Open Recommendations

We recommend that USAID/Zimbabwe verify that Centre for Sexual Health and HIV/AIDS Research Zimbabwe corrects the one instance of material noncompliance detailed on page 21 of the audit report.

We recommend that USAID/Tanzania verify that Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania corrects the one instance of material noncompliance detailed on pages 39 to 40 of the audit report.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, reevaluate the Vehicle Allocation Methodology and update the criticality scoring system to eliminate the retention bias toward armored vehicles located in high-threat environments. This evaluation should consider the relative weight of each factor within the criticality score and consider requiring justifications for the retention of low-usage, high-criticality vehicles to achieve a balanced score.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring overseas posts to periodically assess the volume of special protective equipment and hazardous materials. The guidance should take into consideration usage rates and the criticality of each asset in order to determine the appropriate quantities needed for post operations and provide instructions for adjusting asset holdings based on the outcomes of the assessment.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security update the Foreign Affairs Handbook to include a requirement that posts develop and maintain written disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for all special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop, implement, and distribute guidance to overseas posts on how to develop disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, for special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles. The guidance should include details on key considerations to make during the planning process, such as determining which stakeholders to involve in the planning process; planning for a variety of evacuation scenarios; considering timelines and resources needed to ship items out of the country; calculating the timelines needed to destroy assets at post; ensuring security personnel have access to all materials, tools, equipment, and vendors…

Following the implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4, OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance requiring post Emergency Action Committees to periodically review and approve post disposition plans, including emergency destruction plans, and to determine whether updates or changes are needed.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its emergency destruction procedures to describe all acceptable methods to destroy special protective equipment, including methods that can be employed in a limited evacuation timeframe, as well as the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement guidance on the disposition of hazardous materials in an emergency evacuation scenario. The guidance should include steps that can be implemented in a limited evacuation timeframe and outline the equipment and time needed to execute each step. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should then distribute the updated guidance to all overseas posts.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security revise its armored vehicle disposal procedures to better guide Department of State personnel on how to efficiently disable or destroy armored vehicles in an exigent evacuation scenario. These procedures should include details on the estimated time needed to complete each required step, which steps should be prioritized over others, and which steps may be skipped given limited time and resources. The procedures should also include guidance and visual aids applicable to all models of Department of State armored vehicles maintained worldwide.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement training for post security personnel on acceptable practices for the disposition of special protective equipment, hazardous materials, and armored vehicles in an emergency evacuation scenario.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual, that, in the event of a suspension of operations, a comprehensive reconciliation of post-assigned special protective equipment and armored vehicles must be conducted. The requirement should define who is responsible for conducting the reconciliation; define the time period following the suspension of operations in which the reconciliation should be completed; address the need to collect, analyze, and follow up on all available data about the status of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles…

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, define and implement a requirement in the Foreign Affairs Manual to, in the event of a suspension of operations, issue a report to the Department's accountable property officer detailing the final status of a post's assets following a suspension of operations. The report would follow the completion of a comprehensive reconciliation of a post's special protective equipment and armored vehicles. The requirement should define who is responsible for drafting and issuing the report.

OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement detailed guidance for overseas posts on how to establish and maintain records on the status of special protective equipment and armored vehicles assigned to post following a post's suspension of operations, including guidance on the types of information to record, how frequently and under what circumstances records should be updated, and options for using remotely accessible backup records.

The report requires safeguarding and dissemination controls and is not available to the public.

The report requires safeguarding and dissemination controls and is not available to the public.

(U) Rec. 1.a: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 1.b: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 1.d: Recommendation is Classified.

(U) Rec. 2: Recommendation is Classified.

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps develops and implements acybersecurity risk register to support the implementation of a fullyintegrated Risk Management and Information Security ContinuousMonitoring (ISCM) program (Metric 10).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps develops component authenticitypolicies and procedures (Metric 15).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps periodically evaluates, reviews,and updates its policies and procedures, as necessary, to align with anissued and approved ICAM strategy which includes assigning personnelrisk designations and performing appropriate screening prior to grantingaccess to its systems (Metric 28).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps conducts, captures, and shareslessons learned in its implementation of the incident response program(Metric 54 and 55).

OIG recommends that the Peace Corps conducts agency-level BusinessImpact Assessments (BIA) and integrates the results into informationsecurity strategies and other plan development efforts (Metric 61).