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Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
State & Local Reports
Date Issued
Agency Reviewed/Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Cuyahoga County
Real Property Audit Fiscal Office January 1, 2021- December 31, 2021
Cuyahoga County, Ohio Department of Internal Auditing
Report Description
The Cuyahoga County Department of Internal Auditing (DIA) has conducted an audit of Fiscal Office processes and procedures relating to revenue and receivables of real property taxes for the period of January 1, 2021 – December 31, 2021. The audit’s objective was to assess the adequacy, completeness, and accuracy of the revenue generation process for real property operations from appraisal to collection. To accomplish the audit’s objectives DIA conducted interviews with management and staff regarding the procedures that various departments perform related to the life cycle of real property taxes. The adequacy, completeness, and accuracy of real property was assessed through a review of various Cuyahoga County departments: Appraisal, Real Property, Transfer & Recording, and the Treasury. Audit procedures disclosed internal control weaknesses related to a lack of complete policies and procedures, segregation of duties or supervisor approval, accuracy of agricultural property values, and reconciliation of payment collections. Recommendations made to management included to update policies and procedures, institute processes for Accounts Payable to mail out refund checks for property owners, create documented procedures for how triennial factors are calculated for groups of parcels and how exempt parcels are to be reviewed as part of the sexennial valuation, implement cash collection internal controls such as installation of new cameras and segregation of duties, perform a more in depth review of legal descriptions on property transfer documents, and fulfill current vacancies to mitigate risk from staff shortages.
The objective of our audit was to determine if the department maintained an adequate information technology service management level during the increase in claims processing related to the COVID-19 pandemic. An additional objective was to determine if the selected general controls were working properly to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the applications and data in the claims processing environment. We found that the department provided a sufficient information technology service management level to claimants to meet the increased needs in the unemployment insurance (UI) claims processing environment, and we found no evidence that delays in the processing of initial claims or recertifications were caused by deficiencies in the information technology structure or operations.
The objective whether the Department of Labor (Department) has taken appropriate steps to oversee and manage the Unemployment Insurance system and to comply with selected portions of the New York State Information Security Policy and Standards. Overall, we found deficiencies with the Department's oversight and management of its UI system that ultimately compromised its ability to effectively mitigate risks related to the processing of claims.
This Single Audit identifies federal funds spent by state agencies from July 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021. During this time, many state agencies were drawing down federal stimulus dollars from the Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF). In our audit we discovered millions of questioned costs. Notable findings include that the Mississippi Department of Employment Security saw a 301 percent increase in known overpayments from the previous year and made at least $473 million in improper or fraudulent unemployment payments this year. This included unemployment payments to prisoners and people outside of Mississippi.
Our audit sought to determine if unemployment claims filed I the name of Ulster County employees were handled in accordance with current law and Ulster County policy. Our audit revealed that the Personnel Department properly identified fraudulent unemployment claims and challenged those claims. In addition, the Personnel Department staff appropriately notified the Sheriff’s Department and the Information Systems Department about the potential unemployment insurance fraud. However, it appears that some employees may not have been notified by the Personnel Department that they were the victims of identity theft. The Personnel Department has since changed the process for addressing unemployment claims.
The Broward Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concluded its investigation into several allegations against City of Dania Beach public works department utilities manager Jose Urtecho, including that he was receiving kickbacks from city vendors. The OIG substantiated this allegation and found that Mr. Urtecho committed state ethics misconduct1 when he corruptly used his public position to rig city purchases from certain city vendors and requested and accepted from those vendors special benefits or gifts for himself and his girlfriend. The investigation uncovered Mr. Urtecho’s manipulations in 2018 and 2019 to give city work or payment to vendors who, at Mr. Urtecho’s suggestion and in return for getting city work or payment, provided money and free services to Mr. Urtecho and work for Mr. Urtecho’s girlfriend. To perpetuate his scheme, Mr. Urtecho directed subordinate employees to pay these vendors with their city-issued purchasing cards (p-cards), as the city had suspended and then banned him in 2015 from using his own p-card for violating the city’s purchasing policy. Although we found that Mr. Urtecho’s employees were not aware of his scheme, some of them saw red flags in his procurements but did as they were told because they feared retaliation from him, their manager. Thus, Mr. Urtecho was free to choose vendors that would provide personal benefits to him. The OIG found that, from January 2016 to June 2019, the city paid a total of $429,420.80 to the four vendors discussed in this report.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inquiry into two Chicago Police Department (CPD or the Department) strategies to support members’ mental health and wellbeing, here termed “officer wellness support strategies.”1 The two officer wellness support strategies evaluated here are (1) the Peer Support Program (PSP) and (2) CPD’s reliance on frontline supervisors to monitor their officers’ mental health and refer them to services as needed.Most of CPD’s existing officer wellness programs are run through its Professional Counseling Division (PCD). PCD’s services include the Employee Assistance Program, Traumatic Incident Stress Management (TISM) Program, Alcohol-use and Substance-use Services Program, and PSP. Additionally, the Department charges supervisors with identifying members who may be struggling with their mental health and referring them to professional services as needed, whether within or outside the programs offered through PCD.The objectives of this inquiry were to determine: (1) whether PSP is designed and implemented in accordance with best practices as defined by mental health experts and the policing profession; and (2) whether CPD adequately prepares its supervisors to identify members in need of mental health assistance. OIG opted to review just two of CPD’s officer wellness support strategies because the full universe of officer wellness strategies is too broad to review comprehensively in the space of a single report. Other CPD officer wellness strategies and PCD programs may be topics of future OIG inquiry.At the conclusion of this inquiry, OIG reached two findings:1. Several operational limitations prevent PSP from better meeting officer wellness needs. Specifically, there are deficiencies in recruitment and staffing, training, documentation and record-keeping, internal communications, and cultural competency.2. CPD does not adequately prepare its supervisors to identify members in need of wellness services, and does not ensure that supervisors remain up to date on supervisory responsibilities relating to officer wellness. a. Some supervisors expressed the opinion that they were not fully prepared for their wellness support roles.b. Some supervisors lacked knowledge of key aspects of their wellness support responsibilities.c. CPD has provided supervisors little in-service officer wellness training, and strategies for new directive rollouts have been insufficient to keep supervisors informed of directive changes.