Federal Reports

The Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Power Supply Plans (PSPs) combine optimized capacity and generation plans that balance load and power supply and provide detailed dispatch and generation forecasts used in resource decisions, budgeting, and analysis. PSPs incorporate key planning assumptions, including load and commodity forecasts, fleet characteristics, and other inputs, applying least cost planning methodology. TVA’s 2025 Draft Integrated Resource Plan identified the TVA region is experiencing increasing demand for electricity driven by population, employment, and industrial growth, weather trends, and increasing electric vehicle usage. Due to the importance of effective power supply planning to meet future load and energy demand requirements, we performed an evaluation of TVA’s analysis of the reliability of the PSP. The objective of our evaluation was to evaluate TVA’s process for analyzing the reliability of the PSP and taking corrective actions as necessary.

We determined TVA took steps to analyze the reliability of some elements of the PSP and took corrective actions as necessary. While TVA does not have a Standard Program and Process defining analysis of the reliability of the PSP, we found that TVA utilized several procedures and practices to provide governance of its power supply planning process. Additionally, we identified examples of corrective actions TVA had taken to improve the reliability of some aspects of the PSP.

We also found some elements of the PSP process that could impact its reliability. Specifically, we identified (1) significant variance in near-term planned system changes, (2) misalignment of cost assumptions in the modeling and approvals process, (3) some PSP input controls not working as designed, and (4) several Standard Programs and Processes past their review cadence.

Our objective was to assess the company’s management and oversight of this program and to identify any risks to its successful delivery.

We found that the company is in the process of identifying car builders for the first phase of the Long Distance Fleet Replacement Program—intended to replace equipment on 9 of 15 long distance routes. The company plans to use up to $7 billion it received through the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act for this first phase. Early challenges in developing design requirements for the trainsets, however, have delayed the schedule. Moreover, the complexity of the program itself poses an innate risk of cost increases and additional delays. Given the program’s significant size, any such increases or delays could have cascading impacts on the company’s ability to accomplish other major capital projects and maintain its existing long distance service. We also found that although the company has established a management framework to execute the program once it selects a car builder, it has not fully developed contingency plans for the program’s highest risks or established clear lines of authority, resulting in slow decision making.

Because the company is in the process of amending its requirements for the trainsets, we are not making a recommendation in this area but note that any future decisions that would add complexity to this program warrant thoughtful consideration and caution. Regarding the management framework, we recommend the company review and clarify roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for each stage of the program; fill program vacancies; and identify contingencies for its high impact risks.

USDA OIG was asked to respond to questions regarding potential anomalies related to locality pay, including telework situations.

An Amtrak conductor based in Miami, Florida, was terminated from employment on December 13, 2024, following an administrative hearing. Our investigation found that the employee violated company policies by failing to report two domestic violence-related criminal convictions to the company within 72 hours after conviction, as required by company policy. The employee also violated company policy by being dishonest with our agents during his interview.

We assessed Agency compliance with applicable policy requirements and procedures for the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Military Equal Opportunity Program. We issued the results of our evaluation, along with one recommendation, in a final report dated December 13, 2024.

We obtained the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) two nondisclosure policies and two nondisclosure forms applicable to HUD employees. We also obtained 13 nondisclosure agreements between HUD and HUD employees. The nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements did not include the anti-gag provision as required by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012. HUD had not ensured that these nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements included the anti-gag provision as required by law.

When HUD employees are subject to policies, forms, and agreements that do not include the anti-gag provision as required by law, the employees may be discouraged from exercising their legally protected whistleblower rights. In addition, implementing or enforcing nondisclosure policies, forms, or agreements that do not include the anti-gag provision may be a prohibited personnel practice, and the practice may result in disciplinary action or a civil penalty. It may also be a violation of the Antideficiency Act to use congressionally appropriated funds to implement or enforce nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements that do not include the anti-gag provision as required by annual appropriations acts. We did not make a determination on whether violations of the Antideficiency Act took place at HUD because the Office of the Chief Financial Officer is responsible for making such determinations.

HUD program offices followed a decentralized process for implementing and enforcing nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements applicable to HUD employees. However, as part of this decentralized process, the Office of General Counsel and program offices did not ensure that HUD’s nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements included the anti-gag provision as required by WPEA. Based on the nondisclosure agreements we reviewed, HUD did not communicate to its employees the legal requirement to include the anti-gag provision in nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements. Additionally, HUD’s nondisclosure policies did not communicate that HUD employees must include the anti-gag provision in nondisclosure forms and agreements.

WPEA requires agencies that have a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement to post the anti-gag provision on the agency website, accompanied by the list of Executive orders and statutory provisions that are controlling in case of a conflict. On October 15, 2024, in response to our evaluation, HUD posted this information on its website.

We provided HUD with six recommendations to ensure HUD’s compliance with the legal requirement to include the anti-gag provision in its nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements. Because we received and agreed with the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer’s proposed management decision, the status of recommendations 1 and 2 is “resolved-open.” The status of recommendations 3, 4, 5, and 6 will remain “unresolved-open” until we agree to the proposed management decisions from Office of the Chief Financial Officer, OGC, and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae).