Department of Homeland Security

The U.S. Border Patrol within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) followed its screening procedures to prevent migrants with serious criminal backgrounds or individuals on the terrorist watch list from entering the United States. We determined that Border Patrol agents conducted required record...

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided approximately $49.3 million of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic relief funds to Springfield, MA; Coeur D’Alene, ID; Sheridan County, NE; Marion County, GA; White Earth Nation in Minnesota; and Jicarilla Apache Nation in New Mexico.

Department of Homeland Security component collaboration on law enforcement virtual training simulators is limited. Specifically, components are not always aware of other DHS components’ research, purchases, capabilities, or availability of law enforcement virtual training simulators.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must improve its oversight of the National Board’s (Board) administration of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP) to ensure individuals receive aid in a timely manner and that program funding is used in accordance with Federal requirements.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) co-manage the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) program but do not monitor and maintain RPM systems to ensure they continue to meet needed capabilities.

Our objective was to determine how four Border patrol sectors on the Southwest border determine post-apprehension outcomes for noncitizens encountered between ports of entry.

We determined DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and inspect all Afghan evacuees arriving as part of OAR/OAW. Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not always have critical data to properly screen, vet, or inspect Afghan evacuees. We determined some information used to...

We determined that CISA and FEMA could better ensure program efforts are mutually reinforcing; they did not have compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across component boundaries; and CISA did not regularly update and monitor written agreements with Energy Sector partners...

We determined that USCIS did not apply the IT access controls needed to restrict unnecessary access to its systems, networks, and information. Specifically, USCIS did not consistently manage access for personnel, service accounts, and privileged users. We attribute these deficiencies to insufficient...

DHS’ IT systems did not effectively allow CBP and ICE personnel to track migrants from apprehension to release or transfer. Instead, DHS personnel and partner agencies at the border implemented manual and ad hoc workarounds to process migrants apprehended illegally entering the United States. DHS...