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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Labor
ETA's Lack of Key Controls Over the H-2B Application Process Jeopardized Businesses That Depend on H-2B Workers
This report identifies our views of the top management and performance challenges facing Amtrak (the company). Many other inspectors general are legislatively required to produce similar reports focusing on high-risk or high-impact activities and performance issues that affect programs, operations, and the achievement of strategic goals. Those reports have shown that periodically identifying and reporting these challenges to management and other decision-makers can help improve organizational performance. Although we are not legislatively required to report on top management and performance challenges, we do so with the intent of providing similar benefits.In deciding whether to identify an issue as a top management and performance challenge, we considered its significance in relation to the company’s mission and strategic goals; its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse; whether the underlying causes are systemic in nature; and the company’s progress in addressing the challenge. We discussed the challenges we identified with company executives and senior managers to obtain their insights and reviewed industry, government, and legal documents to gain additional perspectives. We also solicited and considered comments from company executives in finalizing this report.
In this audit, we sought to determine whether the Department had effective oversight of the programs provided to charter schools and whether it sufficiently monitored State educational agencies to ensure that (1) procedures and internal controls were in place to identify the causes for charter school closures and for mitigating the risks of future charter school closures, (2) close-out procedures for Federal funds received by a charter school are performed in accordance with Federal law and regulations, (3) assets acquired with Federal funds by a charter school that closes are disposed of in accordance with Federal law and regulations, and (4) student information and records from closed charter schools are protected and maintained in accordance with Federal law and regulations.We found that the Department’s oversight and monitoring of the States was not effective to ensure that the States performed the charter school closure process in accordance with Federal laws and regulations. Specifically, we found that the Title I, Individual with Disabilities Education Act, and Charter School Program offices did not always (1) provide adequate guidance to the States regarding their charterschool closure procedures and (2) sufficiently monitor the States to ensure they had adequate internal control systems regarding charter school closures. This occurred because the Department did not consider charter school closures to be a risk to Federal funds, and, therefore, did notprioritize providing guidance to the States on how to manage the charter school closure process or monitor the States’ charter school closure processes. As a result, the Department lacked assurance that the State educational agencies ensured all applicable Federal requirementsfor the closed charter schools were consistently performed and documented. During follow-up work in September and October 2017, we found the program offices had issued some guidance regarding requirements related to charter school closures and also updated some of their State monitoring procedures. These State monitoring procedures addressed some issues related to monitoring and oversight of closed charter schools, but we did not verify whether the new procedures have been fully implemented.
Our audit objective was to determine whether the Denali Commission has adequate internal control over its travel program to ensure that federal funds are being appropriately managed.
We found that the post’s financial and administrative operations required improvement to comply with agency policies and applicable Federal laws and regulations. Our report contains 15 recommendations directed to the post and headquarters. For the post, our recommendations included that the post store and dispose of medical waste and controlled substances according to policy; that the post strengthen its controls for managing imprest funds and collecting overpayments; and that the post ensure bills of collection are issued in a timely manner.
This evaluation focused on the appropriateness of programming, training, and evaluation; the adequacy of Volunteer support; and the effectiveness of post leadership and management. This report contains 12 recommendations, which, if implemented, should strengthen post operations and correct the deficiencies detailed in the report.
The Office of the Inspector General previously conducted an evaluation of Materials and Transportation Management (M&TM) (Evaluation 2016-15586 issued July 27, 2017) to identify strengths and risks that could affect M&TM’s organizational effectiveness. Our report identified several strengths and risks along with recommendations for addressing those risks. The objective of this follow-up evaluation was to assess management’s actions to address risks included in our initial organizational effectiveness evaluation. In summary, we determined management has taken actions to address most of the risks outlined in our initial organizational effectiveness evaluation, and management actions appear reasonable to address the remaining risks. However, three recommendations remain unresolved, including (1) one manager’s behavior and teamwork at one location, (2) instances where goals were not SMART, and (3) cross functional risks related to business units.