State & Local Reports

Pursuant to the Municipal Code of Chicago §§ 2-56-030 and -230, the Public Safety section of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an inquiry into the Chicago Police Department’s (CPD) execution of search warrants, focusing on the accuracy of the addresses at which they are executed. As part of an ongoing inquiry, OIG has analyzed CPD data on search warrants issued between January 1, 2017, and December 31, 2020. OIG is issuing this Second Interim Report in order to better equip stakeholders––to the extent feasible given the quality of CPD’s data––with clear and accurate information during the ongoing public conversation and policy debate respecting improvements to CPD’s search warrant policy and practices. OIG also aims to highlight the intersections and gaps between the other proposed changes to CPD’s policy and its existing data collection practices, for consideration as those proposed changes are finalized.Through this Second Interim Report, OIG aims to provide the public with clear and accurate information on recent CPD search warrants and to equip stakeholders to knowledgeably participate in the ongoing public conversation and policy debate surrounding improvements to CPD’s search warrant policy and practices. CPD search warrant data from 2017 to 2020 revealed that CPD’s use of search warrants, particularly of residences, has been declining since late 2019. Of search warrants for a residence, the majority (73%) seek drug-related evidence. Depending on metrics, reported rates of successful search warrants may vary widely. When seeking drugs, CPD recovered drug evidence 75.6% of the time, and when seeking guns, recovered them 40.6% of the time. OIG found that “chance hits,” or the discovery of unintended evidence, occurred more often for Black and Hispanic/Latinx subjects than White subjects, with White subjects comprising just 3.5% of all residential search warrant subjects. Members of the public and CPD members will be best-served by data-informed policy decisions and thoughtful consideration of the implications of policy changes for existing data collection systems and practices. OIG’s inquiry on this matter is ongoing and continues to evaluate CPD’s search warrant training, review, and disciplinary processes and their impact on the occurrence of wrong raids.

For the period July 1, 2020, through January 31, 2021, we confirmed the completeness and accuracy for two samples of grant applications and supporting documentation submitted by Louisiana businesses.

The Office of Inspector General’s Public Safety section (OIG) is required by City ordinance to examine Sustained findings of misconduct committed by members of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and accompanying disciplinary recommendations, to assess trends and whether discipline is consistently and fairly applied. To that end, OIG has developed a comprehensive set of flowcharts that detail all stages of the disciplinary process, including all avenues of disciplinary review and appeal. The aim of the flowcharts is to provide an accessible resource—for the public, City officials, and Department members—that also will serve as a foundation for evaluative reports that OIG will periodically release on CPD’s disciplinary process. These periodic reports will analyze procedural consistency and fairness, as well as substantive fairness and consistency of discipline issued to CPD members found to have committed misconduct.

This report examines the use of overtime by New York State agencies over the past ten calendar years.1 The total cost of overtime in calendar year 2020 reached an all-time high at more than $850 million, covering roughly 19.1 million overtime hours worked. Certain agencies experienced major spikes in overtime due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but most overtime was performed in agencies that have typically relied upon it.

This report summarizes identity theft trends in New York during the coronavirus pandemic

the program guidance issued by ACCD on April 27, 2021 for the Economic Recovery Bridge Grant program uses 2020 federal tax loss to establish eligibility for grants consistent with the requirements of H.315 (Act 9). Focusing on tax loss may help target limited resources to businesses that need assistance to remain viable. However, clarification is needed in the program guidance to avoid reliance on a tax-based measure that is not representative of losses associated with the COVID-19 public health emergency and to prevent grant awards that exceed business need.

The Department of Internal Auditing (DIA) has conducted an audit of the general internal controls of Office of Homeless Services (OHS) subrecipient and provider monitoring, for the period of January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019. The main objective was to conduct an audit of OHS’s monitoring and approval controls in place related to subrecipients and providers of OHS’s services. Controls were assessed and reviewed to ensure disbursement of funds were accurate, approved, and in compliance with agreements in place. To accomplish the objective, DIA conducted interviews with management and staff in regards to the subrecipient and provider monitoring process in OHS to document the effectiveness of controls in place. Also, DIA reviewed efficiency of operations, and documented policies and procedures, conducted control and substantive testing, reviewed internal controls, and reconciled transactions and services to invoices and contract requirements. Recommendations were made including that OHS should adhere to Fiscal procedure requirements regarding monitoring HUD grant sub-recipients, and assure that there is an invoice and proof of payment for all requested reimbursement payments. Also, DIA recommended that OHS should require that all subrecipients show the allocation of expenditures that is requested for County reimbursements, and the reason for any reversals or adjustments noted in the support documentation if there is a variance between what is requested by a subrecipient on the Agency Reimbursement Request Form and what the County is actually paying.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an audit of the data privacy and cybersecurity of the Chicago Department of Public Health’s (CDPH) COVID-19 contact tracing program. Contact tracing is a disease control strategy that involves identifying persons diagnosed with COVID-19 and their contacts, then working with these individuals to stop further transmission. CDPH developed an electronic case management tool to support the work of its COVID-19 contact tracing teams. The COVID-19 Assessment and Response Electronic System (CARES) is a cloud-based data system that allows contact tracers to gather, organize, and store information so the Department can provide support to persons diagnosed with the disease and interrupt the spread of the virus by notifying their close contacts .The objective of the audit was to determine if CDPH managed privacy and cybersecurity risks associated with the collection, storage, and transmittal of COVID-19 contact tracing data in accordance with the City of Chicago’s Information Security and Technology Policies (ISTP) and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance.OIG concluded that CDPH’s COVID-19 contact tracing program mitigates data privacy and cybersecurity risks. Although certain improvements to policies and procedures would encourage consistent and timely application of the security measures, the Department’s efforts to safeguard data suggest that the public’s personal information will be protected.OIG found that the electronic case management tool, CARES, meets the cybersecurity and access control requirements of the City’s ISTP. However, CDPH did not consistently remove terminated users’ access to CARES within seven days, in accordance with ISTP timeliness standards. We found that training for contact tracers aligns with the City’s ISTP and includes several elements to develop awareness of data privacy and information security principles. We also found that contact tracers notify patients and contacts that their information will remain confidential and secure, and obtain consent before proceeding. However, contact tracers do not tell patients and contacts how long the City will retain their information. CDPH also has policies to mitigate risks when exchanging confidential information through electronic communication, and policies to designate persons responsible for approving data requests.