Federal Reports

What We Looked AtUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) serve diverse sectors of the economy and are rapidly growing in number across the Nation. As UAS technology and physical and operational characteristics evolve, opportunities for some systems to evade detection and create challenges for the National Airspace System (NAS) arise. Many UAS are used for legitimate operations; however, the systems can also be used for malicious or disruptive activities by terrorists, criminal organizations, or other lone actors. To respond to these threats, private industry has developed countermeasure or mitigation technologies referred to as counter-UAS (C-UAS). Given the increasing safety and security concerns related to UAS, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation requested that we assess the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) C-UAS coordination efforts. Accordingly, our objectives were to assess (1) FAA's process for coordinating with other Federal agencies authorized to issue guidance and implement the use of C-UAS technologies and (2) strategies undertaken by FAA to ensure that the use of C-UAS technologies by other authorized agencies do not adversely affect aviation and aerospace safety.What We FoundFAA is coordinating with Federal agencies that use UAS detection and C-UAS technologies to ensure there is no impact to the NAS by such use. However, FAA has not conducted a strategic assessment of the UAS detection and C-UAS program to ensure it has the resources needed and agile coordination processes in place to keep pace with increasing demand. Further, because FAA has not yet completed the necessary testing of UAS detection and C-UAS technologies, the Agency cannot fully assess their impact to aviation safety and security, and may not understand those impacts for several years.Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with all three recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its C-UAS coordination and testing programs and provided appropriate actions and completion dates. We consider these recommendations resolved but open, pending completion of planned actions.

We audited the Housing Authority of Plainfield, NJ’s administration of its public housing programs. We selected the Authority based on a risk analysis of public housing agencies in New Jersey that considered the size of the agency, the amount of operating and capital funds received, and previous work conducted by the Office of Inspector General. The objective of the audit was to determine whether the Authority administered its Public Housing Operating Fund and Capital Fund programs in accordance with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Federal, and Authority requirements.The Authority did not always comply with Federal, HUD, State, and Authority requirements when administering its public housing programs. Specifically, the Authority (1) made an unauthorized disposition of property by entering into a long-term rooftop lease and did not properly handle nearly $1.3 million in related proceeds and (2) did not comply with procurement requirements when purchasing $4.1 million in goods and services. These conditions occurred because the Authority did not fully understand its relationship with HUD and requirements for property disposition, related proceeds, and procurement and because it did not have adequate controls in place. As a result, (1) HUD did not have assurance that its interest and investment were adequately protected and that $1.3 million in rooftop lease proceeds was properly accounted for and used for planned, approved purposes, and (2) the Authority paid nearly $2.9 million in unsupported costs and may pay an additional $1.2 million for procurements not adequately performed and documented.We recommend that HUD require the Authority to (1) terminate the current rooftop lease; (2) remedy the reporting and use of proceeds issues related to the nearly $1.3 million in proceeds received under the lease; (3) repay from non-Federal funds any proceeds used for unallowable expenses; (4) obtain HUD approval of any new lease agreement; and (5) implement controls to ensure compliance with requirements for third-party agreements and that disposition proceeds are properly accounted for and used. Further, we recommend that HUD require the Authority to (1) support that nearly $2.9 million paid for goods and services was reasonable in accordance with applicable requirements or repay from non-Federal funds any amount that it cannot support; (2) support that $1.2 million in funds not yet spent on the contracts reviewed, along with any new procurements, would be reasonable or reallocate the funds; (3) ensure that its staff receives training on applicable requirements; and (4) improve its controls to ensure that future procurement actions comply with requirements and that prices paid for goods and services are reasonable.

As of November 1, 2021, the EPA had 93 overdue RTRs or TRs, almost half of which were overdue by more than five years. These reviews are used to establish limits for air toxics emissions and to protect public health.

This report contains information about recommendations from the OIG's audits, evaluations, reviews, and other reports that the OIG had not closed as of the specified date because it had not determined that the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a non-DOJ federal agency had fully implemented them. The list omits information that DOJ determined to be limited official use or classified, and therefore unsuitable for public release.The status of each recommendation was accurate as of the specified date and is subject to change. Specifically, a recommendation identified as not closed as of the specified date may subsequently have been closed.

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Program report provides a focused evaluation of the leadership performance and oversight by Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 6: VA Mid-Atlantic Health Care Network in Durham, North Carolina, covering leadership and organizational risks and key processes associated with promoting quality care. This inspection also focused on COVID-19 Pandemic Readiness and Response; Quality, Safety, and Value; Medical Staff Credentialing; Environment of Care; Mental Health: Suicide Prevention; Care Coordination: Inter-facility Transfers; and Women’s Health: Comprehensive Care.The VISN’s executive leadership team consisted of the acting Network Director, acting Deputy Network Director, acting Chief Medical Officer, and Chief Nursing Officer, who had worked together for about four months. Additional VISN leaders included the Quality Management Officer and acting Human Resources Officer. Selected survey scores related to employees’ satisfaction indicated that leaders were engaged and promoted a culture where employees felt safe bringing forward issues and concerns. Opportunities appeared to exist to improve employee perceptions of servant leadership and reduce feelings of moral distress in the workplace. Patient experience survey scores were lower than VHA averages.The OIG’s review of access metrics and clinical vacancies identified potential organizational risks at selected facilities, with extended average wait times and clinical vacancies in certain specialties. The executive leaders were knowledgeable within their scope of responsibilities about VHA data and factors contributing to poorly performing quality measures; however, opportunities existed to improve their facility-level oversight of quality, safety, and value; care coordination; and high-risk processes.The OIG issued five recommendations for improvement in three areas:(1) Medical Staff Credentialing• Physician credentials review process(2) Environment of Care• Emergency management committee meetings• Annual review of VISN-wide strengths, weaknesses, priorities, and requirements for improvement(3) Women’s Health• Annual site visits• Staff education gap assessments

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed the stewardship and oversight of funds by the Durham VA Health Care System in North Carolina and identified potential cost efficiencies in carrying out medical center functions from October 1, 2020, through March 31, 2021. The healthcare system had 309 inactive obligations totaling $81.7 million. Of these 309 obligations, 200 (totaling over $74 million) had no activity for 181 days or more. In a subsample of 20 obligations, VA staff had not reviewed 17, as required. If inactive obligations are not reviewed, these funds cannot be reobligated and used in that fiscal year to support veterans. The OIG also found that, contrary to VA policy, healthcare system staff used purchase cards instead of contracts for 21 of 40 sampled transactions (53 percent), totaling approximately $328,000. These 21 transactions were missing required supporting documentation to verify that the transactions were approved and payments were accurate, resulting in $308,000 in questioned costs. Furthermore, the purchase card coordinator did not conduct required quarterly audits. The healthcare system had 105 more administrative full time equivalent staff than the expected number, which suggests the potential opportunity to improve efficiency. The healthcare system could improve pharmacy efficiency by narrowing the gap between the facility’s observed drug costs and expected drug costs, bringing the turnover rates closer to the Veterans Health Administration–recommended level, and meeting requirements for noncontrolled drug line audits. The OIG made nine recommendations to the healthcare system director and one recommendation to the director of contracting for Network Contracting Office 6, VA Mid-Atlantic Health Care Network.