Federal Reports

As required under the Grants Oversight and New Efficiency (GONE) Act of 2016, Public Law 114-117, we conducted a risk assessment of FEMA’s grant closeout process to determine whether a full audit is warranted in the future. We identified risks in three overarching areas: Unreliable Systems of Record, Lack of Integration in Grant Closeout Policies and Guidance, and Delays in Grant Closeout and Deobligation of Funds. As a result, we may conduct a full audit of FEMA’s grant closeout process at a future date. DHS and FEMA concurred with our risk assessment results. We made no recommendations to FEMA.

Following Hurricane Maria, FEMA did not maximize the use of advance contracts to address identified capability deficiencies and needs in Puerto Rico. Specifically, we identified 49 of 241 new contracts issued in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria for the same goods or services covered by existing advance contracts. We attributed FEMA’s limited use of advance contracts to its lack of a strategy and documented planning process for ensuring maximum use of advance contracts. Further, FEMA did not maintain contract files in accordance with Federal acquisition regulations and departmental or its own policy. This occurred because FEMA’s Office of the Chief Procurement Officer did not have controls in place to ensure contract personnel follow Federal regulations and departmental or its own internal policy. As a result, FEMA’s ability to hold contractors accountable for deliverables is hindered if contract files are not easily located. We made four recommendations to help FEMA improve its strategy for advance contracts, its process for identifying capability needs and gaps, and its contract file management practices. FEMA concurred with all four recommendations and described corrective actions it plans to take.

In reviewing 16 contract files, we found files that did not have relevant Federal tax information, were missing information on the contractor’s past performance evaluations, and contained incomplete and inconsistent documentation. We attribute these deficiencies to FEMA not providing guidance on procedures for implementing Federal regulations to contracting personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security removing guidance from its acquisition manual that is used by component personnel. As a result of inadequate guidance, FEMA personnel awarded contracts without making fully informed determinations as to whether prospective contractors could meet contract demands. If contractors cannot meet demands, FEMA may have to cancel contracts it has awarded, which has happened in the past and continues. In fact, between March and May 2020, FEMA awarded and canceled at least 22 contracts, valued at $184 million, for crucial supplies in response to the national COVID-19 pandemic. By awarding contracts without ensuring prospective contractors can meet contract demands, FEMA will continue wasting taxpayer dollars and future critical disaster and pandemic assistance will continue to be delayed. We made one recommendation that, when implemented, should help strengthen FEMA’s responsibility determination process. The Department concurred with our recommendation.

We determined that FEMA did not ensure procurements and costs for debris removal operations in Monroe County, Florida, met Federal requirements and FEMA guidelines.  Specifically, FEMA did not adequately review local entities’ procurements for debris removal projects and reimbursed local entities for questionable costs.  These deficiencies were due to weaknesses in FEMA training and its quality assurance process.  As a result, FEMA approved reimbursement to local entities for nearly $25.6 million (more than $23 million in Federal share) for debris removal projects, including contracts that may not have met Federal procurement requirements, and more than $2 million in questionable costs.  Without improvements to FEMA’s training and project review processes, FEMA risks continuing to expose millions of dollars in disaster relief funds to fraud, waste, and abuse.  We made three recommendations with which FEMA officials concurred.  Based on the information FEMA provided, we consider the three recommendations resolved and open.  

The objective was to determine how effectively FEMA supported and coordinated Federal efforts to distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. We determined that FEMA did not have reliable data to inform allocation decisions and ensure accurate adjudication of resource requests, it did not have a process to allocate the limited supply of PPE, and FEMA’s strategic documents did not clearly outline roles and responsibilities to lead the Federal response. We made three recommendations that FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC, formally document the policies and procedures for allocating critical lifesaving supplies and equipment, and that FEMA work with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to clarify the agencies’ pandemic response roles and responsibilities under Stafford Act declarations. FEMA concurred with all three recommendations which remain open and resolved.

The objective was to determine the extent to which the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) met the goals set forth in Section 428 of the Stafford Act and did so in accordance with legislation and FEMA guidelines since the alternate procedures were made available in 2013.

Following the January 13, 2018, false missile alert in Hawaii, Congress requested we examine the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) role in the incident. We concluded that FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending and canceling of state and local alerts. Following the Hawaii false missile alert, three U.S. Senators proposed legislation to define the federal government’s role during false missile alerts, as well as to direct FEMA to recommend best practices in the alerting process. We also identified two areas of concern regarding FEMA’s overall oversight of IPAWS. Although FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform, state and local alerting authorities must obtain commercially-available emergency alert software to generate a message which passes through IPAWS for authentication and delivery. However, we found that FEMA does not require that this software perform functions critical to the alerting process, such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead, FEMA only recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as “best practices.”

We determined that FEMA is unable to assess flood hazard miles to meet its program goal and is not ensuring mapping partner quality reviews are completed in accordance with applicable guidance. FEMA needs to improve its management and oversight of flood mapping projects to achieve or reassess its program goals and ensure the production of accurate and timely flood maps. We made four recommendations that would help FEMA strengthen its management and oversight of flood mapping projects to achieve program goals. FEMA concurred with all four recommendations.

We found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) overpaid its employees because it mistakenly believed the Department’s payroll provider had an automated control to prevent payments over the annual cap, and because it did not follow its own premium pay policy. We also found that FEMA has no effective policy or practice to determine the Fair Labor Standards Act status of FEMA employees during disaster deployments, which also contributed to this issue. Since discovering the overpayments, FEMA has been working to calculate how many people were overpaid, but it cannot finish that analysis until it addresses a number of outstanding questions.