U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not fully leverage its large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems to detect contraband coming into the United States, potentially wasting taxpayer funds, missing opportunities to detect and seize contraband, and losing an important tool to fight the fentanyl epidemic.
Open Recommendations
Recommendation Number | Significant Recommendation | Recommended Questioned Costs | Recommended Funds for Better Use | Additional Details | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | No | $0 | $0 | ||
We recommend that the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations develop and implement a plan to deploy and install the large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems identified in this report. | |||||
2 | No | $0 | $0 | ||
We recommend that the Executive Director of CBP’s Integrated Logistics Division develop and implement policies and procedures, as required by the modified maintenance contracts, to hold venders accountable by tracking and applying any disincentives for longstanding and ineffective repairs. | |||||
3 | No | $0 | $0 | ||
We recommend that the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations Non-Intrusive Inspection Division develop and implement guidance to ensure non-intrusive inspection utilization data is recorded in Office of Field Operations systems accurately to include equipment downtime. | |||||
4 | No | $0 | $0 | ||
We recommend that the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations Non-Intrusive Inspection Division update guidance to ensure non-intrusive inspection operational interruption data recorded reflects the reasons for an operational disruption. |