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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
U.S. Agency for International Development
Closeout Audit of the Good Governance Initiative Fund Project in the Republics of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan Managed by Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, Cooperative Agreement AID-176-A-14-00007, January 1 to September 30, 2018
Audit on G4S Risk Management Limited's Incurred and Billed Costs, Local Governance Program in Iraq, Subcontract AID-267-C-11-00006-G4S With Chemonics International, Inc., USAID Prime Contract AID-267-C-11-00006, January 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015
Closeout Fund Accountability Statement Audit of Parents Circle Families Forum Under Narrative for Change Project in West Bank and Gaza, Cooperative Agreement AID-294-A-14-00008, January 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017
Audit of the Fund Accountability Statement of Center for Media Development and Analysis Under Multiple Awards in Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 20, 2016, to December 31, 2017
Financial Audit of USAID Resources Managed by Expanded Church Response in Zambia Under Cooperative Agreement AID-611-A-15-00002, January 1 to December 31, 2018
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is not effectively designating Surge Capacity Force (SCF) volunteers and managing the SCF program during disaster operations. In 2017, FEMA was not prepared to deploy SCF Tier 4 volunteers rapidly and efficiently because FEMA had neither a clear commitment from agencies outside DHS to participate in SCF, nor a roster of volunteers capable of rapidly deploying. FEMA did not adequately measure SCF performance because it did not have mechanisms to collect data and feedback to gauge program success. FEMA did not effectively manage the SCF financial program because it relied heavily on the financial controls of volunteers’ home agencies without guarding against breakdowns in those controls. Finally, FEMA did not close mission assignments promptly because it did not make closing them a priority in what officials described as a series of “overwhelming” catastrophes. We made four recommendations for FEMA to improve designation of SCF volunteers and management of the SCF program. FEMA concurred with three of our four recommendations.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.