Open Recommendations

Revise the Unit's MOU with the State Medicaid agency to establish procedures by which the Unit will receive referrals of potential fraud from MCOs

Ensure that costs associated with non-MFCU activities are excluded from the Unit's Federal reimbursement request

IHS should solicit feedback from CCRTs regarding their observations of potential need for broader IHS-wide improvements

IHS should compile the CCRTs' recommendations to individual facilities and share them across all IHS and Tribal facilities.

IHS should assess whether IHS could use the CCRT model to provide support and training to facilities needing assistance with non-COVID-19-related care.

Determine the allowability of $185,339 in ineligible questioned costs on pages 7 and 8 of the audit report and recover any amount that is unallowable.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (a) assign responsibilities to additional personnel for the collection and reporting of Timeliness Data and National Security Metrics and (b) require a secondary level of review prior to submitting the data reported to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, discontinue its practice of awarding noncompetitive contracts for Operations Maintenance Support Services and Baghdad Life Support Services. The bureau should award Mission Iraq-specific task orders under the Diplomatic Platform Support Services contract or use an alternative mechanism to competitively replace the Operations and Maintenance Support Services and Bagdad Life Support Services contracts.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive (OPE), strengthen its review and approval process and oversight of noncompetitive contract actions awarded, based on Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-2, “Unusual and compelling urgency,” related to circumstances permitting other than full and open competition. OPE should put in place controls to ensure those actions are not excessive, such as enforcement of time limitations on the duration of the use of these actions, and use appropriate rationales, which exclude lack of advanced planning. In addition, OPE should provide training, as appropriate, to officials in the review process to ensure…

Implement controls to follow National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance when conducting systems categorizations by:a. Involving the appropriate key stakeholders, including mission owners and the chief information security officer, during the system security categorization process as prescribed in the National Institute for Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60 Volume I,Table 3, Process Roadmap.b. Having responsible parties adhere to all activity steps as outlined in the National Institute for Standards and Technology Process Roadmap, including selecting all application information types applicable to information systems.c. Having responsible parties document the security categorization determinations and decisions within system security plans as provided…

CMS should provide oversight of the 20 MA companies that had a disproportionate share of the risk-adjusted payments from chart reviews and HRAs.

CMS should take additional actions to determine the appropriateness of payments and care for the one MA company that substantially drove risk-adjusted payments from chart reviews and HRAs.

CMS should perform periodic monitoring to identify MA companies that had a disproportionate share of risk-adjusted payments from chart reviews and HRAs.

We recommend CBP’s Component Acquisition Executivereview the Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft and the Medium Lift Helicopterprograms to ensure they comply with all DHS Acquisition Lifecyclerequirements. Specifically, CBP’s Component Acquisition Executive shoulddetermine whether the Acquisition Program Baseline for the Medium LiftHelicopter program reflects revised requirements accurately.

We recommend CBP AMO conduct a postimplementation review of the Medium Lift Helicopter program to determinewhether the deployed system is meeting capability needs, take correctiveactions as appropriate, and apply lessons learned for future acquisitions.

The under secretary for health makes certain that policies and procedures are developed to require VA police, and other VHA staff as appropriate, to conduct searches for all persons who are reported missing on medical center campuses.

The assistant under secretary for health for operations, in consultation with the VA chief security officer, requires VA police chiefs at medical centers to obtain approval from the facility associate director or the medical center director prior to excluding a building or area of the medical center’s campus from regular patrols, and, if the building or area is subject to an enhanced-use lease, confirms with the Office of Enterprise Asset Management and the Office of General Counsel that the exclusion is not in conflict with the terms of the lease.

For all medical centers that have property subject to enhanced-use leases, the assistant under secretary for health for operations, in consultation with the VA chief security officer, requires the medical center director or the director’s designee to meet with the assigned oversight monitor at the Office of Asset Enterprise Management, the designated local site monitor, and a representative of the Office of General Counsel at least annually—or sooner if there is a change of lease terms or facility leadership—to discuss the terms of the enhanced-use leases and the lessee’s and VA’s responsibilities with respect to the leased properties.

Develop specific guidance regarding communication withdetainees regarding their medical conditions and care and ensure facilitiesimplement this guidance.

We recommend the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Ensure all detention facilities that conduct whole-facilitytesting have submitted plans to ICE and that these plans have been approved.

We recommend the Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Recommendation 1: Update the Dams Sector-Specific Plan as required, ensuring alignment with the updated National Infrastructure Protection Plan currently under development.

We recommend the Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Formalize CISA's organizational structure to clarify roles, responsibilities, coordination processes, and reporting procedures across all divisions performing activities relating to CISA's role as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector.

We recommend the Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Establish policies, procedures, and performance metrics to help ensure CISA divisions consistently assess the impact of all programs and activities relating to CISA's role as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector, and that CISA assess their effectiveness in the role of Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector.

We recommend the Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Strengthen coordination with FEMA by establishing Memorandums of Understanding, Interagency Agreements, or other documented strategies to formally define CISA's and FEMA's roles and responsibilities for information sharing and analytical collaboration for grant decision-making related to safety, security, and resilience of dams, as well as the use and applicability of numerical simulation models, flood inundation tools, and supporting geospatial mapping capabilities to support emergency preparedness and incident response.

We recommend the Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Develop and implement a strategy for Dams Sector stakeholders to use the HSIN-CI Dams Portal to its fullest potential. CISA should develop metrics on usage, performance, and training needs; update the HSIN-CI Dams Portal with clear instructions; and encourage sharing of lessons learned, after action reports, and best practices among stakeholders.