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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
The OIG investigated allegations that a company fraudulently altered a purchase order (PO) that the National Park Service (NPS) awarded for the replacement of two fuel pumps at Great Smoky Mountains National Park. The company also allegedly then issued the altered PO to a second company to perform the work.We found that Kentey Fielder, owner of the first company, falsely represented himself to a second company as an NPS employee and emailed that second company two altered POs reflecting the second company as the primary contractor on the NPS fuel pump project. On the basis of these fraudulent POs, the second company then performed the work. The NPS subsequently paid Fielder under the legitimate PO, but Fielder never paid the second company for the equipment or labor it provided.Fielder pleaded guilty to one count in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Wire Fraud, and was subsequently sentenced to 3 years of probation with an additional condition of 8 months of home detention. He was also ordered to pay restitution totaling $12,687.62 and was debarred from participation in Federal procurement and nonprocurement programs.
We audited the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) purchasing card (P-Card) usage to determine if personnel complied with TVA's P-Card policies and procedures. Our audit scope included approximately $79.8 million in transactions occurring from October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2019. Our audit found multiple instances where TVA personnel did not comply with requirements in TVA's P-Card policies and procedures. Specifically, we found (1) some approving officials were not performing their review duties properly, (2) split transactions occurred, (3) disallowed and questionable (nonbusiness expense) transactions occurred, (4) only 25 percent of TVA's cardholders and approving officials completed the required annual P-Card training at least once, (5) periodic audits of P-Card transactions by Supply Chain were not performed, and (6) certain potentially fraudulent transactions by one cardholder had not been identified due to inadequate reviews of the cardholder statements. OIG Investigations subsequently found evidence the cardholder had used the P-Card to make several monthly rental payments to the apartment complex where the cardholder lived. In addition to those areas of noncompliance listed above, we found P-Cards were being used without determining if sources the Supply Chain and Financial Services Standard Programs and Processes rank ahead of the P Card in its hierarchy were available. We made 12 recommendations to TVA management to strengthen controls and help improve compliance with the P-Card policies by (1) implementing additional procedures and monitoring activities and (2) clarifying and updating the policies and related training. TVA management provided actions they plan to take to address each of our recommendations.
San Antonio did not have effective controls to ensure that it reported complete and accurate Clery Act crime statistics. San Antonio had processes for requesting crime statistics from local law enforcement agencies, identifying campus security authorities (CSA), processing and compiling the crime information, and reporting the annual Clery Act crime statistics by the reporting deadline. However, these processes were not effectively designed or consistently performed during the audit period and did not provide reasonable assurance that the reported Clery Act crime statistics would be complete and accurate. Additionally, we found that San Antonio did not follow all applicable Clery Act requirements and guidance, which, if followed, would help support the completeness and accuracy of the reported crime statistics. For example, San Antonio did not properly notify its CSAs of their roles and responsibilities, request crime reports from CSAs, or follow applicable requirements for identifying its Clery Actgeography. San Antonio’s reported Clery Act crime statistics for calendar years 2015–2017 were not complete and accurate. As a result, the statistics did not provide reliable information to current and prospective students, their families, and other members of the campuscommunity for making decisions about personal safety and security.
The Corporation for National and Community Service, Office of Inspector General (CNCS-OIG) presents its Semiannual Report, covering the six-month period of April 1, 2020 - September 30, 2020