



2018

Semiannual Report to Congress

Office of Inspector General

April 1 – September 30, 2018



MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present this National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report summarizing our work for the reporting period ending 30 September 2018. OIG conducted audit and inspection oversight, produced recommendations for improvements in a wide variety of agency programs, and pursued allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.

This year we mark the 40th anniversary of the Inspector General Act and the creation of the original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 1980. Since that time, we have been part of a community that has grown to include 73 statutory Inspectors General who collectively oversee the operations of nearly every aspect of the Federal government. Every six months we provide Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of NGA during the reporting period. This report is our 17th semiannual report since we became a statutory OIG in October 2010. Prior to October 2010, we submitted reports through the Department of Defense Inspector General. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to provide independent and effective oversight of NGA and working with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our government.


Working closely with the NGA components and offices, we closed 53 of 129 (42 percent) audit and inspection recommendations during this period. Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we will continue to expand our collection of metrics (see appendix A, page 22) resulting from our recommendations to the Agency.

The Audit Division examined the NGA's management of the personnel separation process, the security financial disclosure program, and the personnel security clearance process. The recommendations focus on improving compliance with policies, procedures, and requirements; internal controls; and effectiveness and efficiency in these processes. The government auditors provided oversight of the independent contract auditors' work on the NGA financial statement audits and the annual evaluation of NGA pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act.

The Inspections Division reexamined NGA's privacy program, which resulted in a repeat recommendation to establish an independent program that protects the privacy and civil liberties of US persons and has oversight over agency components. In August 2018, NGA created a new mission oversight and compliance office that reports to NGA's executive director. A review of NGA's Medical Services resulted in 14 recommendations designed to improve and increase effectiveness and efficiency in those services.

The Investigations Division closed 90 cases this period, substantiating 30 (30 percent) of its cases involving time and attendance fraud, computer misuse, security, and travel and recovered \$294,227. The division continues to work on several investigations of senior officials. The division's Forensic Analysis Support Team increasingly uses data analytics to pursue potential fraud in contracts, government purchase and travel cards, and to identify potential misconduct.

I appreciate the ongoing support from the Director, senior leadership, and NGA workforce.



Cardell K. Richardson, Sr.
Inspector General

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Overview | 1 |
| Resources and Organization | 1 |
| Counsel to the Inspector General | 2 |
| Audit | 3 |
| Inspections | 3 |
| Investigations | 3 |
| Summaries of Audits | 5 |
| Completed | 5 |
| Ongoing | 7 |
| Summaries of Inspections | 10 |
| Completed | 10 |
| Ongoing | 13 |
| Summaries of Investigations | 15 |
| Judicial Actions and Prosecutions | 15 |
| Cases Involving Senior Government Officials (Substantiated) | 15 |
| Cases Involving Senior Government Officials (Unsubstantiated) | 16 |
| Whistleblower | 16 |
| Time and Attendance Fraud | 17 |
| Contractor Labor Mischarging | 19 |
| Computer Misuse | 19 |
| Other Noteworthy Investigations | 20 |
| Criminal Investigations | 21 |



| | |
|---|-----------|
| Forensic Analysis Support Team | 21 |
| Completed | 21 |
| Ongoing | 21 |
| Appendix A. Status of Audit and Inspection Recommendations | 22 |
| Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 31 March 2018 | 22 |
| Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period | 30 |
| Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods Before 1 April 2018 | 32 |
| Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period | 47 |
| Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs | 48 |
| Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use | 49 |
| Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before 1 October 2017 | 49 |
| Statutory Reporting | 50 |
| Information or Assistance Refused by NGA | 50 |
| Significant Revised Management Decisions | 50 |
| OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decision | 50 |



| | |
|--|-----------|
| Compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 | 50 |
| Attempts to Interfere with the IG's Independence | 50 |
| Public Disclosure | 51 |
| Peer Reviews | 51 |
| Appendix B. Investigative Metrics | 52 |
| Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting Period | 52 |
| Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period | 52 |
| Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period | 52 |
| Appendix C. Index of Reporting Requirements | 53 |
| Appendix D. Abbreviations | 54 |

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OVERVIEW

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat-support agency and a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Agency receives guidance and oversight from DoD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress. NGA provides geospatial intelligence—GEOINT—that supports US national security and defense, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.



The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of NGA programs and operations.

Our assessments of NGA’s worldwide programs and operations are undertaken and performed in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in compliance with the standards of the Government Accountability Office and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

The OIG also serves as the principal NGA agent responsible for investigating potential violations of law, rule, or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process. In addition, the OIG performs the NGA external liaison function for Federal, state, and local Inspectors General and congressional overseers on IG-related matters. The OIG is the liaison to external law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI.


RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION

The OIG is authorized 60 billets, and as of 30 September 2018, 54 employees were on board. The OIG staff is allocated among three core divisions—Audit, Inspections, and Investigations—and a support function—the Plans and Programs Division. A Counsel reports directly to the IG.

The Inspector General addressed independence concerns about NGA’s career service personnel management system by developing the NGA Human Capital Management Framework signed by the Director and the Inspector General in September 2017. The IG Career Service (IGCS) was established 1 October 2017. The IG Career Service achieved initial operating capability in April, with the assignment of a dedicated IG Career Service Manager. The Deputy Inspector General was assigned an additional part-time duty to be the Career Service Head.

The IG Career Service will achieve full operating capability in November 2018 with the employment of one additional staff member. The IGCS allows the NGA Inspector General to manage internal talent management processes, such as hiring, career development, assignments, and promotions, thereby helping to ensure OIG independence regarding human capital management.

Figure. OIG Organization Chart



COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Counsel to the Inspector General (IG) is an in-house legal asset. Counsel provides legal advice directly to the IG and Deputy IG, and provides legal assistance to all Office of Inspector General (OIG) divisions. Counsel also represents the OIG in litigation arising out of or affecting OIG operations, manages the OIG legislative and regulatory review, and reviews all plans, investigations, and final reports for legal sufficiency. In addition, Counsel liaises, on behalf of the IG and OIG, with, among others, DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) counsels, DoD IG, federal and state prosecutors, NGA's Office of General Counsel, and other components of NGA. A new Counsel came on board in July from the US General Services Administration OIG's Counsel's office where Counsel was a Senior Assistant Counsel.

AUDIT

The Audit Division is responsible for providing independent oversight and objective audits of NGA's programs and operations, and promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of NGA programs and operations. Audits are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Audit findings and recommendations seek to reduce costs; improve overall performance; and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. The recommendations resulting from the projects offer insight for management, help improve internal controls, and ensure compliance with laws, regulation, and policy.



INSPECTIONS

The Inspections Division has responsibility for the evaluation, review, and analysis of NGA's programs and activities, including authorities, policies, procedures, and controls. The division provides independent assessment of the reliability of information, compliance with regulations and policies, management of resources, and achievement of program results. Intelligence oversight inspections, conducted in accordance with executive orders, particularly Executive Order 12333, are also a responsibility.

INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division conducts independent investigations of complaints and other information of possible violations of criminal and civil law. The division is the principal NGA agent for investigating potential violations of rule or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process.

The division also incorporates the Forensic Analysis Support Team (FAST), which conducts an agency-wide fraud detection program using data mining and forensic analyses tools. FAST also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Systemic findings are referred to the Inspections Division or Audit Division for further analysis and review. This division recovered \$294,227 for the second half of FY2018 and substantiated 30 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The funds recovered involve time and attendance fraud, contractor labor mischarging, and contractor self-disclosure cases.

The division is a member of the newly formed Intelligence Community Inspector General Forum Whistleblower Working Group. The group provides a venue for IC OIGs to identify and discuss whistleblower issues, share best practices, and develop solutions to better enable our respective whistleblower programs. The division participated in the initial meeting held in March 2018 where topics of discussion included issues concerning the new statutory IC contractor whistleblower protections; whistleblower outreach opportunities; and providing an open forum to discuss issues, trends, and best practices.

The division is also included in the *GAO Whistleblower in the IC* review, which includes a review of the DIA, NRO, CIA, ICIG, NSA, and NGA processes and procedures in handling whistleblower complaints.

SUMMARIES OF AUDITS

COMPLETED

Audit of NGA's Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, issued 18 April 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit was to determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information was secure from personnel who separated from NGA. Specifically, we reviewed the separation process for civilian and contractor personnel at NCE and NCW for the period of 1 May 2016 through 30 April 2017.

Findings. We found that NGA has not established formal personnel separation policy and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information is secure from personnel who separate from NGA. Specifically, management did not adequately document and monitor the removal of logical and physical access for all personnel evaluated in the audit. As a result, NGA systems, facilities, and information are vulnerable to unauthorized access and misuse. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Results. The report contains two recommendations. The recommendations focus on designating a component to manage NGA's personnel separation process and for that component to identify an office of primary responsibility to develop an agency-wide personnel separation policy and procedures that define roles and responsibilities.

Audit of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, issued 12 July 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is effectively managed in accordance with applicable Federal, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

Findings. We found that [REDACTED]. We also observed that the Security Financial Disclosure Program is not on track to achieve its goal of full coverage of NGA designated personnel by 2020.

Results. The report contains nine recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program. The recommendations focus on improvements in internal control, implementation of software that will enhance program effectiveness and efficiency, and a requirement for all designated personnel to file by the 2020 filing season.

Audit of NGA's Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report No. OIGA18-07, issued 9 August 2018

Overview. The objective of this audit had two parts. The first part was to determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background investigations, including controls for mitigating risk associated with onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations. The second part was to determine whether NGA has a backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background investigations.



Findings. NGA did not administer or properly track polygraphs for all contractors that onboarded in fiscal years 2016–2017. Specifically, NGA did not (1) administer the polygraphs, (2) update PeopleSoft for individuals whose polygraphs were accepted via reciprocity, or (3) update PeopleSoft until the individual successfully passed the polygraph. Not administering polygraphs on contractors on a timely basis and properly recording polygraph information in PeopleSoft to effectively identify and track individuals in need of a polygraph examination

█ Additionally, while NGA made improvements to meet the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) timeliness goals for initiating background investigations and adjudicating security clearances, it did not meet IRTPA timeliness goals for the Investigation phase of the security clearance process for fiscal years 2016–2017. In addition, as of January 2018, NGA had 384 open cases (80 initial security clearances and 304 periodic reinvestigations) that already exceeded the IRTPA end-to-end timeliness goals, an indication that timeliness issues persist. The untimeliness of processing security clearances delays the onboarding process of applicants, potentially causing NGA to lose qualified individuals to other employment offers, and █

█ are not processed timely.

Results. The report contains 11 recommendations to improve compliance with polygraph requirements and to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the personnel security clearance process.

Audit of the Emergency Management Test, Training, and Exercise Program at NCE, Memorandum U//FOUO-230-18/OIG, issued 11 September 2018

Overview. The audit objective was to determine whether NGA has developed and implemented an effective emergency management test, training, and exercise (EM) program at NCE in accordance with applicable Department of Homeland Security, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

Findings. We observed during our audit planning that the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We also noted that the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for the period under review of 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2017.

Results. Our observations were largely attributable to circumstances that have changed or are changing and would result in recommendations that management is aware of and working to address. As such, we issued a memorandum that communicated our observations and terminated the audit, because completing the audit at that time would have represented an inefficient use of OIG resources and provided minimal value to the Agency.

ONGOING

Audit of NGA's Analysis Event Response for National Security and Natural Disasters, Project No. 17-A08

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether Analysis component-related crisis and event response plans are in place and are executed and managed effectively. Specifically, the audit will determine whether the execution and management of those plans facilitate coordination among stakeholders, standardization of procedures where practical, and reduction in duplication of efforts, and determine whether the plans efficiently allocate available resources.

Status. OIGA announced the project in May 2017, and plans to issue a report in January 2019.

Audit of NGA's Support of US Strategic Command Mission Requirements, Project No. 17-A11

Overview. NGA supports US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) by satisfying requirements, including providing reliable navigation and planning charts. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is satisfying STRATCOM requirements effectively and efficiently.

Status. OIGA announced the project in August 2017, and plans to issue a report in December 2018.

FY2018 Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation of the NGA Information Security Program, Project No. 18-A02

Overview. OIGA engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the FY2018 evaluation required by the FY2018 Federal Information Security



Modernization Act (FISMA). The overall objectives of the evaluation are to assess NGA's information security program in accordance with the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the Department of Homeland Security and determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2017 assessment. The evaluation will include a sample of seven systems for testing to support the IG metrics.

Status. OIGA announced the project in January 2018 and plans to issue the final external metrics report to the ICIG in October 2018, and the detailed internal report to NGA management in November 2018.

Audit of the NGA Financial Statements for FY2018, Project No. 18-A03

Overview. OIGA engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's FY2018 financial statements. The audit objective is to determine whether NGA's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles. To meet requirements for federal financial statement audits, KPMG is also assessing internal control over financial reporting and performing tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

KPMG is following up on the status of management's corrective actions to address the findings and recommendations communicated in the *Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016* (Report No. OIGA 18-02), and the *Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY 2017 Financial Statement Audit* (Report No. OIGA 18-04).

Status. The project was announced in January 2018. KPMG's report will be issued no later than 15 November 2018. If necessary, a management letter will be issued by 31 December 2018.

Audit of NGA's Corrective Action Implementation, Project No. 18-A04

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is effectively and efficiently following up on recommendations to correct findings identified through external cyber security reviews. Specifically, this audit will focus on whether NGA is correcting

deficiencies identified during the Defense Information Systems Agency Command Cyber Readiness Inspection and Cybersecurity Service Provider inspections. In addition, we will determine whether NGA is using these inspection results to correct enterprise-wide deficiencies and improve cyber security readiness throughout the Agency.

Status. OIGA announced the project in February 2018 and plans to issue a report in January 2019.

Audit of NGA's Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Program, Project No. 18-A05

Overview. The objective of this audit aims to determine whether NGA is effectively and efficiently managing the DAWIA Program. Specifically, OIG will determine whether the NGA acquisition workforce was in compliance with the DAWIA core certification requirements for training, education, and experience for the period 1 January 2017 through 31 December 2017.

Status. OIGA announced the project in March 2018 and plans to issue a report in January 2019.

Audit of NGA's Geodesy Products, Project No. 18-A07

Overview. The objective of this audit is to determine whether the NGA Office of Geomatics is effectively achieving Federal, DoD, and National System for Geospatial Intelligence requirements for delivery of timely, relevant, and accurate geodesy products.

Status. OIGA announced the project in June 2018, and plans to issue a report in August 2019.

SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS

COMPLETED

Follow-up Inspection of NGA's Privacy Program, Report No. OIGE-18-04, Issued July 2018.

Overview. Follow-up inspections assess actions taken by management to correct deficiencies found during prior inspections. They are designed to assess whether corrective actions are effective and complete; are producing desired results; are not causing new problems; and are economical, efficient, practical, and feasible. The overall objective of the review is to assess the status of open recommendations from the FY2015 inspection of the agency's Privacy Program. That inspection found the following:



- (1) The NGA Privacy Program had been hindered by long-term leadership and resource deficiencies;
- (2) The program needed to improve privacy training awareness, work force communication, and incident management;
- (3) The Agency did not adequately secure privacy information and;
- (4) NGA did not comply with major privacy legislation such as the Privacy Act and E-Government Act.

OIGE's report contained 22 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Privacy Program, at the start of the follow-up three remained open (appendix A).

Findings. NGA closed 20 of 22 recommendations identified in the Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management Report (OIGE 15-01). That report contained 22 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Privacy Program and focus on the organization, staffing, training, and expertise required to operate an effective program. At the start of this follow-up inspection, three recommendations remained open. Recommendation 20 (evaluating and updating the e-mail classification tool with a privacy module) was closed during the inspection; the two remaining open recommendations include managing Privacy Act statements on NGA forms; and publishing completed Privacy Impact Assessments on NGA's webpages. These recommendations remain valid and necessary to improve the privacy program. In addition, we found that the NGA Privacy Program continues to be hindered by long-term organization and resource deficiencies, which impede its ability to provide effective and efficient mission-related privacy and civil liberties protections, a repeat finding from the 2014-2015 inspection.

Results. We recommended that NGA establish an independent program that protects the Privacy and Civil Liberties of US Persons regardless of the data type (mission-related or administrative). This program should be placed to have oversight over the components, and should not be subordinate to them. This was a repeat recommendation from the previous report. In response, NGA created a new Mission Oversight and Compliance office in August 2018. The new office reports to the executive director of the Agency.

Inspection of NGA's Medical Services, Report No. OIGE-18-05, Issued August 2018.

Overview. This inspection was initiated because of senior leaders' concerns regarding the effectiveness of the deployer program and medical and psychological issues experienced by returning deployers. Between 2003 and 2015, NGA deployed more than 3,700 employees and contractors worldwide to areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Djibouti, and Colombia. While deployment can be a great professional opportunity, the experience can also be life changing and stressful. In response to increased demands and stresses experienced by the deploying workforce, NGA developed the Deployment Psychological Services Program in 2008 to provide consultation, screening, and support services to personnel as they readjust to life and duties at home. The overall objective of the inspection was to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight requirements of NGA's medical services, including the deployer program, during the period of 2014 to 2017.

Findings. Three findings detailed that NGA's Medical Services (1) has deficiencies in the areas of organizational structure (including personnel management and support agreements), communication, and records management; (2) lacks an established deployer resiliency program; and (3) has medical contracts that do not comply with standards. More specifically, we found that the Medical Advisor's organizational placement marginalizes the position and hinders NGA's clinical services. In addition, communication failures caused confusion among medical staff. We found that deployers' medical records were missing, and assessed that medical records do not comply with oversight requirements, placing the Agency at risk of financial penalties. NGA lacks an established deployer resiliency program. Remaining resiliency services are not available to all deployers, are not documented, and underuse the Employee Assistance Program. Finally, we found that NGA's medical contracts do not comply with standards. For instance, performance work statements for NGA's Medical Services contract provides insufficient guidance, and contracts lack medical liability protection clauses.

Results. We made 14 recommendations and two considerations designed to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and improvement of NGA's Medical Services. For example, we recommended that HD determine appropriate staff composition of government employees (Psychologists and EAP counselors) needed to conduct inherently governmental functions. NGA needs to coordinate pre- and post-deployment health activities with the Secretaries of the

Military Departments and implement secure electronic transfer of deployment health activities to the appropriate oversight officials, and consider performing psychological assessment for OCONUS deployments lasting less than 30 days.

Intelligence Oversight Inspections

Overview. OIGE provides oversight of NGA's Intelligence Oversight Program. OIGE performs this function by conducting intelligence oversight (IO) inspections of NGA offices to determine compliance with applicable policies and procedures. OIGE also assesses whether personnel are familiar with procedures for recognizing and reporting questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or highly sensitive (S/HS) matters.



We completed five IO inspections during the reporting period. The inspected components are as follows:

- Office of Special Programs, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-01, issued April 2018.
- Open IT Solutions Office, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, issued June 2018.
- NGA Support Team to US Central Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-03, issued August 2018.
- NGA Support Team to US Special Operations Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-04, issued August 2018.
- Source Aeronautical Navigation, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-05, issued August 2018.
- Source Operations Group, Project No. IO-18-05, issued September 2018.

Findings and Results. We found no deficiencies rising to the level of a QIA or S/HSM and, in most cases, found employee knowledge, training, and program execution to be compliant with Agency and DoD guidance. In report OIGE-IO-18-02, we had one finding and made one recommendation to improve employee understanding of QIAs and S/HSMs; we asked the program office to provide specialized IO training to address and ensure employee proficiency.

Inspection of NGA's Insider Threat Program Case Management, Project No. II-17-02

Overview. Executive Order 13587 directed structural reforms to improve the security of classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. In November 2012, the President issued the National Insider Threat Policy, which required agencies to implement an insider threat program within 180 days. OIG published a report in February 2016 that assessed NGA's compliance with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The purpose of this inspection, announced in February 2017, is to evaluate NGA's protection of employees' civil liberties and the status of progress in following minimum required standards. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess the processes and procedures that the NGA Insider Threat Program uses to manage cases and comply with statute and DoD and IC policy.

Status. This inspection was delayed in June 2017 due to the personnel resource demands of a Congressionally directed action and was resumed in January 2018. The final report is planned for November 2018.

Inspection of GEOINT Services, Project No. II-18-01

Overview. The GEOINT Services (GS) initiative is NGA's delivery of geospatial content and analytics through a cloud-based architecture. GEOINT services are web-based tools and data that allow customers to discover, access, exploit, and contribute geospatial capabilities, datasets, and best practices. During her tenure as NGA Deputy Director, Sue Gordon stated, "GEOINT Services isn't an abstraction or an architecture, it's about exposing what we know in a way that can be used by people who need it to do their job." This inspection will focus on NGA's planning and implementation of the GEOINT Services initiative from a holistic agency perspective and as an IC service of common concern. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess GEOINT Services implementation against customer requirements; agency goals, plans, and milestones; assigned responsibilities; and return on investment. The inspectors will review policies relating to oversight guidance regarding Geospatial Platform as a Service and the agency's implementing guidance. In addition, we will review the management of the effort, including the requirements process, overlap with other portfolios and programs, and the budgetary effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in November 2018.

Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Processes and Procedures (Phase III), Project No. II-18-02

Overview. This inspection is the third, and final, in a series of acquisition-function inspections. Since the NGA acquisition function is large and complex, a single comprehensive inspection would have taken too long. Some of the information could become outdated before the end of the inspection. Therefore, to provide the most relevant and timely assistance to NGA senior management, the inspection was divided into three phases, generally based on a framework established by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The overall objective of the inspection is to assess NGA's acquisition policies and processes to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's acquisition program management and compliance with oversight requirements.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in September 2019.

Inspection of Aeronautical Safety of Navigation, Project No. QL-18-0

Overview. NGA's Source component supports DoD and civilian air Safety of Navigation worldwide with regularly updated paper and digital charts of the world's airways and oceans, and publications of its runways. Through the science of geomatics, NGA can precisely geo-reference where things are on the earth. This inspection continues our evaluations of NGA's safety of navigation missions but focuses on aeronautical vs. maritime as previous reports did. The overall objective of this inspection is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGA Aeronautical Navigation mission.

Status. The final report is planned for publication in January 2019.

SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division (OIGI) closed 90 cases during the reporting period; 30 were substantiated, or 30 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The division opened 70 cases and has 77 ongoing investigations.



JUDICIAL ACTIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

OIGI did not have any judicial actions during the reporting period. One case that was referred in a previous reporting period for federal prosecution to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Missouri involving contractor labor mischarging is pending.

CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (SUBSTANTIATED)

OIGI conducted three investigations of senior officials that resulted in substantiated allegations, which are summarized below. OIGI has 16 pending investigations on senior officials.

OIG Case No. 15-100, closed April 2018.

OIGI investigated an allegation that senior managers in the Analysis component allowed an NGA employee to be reassigned to an overseas location without properly documented approvals. The investigation found that senior managers did not abide by NGA Instruction 1400.5R7, Civilian Employees Overseas Employment, which states that an assignment agreement documenting the overseas tour must be completed for each overseas assignment. The investigative results were reported to the appropriate management chain for action.

OIG Case No. 15-139, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation that a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES) program advisor requested and received education benefits without going through proper procedures. The investigation substantiated this allegation and found that the advisor committed agency funds without proper authority. OIG found no evidence that the advisor knowingly violated regulations and policies, but acted on the advice of superiors. The superiors' actions were fully addressed in other cases that were completed in earlier periods. The advisor was orally admonished.

OIG Case No. 18-013, closed June 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a senior military officer working at NGA misused position and authority by requesting that subordinate employees retrieve and deliver personal items to the officer. The investigation developed sufficient evidence to establish that the officer asked a senior staff member to conduct a personal errand for the officer and authorized other staff members to conduct similar personal errands. The advisor's NGA supervisor directed the officer to cease these activities, and the investigative results were also reported to the officer's military service Inspector General.

**CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
(UNSUBSTANTIATED)**

OIG Case No. 18-026, closed June 2018

Senior government officials took actions against a subordinate employee that violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-107, closed September 2018

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-075, closed September 2018

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

OIG Case No. 18-051, closed August 2018

Senior government officials committed gross mismanagement by approving excessive training; not substantiated.

WHISTLEBLOWER

There are four closed whistleblower cases to report this period, which are summarized below.

OIG Case No. 17-115, closed April 2018.

OIGI investigated allegations that two Pay Band 5 supervisors in the Security and Installations (SI) component retaliated against a subordinate employee by providing the employee a negative and inaccurate performance assessment for promotion consideration after

the employee reported inappropriate activities of SI personnel to the NGA Office of Inspector General. The OIGI investigation concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the supervisors did not retaliate against the employee for making a protected communication. These findings were reported to the subordinate employee.

OIG Case No. 18-030, closed July 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation of retaliation against a Pay Band 3 counterintelligence (CI) officer by his supervisors for reporting management issues to management and the NGA Office of Inspector General. The officer was removed as the lead on a case inquiry, and received a Letter of Reprimand (LoR) for the manner of communication used with fellow employees. OIGI obtained documents that supported issuance of the LoR and, based on the timeline of events that OIGI produced, determined that a prima facie reprisal case did not exist. These findings were reported to the CI officer.

OIG Case No. 18-051, closed September 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band (PB) 5 supervisor in the Information Technology Services component experienced unfavorable personnel actions for making protected disclosures to the NGA Office of Inspector General, management, and the NGA Office of Diversity Management and Equal Employment (ODE). OIGI communications with the PB 5 supervisor disclosed that the employee's reprisal allegations had already been included in a formal equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint with ODE and were being addressed in that venue. OIGI personnel advised the complainant that OIGI would not conduct an investigation of the same reprisal allegations that were being addressed in the EEO complaint, and that the complainant could return to the OIGI after the EEO complaint process concluded if there were still issues that should be addressed by OIGI.

OIG Case No. 18-075, closed September 2018

OIG investigated an allegation that supervisors retaliated against a Pay Band 4 analyst when they assigned duties of a recently departed employee to the analyst and told the analyst not to support the analyst's customer. During the investigation, OIGI interviewed the analyst. The analyst did not believe that the assignment of new duties was reprisal, and continued to support the cited customer with the supervisors' knowledge. No further investigation was required.

TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD

The OIGI conducted more time and attendance fraud investigations during this period than in the previous six-month period, and the investigations accomplished were significant and resulted in the recovery of funds totaling \$125,293.23 for time claimed for work

not performed. The division continued to send many of the less substantial issues to management for corrective action, which also resulted in the recovery of funds. The following are summaries of four time and attendance fraud investigations that resulted in the termination of employment, a significant suspension, and the recovery of funds totaling \$105,249.65.

OIG Case No. 17-055, closed July 2018

A supervisor alleged that a Pay Band 3 analyst in the Analysis component misused NGA computer systems and committed time and attendance fraud. The investigation found that the analyst used NGA computer systems to shop on several online sites, and falsely claimed 198 hours that the employee did not work, valued at \$9,153.47. Employment was terminated in June 2018 after the analyst failed to respond to proposed adverse actions and refused to come to work.



OIG Case No. 17-012, closed September 2018

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting disclosed that a Pay Band 3 human resource specialist in the Human Development component was not accurately accounting for the hours worked. The analysis showed that the specialist claimed 647 hours that were not worked, valued at \$29,301.93. The specialist received a 30-day suspension without pay. NGA is initiating action to recover the value that was falsely reported.

OIG Case No. 17-033, closed July 2018

A supervisor reported that a Pay Band 4 analyst in the Analysis component was not accurately accounting for the hours the analyst worked. An analysis of time and attendance reporting and the OIG investigation found that the employee claimed 604 hours on time sheets that were not worked, valued at \$35,184.84. The analyst resigned from NGA before any adverse action could be proposed. Further review of his time sheets revealed that he owed the government \$29,054.48, vice \$35,184.84; debt collection actions have been initiated.

OIG Case No. 17-097, closed August 2018

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting disclosed that a Pay Band 4 budget analyst in the Financial Management component was not accurately accounting for the hours worked. The analysis showed that the analyst claimed 639 hours that were not worked valued at \$37,739.67. The analyst's employment was terminated in July 2018, and NGA has initiated action to recover the value that was falsely reported.

CONTRACTOR LABOR MISCHARGING

OIGI continued to address issues of contractor labor mischarging through outreach efforts with industry and a fraud survey that has been provided to the NGA workforce. Having evaluated the survey results, OIGI is improving the survey instrument. OIGI closed significant contractor labor mischarging cases during this period, recovering a total of \$168,934. Below are summaries of two cases in which recoveries of funds totaling \$54,292.70 have been coordinated with NGA contractors. Another case continues to be worked in coordination with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the US Attorney's Office in St. Louis, Missouri.



OIG Case No. 17-111, closed July 2018

An NGA contractor reported that an employee working on a contract at NGA improperly charged NGA for 365.65 hours that were not worked. The employee was terminated and OIGI obtained proof of reimbursement to NGA for \$43,951.13.

OIG Case No. 18-067, closed July 2018

An NGA contractor reported that an employee working on a contract at NGA improperly charged NGA for 78.9 hours that were not worked. The employee was terminated and OIGI obtained proof of reimbursement to NGA for \$10,341.57.

COMPUTER MISUSE

OIGI investigated acts of computer misuse by contractor and government personnel at NGA. The following case summaries depict investigations of using NGA computer systems for an excessive amount of personal use. One involves a contractor employee and the other a government employee.

OIG Case No. 17-054, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated an allegation that a contractor employee in the Financial Management component repeatedly used NGA computer systems to support a personal business, using email and creating documents not related to NGA business on government time. The investigation also found that the employee used government phones to operate a personal business. The employee resigned before the NGA Office of Contract Services or the employer could take any action.

OIG Case No. 18-040, closed May 2018

A computer network audit disclosed that a government researcher detailed from another government agency to NGA's Research component repeatedly used NGA computer systems to conduct activities related to personal businesses and engage in inappropriate conversations using a personal email account. The researcher failed to report many outside business activities to NGA. The researcher ended the detail to NGA and resigned from Federal service before any adverse actions were proposed.

OTHER NOTEWORTHY INVESTIGATIONS

OIG Case No. 15-103, closed May 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 4 research and development scientist in the Research component engaged in activities that presented a conflict of interest when executing acquisition-related duties, misused the position to benefit a personal friend, accepted gifts from a prohibited source and failed to disclose it, and used a personal email account to conduct official government business. OIGI substantiated all the allegations and coordinated the investigation with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and appropriate Department of Justice attorneys for possible criminal and civil actions. DoJ declined to take any action. The researcher left NGA before any administrative action could be proposed.

OIG Case No. 15-150, closed August 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 5 systems engineer in the Analysis component misused the position to endorse contractor businesses at NGA, misused government resources to communicate with contractors regarding potential contracts, and failed to make all appropriate disclosures on ethics forms. The investigation found sufficient evidence that the engineer misused the position, and that the assistance provided to two contractors gave the appearance of a conflict of interest. The investigation also substantiated that the engineer did not disclose reportable information on the Office of Government Ethics Form 450. The systems engineer received a Letter of Caution on 30 August 2018 for these violations.

OIG Case No. 16-078, closed May 2018

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 5 supervisory analyst in the Analysis component misused the position and government resources to operate a personal vanpool business and procure ridership, and failed to report this outside enterprise. The investigation substantiated all the allegations and identified that the analyst had received \$8,405 in Mass Transit Benefits that were not allowed. The analyst was removed from Federal service in April 2018, and actions were initiated to recover the \$8,405.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

During this period, OIGI worked on seven investigations with the DCIS and other criminal investigative agencies. The issues included false claims, cost mischarging, conflict of interest, theft of government equipment, threats to Federal employees, and tax fraud.

FORENSIC ANALYSIS SUPPORT TEAM

FAST uses data forensics to uncover potential fraud in contracts, procurements, and financial transactions. The team also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Part of the Investigations Division, FAST comprises a forensic auditor and three forensic data analysts.

COMPLETED

FAST has no completed projects to report for this reporting period.

ONGOING

OIG Contract Fraud Survey, Project No. F18-001

NGA OIG has developed an online survey tool, which allows NGA employees to report potential contract fraud anonymously. The goal of this project is to detect fraudulent activities with the aid of NGA employee input and enable OIG to take necessary action to neutralize or mitigate fraud schemes once detected. Additionally, the OIG Contract Fraud Survey aims to increase fraud awareness among NGA personnel and leadership, improve the prosecutor referral rate for cases involving criminal activity, and enhance NGA OIG proficiency and knowledge in Procurement Fraud investigations. OIG conducts the OIG Contract Fraud Survey annually.

Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F18-002

FAST has selected to review NGA Payroll and is developing a model to algorithmically detect NGA employees that are considered high risk for payroll fraud. High-risk individuals will be referred to investigations for further review. The Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model is projected to be completed December 2018.

APPENDIX A. STATUS OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

This appendix includes seven tables that present the status of recommendations according to various parameters.

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 30 September 2018

This table provides the number of NGA OIG and DoD OIG audit and inspection recommendations issued to NGA management that were closed or remained open at the end of the reporting period. This table does not include recommendations from the Financial Statement Audit and FISMA evaluation. Recommendations that closed prior to 1 April 2018 are not included.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|---|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Review of NGA’s Management of Removable Media Devices and Data Transfer Activities, Report No. OIGA 14-05, August 2014 | 5 | 0 |
| Objectives: To assess whether NGA had adequate controls over the use of removable media devices and data transfer activities. Specifically, to determine whether NGA’s removable media and data transfer activities complied with the requirements in the Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum, <i>Insider Threat Mitigation</i> , 12 July 2013, and the ODNI memorandum, <i>Oversight of Privileged Users with the Intelligence Community</i> , 25 July 2013. | | |
| Review of NGA’s Management of the Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses Funds, Report No. OIGA 15-04, January 2015 | 1 | 0 |
| Objectives: To assess whether NGA used the Official Representative Funds and Confidential Military Purpose funds for their intended purposes and to determine whether NGA management had adequate controls to manage the funds. | | |
| Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, May 2016 | 0 | 1 |
| Objective: To determine whether NGA policies and procedures ensured the proper use of administrative leave. | | |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|---|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Observations on NGA Purchases of Passenger Motor Vehicles, Report No. OIGA 16-11, September 2016 | 0 | 1 |
| Objectives: Observations identified during a formal investigation to determine whether NGA violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA) when it purchased two canine vehicles in FY 2013 using the Operation and Maintenance appropriation. While NGA did not violate the ADA when it purchased the vehicles, certain matters were of sufficient importance to communicate to management. | | |
| Audit of Foreign Travel, Report No. OIGA 16-13, September 2016 | 1 | 1 |
| Objective: To determine whether management of foreign temporary duty (TDY) travel was effective and efficient. Specifically, the OIG determined whether NGA travelers and approving officials complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for foreign TDY travel. | | |
| Audit of NGA's Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report No. OIGA17-06, March 2017 | 0 | 4 |
| Objective: To determine whether NGA sanitized and disposed of e-waste in accordance with IC, DoD, and NGA policies and procedures. | | |
| Audit of NGA's Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA17-09, June 2017 | 0 | 1 |
| Objective: To determine whether the NGA workforce performing information assurance functions have met appropriate certification requirements in accordance with DoD and NGA policies and procedures. | | |
| Audit of NGA's Oversight of Contractor Performance and Contract Payments, Report No. OIGA17-11, September 2017 | 8 | 2 |
| Objective: To assess the effectiveness of oversight of contractor performance and payment, specifically, to determine, for contracts, whether (1) contractor officers' representatives (CORs) and technical monitors (TMs) were properly appointed in accordance with applicable policy; (2) an appropriate oversight plan was established; (3) CORs are reviewing contractor work on a timely basis and in accordance with the oversight plan; and (4) contract payments are adequately supported. | | |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|---|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Audit of NGA's Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE), Report No. OIGA18-03, November 2017 | 1 | 1 |

Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided adequate contract and program oversight for the acquisition of the CFPE.

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| Audit of NGA's Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, April 2018 | 1 | 1 |
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Objective: To determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information was secure from personnel who separated from NGA.

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| Audit of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, July 2018 | 1 | 8 |
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Objective: To determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is effectively managed in accordance with applicable Federal, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

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| Audit of NGA's Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report No. OIGA18-07, August 2018 | 0 | 11 |
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Objective: Part 1: To determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background investigations, including controls for mitigating risk associated with onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations. Part 2: To determine whether NGA has a backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background investigations.

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| Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, November 2014 | 1 | 2 |
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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA's Privacy Program, processes, and procedures. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the Privacy Program was effectively organized, staffed, and trained to fulfill its responsibilities; (2) the risk of a privacy breach and existing mitigation efforts; (3) key factors in promoting and hindering the effective exercise of privacy protections; and (4) the completeness of required agency privacy documentation.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|---|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Inspection of NGA's Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Program, Report No. OIGE 15-02, March 2015 | 4 | 0 |

Objectives: To determine whether NGA has developed and implemented an effective IdAM Program. The subobjectives included determining whether the program is effective for managing user identities and access controls.

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| Inspection of NGA's Process for Managing Information Systems User Accounts, Report No. OIGE 15-03, March 2015 | 4 | 0 |
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Objective: To assess how agency information technology user accounts are created, activated, changed, suspended, terminated, or inactivated.

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| Inspection of the National System for Geospatial Intelligence Needs Process, Report No. OIGE 15-05, May 2015 | 1 | 0 |
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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NSG Needs Process. The subobjectives were to determine whether the NSG Needs Process is in compliance with governing policies, procedures, rules, and regulations, and to evaluate the performance of NGA's management, coordination, and monitoring activities of the NSG needs.

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| Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase I: Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16-02, November 2015 | 0 | 1 |
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Objectives: To determine whether NGA developed and implemented the necessary governance structure, oversight, and review processes, as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assessment guidelines, for entity-level reviews of the acquisition functions. The subobjectives were to (1) determine whether NGA's acquisition function is aligned with agency mission and needs; (2) evaluate the level of NGA leadership commitment; and (3) determine whether NGA's defense acquisition management review and oversight processes are sufficient.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|---|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human Capital, Report No. OIG 16-03, November 2015 | 8 | 1* |

Objectives: To review NGA's acquisition human capital policies and practices to evaluate whether NGA has developed and maintained a fully proficient acquisition workforce that is flexible and highly skilled across a range of management, technical, and business disciplines as outlined in OMB's assessment guide. The subobjectives were to determine (1) whether NGA is conducting effective strategic human capital planning and (2) whether NGA is effectively and efficiently acquiring, developing, and retaining acquisition talent.

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| Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIG 16-04, February 2016 | 0 | 3 |
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Objectives: To determine compliance with its statement of capabilities.

*This recommendation was reopened.

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| Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No. OIG 16-05, February 2016 | 1 | 2 |
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Objectives: To determine whether NGA's Insider Threat Program complies with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The subobjectives were aligned with the following six minimum standards established by the National Insider Threat Policy: (1) designation of senior official(s) and associated responsibilities; (2) information integration, analysis, and response; (3) insider-threat program personnel; (4) access the information; (5) monitoring user activity on networks; and (6) employee training and awareness.

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| Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners, Report No. OIG 16-06, May 2016 | 1 | 1 |
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Objective: To assess the magnitude, primary causes, and impact of the backlog within NGA's Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program.

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| Inspection of NGA's Office of Small Business Programs, Report No. OIG 16-07, June 2016 | 1 | 1 |
|---|---|---|

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Office of Small Business Programs, as well as compliance with IC, DoD, and Federal policies and directives

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|--|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the Office of Customer Engagement and the Office of Design, Xperience Component, Report No. OIGE IO-16-03, July 2016 | 2 | 0 |

Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA's overall IO program and the organization's IO Program.

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| Inspection of NGA Imagery Analyst Tradecraft Training, Report No. OIGE 17-02, February 2017 | 2 | 3 |
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Objectives: To determine the extent to which NGA is training its IAs to exploit imagery by taking advantage of the full spectrum of geospatial phenomenologies and making use of traditional and nontraditional sources. Subobjectives were to (1) determine the extent to which IAs have been trained to exploit full-spectrum GEOINT; (2) determine the extent to which IAs are trained to the same tradecraft standards; and (3) assess the mechanisms by which new IA tradecraft content, regardless of origin, is integrated into NGA College learning solutions and curricula.

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| Inspection of InnoVision's Research and Development and Technology Transition Outcomes, Report No. OIGE 17-03, March 2017 | 2 | 1 |
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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which InnoVision selects and transitions new products, processes, and services to the agency. Subobjectives of this inspection were to (1) identify the R&D programs/projects InnoVision has been pursuing over the last 5 years; (2) for each of the above programs/projects, identify its source and the reason it was chosen; and (3) for each program/project, determine the outcome. (Was the project transitioned, did it enhance the mission, what capabilities were delivered, etc.?)

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| Inspection of NGA's Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017 | 1 | 4 |
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness of NGA's strategic workforce planning function in meeting the requirement to have a future workforce that is capable of supporting DoD and IC missions. Consistent with Title 10, US Code, and DoD Instruction, the OIG used stages of the Office of Personnel Management's workforce planning model as the baseline for the assessment and issued five subobjectives: (1) assess strategic direction; (2) assess effectiveness of workforce and skills-gap analysis; (3) assess action plan(s); (4) assess implementation of action plan(s); and (5) assess the effectiveness of monitoring, evaluation, and revision.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|--|-----------------|-----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| Inspection of Structured Observation Management (SOM), Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017 | 4 | 3 |
| Objective: To assess SOM implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans and goals, milestones, and customer requirements. Sub-objectives of the inspection were: (1) determine the extent to which SOM has been implemented against the agency's established plan; (b) determine if SOM is meeting customer needs; and (c) assess the implementation of the program with respect to established standards. | | |
| Inspection of NGA's Office of Counterintelligence, Report No. OIGE 18-02, November 2017 | 0 | 6 |
| Objective: To determine whether NGA's counterintelligence program complies with DoD and IC policies and standards. The inspection also assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and execution of counterintelligence processes and activities. Sub-objectives of the inspection were to: (1) determine whether the Office of Counterintelligence programs and activities comply with DoD and IC policies and standards; (b) assess the Office of Counterintelligence program and organizational structure; and (c) assess the Office of Counterintelligence for effectiveness and efficiency. | | |
| Intelligence Oversight Inspection of Open IT Solutions Office, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, June 2018. | 1 | 0 |
| Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA's overall IO program and the organization's IO Program. | | |
| Follow-up Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program, Report No. OIGE-18-04, July 2018. | 1 | 0 |
| Objective: To assess the status of open recommendations from the 2014 OIG Report (OIGE-15-01) and to evaluate whether program improvements have been sustained. | | |
| Inspection of NGA's Medical Services | 1 | 13 |
| Objective: To assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight requirements of NGA's medical services, including the deployer program, during the period of 2014 to 2017. | | |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Recommendations | |
|--|-----------------|----------|
| | No. Closed | No. Open |
| An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies, Report No. DODIG-2014-060, April 2014 | 0 | 4 |

Objectives: To assess (1) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility; (2) if the referred investigations had been adjudicated; and (3) the results of those security adjudications.

A **recommendation for corrective action** is issued in response to a finding that a Federal standard is not being met; it is intended to bring the agency into compliance with the standard.

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|--|
| Inspection of NGA's Medical Services, Report No. OIG 18-05, August 2018 | 3 | Consistent with the Economy Act, reassess whether inter-Agency support is available for medical services that would be advantageous to the government. For all such support, (1) ensure documentation in an ISSA (DD Form 1144) and (2) ensure the support is explained in relevant internal SOPs. |
| | 5 | Implement a secure electronic transfer of NGA pre- and post-deployment health activity requirements to Defense Medical Surveillance System. |
| | 6 | Ensure Human Development Component's respective Primary Information Officer (PIO) and Information Officer (IO) responsible for all medical program records perform Records and Information Lifecycle Management requirements including updating the office file plan with the proper file series. |
| | 13 | Correct all nonpersonal service contracts covering medical professionals to make them compliant with 48 CFR Subpart 37.403. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|---|
| <p>Audit of NGA's Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, issued 18 April 2018</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>OIG recommends that the component designated in recommendation 1 identify an office of primary responsibility to develop agency-wide personnel separation policy and procedures that define roles and responsibilities, including, but not limited to, procedures for: ·</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating and maintaining documentation showing [REDACTED] • Monitoring the personnel separation process. • Training personnel on the documentation of the separation process. |
| <p>Audit of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, issued 12 July 2018</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>OIG recommends the Director, Security and Installations, [REDACTED] the Security Financial Disclosure Program [REDACTED]. In developing the Security Financial Disclosure Program [REDACTED]</p> |

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods Before 1 April 2018.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|--------------------|---|
| FY 2017 Evaluation of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 | 1.1. | Develop and implement an organizational continuous monitoring strategy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 1.2. | Develop and implement a continuous monitoring policy and procedures in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 1.3. | Develop and implement information system continuous monitoring plans in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 1.4. | Perform continuous monitoring over NGA IT security and performance metrics, and common and information system security controls in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 2.1. | Develop policies and procedures for security awareness and role-based training in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 2.2. | Provide and track role-based training for information security personnel in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 03.01. | Develop notification, investigation, and reporting timelines for all defined incident categories. |
| | 4.1. | Finalize cloud incident response procedures. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|---|
| FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued) | 4.2. | Finalize the development and implementation of cyber tools for all traffic routed into the agency, to include the cloud. |
| | 05.01. | Develop and implement a process to ensure that [REDACTED] POA&Ms address all requirements in accordance with policy and procedures. |
| | 6.1. | Develop an organizational risk management strategy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 6.2. | Develop risk assessment policy and procedures over mission and business processes in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 6.3. | Perform risk assessments on NGA mission and business processes and NGA information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 6.4. | Define the required frequency for security control assessments in accordance with CNSS, and NIST guidance and implement security control assessments in accordance with policy. |
| | 6.5. | Categorize and authorize all NGA information systems to operate in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. |
| | 6.6. | Ensure its information systems' security plans are updated and maintained to reflect the current environment, in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|--|
| FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued) | 7.1. | Ensure all systems in production have approved ITDRs. |
| | 7.2. | Ensure system personnel take action to address the findings identified in ITDR exercises. |
| | 7.3. | Document and implement procedures for assessing continued operations in a service continuity event for systems operating in the cloud environment. |
| | 7.4. | Ensure information system management establish processes for ensuring backups are performed in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. |
| | 7.5. | Identify, track, and oversee the implementation of system alternate processing sites in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. Perform evaluations to determine whether management should implement alternate processes to enable the system to meet recovery objectives in the event of a disaster at the primary processing site, prior to the establishment of an alternate processing site. |
| | 8.1. | Document an entity level POA&M lien to identify and track the completion the requirements of OMB M-15-13 to ensure the agency allocates appropriate oversight for completion. |
| | 8.2. | Develop and approve a process for the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS for all current and future public facing websites. |
| | | |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|---|
| FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued) | 8.3. | Implement the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS on all public facing websites as required by policy. |
| | 9.1. | Develop a formal identity and access management policy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 9.2. | Implement an identity and access management program over information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 9.3. | Ensure information systems describe implementation of NIST Access Control family controls, such as account types, access authorization, segregation of duties, and access recertification in security documentation in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 10.1. | Ensure information systems develop and maintain configuration management procedures and plans in accordance with the ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 10.2. | Ensure information system owners maintain accurate listings of their hardware and software inventories in order to maintain an accurate configuration baseline. |
| | 10.3. | Develop and implement processes to consistently authorize changes to information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance. |
| | 10.4. | Perform vulnerability scans in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|---|
| FY 2017 FISMA, Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued) | 10.5. | Remediate vulnerabilities in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. |
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 | 1A. | FM and OCS should complete the design of and implement its tri-annual review, to include a reconciliation to the general ledger and measures to quantify the results of the review. |
| | 1B. | FM and OCS should complete planned corrective actions to identify and de-obligate stale or invalid paid and unpaid UDOs. |
| | 1C. | FM and OCS should identify reasonable methods of [REDACTED], and develop and implement procedures [REDACTED]. |
| | 1D. | FM and OCS should improve standard operating procedures (SOP) to include enhanced contract creation and execution controls (e.g., contract approval and three-way match between the obligation, the invoice, and the receiving report) and should establish monitoring controls to enforce such procedures. |
| | 1E. | FM should work with OCS to complete an assessment to quantify the potential impact of expenditures on advance paid MIPRs incurred outside the period of performance. Additionally, FM should draft, finalize, and implement the SOP for advance paid MIPRs, to include consideration of the period of performance in its advance liquidation process. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|---|
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 | 1F. | FM should formally and completely document its criteria and procedures for performing and reviewing the accounts payable accrual look-back analysis into an SOP, including allocation between federal and nonfederal attributes, determination of invoices to be included in or excluded from the analysis, and more detailed supervisor review requirements. |
| | 1G. | <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> |
| | 1H. | FM should develop, document, and implement controls over the completeness and presentation of TBOs reported to DFAS and determine if an additional UDA accrual is necessary. |
| | 1I. | FM and the Security & Installations component (SI) should continue to remediate <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> |
| | 1J. | FM should complete implementation of configuration changes to GEO-F posting logic to properly record refunds of prior year paid obligations. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|--|
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 | 2A | FM, SI, and the Chief Information Officer and IT Services component (CIO-T) should continue their efforts to remediate personal property deficiencies, including a review of personal property CIP and IUS in development costs. As part of its review, management should place completed assets into service. Going forward, FM and SI should develop and implement a process that allows for in-use assets to be placed in-service in a timely manner. |
| | 2B. | SI should work with CIO-T and FM to assess the feasibility of implementing system configuration changes to capture personnel costs incurred for IUS in development. As an alternative, SI should work with CIO-T and FM to develop and implement a standard methodology to allocate capitalizable Government personnel costs incurred during system development to IUS in development at the asset level. |
| | 2C. | FM, SI, and CIO-T should work to develop and implement a process for summarizing personal property CIP and IUS in development costs by asset to allow for tracking and data analysis and timely movement to in-service PP&E accounts. |
| | 2D. | FM and SI should ensure that NGA's continued PP&E remediation efforts include a floor-to-book inventory of IUS, CAP, and GFP. |
| | | |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|--|
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued) | 2E. | SI, in coordination with FM, should develop and implement a policy for identifying completed CIP and IUS in development assets. The policy should define the point at which an asset is "complete" for financial reporting purposes to ensure timely asset and depreciation recognition. |
| | 2F. | FM should enhance and implement its PP&E impairment monitoring policy to include all required components of SFFAS No. 10 and SFFAS No. 44 and document the impairment analyses performed. |
| | 2G. | FM and SI should develop and implement corrective actions related to the identification of leased equipment, assessment of equipment leases as capital or operating leases, and inclusion of these leases in the lease note disclosure. |
| | 3A. | FM should develop, implement, and document a monitoring control to ensure adherence to NGA's journal entry review and approval policy. |
| | 3B. | FM should develop and implement system-enforced segregation of duties controls over journal entry preparation and approval. Such controls should include expanded use of the GEO-F journal entry approval role to enforce review thresholds. |
| | 3C | FM should configure GEO-F to restrict journal entry approvers from changing journal vouchers prior to approval, or to require that modified entries are routed through the preparer to re-submit. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|--|
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued) | 3D. | FM should ensure that adequate training and other resources, such as desktop guides, policies, or quick reference cards, are provided to personnel with journal entry preparation or approval responsibilities. Such training and resources should be provided timely upon the assumption of such responsibilities (i.e., prior to the month or quarter-end journal entry preparation timeline). |
| | 3E. | FM should enhance policy to include [REDACTED] |
| | 3F. | FM should identify relevant information relied upon in its business processes and work with other key components, as appropriate, to design, document, and implement internal controls over the completeness and accuracy of such information. |
| | 3G. | FM should develop and implement posting logic in GEO-F to record transactions in accordance with the USSGL at the transaction level. |
| | 4A. | FM should continue to work with DFAS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish a Plan of Action and Milestones for reliance on DFAS's FBWT reconciliation. As an alternative, FM management should develop appropriate analyses and processes to support the completeness and accuracy of NGA's FBWT without relying on the CMR report. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|---|
| (U) Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued) | 4B. | FM should continue to work with DFAS to obtain appropriate documentation to support legacy transactions. |
| | 5A. | We recommend that FM consistently follow recently implemented procedures to recognize all customer orders. |
| | 6A. | <p>Regarding access controls:</p> <p>1. Develop, document, implement, and enforce consistent [REDACTED]</p> <p>2. Enforce [REDACTED] policy, or document approved deviations from policy.</p> |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|--|
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued) | 6B. | <p data-bbox="873 327 1276 390">Regarding segregation of duties controls:</p> <p data-bbox="873 436 1382 684">1. Develop, approve, and implement procedures to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] approved deviations from policy should be documented.</p> <p data-bbox="873 730 1365 905">2. Enforce [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> |
| | 6C. | Regarding [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|---|
| | 7A. | <p>To address the FM-related deficiencies noted above, FM, in coordination with the relevant Key Components, should:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete, document, and implement an [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2. Develop or update, document, approve, and disseminate [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. 3. Update, approve, and disseminate a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in compliance with the relevant standards. |
| | 7B. | <p>To address the other information technology-related deficiencies noted above, CIO-T and the Office of Contract Services should:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete, approve, and disseminate [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] guidance. [REDACTED] |
| Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued) | 7B. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Perform and document [REDACTED] [REDACTED] compliance with NIST SP 800-53. 3. Update and disseminate [REDACTED] in compliance with NGA policy. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|----------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|
|----------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|

4. Update and implement policies and procedures for [REDACTED] in accordance with applicable guidance.

5. Develop and implement procedures to monitor and enforce the [REDACTED].

- 7B. Recommendations to address instances of noncompliance:
1. We recommend that Financial Management and the Office of Strategic Operations revise NGA's FMFIA process to incorporate the ERM requirements of OMB Circular No. A 123. Additionally, FM should perform additional procedures to identify material weaknesses in NGA's ICOFR environment.
 2. We recommend that NGA implement the recommendations provided in Exhibits I and II and improve its processes to ensure compliance with the requirements of FFMIA section 803(a) in FY 2018.

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|-------------|--|
| Audit of NGA's Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA 17-09, 30 June 2017 | 1 | Comply with DoD 8570.01-M. If management chooses to accept the risk of not complying with DoD 8570.01-M, perform a comprehensive risk assessment, signed by the Chief Information Officer, that justifies not complying with DoD 8570.01-M requirements. The risk assessment should address the risks to the protection, detection, and reaction capabilities of NGA's information systems and networks and any other information deemed necessary to support the assessment. |
| Audit of NGA's Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, 12 May 2016 | 1 | <p>Update NGA guidance relevant to administrative leave. Policies should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Establish clear procedures for supervisors, managers, and key personnel to follow when taking actions that result in the placement of employees on administrative leave. (2) Establish oversight procedures for the approval of administrative leave, to assess the use of administrative leave, and to follow up when the improper use of administrative leave is identified. (3) Address appropriate time limits for administrative leave, and ensure that the references to related NGA policies and procedures are consistent and accurate. (4) Identify the responsible component for official tracking of administrative leave. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|--|-------------|--|
| Inspection of Structured Observation Management, Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017 | 5 | Develop and issue, across the NSG, SOM tradecraft standards that address: accuracy requirements with rules for capturing objects, observations, and judgements; a quality control process; and sourcing and data disclaimers consistent with ICDs 203 & 206. |
| Inspection of NGA's Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017 | 1 | In accordance with statute and policies, develop and issue a strategic workforce plan that looks at a total workforce mix with an emphasis on critical skills and competencies needed to perform the agency's evolving mission. |
| | 3 | Establish a resourced activity to update the NGA leader competency model to reflect requirements defined within ICD 610, ICS 610-3, ICS 610-4 |
| Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, 25 February 2016 | 3 | Identify and review data. |
| Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase I: Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16- 02, 10 November 2015 | 2 | Ensure that NGA policy and guidance effectively promote a strategic, integrated, and agency-wide approach to the acquisition function. |
| Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014 | 19 | Establish a systematic process to ensure that all forms and other PII collection methods have accurate Privacy Act statements associated with them. Update and publish agency-level privacy policy with the statement procedures. Conduct periodic checks of the agency's forms and e-mails to evaluate the use of Privacy Act statements. |

| Report Title, Number, Date | Rec. Number | Recommendation for Corrective Action |
|---|----------------|--|
| Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014 (continued) | 21 | In accordance with previous recommendations, after establishing a method to identify IT systems that contain PII, ensure that IT system owners (program managers) complete Privacy Impact Assessments and submit them to the Senior Component Official for Privacy. Publish completed Privacy Impact Assessments on NGA's webpages. |

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period

| Report Title, Number, Date Issued | Questioned Costs | Unsupported Costs | Funds To Be Put to Better Use |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Audit of NGA's Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, 18 April 2018 | \$0 | 0 | \$0 |
| Audit of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, 12 July 2018 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Audit of NGA's Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report No. OIGA18-07, 9 August 2018 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Audit of the Emergency Management Test, Training, and Exercise Program at NCE, Memorandum U-230-18/OIG, 11 September 2018 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Total | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs

| Recommendation Status | Number of Reports | Number of Recommendations | Questioned Costs |
|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period | 2 | 2 | \$109,600,000 |
| B. Issued during reporting period | 0 | 0 | \$ 0 |
| Total A + B | 2 | 2 | \$109,600,000 |
| C. Management decision made during reporting period | | | |
| (i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs) | 2 | 2 | \$109,600,000 |
| (ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs) | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C] | 0 | 0 | \$0 |

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use

| Recommendation Status | Number of Reports | Number of Recommendations | Funds To Be Put to Better Use |
|---|--------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| B. Issued during reporting period | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| Total A + B | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| C. Management decision made during reporting period | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| (i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs) | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| (ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs) | 0 | 0 | \$0 |
| D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C] | 0 | 0 | \$0 |

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before 1 April 2018

| Unresolved as of 30 September 2018 | Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations | Number of Unimplemented Recommendations | Questioned Costs | Funds To Be Put to Better Use |
|---|---|--|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Audits | 10 | 91 | \$82,700,000 | \$112,200,200 |
| Inspections | 12 | 28 | \$109,600,000 | \$0 |
| Total | 22 | 119 | \$192,300,000 | \$112,200,000 |

STATUTORY REPORTING

Information or Assistance Refused by NGA

Section 5(a)(5) of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 requires IGs to promptly report to the head of the establishment if information requested is unreasonably refused or not provided. No such reports were needed or made during this reporting period.

Significant Revised Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(11) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to describe and explain the reasons for any significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period. We are not aware of revisions to any significant management decisions during this reporting period.

OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decisions

Section 5(a)(12) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information concerning any significant management decisions with which they disagree. During this reporting period, the IG had no instances of disagreement with significant management decisions.

Compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

Section 5(a)(13) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information described under section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. This information involves the instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates within its remediation plan to bring financial management systems into compliance with the law. NGA has developed and implemented radiation plans to address areas causing noncompliance for financial management systems. NGA has met the intermediated target dates in the plans.

Attempts to Interfere with the IG's Independence

Section 5(a)(21) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to provide detailed descriptions of any attempts by their establishments to interfere with their independence. We did not experience any attempts to interfere with our office's independence during this reporting period.

Public Disclosure (Closed But Undisclosed Audits, Inspection, Investigations)

Section 5(a)(22) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to provide detailed descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations involving senior government employees that were closed during the reporting period without being publicly disclosed. Summaries of all such work are included in the appropriate sections of this report.

- Audits closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 5.
- Inspections closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 10.
- Investigations closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 15.

Peer Reviews

Section 5(a)(14-16) of the IG Act require IGs to report information about peer reviews that their offices have conducted or been subject to. No peer review of NGA OIG was conducted by another OIG during this reporting period.

The most recent external peer review of the NGA OIG Audit Division was performed by the National Security Agency OIG. In its report of 23 February 2018, we received a rating of “pass” for our system of quality control in effect for the three-year period ending 30 September 2017. There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews of the Audit Division.

NGA OIG did not conduct any external peer reviews of another OIG during the reporting period.

APPENDIX B. INVESTIGATIVE METRICS

Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting Period

| Type of Case | Number of Cases | | |
|--------------|-----------------|----------|----------|
| | Referred | Accepted | Declined |
| Criminal | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Civil | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period

| Action | Number |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| Indictments | 0 |
| Convictions | 0 |
| Years of incarceration | 0 |
| Years of supervised release | 0 |
| Years of probation | 0 |

Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period^a

| | |
|--|----|
| No. investigative reports issued | 11 |
| No. individuals referred to DoJ for criminal prosecution | 0 |
| No. individuals referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution | 1 |
| No. indictments and criminal informations resulting from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities | 0 |

^a. NGA OIG issued no criminal investigative reports; however, NGA OIG did issue 11 administrative reports of investigation from 1 April 2018 to 30 September 2018.

APPENDIX C. INDEX OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

| Semiannual Reporting Requirement | | Page |
|----------------------------------|---|-------|
| §5(a)(1) | Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies | 5–20 |
| §5(a)(2) | Recommendations for corrective action | 30–46 |
| §5(a)(3) | Significant outstanding recommendations | 22 |
| §5(a)(4) | Matters referred to prosecutorial authorities | 15 |
| §5(a)(5) | Information or assistance refused | 50 |
| §5(a)(6) | List of completed audit, inspection, and evaluation reports | 5–14 |
| §5(a)(7) | Summaries of significant reports | 5–14 |
| §5(a)(8) | Statistical table showing questioned costs | 48 |
| §5(a)(9) | Statistical table showing recommendations that funds be put to better use | 49 |
| §5(a)(10) | Summary of reports for which no management decision was made | 49 |
| §5(a)(11) | Significant revised management decisions | 50 |
| §5(a)(12) | Management decision disagreements | 50 |
| §5(a)(13) | Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 | 50 |
| §5(a)(14-16) | Peer reviews | 51 |
| §5(a)(17-18) | Investigations statistics and metrics | 52 |
| §5(a)(19) | Investigations involving substantiated allegations against senior officials | 15–16 |
| §5(a)(20) | Descriptions of whistleblower retaliation | 16–17 |
| §5(a)(21) | Attempts to interfere with IG independence | 50 |
| §5(a)(22) | Public disclosure | 51 |

APPENDIX D. ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|---|
| ADA | Antideficiency Act |
| CAE | Component Acquisition Executive |
| CDA | Congressionally directed action |
| CFPE | Consolidated Foundation Production Environment |
| CI | Counterintelligence |
| CIO-T | Chief Information Officer and IT Services Component |
| CIGIE | Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency |
| CIP | Construction-in-Progress |
| CNSS | Committee on National Security Systems |
| COR | contracting officer's representative |
| CTTA | Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority |
| DCIS | Defense Criminal Investigative Service |
| DFAS | Defense Finance and Accounting Service |
| DISES | Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service |
| DoD OGC | DoD Office of General Counsel |
| FAST | Forensic Analysis Support Team |
| FISMA | Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 |
| FM | Financial Management Component |
| GEO-F | GEOINT-Financials |
| GEOINT | geospatial intelligence |
| GPC | Government Purchase Card |
| GS | GEOINT Services |
| IC | Intelligence Community |
| IO | intelligence oversight |
| IPERA | Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act |
| IT | information technology |
| ITC | Interim Transition Capability |
| MDCO | Military Department CI Organization |
| MFT | Multifunctional Team |
| MI | Military Intelligence |
| MOA | Memorandum of Agreement |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NAS | NSG Application Schema |
| NCE | NGA Campus East |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| NRO | National Reconnaissance Office |
| NSG | National System for Geospatial Intelligence |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| NtM | Notice to Mariners |
| OCS | Office of Contract Services |
| ODNI | Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
| OIG | Office of Inspector General |
| OMB | Office of Management and Budget |
| OUSD(C) | Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) |
| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
| POA&M | plan of action and milestones |
| QIAs | questionable intelligence activities |
| S/HS | significant or highly sensitive matters |
| SCIF | Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility |
| SI | Security and Installations component |
| SIC | Office of Counterintelligence |
| SIS | Office of Security |
| SOM | Structured Observation Management |
| SoN | Safety of Navigation |
| TM | technical monitor |
| US STRATCOM | US Strategic Command |

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