Federal Reports

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) transitioning of offices from mandatory to maximum telework during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, based on a request from Representative Gerald Connolly, to review whether HUD was employing best practices and existing guidance when deciding whether or when to require Federal employees to return to their offices. Transitioning an office to maximum telework allowed HUD employees to voluntarily return to an office.We focused our audit on whether HUD complied with its internal Resuming Normal Operations Guide, COVID-19 Response, for Headquarters and Field Offices (Guide) when transitioning offices from mandatory to maximum telework during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, our audit objective was to determine whether the memorandums that HUD’s regional administrators and Assistant Secretary for Administration submitted to the Deputy Secretary, which recommended allowing the voluntary reentry of employees to HUD’s offices (reentry memorandums), sufficiently addressed the criteria in HUD’s Guide regarding the transition to maximum telework.HUD issued its Guide in June 2020 to provide a framework to resume normal operations safely and efficiently, including transitioning offices from mandatory to maximum telework. The Guide detailed gating criteria, data-driven conditions that geographic areas were to satisfy before proceeding to phased openings, and required checklist tasks that were to be met before HUD transitioned offices to maximum telework. However, HUD did not always comply with its Guide when transitioning its offices. Specifically, the reentry memorandums reviewed for seven selected offices that transitioned did not sufficiently address the gating criteria. HUD also did not (1) provide sufficient documentation to support that the gating criteria were met and (2) establish metrics for determining whether the offices met the gating criteria to transition. Further, regional administrators for two offices recommended transitioning the offices, although all tasks required had not been completed. These conditions occurred because HUD did not have sufficient policies and controls to ensure that (1) applicable gating criteria were met in the geographic areas where offices were located and (2) required checklist tasks were sufficiently completed, before transitioning offices. As a result, HUD lacked assurance that its offices were transitioned to maximum telework in accordance with its Guide and in a consistent manner.We recommend that the General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration ensure that future policies and guidance developed to return HUD’s offices to normal operations include the specific criteria, metrics, and defined geographic area to be used by all offices as applicable. We also recommend that the General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration develop and implement sufficient policies and controls to ensure that (1) applicable criteria in any future guidance are met and all safety measures are sufficiently completed before returning HUD’s offices to normal operations and (2) sufficient documentation is maintained to support that the applicable criteria were met.

What We Looked AtIn August and September 2017, three costly hurricanes hit the United States and caused devastation to transportation infrastructure, particularly highways and bridges. The Department of Transportation (DOT) provided emergency aid for infrastructure repairs through the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) emergency relief programs. Due to the size of DOT's investment and the speed required for emergency relief, we initiated this audit. Specifically, we assessed FHWA's controls over the use of its emergency relief funds.What We FoundFHWA does not always deallocate funds that have not been obligated by the end of the fiscal year, as its policy requires. For example, of the $48,022,716 that FHWA allocated to Florida in 2018 and 2019 for hurricane damages, approximately $46 million remained unobligated in March 2020, but had not been deallocated. FHWA's Division Offices also do not always deallocate unobligated quick release funds--funds that are allocated quickly for emergency repairs--as required. We noted that Florida DOT took over 10 months to obligate $13.4 million of $25 million in quick release funds, FHWA officials stated that the Agency is not statutorily required to deallocate these funds. FHWA also did not document required approvals for $48 million in quick release funds, and has not deobligated almost $2 million in unneeded emergency relief funds allocated to Texas DOT. FHWA is required to maintain adequate internal financial management controls. By not following its own policies, the Agency increases the risk that unused quick release funds and unobligated allocations will not be available for other States in need. Furthermore, the Highways ER Manual, last updated in May 2013, does not reflect current practices or align with other Agency policies. Still, despite these oversight weaknesses, we found a low incidence of improper payments in a sample of Highways disbursements.RecommendationsFHWA partially concurred with our recommendation 1, did not concur with our recommendation 2, and concurred with our recommendations 3 through 6.

The USGS reported no safety incidents or violations of applicable guidelines and the USGS followed applicable Federal directives for this study.

The 8(a) Business Development Program helps small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals gain business skills and access to federal contracting opportunities so that they can better compete in the open marketplace. We set out to determine to what extent SBA measures and monitors an 8(a) firm’s progress and ensures 8(a) firms receive the help needed to meet their goals. We also examined whether the program adapted successfully during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic to help firms.We reviewed the business development assistance SBA provided 8(a) program participants from 2011-2020, which included reviewing the files for 40 of the firms assigned to 5 district offices. We also reviewed applicable public laws, regulations, policies, and procedures and interviewed program officials. We found that 15 of the 40 firms we tested did not have approved business plans, making these firms ineligible to receive $93 million in 8(a) awards. We also found SBA did not consistently document that its staff assessed the needs, counseled, or conducted field visits with 8(a) firms to ensure they received the assistance needed to be prepared to compete for contracts without further 8(a) assistance.However, we found SBA program officials offered program flexibilities to all 8(a) participants during the pandemic, adapting business development assistance to help firms stay in business and remain in the program. We made eight recommendations for the agency to measure, monitor, and better deliver training and other business development assistance to 8(a) firms.