State & Local Reports

OIG reviewed Chicago Police Department (CPD) reports of Chicago Fire Department (CFD) badges purportedly lost or stolen from January 1, 2015, through June 30, 2020. Overall, 340 CFD members reported their badges stolen or lost to CPD during this period. Approximately, 79.7% of the reports––271 of the total 340––came from retiring CFD members. Approximately, 22.6% of all retiring members who reported their badges stolen or missing to CPD did so within 6 months prior to retirement.This pattern of a large number of badges reported lost or stolen, as CFD members retire, suggests a number of possible causes, including: 1) that CFD members are committing theft of City property (badges), filing false police reports to cover up the theft, and thereby enabling themselves to retain their CFD badges upon retirement (which since 2018 they are able to replace at a cost lower than the cost of purchasing a retirement badge), or 2) that CFD members may be misplacing their badges and not reporting them missing or stolen until it is time to return the badges to CFD at retirement. Both scenarios constitute control and misconduct concerns. Theft of City property and filing false police reports are crimes. Failing to immediately report a missing or stolen CFD badge is a violation of CFD general orders and the City of Chicago Personnel Rules.Failure to properly account for the CFD badges is a control risk concern. CFD badges designate the holder as having official authority conferred by the City. The purpose of the badge ends when the holder leaves CFD or retires. The current retirement process allows individuals to hold onto official CFD badges through false and fraudulent pretenses, permitting former CFD members to retain these indicia of authority even after leaving City service. Further, CFD has no control over what happens to these “lost” or “stolen” badges, including whether the former CFD member gives the badge to another person.

The Department of Internal Auditing (DIA) has conducted the Jobs and Family Services (JFS) Benefits Compliance Review for the period of January 1, 2019 through January 6, 2021. The main objective was to assess progress on management action plans developed in response to findings and recommendations by federal and state audits. Also, that the progress is sufficiently monitored by management and supported by sufficient documented evidence. Audit procedures disclosed no findings or areas of concerns relative to appropriate progress on management action plans by Cuyahoga County Job and Family Services for audit reports received during the audit period. We commend Cuyahoga Job and Family Services for the establishment of and adherence to processes and procedures that ensure effective resolution of audit findings.

This audit examined whether the Green Communities Division ensured that municipalities applying for green community designation met all of the required criteria, submitted their required annual reports, grant funding distributed through DOER’s Green Communities Designation and Grant Program was used for its intended purposes. The audit examined the period of July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2020.

This report provides the results of our evaluation of the Louisiana Workforce Commission’s (LWC) Unemployment Insurance program (State UI) and federally funded COVID-19 pandemic-related unemployment assistance programs (Federal UI). The purpose of this report was to identify potential overpayments or improper unemployment benefit payments LWC made to claimants. Overall, we found that LWC made approximately $2.9 million in payments that potentially violated unemployment benefit program rules outlined in federal and/or state law, including payments to claimants enrolled in multiple programs at the same time, payments higher than the maximum benefit amount, and duplicate payments.

The audit examined the Office of the Commissioner of Probation’s oversight of its electronic monitoring program for probationers and access to juvenile probation records by police. Although the audit found no deficiencies in these systems, it did identify areas where OCP could improve information technology (IT) procedures. The audit examined July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2020.

The Office of the Inspector General is an independent agency that prevents and detects abuse of public funds and promotes transparency in state government. Our audit found the office was conducting cybersecurity awareness training for its staff as required by the state.

The Broward Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has concluded its investigation into an allegation that misconduct occurred in connection with the procurement of holiday lighting and displays for the City of Fort Lauderdale. We substantiated the allegation. The OIG investigation uncovered that, without the city’s knowledge or authorization, CRA Coordinator Thomasina Turner-Diggs agreed in writing on behalf of the city to pay South Florida Lighting Team, LLC, doing business as (d/b/a) Miami Christmas Lights (MCL) $51,450.50 for holiday display lighting services for the city and CRA’s 2016 Light Up Sistrunk event. At the same time, MCL’s sales representative M. Randy Meyerson, who worked on commission, fabricated two higher quotes, purportedly from two competing vendors but in actuality vendors related to MCL, for Ms. Turner-Diggs to use in processing the procurement. He did this with her knowledge, in her presence, and on her office computer. Approximately six weeks later, in an effort to maintain control of the procurement and circumvent the city’s formal, sealed bid process that was triggered when a city purchase was estimated to exceed $25,000.00, Ms. Turner-Diggs directed Mr. Meyerson to split MCL’s quote into two, smaller quotes. She then had the CRA process a requisition for the city to purchase the holiday lighting services from MCL for $22,950.00, submitting one of the broken down quotes in that amount, along with the two fabricated quotes from purportedly competing vendors. Ms. Turner-Diggs’s acts constituted state criminal misconduct in the form of bid tampering, a second degree felony; criminal use of public records, a third-degree felony; and falsifying records, a first degree misdemeanor.