Open Recommendations

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual, that, in the event of a suspension of operations, a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles must be conducted. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles…

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's accountable property officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations. The report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

The report requires safeguarding and dissemination controls and is not available to the public.

The report requires safeguarding and dissemination controls and is not available to the public.

(U) Rec. 1.a: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 1.b: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 1.d: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 2: Recommendation is Classified.

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps develops and implements acybersecurity risk register to support the implementation of a fullyintegrated Risk Management and Information Security ContinuousMonitoring (ISCM) program (Metric 10).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps develops component authenticitypolicies and procedures (Metric 15).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps periodically evaluates, reviews,and updates its policies and procedures, as necessary, to align with anissued and approved ICAM strategy which includes assigning personnelrisk designations and performing appropriate screening prior to grantingaccess to its systems (Metric 28).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps conducts, captures, and shareslessons learned in its implementation of the incident response program(Metric 54 and 55).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps conducts agency-level BusinessImpact Assessments (BIA) and integrates the results into informationsecurity strategies and other plan development efforts (Metric 61).

Develop and implement inspector guidance on how to assess risk within Boeing manufacturing facilities.

Develop and implement a structured oversight approach for planning and performing audits to provide a comprehensive assessment of Boeing production.

Assess the Aircraft Certification Audit Information System to determine whether the system incorporates the functions that the inspectors need to plan and manage effective audits. Based on the assessment results, implement changes to the system as appropriate.

Clarify FAA Order 8120.23A defining isolated and systemic findings and how inspectors should categorize these findings.

Revise guidance to require inspectors to evaluate Boeings risk assessments of suppliers, including subtier suppliers, and incorporate the results of those assessments into FAAs audit planning.

Enhance inspector guidance to account for the number of Boeing suppliers, including subtier suppliers; what each supplier manufactures; and the number of audits needed to ensure Boeing effectively controls its suppliers

Develop and implement procedures that require FAA to disposition recommendations from joint FAA and industry reviews related to Boeing production and manufacturing.

Develop and implement guidance requiring inspectors to evaluate Boeings supplier control, including review of first article inspections, to verify suppliers can produce conforming parts.

Assess whether the Compliance and Enforcement Action system has the functionality that inspectors need to manage noncompliances, including the ability to track deadlines and identify potential repetitive issues. Implement changes to the system as appropriate based on the assessment results.

Develop and implement processes used by the Boeing oversight group to evaluate root causes of noncompliances and the associated corrective actions.

Train inspectors on updated guidance and system updates for the Aircraft Certification Audit Information System and the Compliance and Enforcement Action system.