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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Tennessee Valley Authority
Semiannual Report – October 1, 2025 – March 31, 2026
We are pleased to present our report for the period October 1, 2025, to March 31, 2026. In this semiannual period, our audit, evaluation, and investigative activities identified more than $41.7 million in questioned costs, recoveries, fees, and savings; and opportunities for Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to improve its programs and operations. In our semiannual report feature, we discuss TVA’s role and challenges in Energizing the Valley’s and America’s Future.
TVA manages one of the nation’s largest public power systems and faces a variety of strategic, operational, and compliance risks as the energy landscape rapidly evolves. As TVA continues to build new generation and integrate new nuclear technologies to increase capacity, it must also keep at the forefront the need to maintain high reliability and keep rates as low as feasible.
The TVA OIG provides independent oversight with the vision to help make TVA better. Through audits, evaluations, and investigations, the OIG identifies vulnerabilities, promotes efficiency, and addresses concerns involving fraud, waste, or misconduct. By delivering objective analysis and actionable recommendations, the OIG supports TVA leadership in making informed decisions, enhancing transparency, and improving operations for the 10 million people of the Tennessee Valley.
This report summarizes the results of our fiscal year 2025 Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) evaluation of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) information security program.
We found SBA’s overall information security program has defined policies but the agency has not consistently implemented them, falling short of the Office of Management and Budget rating for effective security controls. SBA fell below the baseline for effective controls in 9 of the 10 domains. Domains are metrics used to assess the effectiveness of an agency’s information security program. SBA made progress in 1 of the 10 domains, incident response, which was rated as optimized, exceeding the baseline for effective security controls. SBA regressed in three other domains: information security and continuous monitoring, identity and access management, and risk and asset management.
This fiscal year there are 17 new recommendations to improve SBA’s IT security program. Additionally, the agency continues to make progress on implementing 13 open recommendations from 4 prior evaluations. SBA managers agreed and proposed corrective actions that resolved all recommendations.
The CPSC's lack of necessary internal controls over the segregation of duties has created a potential fraud risk by authorizing the budget officer to hold incompatible roles in the appropriation process. Additionally, the OIG determined that CPSC Directive 1230.1, meant to ensure compliance with OMB's A-11 Section 150 and Appendix H, is outdated and noncompliant with OMB’s requirements. Management have indicated that are already taking the corrective action needed to correct these issues.
The CPSC’s lack of adequate controls over its Agency Clearance application has allowed application users inappropriate access to non-public government information without a valid need-to-know. Since the initiation of this assessment, the CPSC has taken steps to strengthen its internal controls over the Agency Clearance application to restrict access of non-public government information to users with a valid need-to-know.
The VA Office of Inspector General reviewed acute inpatient mental health care at the Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Inspectors evaluated care in five areas. The OIG inspection team provided preliminary observations to leaders and later issued seven recommendations. The mental health leadership structure relied on shared responsibilities across multiple managers, which leaders perceived led to improved workload management and coverage. The Mental Health Executive Council did not include required veteran representation, limiting opportunities for veterans to influence the quality of care. The inpatient unit implemented recovery oriented practices. Veterans had daily interdisciplinary programming and access to natural light, a sunroom, and computer kiosks. Staff engaged consistently with veterans, and leaders supported recovery focused approaches. Inspectors identified gaps in clinical care coordination. Staff did not always document veterans’ legal status at admission or discussions about medication risks and benefits. Discharge instructions sometimes used undefined abbreviations or did not explain the purpose of medications, which could hinder veterans’ ability to safely manage their medications.
Staff completed required suicide risk screenings and safety plans before discharge. However, some staff had not completed mandatory suicide prevention training. Required safety inspections on the inpatient unit were completed and a ligature risk was corrected quickly, but a key team member did not attend inspections consistently. Several staff and volunteers also did not complete required training. The recommendations called for veteran participation on the Mental Health Executive Council, improved documentation practices, clearer discharge instructions, completion of required suicide prevention training, and full participation in environmental safety processes. VA leaders concurred with all recommendations and began corrective actions, including strengthening oversight, updating training requirements, improving documentation workflows, adding veteran input to governance, and monitoring compliance through established committees. These efforts are intended to improve the safety, quality, and recovery orientation of inpatient mental health care.
The Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act requires the EPA to prepare and the OIG to audit the accompanying financial statements of the EPA’s Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest System Fund. Our primary objectives were to determine whether the:
Fund’s financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects.
EPA’s internal control over financial reporting was in place.
EPA’s management complied with applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements.
Summary of Findings
We found the fund’s financial statements to be fairly presented and free of material misstatement. We did not identify any matters that we consider to be material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in the fund.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, or FIFRA, as amended by the Food Quality Protection Act, requires the EPA OIG to perform an annual audit of the financial statements for the Pesticides Reregistration and Expedited Processing Fund. Our primary objectives were to determine whether:
The financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects.
The EPA’s internal controls over financial reporting were in place.
The EPA’s management complied with applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements.
Summary of Findings
We found the fund’s financial statements to be fairly presented and free of material misstatement. We noted the following material weakness: The EPA did not appropriately allocate an expense paid to the U.S. General Services Administration for the use of government facilities.
The U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s mission is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation’s mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. According to the Postal Inspection Service mail theft strategy, employees have come under increased attack by criminals seeking to perpetrate financial crimes using stolen mail. In 2023, the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted the U.S. Postal Service’s Response to Mail Theft audit, which discussed the Postal Service’s and Postal Inspection Service’s strategic and technical solutions to address mail theft and combat carrier robberies occurring across the nation.
What We Did
Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service’s and the Postal Inspection Service’s progress on its mail theft strategy, including actions taken in response to our 2023 report. To assess the effectiveness of the agencies’ mail security processes, we also examined controls over arrow keys — often a target in carrier robberies and used to commit mail theft — and collection box security and management at several Postal Service facilities within associated Postal Inspection Service divisions.
What We Found
In response to our 2023 report, the Postal Inspection Service finalized its Mail Theft strategy and developed standard operating procedures to define its Mail Theft Analytics Program. The Postal Service also developed a plan to acquire and deploy enhanced security measures to replace outdated technologies. While we found that these actions improved some policies, operations, and decision making related to mail theft, greater controls are needed to protect the mail and employees. Specifically, we found many of the same deficiencies identified in prior OIG reports regarding arrow key inventory, scanning, safeguarding, and reporting processes, and we identified a need to increase oversight of arrow key accountability training completion. We also found that collection box system data was not always accurate, the condition of collection boxes should be improved, and updated security information was not always shared internally.
Recommendations and Management Comments
We made four recommendations to address the findings and management agreed with recommendations 1, 3, and 4 but disagreed with recommendation 2. Management’s comments and our evaluation are at the end of each finding and recommendation. Regardless of the disagreement with recommendation 2, we consider management’s comments responsive.