Federal Reports

HHS is one of the largest contracting agencies in the Federal Government and in fiscal year 2019 awarded contracts totaling approximately $27 billion, of which $7 billion related to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts. Congress has expressed concerns about and the media has reported on CMS's awarding of contracts for strategic communications services. Separately, OIG had begun preliminary work to review the strategic communications services contracts during CMS Administrator Seema Verma's tenure. Based on this preliminary work, we conducted an audit of these CMS contracts.

THE DEPARTMENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION (SSI) that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520 to protect Sensitive Security Information exempt from public disclosure. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. A redacted version of the report will be posted here on our website when it is available. What We Looked AtThe Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates up to 172 Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, which provide air traffic control services to pilots in the airspace immediately surrounding major airports. Currently, air traffic controllers use the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) to provide critical air traffic services at the 11 largest TRACONs, which handle about 33 percent of all TRACON traffic in the United States. Effective security controls and contingency plans at these 11 facilities are critical to maintaining the safety and security of the National Airspace System. Accordingly, we initiated this audit to (1) assess FAA’s identification and mitigation of security risks in STARS and (2) determine whether FAA’s contingency planning limits the effects caused by the loss of STARS operations at large TRACON facilities during emergencies. What We FoundFAA is identifying STARS’ security risks but is not mitigating vulnerabilities in a timely manner. In March 2019, for example, FAA found vulnerabilities in 53 of 73 STARS security controls but did not meet its own schedule for remediating them. DOT policy requires timely remediation of vulnerabilities to reduce the risk that an attacker could gain unauthorized access to mission-critical systems. In addition, the Agency’s STARS incident response policy does not comply with Federal requirements, and we found security control weaknesses that could make it harder for the Agency to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of STARS. Finally, FAA’s contingency plans for three large TRACONS are not sufficient to maintain continuity of air traffic operations during unplanned outages, as Agency policy requires. Our RecommendationsWe made 11 recommendations and consider recommendations 1–9 and 11 resolved but open pending completion of FAA’s planned actions. In accordance with DOT Order 8000.1C, we have asked the Agency to provide additional information on its planned actions for recommendation 10 within 30 days of the date of this report. 

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection at the VA Southern Nevada Healthcare System in North Las Vegas in response to a referral from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which contained allegations that facility leaders responded inadequately after a patient attacked and later threatened a social worker. The OIG determined that facility managers failed to timely respond after the social worker reported an assault during a home visit and did not address the social worker’s health needs after the assault. The social worker’s supervisor failed to immediately report the incident to community and VA police. The facility’s policies lacked specific guidance regarding employee emotional and mental health injuries. Further, the OIG substantiated that the social worker was not informed by a supervisor of a homicidal threat, occurring subsequent to the assault, until two weeks after facility leaders became aware of the threat. Deficient communication between the supervisor and the Deputy Chief of VA Police resulted in a delay in notification to the social worker as well as a failure to coordinate with the community police who had jurisdictional oversight. Additional issues included a delay in disruptive behavior flag placement, deficiencies in VA police Disruptive Behavior Committee participation, and vacancies and staff turnover in the facility Housing and Urban Development Veterans Affairs Supporting Housing (HUD VASH) program. The OIG made six recommendations related to staff and supervisor awareness and reporting compliance with patient disruptive behavior incidents occurring outside of VA grounds, traumatic injury needs of staff experiencing a work-related emotional or mental health injury, timely notification of threats to targeted staff, placement of patient record flags, VA police participation in the Disruptive Behavior Committee process, and a review of HUD-VASH staffing and training needs.