Open Recommendations

We recommend CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office: a. assess the impact that video surveillance system network (patching and scanning) updates have on live feeds and recording capabilities; b. develop and implement a mitigation plan as warranted based on the impacts identified in (a); and c. consider notification options to alert video surveillance system operators of recording gaps.

We recommend the CBP Office of Field Operations Executive Assistant Commissioner, Enterprise Services Executive Assistant Commissioner, and appropriate CBP program offices: a. conduct a program review to identify improvements required for the video surveillance system, equipment, and network infrastructure at land ports of entry and consider alternative solutions when infrastructure cannot be upgraded; and b. establish a risk-based process for upgrading video surveillance system and equipment including factors such as operating environment and limitations at each land port of entry.

We recommend CBP’s OFO Directors of Field Operations collaborate with CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office and relevant program offices to implement a process to ensure: a. continued awareness of and compliance with video surveillance requirements at land ports of entry, such as implementation of a training program for new and existing Centralized Area Video Surveillance System operators; and b. land ports of entry personnel coordinate with CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office and other program offices when upgrading video surveillance equipment or re-purposing rooms.

We recommend CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office, in coordination with other relevant program offices, establish a process requiring feasibility studies to identify network infrastructure needs for new video surveillance system equipment and installations and incorporate these outcomes as warranted.

We recommend the CBP Office of Information and Technology Assistant Commissioner implement a process to ensure video and audio surveillance equipment installed complies with applicable security and privacy controls required by DHS network standards, CBP information security policies, and Centralized Area Video Surveillance System Design Standards for design and operation, as applicable.

We recommend CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office, in collaboration with CBP’s OFO Directors of Field Operations, take immediate action to ensure all land ports of entry have the required privacy protections for hold rooms with lavatory facilities.

We recommend CBP’s Border Security Deployment Program Project Management Office, in collaboration with CBP’s OFO Directors of Field Operations, survey Centralized Area Video Surveillance System operators annually to obtain feedback related to video and audio equipment.

We recommend that CBP’s Office of Field Operations assign responsibility for ensuring STOP Act implementation, including: a. monitoring and resolving advance electronic data quality and quantity issues; b. documenting justifications for advance electronic data waivers; c. providing lists of advance electronic data waivers to International Mail Facilities and implementing routine, alternate screening for mail from countries with advance electronic data waivers; and d. enforcing penalties when the U.S. Postal Service accepts mail without advance electronic data.

We recommend that CBP’s Office of Field Operations establish and implement a process for: a. developing advance electronic data waivers using CBP data to assess a country’s risk eligibility; b. documenting justifications for waiver countries; and c. reporting advance electronic data waivers and justifications to Congress.

We recommend the TSA Assistant Administrator for Policy, Plans, and Engagement, in consultation with interagency partners, such as the Department of Transportation, complete rulemaking that will permanently codify critical cybersecurity requirements for pipelines.

We recommend the TSA Assistant Administrator for Surface Operations develop standard operating procedures and a formal tracking system to ensure consistent tracking and follow-up of the implementation of security directives and eventual regulations.

We recommend the TSA Assistant Administrator for Surface Operations include in TSA’s standard operating procedures developed in response to recommendation 2, a requirement to conduct follow-up inspections that ensure pipeline operators have completed mitigation activities to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Develop and implement DOT's zero trust architecture plan for network traffic that cannot be routed through traditional Trusted-Internet Connections (TIC) access points as required by OMB M-19-26, Update to the TIC Initiative.

In coordination with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), complete the pilot and testing of TIC 3.0 use cases and revise FAA policies to reflect requirements in OMB M-19-26, Update to TIC Initiative.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

This recommendation contains sensitive information that should not be made public. Therefore, we are not including the wording for this recommendation.

Work with the Information Technology organization to rectify the programming error pertaining to Municipal Tax Levies to prevent levy issuance when the CDP notice posts on the same cycle or following cycle of an additional assessment. Additionally, monitor the MTLP programming periodically to inspect for flaws that may be causing erroneous levies and timely rectify them to prevent further taxpayer rights violations.

Monitor the SITLP periodically to determine whether improvements are needed to mitigate taxpayer rights violations and taxpayer burden. If improvements are warranted, corrective actions should be taken promptly.

The DCSE should update the Processing Returns and Accounts of the President and Vice President internal guidelines to accurately reflect the process followed from receipt of a Presidential return through assignment and performance of the mandatory examination.