Federal Reports

This report presents the results of our audit of U.S. Postal Service’s financial controls and safeguarding assets at selected retail units.

The Postal Service operates approximately 31,000 retail units that provide services to customers nationwide. Retail unit employees are required to adhere to policies and procedures regarding financial reporting and the safeguarding of assets. All retail units must report their financial activity to Accounting Services daily, and retail unit management is responsible for the security of accountable items. Controls over these processes are essential for ensuring financial information is reliable and assets are protected. During a prior audit, we identified potential security matters and financial control issues at selected retail locations. As a result, we visited 10 additional retail units to determine compliance with policies and procedures and whether issues were remediated.

What We Did

Our objective was to determine compliance with policies and procedures regarding financial controls and safeguarding assets at selected Postal Service retail units. Specifically, we interviewed Postal Service management and retail associates, observed the safeguarding of assets, reviewed Postal Service (PS) Form 1412 supporting documentation, and inventoried arrow keys present at the retail units.

This review examines whether medical facilities in VISN 12 (the VA Great Lakes Health Care System covering parts of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin) correctly identified veterans eligible for community care, informed them of their care options, and delivered timely care.

The OIG found that during the first quarter of fiscal year 2024, VISN 12 did not consistently offer veterans required information about care options for direct VA or community care. Schedulers also did not always accurately determine a veteran’s eligibility for community care, inform veterans of their eligibility, or correctly process requests for care and appointments. These deficiencies occurred primarily because schedulers lacked the means to identify all available appointments within or outside VISN 12. Another factor was uneven VHA guidance, requiring schedulers to check all eligibility criteria for new patients but only wait times for established patients.

VISN 12 did not reliably provide timely care to veterans during the review period. From scheduling to appointment took on average 44 days for community care (the goal is 30 days) and 35 days for care within VA (with goals of 20 or 28 days depending on the type of care). VISN 12 also had about 250 consults, including both types of care, that had not been completed for a year. These delays risked some veterans not receiving care when needed.

The VISN 12 director concurred with the OIG’s four recommendations to improve the community care program. The OIG is also conducting two national follow-up reviews: the first examines how VISNs determine eligibility and inform veterans of care options and the second compares the timeliness of care received at VA with community care. Because these national audits will include recommendations beyond VISN 12, no national recommendations related to these concerns are offered in this report.

Improved Documentation and Guidance Can Help Strengthen Corporation Finance’s Disclosure Review Program, Report No. 586

The OIG found that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively uses operating experience (OpE) information to inspect Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) at operating nuclear power plants. However, the agency could strengthen the Reactor OpE Program by updating guidance and assessing the program, and ensuring the EDG Technical Review Group (TRG) members know their roles and responsibilities.
Currently, the guidance provided in Office Instruction LIC-401, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Reactor Operating Experience, and NRR’s Operating Experience Staff Handbook is outdated. In addition, the NRC does not have an assessment process for the Reactor OpE Program. Assessing the Reactor OpE Program periodically could help staff and management determine whether the program meets its objectives and staff are using relevant guidance to process OpE information. Moreover, the NRC lacks policies and procedures for the EDG TRGs, which may lead to inconsistent practices, reduced productivity, and missed opportunities to disposition EDG-related OpE information.
The OIG makes seven recommendations to strengthen the Reactor Operating Experience Program implementation process.

The Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) provides debt financing in the form of loans and loan guarantees to support innovative clean energy, advanced transportation, and tribal energy projects in the United States. To help carry out its mission, the LPO utilizes contractors and third-party advisors to assist with loan application processing, which increases the risk for conflicts of interest.

Given the LPO’s reliance on contractors and third-party advisors, we initiated this audit to determine whether the LPO had an
effective framework in place for managing conflicts of interest for contractors providing support and advisory services to its Office.

We found that the LPO did not have an effective framework in place for managing conflicts of interest for contractors providing support to the LPO. Specifically, the LPO was not aware of all the relationships that could cause conflicts of interest. We also found that the LPO did not ensure adequate management of conflict of interest disclosures and waiver requests, and did not ensure its prime contractor fully implemented key aspects of its strategy for managing potential conflicts of interest.

These issues occurred because the LPO did not have controls in place to identify and manage conflicts of interest. Specifically, the LPO had not developed and implemented a formal, centralized tracking system or policies and procedures for managing conflicts of interest. Additionally, the LPO relied upon third-party advisors and other contractors to self-identify conflicts of interest and did not ensure adequate oversight of its prime contractor.

To address the issues identified in this report, we have made two recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that decisions about awarding and managing loans and loan guarantees are in the Government’s and the public’s best interest.

This report presents the results of our audit of Cardboard Mail Transport Equipment Recycling Program. 

The U.S. Postal Service uses significant quantities of cardboard mail transport equipment (MTE) for transportation of mail and packages. In its Delivering for America 2.0 strategic plan, the Postal Service aims to divert 75 percent of waste from landfills by fiscal year (FY) 2030. In FY 2024, the Postal Service diverted 66 percent of its total waste from landfills, with cardboard waste accounting for 31 percent of this diversion. This initiative helped the Postal Service avoid over $10.8 million in costs related to cardboard MTE trash services. Despite incurred costs of approximately $11.8 million, they generated about $6.5 million in revenue from recycled materials, yielding net savings of $5.5 million. Efficient recycling and reuse practices for materials such as cardboard MTE, reduce waste and support the Postal Service’s sustainability target.
 

Our objective was to assess the efficiency of the Postal Service’s purchasing and recycling of cardboard MTE. We conducted observations at 11 mail processing facilities and interviewed facility management. We also reviewed contracts and data for purchasing and recycling of cardboard MTE from FY 2022 through FY 2024.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to evaluate and obtain critical technology needed to identify, assess, breach, and remediate cross-border tunnels and has made progress in its efforts since our 2021 audit on border technology.   The Department of Homeland Security in January 2020 and January 2024 approved testing by the Cross-Border Tunnel Threat program of two critical tunnel detection technologies to evaluate whether they are functional and viable solutions.  At the time of this audit, these technologies were being tested for effectiveness in operational conditions and eventual vendor selection.   Based on CBP’s progress, it was too early for us to audit the effectiveness of these technologies and therefore we made no recommendations.  We note, however, that once CBP selects its tunnel detection technology solutions, the program’s success will require adequate program resources and effective coordination between CBP offices.