportunities to improve exist. We identified issues that impact the effectiveness of the OSPD’s oil spill preparedness efforts. These issues include weaknesses in oil spill exercises, as well as outdated regulations and agreements that hamper response management.We made eight recommendations to help BSEE achieve its oil spill response mission through the OSPD. We also identify four practices that could improve certain functions of the OSPD and possibly other BSEE program areas. BSEE fully concurred with six recommendations and only partially concurred with two recommendations. We consider one recommendation resolved and implemented, and seven recommendations resolved but not implemented.

The OIG investigated allegations that a Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) manager violated Federal procurement laws and regulations by improperly influencing recommendations made by procurement source selection committees and by inflating Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCEs). We also investigated allegations that the manager’s supervisor also improperly influenced the committee’s recommendations and obtained protected source selection information.We found that the BSEE manager and her supervisor mishandled source selection information by altering source selection reports, which are used to prioritize vendor ratings, and by influencing source selection committee members to change their vendor recommendations. In addition, the manager released protected source selection information to BSEE employees not authorized to receive it. We also found that the manager’s supervisor requested and received protected source selection information that he was not authorized to receive. Finally, we found that the manager also directed staff to increase the IGCEs to meet predetermined budgets, which contradicts the objective and independent nature of an IGCE.