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Title Full
TSA Policies Impede Effective Coordination and Investigation of Misconduct Allegations
Date Issued
Submitting OIG
Department of Homeland Security OIG
Agencies Reviewed/Investigated
Department of Homeland Security
Report Number
OIG-25-32
Report Description

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not clearly assign law enforcement roles to its program offices, which led to internal disagreements and friction between TSA’s Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) Insider Threat Section (ITS) and TSA Investigations related to referring and investigating allegations of misconduct.  TSA’s conflicting management directives resulted in impeded collaboration and deconfliction of investigations into risks to the Nation’s transportation system, potentially jeopardizing TSA’s ability to mitigate insider threats. 

Report Type
Inspection / Evaluation
Agency Wide
Yes
Number of Recommendations
6
Questioned Costs
$0
Funds for Better Use
$0
Report updated under NDAA 5274
No
External Link
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2025-08/OIG-25-32-Aug25-Reda…

Open Recommendations

This report has 6 open recommendations.
Recommendation Number Significant Recommendation Recommended Questioned Costs Recommended Funds for Better Use Additional Details
1 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Administrator evaluate the organizational placement of the Insider Threat Program within TSA to determine optimal alignment to achieve its goals and objectives.

2 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Administrator update existing TSA management directives to clarify and align law enforcement roles and responsibilities with TSA’s current strategic intent and eliminate policy conflicts. In particular, TSA MD 100.0 must clearly distinguish roles and responsibilities of ITS and TSA Investigations.

3 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Executive Assistant Administrator for LE/FAMS develop Insider Risk Mitigation Hub policies to standardize communication and deconfliction practices between TSA Investigations and ITS.

4 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Executive Assistant Administrator for LE/FAMS formalize and implement ITS policies and procedures in an approved SOP, including criteria agreed upon with TSA Investigations for referring and deconflicting allegations of misconduct.

5 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Executive Assistant Administrator for LE/FAMS develop and implement a formalized training plan to ensure ITS personnel: • follow internal referral and investigation processes outlined in its approved SOP; and • possess appropriate levels of insider threat-related training to meet DHS Insider Threat Program Minimum Standards.

6 No $0 $0

We recommend the TSA Executive Assistant Administrator for LE/FAMS develop a mechanism to accurately track and maintain ITS personnel training records.

Department of Homeland Security OIG

United States