Federal Reports

We conducted a performance audit of National Endowment for the Arts (Arts Endowment) awards issued to the Massachusetts Cultural Council (Council). Based on our review, we determined the Council generally met the financial and compliance requirements set forth in the award documents. However, the Council did not fully comply with Federal grants management requirements. For instance, the Council: did not report actual costs on one of three Federal Financial Reports (FFR); did not follow its FFR reporting policy; included unsupported costs and costs incurred outside the award period on all three FFRs; included unallowable fundraising, foreign travel, and entertainment costs on two of three FFRs; included unallowable sub-awards on two of three FFRs; did not follow Federal Financial Accountability and Transparency Act reporting requirements; and did not provide the required notification to all its Federal award participants; and did not submit its FFR and FDR reports by the reporting deadlines. Thus, we are questioning $3,014,242 in unsupported and unallowable costs, with a potential refund of $60,000 due to the Arts Endowment. There are 16 recommendations to address the findings, ten to the Council and six to the Arts Endowment.

This report was submitted to the Comptroller General in accordance with Section 5 of the Government Accountability Office Act of 2008. The report summarizes the activities of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the six-month reporting period ending March 31, 2021. During the reporting period, the OIG issued one audit report and began three performance audits. In addition, the OIG closed four investigations and two self-initiated inquiries, and opened seven new investigations. The OIG processed 46 hotline complaints, many of which were referred to other OIGs for action because the matters involved were within their jurisdictions. The OIG remained active in the GAO and OIG communities by briefing new GAO employees on its audit and investigative missions, and participating in committees and working groups of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including those related to the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee. Details of these activities and other accomplishments are provided in the report.

Improved EPA oversight could ensure that state NPDES programs are protecting human health and the environment.

The EPA’s actions in the final SAFE Vehicles Rule undercut the rule’s quality.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of the Johnsonville Combustion Turbine (JCT) organization to identify factors that could impact JCT’s organizational effectiveness. During the course of our evaluation, we identified behaviors that had a positive impact on JCT. These included leadership actions and positive relationships with team members. However, we also identified minimal risks to operations that, if unaddressed, could hinder JCT’s effectiveness. These were related to resource needs, such as specific training and budgetary needs for plant maintenance.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) opened this review in March 2019 after receiving a congressional request to examine alleged delays in the disbursement of approximately $20 billion of disaster recovery and mitigation funds appropriated for Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Our review examined the decisions and actions of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD or Department) officials that affected the timing of HUD’s release of three tranches of funds intended to address Puerto Rico’s unmet needs for repairs and mitigation efforts. We examined (1) the effect that the government shutdown during late 2018 to early 2019 had on the release of these funds; (2) HUD’s decision-making process for making the second and third tranches of funding available to the Puerto Rico grantee; and (3) whether former HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Patenaude resigned because of undue influence related to HUD’s administration of Puerto Rico disaster-recovery funds. Our examination of HUD officials’ decision-making in this review included inquiry into their interactions with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and White House officials regarding the execution of HUD’s disaster-recovery programs. Our role in this review was not to opine on the appropriateness of any OMB or White House officials’ actions, as our oversight authority does not extend to their conduct, but we assessed the extent to which OMB or White House officials directed or influenced HUD officials’ actions.