Federal Reports

Our objective was to review access and wait times for people seeking assistance from, and problem resolution through, the Social Security Administration's (SSA) field offices.

On March 27, 2020, the President signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), which provided the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) with $756 million to support the needs of DOI programs, bureaus, Indian Country, and the Insular Areas.As part of the CARES Act, the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) received $69 million from the DOI to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to the CARES Act funding appropriated directly to the DOI, the CARES Act’s Education Stabilization Fund required the U.S. Department of Education to set aside $153.75 million for programs operated or funded by the BIE, in consultation with the Secretary of Interior.The CARES Act money will provide much-needed assistance for Indian schools. This report provides a snapshot of the BIE’s funding and planned expenditures.

To receive Federal funding for child welfare services, States are required to have a plan for overseeing and coordinating health care services for any child in foster care placement, including medications prescribed for the children. Psychotropic and opioid medications are among those that may be prescribed for children in foster care. Medications can have serious side effects, and ineffective monitoring may increase the risk for inappropriate dosing, frequent medication changes, or the use of inappropriate medication combinations. In recent audits, we found that children's case records did not always contain documentation to support that the required health care services were provided.

We determined that the city of Houston has adequate policies, procedures, and business practices that comply with Federal procurement regulations and FEMA guidelines to expend FEMA grant funds. We found Houston may have inappropriately included the $73.8 million cost of Houston First Corporation’s (Houston First) disaster damages in its damage estimate, even though it was not an eligible applicant for them. We did not examine procurement policies and procedures related to Houston First because the entity was outside the scope of our audit. During the audit, FEMA acknowledged it would reiterate in writing to the City of Houston the importance of proper oversight for all procurements executed by Houston First. This report contains no recommendations.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has not demonstrated the acquisition capabilities needed to effectively execute the Analyze/Select Phase of the Wall Acquisition Program. Specifically, CBP did not conduct an Analysis of Alternatives to assess and select the most effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions to obtain operational control of the southern border as directed, but instead relied on prior, outdated border solutions to identify materiel alternatives for meeting its mission requirement. CBP did not use a sound, well-documented methodology to identify and prioritize investments in areas along the border that would best benefit from physical barriers. Additionally, the Department did not complete the required plan to execute the strategy to obtain and maintain control of the southern border, as required by its Comprehensive Southern Border Security Study and Strategy. Without an Analysis of Alternatives, a documented and reliable prioritization process, or a plan, the likelihood that CBP will be able to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the southern border with mission-effective, appropriate, and affordable solutions is diminished. We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s ongoing investments for obtaining operational control of the southern border. DHS concurred with recommendation 2 but did not concur with recommendations 1 and 3.