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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Justice
Recommendations Issued by the Office of the Inspector General That Were Not Closed as of December 31, 2022
This report contains information about recommendations from the OIG's audits, evaluations, reviews, and other reports that the OIG had not closed as of the specified date because it had not determined that the Department of Justice (DOJ) or a non-DOJ federal agency had fully implemented them. The list omits information that DOJ determined to be limited official use or classified, and therefore unsuitable for public release.The status of each recommendation was accurate as of the specified date and is subject to change. Specifically, a recommendation identified as not closed as of the specified date may subsequently have been closed.
The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a national review to assess elements of the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA’s) Intensive Community Mental Health Recovery programs (ICMHR). ICMHR provides highly intensive community-based care to veterans with serious mental illness. Visit frequency is a measure of ICMHR service intensity. This review examined the visit frequency for ICMHR-enrolled veterans from April 1, 2019, through March 31, 2021. The time frame represents approximately one year prior to and one year after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the OIG evaluated VHA healthcare systems’ contingency planning for veteran medication access during emergencies.The OIG found ICMHR did not meet VHA’s required visit frequency for high-intensity services. ICMHR staff are expected to have, on average, two to three weekly visits with ICMHR-enrolled veterans, typically in the veterans’ communities or homes, to provide high-intensity services. The OIG reviewed ICMHR-related data from VHA, calculated the weekly average number of visits in a veteran’s treatment period, and found that ICMHR did not meet VHA’s required visit frequency for high-intensity services.The OIG also evaluated VHA’s contingency planning for veteran medication access during emergencies. Community-based programs, such as ICMHR, should have program-specific contingency plans for veterans’ medication access, including to long-acting injectable antipsychotic medications, during emergencies. A disruption in medication access could be destabilizing for veterans with serious mental illness. The OIG found the majority of VHA healthcare systems did not have ICMHR-specific contingency plans for veteran medication access.The OIG made three recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health. The recommendations address ICMHR visit frequency and intensity of care provided; the ongoing role of virtual care in the delivery of ICMHR; and ICMHR-specific contingency planning related to medication access during emergencies, with a focus on long-acting injectable antipsychotic medications.
We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) efforts to proactively communicate information related to the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) to homeowners with Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured mortgages. We initiated this work based on a U.S. Government Accountability Office report that identified helping borrowers understand the protections available to them as a key challenge and prior audit and evaluation work that found issues related to communication and COVID-19. Our audit objective was to assess HUD’s communication to homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages through its website, joint website, and other proactive methods about protections, repayment options, loss mitigation options, and responsibilities related to COVID-19.HUD proactively communicated critical information to homeowners during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there are several areas in which HUD could improve its communication. For example, HUD’s COVID-19 Resources for Homeowners webpage did not (1) clearly present the deadline for requesting forbearance, (2) detail loss mitigation options available after forbearance, and (3) include detailed information for homeowners with reverse mortgages. Additionally, letters mailed to homeowners may not have been timely for some and did not discuss loss mitigation. This condition occurred in part because HUD chose to direct certain information to lenders only and relied on them to communicate with borrowers, and because it did not have a strategy for sending letters. As a result, homeowners may not have been aware of available protections and loss mitigation options. If HUD addresses the issues identified, it could better serve homeowners through the end of the COVID-19 pandemic and during future disasters and national emergencies.We recommend that HUD’s Office of Single Family Housing update its COVID-19 Resources for Homeowners webpage to adequately cover key information related to forbearance for forward mortgages, extension periods for reverse mortgages, loss mitigation, and other assistance available. We also recommend that HUD develop a communication strategy detailing how and when it plans to use websites, letters, and other methods to proactively notify homeowners about relief programs, protections, and loss mitigation options during disasters and national emergencies.
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
Report Description
Ever since Congress created the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), SIGTARP has delivered for American taxpayers. As a law enforcement office, SIGTARP has a proven record of identifying and investigating fraud and other crime. SIGTARP investigations have resulted in the recovery of at least $11.3 billion, criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice and others of 469 defendants—321 of them sentenced to prison, including 75 bankers. Our investigations have also resulted in enforcement actions against 25 corporations/entities, including enforcement actions against many of the largest U.S. financial institutions. As an independent watchdog, SIGTARP has consistently identified fraud, waste, abuse, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and risk in EESA programs, and brought transparency to EESA.