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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
U.S. Postal Service
Management of Highway Contract Route Contractor Failures at the Columbus, OH, P&DC
The Columbus Processing & Distribution Center is in the Ohio Valley District of the Eastern Area. In fiscal year (FY) 2019, the Postal Service reported 2.1 million late trips nationwide due to contractor failure. From October 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020, the Columbus P&DC had the second highest number (10,948) of originating late trips due to contractor failure for P&DCs. The average time a trip was late was 43 minutes. There were 41 contractors with originating late trips due to contractor failure at the Columbus P&DC. Two contractors accounted for 61 percent of the failures. Our objective was to assess the management of HCR irregularities due to contractor failure at the Columbus P&DC.
As part of our annual audit plan, we audited costs billed to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) by Trans Ash, Inc. (Trans Ash) for construction support services provided under Contract No. 10059. The contract provided that one or more compensation methods may be utilized to complete the work-cost reimbursable, target cost estimate, or fixed price. Our audit objectives were to determine if (1) costs were billed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract and (2) tasks were issued using the most cost efficient pricing methodology. Our audit scope included about $34.4 million in costs billed to TVA from May 20, 2015, through November 30, 2018. This included $20.9 million for cost reimbursable projects and $13.5 million for fixed price projects.In summary, we determined:Trans Ash overbilled TVA $1,592,128 on cost reimbursable projects, including (1) $1,312,051 in unapproved subcontractor costs, (2) $32,895 in ineligible fees associated with subcontractor costs, (3) $156,403 in labor and related costs, (4) $42,929 resulting from the use of lump sum pricing when the purchase order provided for a cost reimbursable compensation methodology, (5) $42,000 in temporary living costs, and (6) $5,850 in equipment costs.Trans Ash billed TVA for construction equipment rented from TVA's Equipment Support Services (ESS) group using the Trans Ash equipment rental rates included in the contract's rate schedule instead of billing TVA for the equipment rentals as a direct pass through cost, as required by the contract's terms and conditions. However, due to the process used by TVA to bill Trans Ash for ESS equipment rented, we could not determine the cost impact, if any, of Trans Ash billing ESS equipment using the contract's equipment rental rate schedule.The use of fixed price or unit rate payment terms on projects caused TVA to pay at least $1.6 million more than it would have if cost reimbursable payment terms had been used for those projects. Additionally, we determined the unit rate payment terms used by TVA to compensate Trans Ash were not provided for in the contract's terms and conditions.We also noted several opportunities to improve contract administration by TVA. Specifically, we determined TVA paid an additional $137,190 in noncraft labor costs due to conflicting contract language. In addition, we found (1) TVA could not locate any of the exhibits to the contract, (2) Trans Ash did not submit an electronic billing file to the TVA Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the format and frequency provided for in the contract's terms, and (3) the contract's Order of Precedence clause included inconsistent guidance on which documents took precedence in the event of a conflict.(Summary Only)
Afghan National Army: DOD Did Not Conduct Required Oversight or Assess the Performance and Sustainability of the $174 Million ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial System Program
Afghan Ministry of Interior Security Upgrades: Project Was Generally Completed According to Contract Requirements, But Construction and Maintenance Problems Exist
Audit Coverage of Cost Allowability for Sandia Corporation, from October 1, 2015, through April 30, 2017, under the Department of Energy Contract No. DE-AC04-94AL85000
Assessment Report on “Audit Coverage of Cost Allowability for Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC, from October 1, 2014, to September 30, 2017, under the Department of Energy Contract No. DE-EM0001971”
Nutritional marasmus (diagnosis code E41) and unspecified severe protein-calorie malnutrition (diagnosis code E43) are two types of severe malnutrition. Previous OIG audits of severe malnutrition found that hospitals had incorrectly billed Medicare by using severe malnutrition diagnosis codes when they should have used codes for other forms of malnutrition or no malnutrition diagnosis code at all. Diagnosis codes E41 and E43 (severe malnutrition diagnosis codes) are each classified as a type of major complication or comorbidity (MCC). Adding MCCs to a Medicare claim can result in a higher Medicare payment.
The Department complied with IPERA because it met all six compliance requirements. The Department’s improper payment estimate and methodology for the Restart program was generally accurate and complete. However, the Department published improper payments estimates that were unreliable for the Federal Pell Grant (Pell), William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan), and the Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students (Emergency Impact Aid) programs in its FY 2019 Agency Financial Report (AFR). Specifically, the improper payment estimation methodologies the Department developed and the estimates it produced were not accurate, complete, and statistically valid, as described in Finding 1 and Finding 2.