Open Recommendations

(U) Rec. A.2.a: The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic, in coordination with the Commanding Officer of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 conduct a review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and implement required corrective actions.

(U) Rec. A.2.b: The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic, in coordination with the Commanding Officer of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 Update the "Memorandum of Understanding in Case of Ammunition and Explosives Accountability" to include responsibilities for providing oversight of inventory procedures for Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15.

(U) Rec. B.1: The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain officials responsible for munitions at [Redacted].

(U) Rec. 2: The DoD OIG recommended that the Executive Director of the DoD Explosives Safety Board issue guidance for weapons safety managers to verify, at least quarterly, the net explosive weight totals in munitions storage structures located on installations within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

We recommend that the Executive Assistant Commissioner of CBP’s Office of Field Operations develop and implement a plan to ensure effective oversight and monitoring by assessing the results of the monthly statute of limitations report reviews from the Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures field offices.

We recommend that the Executive Assistant Commissioner of CBP’s Office of Field Operations implement a plan to ensure effective oversight and monitoring by increasing the frequency of oversight surveys of Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures field offices. This includes establishing a plan to follow up with field offices with unsatisfactory survey results in a timely manner.

We recommend the TSA Administrator, in coordination with the Secretary and the Office of Management and Budget, work with Congress and the Department to resolve funding shortfalls or request Congress amend or repeal the requirements identified in our report for which TSA did not receive sufficient funding.

We recommend the TSA Administrator, in coordination with the Secretary and the Office of Management and Budget, work with Congress to amend or repeal the requirements identified in our report that TSA indicated it did not plan to implement.

We recommend the TSA Administrator report to Congress on the requirements identified in our report as not fully implemented based on insufficient evidence where TSA disagreed with our assessment.

Develop and implement a formal process to integrate the results of the STB's business impact analysis (BIA) with its enterprise risk management activities.

Update existing methods of resource allocation to account for system categorization.

Perform a cost benefit analysis of introducing automation to support a centralized view of cybersecurity risks, manage risk designations, maintain privileged accounts, and test system contingency plans; and apply the appropriate risk mitigation strategy.

Develop profiles of expected activities on its networks and systems.

Develop a formal process to collect, analyze, and respond to feedback on the performance of its secure configuration policies and procedures and security awareness and training program.

Develop qualitative and quantitative performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the following: Configuration management plan and change control activities; Data exfiltration and enhanced network defenses; Data breach response plan; Privacy awareness training program; Incident response capability; ISCM policies, strategy, and processes; Incident detection, analysis, handling, and response activities; Information system contingency plans. For all performance measures, ensure that supporting data is obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format.

Resume the assessment of the skills and knowledge of its workforce to tailor its awareness and specialized security training.

Obtain access to the appropriate subject matter experts or training to assist with the implementation of secure configuration settings for its information systems.

Implement the logging requirements outlined within OMB's M-21-31.

Correct the processing or payment errors in our sample that resulted in an overage or arrearage to the beneficiaries or incorrect updates to beneficiary records.

Create uniform guidance or policy, providing comprehensive instructions on how to properly process this cyclical workload, possibly using the different training guides already developed by the Social Security Administration.

Re-evaluate this workload with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to determine whether the current process can be improved based on the changes in technology and CMS capabilities.

In coordination with the Strategic Acquisition Center, submit ratifications for any unauthorized commitments following the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Establish internal controls to help ensure the healthcare system submits national contract requests for waiver and justifications prior to purchasing available product list items from nonmandatory procurement instruments.

In coordination with the Strategic Acquisition Center, submit a ratification for an unauthorized commitment following the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Develop formalized processes for monitoring and achieving efficiency targets and using available pharmacy data to make business decisions.