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Federal Reports
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
DOJ Press Release: Bank President’s Arson and Fraud Scheme Goes Up in Smoke
In response to Executive Order 13767, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented new tools and technologies that have enhanced Border Patrol’s surveillance capabilities and efficiency along the southwest border. However, these upgrades are incomplete as CBP has deployed only about 28 percent of planned technology solutions, even after receiving more than $700 million in funding for new technology since fiscal year 2017. Consequently, most southwest Border Patrol sectors still rely predominantly on obsolete systems and infrastructure with limited capabilities. CBP faces additional challenges that reduced the effectiveness of its existing technology. Border Patrol officials stated they had inadequate personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology or maintain information technology (IT) systems and infrastructure on site. Further, we identified security vulnerabilities on some CBP servers and workstations not in compliance due to disagreement about the timeline for implementing DHS configuration management requirements. CBP is not well-equipped to assess its technology effectiveness to respond to these deficiencies. Overall, these deficiencies have limited CBP’s ability to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens who may pose threats to national security. Deploying adequate technologies to complement the physical wall and infrastructure will be essential for CBP to ensure effective operational control of the southern border. We made three recommendations to improve CBP’s border technology, enhance situational awareness of the southwest border, and address potential IT security vulnerabilities. CBP concurred with all three recommendations.
What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has historically maintained an excellent safety record. However, two fatal accidents in 2018 and 2019 involving the Boeing 737 MAX 8 raised concerns about FAA's oversight and certification of civilian aircraft manufactured and operated in the United States. At the request of Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao and several members of Congress, our office has undertaken a series of reviews related to FAA's certification of the MAX and its safety oversight, including the Agency's oversight of Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA). Our overall audit objective was to determine and evaluate FAA's process for certifying the Boeing 737 MAX series of aircraft. In this report, we focused on assessing (1) the effectiveness of FAA's guidance and processes for managing the certification of the 737 MAX 8 and (2) FAA's oversight of the Boeing ODA.What We FoundWhile FAA and Boeing followed the established certification process for the 737 MAX 8, we identified limitations in FAA's guidance and processes that impacted certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the flight control software identified as contributing to the two accidents. First, FAA's certification guidance does not adequately address integrating new technologies into existing aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete understanding of Boeing's safety assessments performed on MCAS until after the first accident. Communication gaps further hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA's ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA. For example, FAA has not yet implemented a risk-based approach to ODA oversight, and engineers in FAA's Boeing oversight office continue to face challenges in balancing certification and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, the Boeing ODA process and structure do not ensure ODA personnel are adequately independent. While the Agency has taken steps to develop a risk-based oversight model and address concerns of undue pressure at the Boeing ODA, it is not clear that FAA's current oversight structure and processes can effectively identify future high-risk safety concerns at the ODA.Our RecommendationsWe made 14 recommendations to improve the Agency's aircraft certification process and oversight of the Boeing ODA. FAA concurred with all 14 of our recommendations and provided appropriate actions and planned completion dates.
Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Ein Dor Museum, Youth United Against Racism Program in West Bank and Gaza, Cooperative Agreement 72029418CA00003, September 28, 2018 to December 31, 2019
Financial Audit of USAID Resources Managed by Deloitte & Touch in Eastern Africa Under Cooperative Agreement AID-OAA-A-15-00030, May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020