Open Recommendations

We recommend that NPPD attract and deploy additional skilled resources to support the control environment and provide the necessary financial reporting oversight.

We recommend that USSS design and implement controls and procedures to perform reconciliations between the PP&E subledger to the general ledger and reconcile all significant differences.

We recommend that USSS adhere to established inventory policies and procedures and design and implement controls to appropriately track asset activity at the transaction level and ensure the timely recording of asset additions, deletions, or other adjustments.

We recommend that DHS appropriately align knowledgeable resources to evaluate the roles of service organizations, assess controls at those service organizations, and identify and assess complimentary controls within the Components relying on those service organizations.

We recommend that USSS establish new, or improve current communication channels within the Administrative Operations Division and Financial Management Division to ensure sufficient review of personal and real property activity and balances, including equipment, IUS, land, buildings and other structures, and to verify costs are appropriate and reflect USSS's business operations during the fiscal year.

We recommend that USSS design and implement controls and processes to identify instances and criteria for asset impairment.

We recommend that USSS attract and deploy additional skilled resources within the Administrative Operations Division and Financial Management Division to support the control environment and provide the necessary financial reporting oversight.

We recommend that FEMA assign the responsibility for central oversight of grants management to one program office within FEMA.

Related to the Entry Process: We recommend that CBP fully implement the automated controls over single transaction bond processing.

Related to the Entry Process: We recommend that CBP develop policies and procedures that clearly identify risks, as well as controls to mitigate those risks for all trade functions transitioning to ACE.

Related to the Entry Process: We recommend that CBP provide training to all personnel on new policies to ensure consistent implementation at decentralized locations.

Related to Refunds and Drawbacks: We recommend that CBP continue with the scheduled implementation of drawback in ACE.

Related to Refunds and Drawbacks: We recommend that CBP continue to enhance the manual controls to detect or prevent excessive drawback claims, including after the implementation of TFTEA, as current claims will take several years to be processed through the drawback lifecycle.

Related to Refunds and Drawbacks: We recommend that CBP implement relevant provisions of TFTEA, which will take effect on February 24, 2018.

Related to Refunds and Drawbacks: We recommend that CBP implement policies and procedures to ensure supporting documentation related to accelerated filer status is maintained.

Related to Refunds and Drawbacks: We recommend that CBP Update and redistribute guidance to necessary personnel regarding the appropriate CBP directives to ensure consistent performance of controls across all locations.

We recommend that the Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security establish a formal entity at the Department level to oversee component use of force activities. Once established, the responsible personnel at the Department level should work with the components to: a. establish minimal requirements for what each component should report as a use of force incident and develop a process to collect and report the accurate number of incidents; b. develop a formal mechanism by which components can share lessons learned regarding use of force policies, training, and oversight; c. collaborate with the components and conduct a review or study…

Work with the Chief Information Officer Officer to perform a risk assessment to determine which aspects of an insider threat program are applicable to other types of sensitive Board information and develop and implement an agency-wide insider threat strategy for sensitive but unclassified Board information, as appropriate.

Take action to work with FAA, FHWA, FMCSA, FTA, MARAD, NHTSA, and OST to develop risk acceptance memos for the expired systems identified in this report.

The Deputy Secretary, or his designee, take action to work with OST COE, FTA, and FAA, the common control providers, to report and update risk acceptance for shared controls that are not implemented in DOT's Repository (e.g., CSAM) per FISMA, OMB, and DOT requirements.

The Deputy Secretary, or his designee, take action to identify and document OST COE compensating controls when used to address security weaknesses in CSAM and system authorizations.

The Archivist implement or upgrade current internal control software or utilize other mechanisms to enhance and improve the agency’s ability to track and report on internal controls.

The Archivist address outstanding recommendations from OIG Audit Report No. 13-01, including:  Revisiting his decision on the placement and role in the organization of the Chief Risk Officer.