Federal Reports

During 2019, there was a surge in Southwest Border crossings between ports of entry, resulting in 851,508 Border Patrol apprehensions and contributing to what senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials described as an “unprecedented border security and humanitarian crisis.” Our unannounced inspections revealed that, under these challenging circumstances, CBP struggled to meet detention standards. Specifically, several Border Patrol stations we visited exceeded their maximum capacity. Although Border Patrol established temporary holding facilities to alleviate overcrowding, it struggled to limit detention to the 72 hours generally permitted, as options for transferring detainees out of CBP custody to long-term facilities were limited. Also, even after deploying medical professionals to more efficiently provide access to medical care, overcrowding made it difficult for the Border Patrol to manage contagious illnesses. Finally, in some locations, Border Patrol did not meet certain standards for detainee care, such as offering children access to telephone calls and safeguarding detainee property. In contrast to Border Patrol, which could not control apprehensions, CBP’s ports of entry could limit detainee access, and generally met applicable detention standards. Supplementing a May 2019 Management Alert recommendation, we made two additional recommendations regarding access of unaccompanied alien children to telephones and proper handling of detainee property. CBP concurred with the recommendations.

EAC OIG issued this advisory to alert EAC's Chairman and Executive Director that EAC did not timely report assistance transactions on USASpending.gov.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) does not effectively coordinate and share best practices to enhance security across the commercial facilities sector. Specifically, CISA does not coordinate within DHS on security assessments to prevent potential overlap, does not always ensure completion of required After Action Reports to share best practices with the commercial facilities sector, and does not adequately inform all commercial facility owners and operators of available DHS resources. This occurred because CISA does not have comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities’ Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). Without such policies and procedures, CISA cannot effectively fulfill its SSA responsibilities and limits its ability to measure the Department’s progress toward accomplishing its sector-specific objectives. CISA may also be missing opportunities to help commercial facility owners and operators identify threats and mitigate risks, leaving the commercial facilities sector vulnerable to terrorist attacks and physical threats that may cause serious damage and loss of life. We made three recommendations to improve CISA’s coordination and outreach to safeguard the commercial facilities sector. CISA concurred with all three recommendations.