An official website of the United States government
Here's how you know
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock (
) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.
Brought to you by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Federal Reports
Report Date
Agency Reviewed / Investigated
Report Title
Type
Location
Department of Defense
Audit of Entitlements for Activated Army National Guard and Air National Guard Members Supporting the Coronavirus Disease–2019 Mission
The Individual Tax Processing Engine Project’s Estimation Methodology Aligns with Best Practices and the Project Addressed the Independent Verification and Validation Recommendations
Independent Auditor’s Biennial Report on the Audit of Expenditures and Obligations Used by the Secretary of the Interior in the Administration of the Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Programs Improvement Act of 2000 for Fiscal Years 2019 Through 2020
The State of Florida Administered Its Housing Repair and Replacement Program Effectively but Not Always in a Cost-Efficient and Prudent Manner for the Projects and Activity Delivery Costs Reviewed
We audited the State of Florida’s Housing Repair and Replacement Program (HRRP), one of the programs that the State developed to address its unmet disaster recovery housing needs because of Hurricane Irma in 2017. We audited this program due to the large amount of Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funding allocated of $346.2 million. Our audit objective was to determine whether the State administered its 2017 CDBG-DR funds for its HRRP effectively and efficiently. Specifically, we focused on determining whether the State (1) effectively used funds for eligible homeowners and properties, (2) effectively ensured that homeowners did not receive duplication of benefits, and (3) administered this housing program in a cost-efficient and prudent manner.The State administered its HRRP effectively for the seven projects reviewed by ensuring that funds were used for eligible homeowners and properties and duplication of benefits did not occur. However, the State did not have cost reasonableness analyses for the overhead and profit amounts paid to contractors totaling $107,036 and allowed percentages up to 65 percent of the contract price. The State also misclassified $134,383 in activity delivery costs that were not eligible to be classified to the HRRP activity. These deficiencies occurred because the State did not have adequate policies and procedures to ensure the cost reasonableness of overhead and profit and proper classification of expenditures. As a result, the State could not provide assurance that disaster recovery grant funds were used in a cost-efficient and prudent manner and funds were properly classified in the reporting system for the projects and activity delivery costs reviewed.We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary require the State to (1) support or reimburse its HRRP for $107,036 in overhead and profit expenditures from non-Federal funds, review the remaining contracts executed under similar circumstances, and support or reimburse overhead and profit expenditures; (2) update policies and procedures to ensure that cost reasonableness analyses are performed on overhead and profit percentages charged by contractors for future contracts; (3) develop and implement procedures to carry out recent changes made to the State’s policy manual; and (4) train staff to ensure the proper classification of expenditures.
We contracted with Williams, Adley & Company-DC, LLC, an independent certified public accounting firm (CPA firm), to audit the financial statements of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2021. In the Independent Auditors' Report, the CPA firm concluded that the NEA’s financial statements were fairly presented in all material respects and thereby issued an unmodified opinion on those statements. In the Report on Internal Control, the CPA firm did not identify any material weaknesses. In the Report on Compliance, the CPA firm concluded that there were no instances of noncompliance for fiscal year 2021 that would be reportable under U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards.
Without documented procedures governing software management and vulnerability remediation processes, the EPA continues to be at risk of outsiders gaining access to compromise and exploit Agency systems and data.
What We Looked AtUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) serve diverse sectors of the economy and are rapidly growing in number across the Nation. As UAS technology and physical and operational characteristics evolve, opportunities for some systems to evade detection and create challenges for the National Airspace System (NAS) arise. Many UAS are used for legitimate operations; however, the systems can also be used for malicious or disruptive activities by terrorists, criminal organizations, or other lone actors. To respond to these threats, private industry has developed countermeasure or mitigation technologies referred to as counter-UAS (C-UAS). Given the increasing safety and security concerns related to UAS, the Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation requested that we assess the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) C-UAS coordination efforts. Accordingly, our objectives were to assess (1) FAA's process for coordinating with other Federal agencies authorized to issue guidance and implement the use of C-UAS technologies and (2) strategies undertaken by FAA to ensure that the use of C-UAS technologies by other authorized agencies do not adversely affect aviation and aerospace safety.What We FoundFAA is coordinating with Federal agencies that use UAS detection and C-UAS technologies to ensure there is no impact to the NAS by such use. However, FAA has not conducted a strategic assessment of the UAS detection and C-UAS program to ensure it has the resources needed and agile coordination processes in place to keep pace with increasing demand. Further, because FAA has not yet completed the necessary testing of UAS detection and C-UAS technologies, the Agency cannot fully assess their impact to aviation safety and security, and may not understand those impacts for several years.Our RecommendationsFAA concurred with all three recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its C-UAS coordination and testing programs and provided appropriate actions and completion dates. We consider these recommendations resolved but open, pending completion of planned actions.