



SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

Office of Inspector General
October 1, 2020 - March 31, 2021



**Homeland
Security**

A Message from the Inspector General



Joseph V. Cuffari

I am pleased to submit our 37th *Semiannual Report to Congress* (SAR), summarizing the work and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) from October 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021. This SAR period marks the 18th anniversary of DHS, which opened its doors on March 1, 2003.

During this period, my office continued to provide important oversight of DHS' programs and operations, including an increased focus on COVID-19 pandemic-related issues. We continued to work with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), to promote transparency and ensure coordinated, comprehensive oversight of the Government's spending and COVID-19 response. In addition to issuing reports, we have delivered informative presentations about our audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations.

In addition to our pandemic-related oversight, this SAR highlights our efforts across DHS' six strategic mission areas; (1) countering terrorism and homeland security threats; (2) securing U.S. borders and approaches; (3) securing cyberspace and critical infrastructure; (4) preserving and upholding the Nation's prosperity and economic security; (5) strengthening preparedness and resilience; and (6) championing the DHS workforce and strengthening the Department. We issued 30 new reports containing 137 recommendations to improve DHS' programs and operations. This SAR also highlights our investigative activities, which resulted in six arrests, two convictions, and \$196,513 in restitutions.

We continued to engage congressional oversight committees, and members of the Senate Whistleblower Protection Caucus through meetings on COVID-19-related issues, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention, whistleblower protection, whistleblower retaliation, and our oversight of events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. I greatly appreciate the support Congress has given us.

I am grateful for the diligent service, selfless sacrifice, and dedication of our approximately 720 employees. Through their audits, inspections, evaluations, investigations, and mission support activities, DHS OIG continues to make our homeland safer, stronger, and more resilient.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH V
CUFFARI

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Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

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Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments

During this reporting period, the DHS OIG completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations.

Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 30 new reports (see Appendix 5) containing 137 recommendations, as well as 276 investigative reports.

Our audit and inspection reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS' programs. Our investigative reports provide factual findings from our investigations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct.

Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$98,197,603, of which \$31,983,647 did not have supporting documentation. As a result, the Department recovered or deobligated \$8,989,106. (See Appendix 6.) We did not issue any audit reports this SAR period identifying funds to be put to better use. We also reported \$196,513 in recoveries, asset forfeitures, fines, and restitution from investigations.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$98,197,603
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$0
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$8,989,106
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$8,989,106
Recoveries and Asset Forfeitures from Investigations (<i>Not from Fines and Restitution</i>)	\$0
Fines from Investigations	\$0
Restitution from Investigations	\$196,513

Investigations

We initiated 280 investigations and closed 301 investigations. Our investigations resulted in six arrests, two indictments, two convictions, and one personnel action. In accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, we have included information regarding the number of persons

referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations as of 10/01/2020	1,040
Investigations Initiated	280
Investigations Closed	301
Open Investigations as of 3/31/2021	1,019
Investigative Reports Issued	276
Investigations Referred for Federal Prosecution	11
Investigations Accepted for Federal Prosecution	4
Investigations Declined for Federal Prosecution	6
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	0
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	1

* All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigations' case management system. Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.



Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, fraud, or abuse affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	15,314
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	10,948
Complaints Closed	12,821

Note: Complaints referred and closed include complaints received in prior period.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, as well as by employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19*; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

Activity During Current SAR Period

Complaint Intake

During this SAR period, WPU received 172 complaints, which it reviewed for allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had five pending complaints to resolve. WPU declined to open an investigation for 158 complaints during the intake process. Investigations were opened on 7 complaints, leaving 12 complaints currently pending WPU review.

WPU Intake Complaints	Number
Pending Complaints Entering this Period	5
Complaints Received by WPU during Period	172
Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period	177
Complaints Declined During Intake Process ¹	158
Complaints Converted to Investigation	7
Total Complaints Pending at End of Period	12

Investigations

WPU closed a record-high seven whistleblower retaliation investigations during the SAR period, including six investigations closed with a report of investigation. WPU substantiated one investigation into whistleblower retaliation allegations during this SAR period, which will be described fully in the section below.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Number
Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	50
Investigations Opened during Period	7
Investigations Closed during Period	7
Investigations Pending at End of Period	50

¹ Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency, or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

Update On Prior Substantiated Reports of Whistleblower Retaliation W17-USCG-WPU-00828 & W17-USCG-19305

As reflected in prior SARs, WPU substantiated allegations that two officers in the United States Coast Guard were retaliated against for reporting misconduct in violation of the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034, in the above-captioned cases. The Coast Guard implemented all four recommendations -- (1) resubmission of the award nominations on behalf of the complainants and subsequently presenting a Commendation medal to one of the officers; (2) removal of a derogatory Officer Evaluation Report (OER) for one officer; (3) removal of negative comments from the OER of the second officer; and (4) convening of a special selection board to determine whether the officer who had previously been considered for promotion with the derogatory OER in the record would have been selected had that OER not been included. The board determined the officer would have been selected, and the Coast Guard issued a retroactive promotion and back pay to the member. The Coast Guard subsequently conducted an internal administrative investigation into whether Coast Guard staff were aware of the substantiated retaliation and as a result of its investigation took administrative action against the two responsible management officials found to have retaliated against the complainants.

Substantiated Report of Whistleblower Retaliation W18-USCG-WPU-02539

In December 2020, OIG substantiated allegations that a whistleblower in the Coast Guard was retaliated against for reporting misconduct in violation of the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034. Thru its investigation, WPU found the Coast Guard member made a protected communication and that several personnel actions were taken against the member after the member made the protected communication, including a negative performance evaluation without a recommendation for advancement. WPU found that the member's supervisors expressed animosity toward the member and others for their involvement in making the protected communication, which resulted in an internal investigation. WPU also determined that during the member's counseling session regarding the performance evaluation, the member's immediate supervisor criticized the member for making the protected communication and accused the member of having "jumped the chain of command." WPU found that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the member would not have received a negative performance evaluation, nor suffered other personnel actions, in the absence of the member's protected communication. In December 2020, WPU provided its report of investigation to the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security for appropriate action under the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*.

WPU received updates from the Coast Guard and DHS regarding corrective action for the complainant in *W18-USCG-WPU-02539*, with Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas directing the Coast Guard to implement appropriate corrective actions by October 2021. WPU will update Congress on corrective actions taken by the Coast Guard in the next SAR.

Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations.

OIG Offices	DHS Components and Offices
Executive Office	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
Office of Audits	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Office of Counsel	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Office of External Affairs	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)
Office of Innovation	Management Directorate (MGMT)
Office of Integrity	Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISOMB)
Office of Inspections and Evaluations	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
Office of Investigations	Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
Office of Management	Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
	Office of Inspector General (OIG)
	Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
	Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
	Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
	Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE)
	Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
	Privacy Office (PRIV)
	Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
	Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
	United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)
	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
	United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. Since our creation, we have issued more than 11,154 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of March 31, 2021, the Department had taken action to address all but 594 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 166 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 30 new reports and 137 recommendations to the Department; we closed 152 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, due to the Department's actions.



In addition to our pandemic response oversight activities, we highlight a number of audits and inspections we conducted during the reporting period in the following strategic mission areas outlined in the *DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024*:

- Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats
- Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches
- Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure
- Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security
- Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience
- Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We have also highlighted several investigations we conducted during the reporting period.

Pandemic Response Oversight

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic noting it was a public health crisis that would affect every sector of society. Then-President Donald Trump declared COVID-19 a national emergency, freeing \$50 billion in Federal resources to combat the pandemic. In March and April of 2020, Congress passed four² funding bills to address the public health and economic crises caused by COVID-19. Together, this legislation authorized approximately \$2.4 trillion in Federal spending. One year later, on March 11, 2021, President Biden signed into law the *American Rescue Plan Act of 2021*, making available another \$1.9 trillion in COVID-19 relief. Given this funding and the range of associated mandates, the Department has adopted a layered response to delivering critical supplies and services. DHS has been working through U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD), United States Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to carry out this mission.

In our November 2020 report, *Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security* (OIG-21-07) (MMPC report), we identified performing fully and effectively during COVID-19 as a major management and performance challenge facing the Department. The challenge to continue mission critical operations and programs relates to every aspect of DHS' mission but particularly Goal 5 in the DHS Strategic Plan: *Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience* – which includes building a national culture of preparedness, as well as responding during incidents.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, OIG has completed three reviews, including one verification review, *Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning* (OIG-21-14). OIG also has 14 projects in progress. As of March 31, 2021, OIG's Office of Investigations received 4,615 COVID-19-related complaints and opened 99 investigations, of which 30 have been closed. OIG is investigating, among others, hoarding and price gouging of personal protective equipment, counterfeit personal protective equipment, and fraud related to FEMA contracts and grants.

² These include in order of passage the *Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020*, Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020); *Families First Coronavirus Response Act*, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020); *Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act* (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); and *Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act*, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 134 Stat. 620 (2020).

In the *Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act* (CARES Act), Congress appropriated \$3 million in supplemental oversight funding to DHS OIG. OIG is using this funding for audits of FEMA's administration of the CARES Act and investigations of fraud related to FEMA contracts and grants.

DHS OIG is one of nine mandated IGs participating in the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established as a committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) by the CARES Act. At present, the PRAC is composed of 22 Inspectors General. The PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and support independent oversight of the funds provided by the CARES Act as well as provide oversight of those funds and the COVID-19 response.

The PRAC is tracking the \$2.6 trillion in payments to individual citizens, loans for businesses, and support for hospitals and other medical providers, as well as economic relief for impacted businesses, industries, and state, local and tribal governments. The PRAC hosts a comprehensive website – www.pandemicoversight.gov – with valuable interactive data visualizations and maps to track pandemic funds. In FY 2021, DHS OIG has contributed to regular PRAC publications such as *Top Challenges in Pandemic Relief and Response* and the *Agile Products Toolkit* for use by Federal, state and local oversight agencies. We have also presented highlights of our investigative work involving other Federal law enforcement partners.

Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches

We are continuously evaluating the Department's operations to achieve its goals of securing our borders, safeguarding and facilitating trade and travel, enforcing immigration laws, and properly administering immigration benefits. In FY 2020, Congress provided OIG a \$20 million budget increase for increased monitoring and oversight of border security and immigration enforcement activities. We completed 10

audits and reviews this SAR period, including our first unannounced virtual inspection at the La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, Arizona. We developed several new protocols for conducting other OIGs subsequently adopted, including using various video applications to perform walkthroughs and conduct interviews.

DHS helps maintain national security by managing the flow of people and goods into the United States. DHS' border security approach focuses on four goals: (1) securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; (2) preventing and intercepting foreign threats so they do not reach U.S. soil; (3) enforcing immigration laws; and (4) properly administering immigration benefits.

DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan

Violations of Detention Standards amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ (OIG-21-30)

We conducted an unannounced inspection of La Palma Correctional Center (LPCC) to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards. We also conducted a limited review of the facility's COVID-19 pandemic preparedness measures. We identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. LPCC complied with the ICE detention standard regarding classification. However, detainee reports and grievances alleged an environment of mistreatment and verbal abuse, including in response to peaceful detainee protests of the facility's handling of the pandemic. In addressing COVID-19, LPCC encouraged compliance with guidelines and procedures but could not enforce precautions including facial coverings and social distancing, which may have contributed to the widespread COVID-19 outbreak at the facility. In addition, LPCC did not meet standards for medical care, segregation, grievances, or detainee communication. We found that the medical unit was critically understaffed, took an average of 3.35 days to respond to detainee sick call requests, and neglected to refill some prescription medications. We also found the facility was not consistently providing required care for detainees in segregation and did not consistently record medication administration and daily medical visits for segregated detainees. Our grievance review revealed that LPCC did not give timely responses to most detainee grievances and, in some cases, did not respond at all. Finally, we found deficiencies in staff-detainee communication practices. Specifically, LPCC did not keep records of detainee requests and ICE did not provide a Deportation Officer visit or call schedule for detainees. We made eight recommendations to ICE's Executive Associate Director of ERO to ensure the Phoenix ERO Field Office overseeing LPCC addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with three of the eight recommendations. Based on our review of evidence ICE provided documenting its corrective actions, we closed two recommendations at report issuance.

ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (OIG-21-12)

The objective was to conduct an unannounced inspection of Imperial Regional Detention Facility (IRDF) to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards. We found violations

of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. Although IRDF generally complied with the ICE detention standards regarding classification of detainees according to risk, it did not meet the standards for segregation, facility condition, medical grievances, and detainee communication. We determined detainees were held in administrative segregation for prolonged periods of 22-23 hours per day, including two detainees who had been held in isolation for more than 300 days. We also determined that parts of the facility were in poor condition, medical checks were insufficient to ensure proper detainee care, medical grievances and responses were not properly documented, and ICE communication with detainees was limited. Until ICE takes corrective action to address these violations of detention standards, the facility will be unable to ensure an environment that protects the health, safety, and rights of detainees. We made six recommendations to ICE's Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) to ensure the San Diego ERO Field Office overseeing IRDF addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all six recommendations and is implementing a corrective action plan to address the concerns identified.

DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge (OIG-21-29)

A key issue preventing CBP from transferring detainees out of its facilities within 72 hours was insufficient ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations' (ICE ERO) bed space. ICE ERO also could not increase capacity quickly enough to keep pace with CBP's apprehensions. As a result, CBP's U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) faced rapidly increasing numbers of detainees — especially single adults — who remained in CBP's holding facilities intended for short-term custody. Despite worsening conditions, Border Patrol generally did not exercise its authority to release single adults from its custody. Border Patrol sectors created ad-hoc solutions to manage the growing detainee populations in its facilities, because their local response plans did not adequately account for ICE ERO's detention limitations. Furthermore, longstanding fragmentation in immigration enforcement operations between CBP and ICE ERO further exacerbated these challenges. We made six recommendations for ICE, CBP, and DHS that will improve the Department's response to migrant surges. The Department concurred with all six recommendations.

DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs (OIG-21-16)

We offered our initial observations on the Prompt Asylum Claim Review and Humanitarian Asylum Review Process programs, based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso, Texas area, as well as analysis of data and information provided by CBP and USCIS. Our observations were intended to inform DHS and Congress of potential challenges with these programs while they were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic and prior to potential expansion along the southwest border. CBP rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full evaluation of the pilots' effectiveness. We noted potential challenges related to how aliens are held and provided access to counsel and representation, and how CBP and USCIS assign staff to program duties and track aliens in the various component systems. We made six recommendations to improve the programs' implementation. DHS did not concur with five of the six recommendations.

CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry (OIG-21-02)

We determined that, in 2018, senior DHS and CBP leaders issued public statements urging undocumented non-U.S. citizens seeking asylum to enter the United States legally at POEs, while also directing ports of entry to focus on other priority missions and institute practices to limit the number of undocumented aliens processed at POE. CBP Office of Field Operations personnel at 7 of 24 southwest border ports of entry stopped processing virtually all

undocumented aliens, including asylum seekers, by redirecting them to other ports located miles away. This redirection contravenes CBP's longstanding practice to process all aliens at a "Class A" POE or reclassify the POE. Additionally, CBP officers at four ports returned undocumented aliens to Mexico despite a legal requirement to process asylum claims of aliens who are physically present in the United States. We made three recommendations aimed at bringing CBP's practices in line with Federal law and regulations and promoting efficient processing of undocumented aliens. CBP concurred with two recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.

CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs (REDACTED) (OIG-21-18)

We determined CBP needs additional oversight to effectively store and destroy seized illicit drugs in its permanent vaults. Federal law requires CBP to destroy most seized drugs and retain samples as evidence to prosecute criminals. However, 86 percent of illegal drugs that CBP stored in its vaults exceeded allowed quantities. Further, CBP stored excess drugs for long periods — in some instances, for more than 20 years. This occurred because CBP routinely waived or circumvented its drug storage and destruction policies. As a result, CBP's excessive and lengthy storage of large quantities of controlled substances created unnecessary safety and security risks. CBP also potentially incurred additional financial burdens to store, secure, inventory, manage, and process the excess drugs. We made four recommendations for CBP to improve the management of its processes to store seized drugs in its permanent vaults. CBP concurred with all four recommendations.

CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain (OIG-21-21)

In response to Executive Order 13767, CBP implemented new tools and technologies that have enhanced Border Patrol's surveillance capabilities and efficiency along the southwest border. However, CBP had deployed only about 28 percent of planned technology solutions, even after receiving more than \$700 million in funding for new technology since FY 2017. Consequently, most southwest Border Patrol sectors still rely predominantly on obsolete systems and infrastructure with limited capabilities. CBP faces additional challenges that reduced the effectiveness of its existing technology. Border Patrol officials stated they had inadequate personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology or maintain information technology systems and infrastructure on site. Further, we identified security vulnerabilities on some non-compliant CBP servers and workstations. CBP is not well-equipped to assess its technology effectiveness to respond to these deficiencies. Overall, these deficiencies have limited CBP's ability to detect and prevent the illegal entry of individuals who may pose threats to national security. We made three recommendations to improve CBP's border technology, enhance situational awareness of the southwest border, and address potential IT security vulnerabilities. CBP concurred with all three recommendations.

Other reports:

CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of Its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance (REDACTED) (OIG-21-19)

ICE Needs to Address Concerns about Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center (OIG-21-03)

ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment (OIG-21-15)

Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats

We continue to provide oversight of Department's counterterrorism activities and make recommendations to improve capabilities to counter terrorism and protect against homeland security threats. We completed five audits and reviews this SAR period.

DHS protects Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats by preventing nation-states and their proxies, transnational criminal organizations, and groups or individuals from engaging in terrorist or criminal acts that threaten the Homeland. The Department's counterterrorism responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) collect, analyze, and share actionable intelligence; (2) detect and disrupt threats; (3) protect designated leadership, events, and soft targets; and (4) counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats.

DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan

Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) (OIG-21-05)

We issued this management alert to notify DHS and FPS about an urgent issue requiring immediate attention and action. DHS must take immediate action to: (1) ensure the Director of FPS has authority to designate DHS employees under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1); and (2) ensure proper, by-name designation of any DHS employees authorized to exercise authority under 40 U.S.C. § 1315 to protect Federal property and persons on that property. During an ongoing review, we learned that the FPS Director did not properly designate DHS employees deployed to protect Federal properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1). Proper designation is important because deployed law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE, TSA, and Secret Service typically lack this precise scope of authority. Several law enforcement personnel were deployed to Portland, Oregon, to augment FPS' protection efforts, but may not have received training on 40 U.S.C. § 1315 before they were deployed. FPS and DHS did not concur with our report findings and two recommendations. However, FPS and DHS indicated that they would implement corrective actions to address the intent of the two recommendations.

TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program – Sensitive Security Information (OIG-21-11)

We determined TSA did not properly plan, implement, and manage the Quiet Skies program to meet the program's mission of mitigating the threat to commercial aviation posed by higher risk passengers. Specifically, TSA did not develop performance goals and measures to demonstrate program effectiveness or always adhere to its own Quiet Skies guidance. This occurred because TSA lacked sufficient oversight to ensure the Quiet Skies program operated as intended. For example, TSA did not have a centralized office or entity to ensure the various TSA offices properly managed Quiet Skies passenger data. Without sufficient metrics, analysis, and controls, TSA cannot be assured the Quiet Skies program enhances aviation security through FAMS as intended. We made two recommendations that, when implemented, may help TSA better measure the effectiveness of its Quiet Skies program. TSA concurred with both recommendations and has begun implementing corrective action plans.

Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch (FOUO) (OIG-21-22)

We determined that CWMD's BioWatch has information sharing challenges that reduce nationwide readiness to respond to biological terrorism threats. According to its mission statement, BioWatch is designed to operate a nationwide aerosol detection system. The system is intended to detect potential biological threat agents, identify the agent used, and share

information with stakeholders, serving as an early warning system. However, BioWatch does not operate a nationwide early warning system. Not implementing changes to address BioWatch's challenges impedes the United States' preparation for, detection of, and response to a potential bioterrorism attack, which could result in significant loss of human life. CWMD concurred with all four recommendations to improve BioWatch.

CBP Faced Challenges in Its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility (Redacted) (OIG-21-27)

We determined that CBP mail inspection processes and physical security at the JFK International Mail Facility are ineffective, and showed limited progress since our prior audit. CBP inspected approximately 12 percent of the 1.3 million pieces of mail it received during our June 2019 site visit. CBP also did not promptly inspect and process mail from high-risk countries, creating unmanageable backlogs. These deficiencies were largely because of inadequate resources and guidance. Consequently, more than 1 million pieces of mail were sent out for delivery without physical inspection. We made eight recommendations aimed at improving international mail processes at JFK. CBP concurred with six recommendations and did not concur with two recommendations.

FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant (OIG-21-24)

The objective was to determine whether FEMA ensured state and local law enforcement agencies accounted for and expended FEMA's grant for protection of the President's non-governmental residences according to Federal regulations and FEMA and U.S. Secret Service guidelines. We determined that FEMA did not ensure state and local law enforcement agencies expended FEMA's grant for protection of the President's non-governmental residences in accordance with Federal regulations and Agency guidelines. Specifically, FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) reimbursed the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for unallowable overtime fringe benefits. Additionally, GPD did not provide effective oversight to manage the PRPA grant during its application review and verification process by assigning limited, inexperienced staff whose work received minimal supervisory review. We made four recommendations to FEMA that should improve the management of the program. FEMA concurred with three recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.

Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure

We conduct mandated and discretionary audits to evaluate DHS' compliance with cybersecurity-related Federal laws and Executive orders to safeguard the Department's information systems and the Nation's critical infrastructure.

We completed one audit this SAR period.

DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure (OIG-21-01)

CISA has improved coordination efforts to secure the Nation's systems used for voting, but should take additional steps to protect the broader election infrastructure, which includes polling and voting locations and related storage facilities, among other things. For example, CISA has developed or updated a set of plans and guidance aimed at securing election systems for the 2020 election cycle. However, these documents do not sufficiently factor in risks associated with physical security, terrorism threats, and targeted violence to the election infrastructure. CISA can also improve the quality of information shared, as well as the timeliness of its assistance to election stakeholders. In the 2020 elections, with revised election processes due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was critical that CISA's divisions also require appropriate resources to provide timely assistance in support of state and local election infrastructure cybersecurity and physical security. We made three recommendations to CISA to address the deficiencies we identified. CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure are one of the most dynamic threats and significant strategic risks to the United States. The Department's cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) secure Federal civilian networks; (2) strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure; (3) assess and counter evolving cybersecurity risks; and (4) combat cybercrime.

DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan

Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security

We continue to provide oversight of DHS' programs and operations affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems to ensure the Department activities and investments effectively support the pursuit of its strategic missions.

We completed one audit this SAR period.

CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage (OIG-21-13)

We determined that while CBP's actions to implement prior OIG outage-related recommendations could not have prevented the onset of the nationwide outage on August 16, 2019, the steps taken did help minimize the length and severity of disruptions to passenger screening. By addressing OIG recommendations, CBP established a more effective control structure for monitoring passenger screening systems, thus enabling prompt action to identify and resolve the outage. However, CBP's configuration management policies and procedures were not sufficient to prevent the 2019 outage. CBP's critical passenger applications were operating on an Oracle database device that was not properly configured, and did not have up-to-date patches. The outage resulted in longer wait times and delays up to 2.5 hours for arriving passengers, as well as the need for CBP to revert to less effective backup systems to support passenger screening procedures. During the outage, CBP personnel could not quickly access "offline" systems and were not fully prepared for backup procedures. This was due to inadequate training and ineffective communication from CBP Headquarters during the outage. We made five recommendations to improve training, procedures, processes, and employee awareness. CBP concurred with all five of our recommendations.

The United States' prosperity and economic security are integral to DHS' homeland security operations, affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems. The Department's prosperity and economic security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) enforce trade laws and facilitate lawful international trade and travel; (2) safeguard the transportation system; (3) maintain waterways and maritime resources; and (4) safeguard financial systems.

DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan

Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience

We conduct mandated, requested, and discretionary audits and evaluations to assess the Department's disaster response and recovery programs and operations to identify deficiencies and make recommendations for improving efficiency and effectiveness. In our MMPC report, we identified improving FEMA's contracts and grants management, disaster assistance, and fraud prevention as a major management and performance challenge.

We completed eight audits and reviews in this mission area this SAR period.

FEMA Needs to Reduce the \$579 Million Backlog of Projects in its New York Public Assistance Grant Program (OIG-21-23)

FEMA Region II and DHSES have not adequately monitored or timely closed hundreds of projects, awarded at \$578.8 million, for seven disasters we reviewed. We recommended that Region II and DHSES address the procedural controls in the closeout process to adequately prepare for the large number and complexity of the next wave of projects ready for closeout. We made four recommendations that will help strengthen internal controls to improve oversight of the Public Assistance grant program. FEMA concurred with all four of our recommendations.

Better Oversight and Planning Are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program (OIG-21-20)

FEMA provided hotel rooms to about 90,000 households (nearly 227,000 survivors) after the 2017 California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. However, FEMA did not oversee and manage the Transitional Sheltering Assistance program to ensure it operated efficiently and effectively to meet all disaster survivors' needs. FEMA officials did not accurately validate taxes charged for hotel rooms and did not ensure that Corporate Lodging Consultants maintained accurate records to ensure taxes charged were reasonable and allocable; paid for unoccupied rooms; and did not transition survivors from Transitional Sheltering Assistance hotels to interim or permanent housing timely. This occurred because FEMA officials did not establish a dedicated program office with staff and standard operating procedures for the program. These deficiencies hindered FEMA from conducting appropriate reviews of the hotel costs and payments, and from adequately coordinating with the states to prepare pre-disaster housing strategies. As a result, FEMA paid more than \$55.8 million in unverified taxes, disbursed indeterminate amounts for unoccupied rooms, and left more than 146,000 disaster survivors in hotels for longer than the recommended 30 days. We made two recommendations to improve FEMA's oversight and pre-disaster planning of transitional sheltering. FEMA concurred with both recommendations.

The Federal Government must remain capable of responding to natural disasters, physical and cyber attacks, weapons of mass destruction attacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, and search and rescue distress signals. Following disasters, the Federal Government must be prepared to support local communities with long-term recovery assistance. The United States can effectively manage emergencies and mitigate harm by thoroughly preparing local communities, rapidly responding during crises, and supporting recovery. The Department's preparedness and resilience responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) build a national culture of preparedness; (2) respond during incidents; (3) support outcome-driven community recovery; and (4) train and exercise first responders.

DHS FY2020-2024 Strategic Plan

FEMA Should Disallow \$12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy (OIG-21-10)

FEMA approved New York State's DHSES application for approximately \$40.8 million to provide Disaster Case Management Program services to disaster survivors for household recovery efforts. FEMA did not provide the oversight needed to ensure DHSES-NY, as the grantee, carried out its responsibilities. DHSES-NY and its managing contractor did not always properly account for FEMA grant funds in accordance with Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines when approving contractor costs claimed, resulting in questioned costs of \$12.2 million. DHSES paper-based system used to track Disaster Case Management Program grant funding and expenditures was not sufficient to ensure contractors claimed eligible costs for payment. As a result, there is no assurance the contractors' claimed costs are valid, putting Federal funds and taxpayers' money at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. We made six recommendations to FEMA to help strengthen oversight of FEMA's Disaster Case Management Program individual assistance grant funds. FEMA concurred with all six recommendations.

FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement (OIG-21-26)

FEMA did not ensure procurements and costs for debris removal operations in Monroe County, Florida, met Federal requirements and FEMA guidelines. Specifically, FEMA did not adequately review local entities' procurements for debris removal projects and reimbursed local entities for questionable costs. These deficiencies were due to weaknesses in FEMA training and its quality assurance process. As a result, FEMA approved reimbursement to local entities for nearly \$25.6 million (more than \$23 million in Federal share) for debris removal projects, including contracts that may not have met Federal procurement requirements, and more than \$2 million in questionable costs. Without improvements to FEMA's training and project review processes, FEMA risks continuing to expose millions of dollars in disaster relief funds to fraud, waste, and abuse. We made three recommendations with which FEMA officials concurred.

Other reports:

FIMA Made Progress Modernizing Its NFIP System, but Data Quality Needs Improvement (OIG-21-04)

Success of Future Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts Depends on FEMA Addressing Current Vulnerabilities (OIG-21-25)

FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds (OIG-21-28)

Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning (OIG-21-14)

Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We continue to provide oversight of DHS' acquisitions, financial and performance management, information systems, mission support, and workforce areas to ensure the Department's activities and investments effectively support the pursuit of its strategic missions. In our November 2020 MMPC report, we identified ensuring proper financial management; IT support for essential mission operations; and oversight and management of major systems acquisition as major management and performance challenges for the Department.

Strengthening and integrating relationships between and among headquarters offices and operational components is critical to optimizing the Department's efficiency and effectiveness. The Department seeks to increase integration, clarify roles and responsibilities, champion its workforce, advance risk-based decision-making, and promote transparency and accountability. The Department's organizational responsibilities focus on three goals: (1) strengthen departmental governance and management; (2) develop and maintain a high performing workforce; and (3) optimize support to mission operations.

DHS Strategic Plan for FY2020-2024

We completed four audits and reviews this SAR period.

Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting (OIG-21-08)

KPMG LLP (KPMG), under contract with DHS OIG, conducted an integrated audit of DHS' consolidated financial statements for FYs 2020 and 2019 and internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2020. KPMG issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on the financial statements, reporting that they present fairly, in all material respects, DHS' financial position as of September 30, 2020 and 2019. However, KPMG identified material weaknesses in internal control in two areas (information technology controls and information systems, and financial reporting) and other significant deficiencies in three areas (custodial activities, grants management, and insurance liabilities). Consequently, KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS' internal control over financial reporting. KPMG also reported instances of noncompliance with three laws and regulations: (1) *Presidential Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019*; (2) *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982*; and (3) *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996*. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations.

DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives (OIG-21-06)

The DHS Privacy Office established a comprehensive framework to administer its privacy program. However, it did not have effective oversight to ensure consistent execution of its privacy program across DHS components. Specifically, the DHS Privacy Office had not established controls to ensure that privacy compliance documentation and Information Sharing Access Agreements are completed and submitted as required. The DHS Privacy Office did not monitor completion of required privacy training across the Department. We attributed these shortfalls to the DHS Privacy Office not having sufficient measures to ensure DHS components adhered to its privacy program. Without such measures, DHS may not be able to identify and address new privacy risks in existing systems and programs or prevent inappropriate dissemination of personally identifiable information. The DHS Privacy Office concurred with all

three recommendations we made to improve oversight of privacy compliance, information sharing access agreements, and privacy training.

DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment (OIG-21-09)

CBP, Secret Service, ICE, and TSA have not fully complied with DHS' guidelines for implementing the Lautenberg Amendment. CBP and Secret Service did not ensure law enforcement officers completed annual Lautenberg Amendment certifications as required. CBP and ICE also did not use available resources to monitor law enforcement officer arrests and convictions subject to the Lautenberg Amendment. None of the four components provided domestic violence awareness training to law enforcement officers as required by the implementing guidelines. We made three recommendations to enhance the components' ability to ensure compliance with DHS' guidelines for implementing the Lautenberg Amendment. DHS, CBP, and ICE concurred with the recommendations and described corrective actions they had either already taken or planned to take to address the report's findings.

DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019 (OIG-21-17)

Based on our review of 45 judgmentally sampled awards (15 non-competitive grants and 30 Other Than Full and Open Competition contracts), we found DHS complied with applicable laws and regulations. DHS officials supported award decisions with the required planning, market research, justification, and approval documentation to ensure effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. However, the Department's report was inaccurate because DHS did not sufficiently identify, review, and validate award information. Although we worked with DHS officials to ensure we had an accurate population for our testing purposes, inaccurate data in the report could hinder our ability to assess DHS' compliance with applicable laws and regulations in future reporting submissions. We made two recommendations to help improve DHS' procedures and ensure future reporting submissions are accurate. The Department concurred with both recommendations.

Investigations

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions. The Office of Investigations is composed of over 230 employees in 34 locations across the country, who investigate more than 1,000 active criminal, civil, and administrative actions each year.

The narratives below represent a small sample of our completed investigations.

FEMA Fraud

Jointly with the West Virginia Commission on Special Investigations, we investigated an inmate at the Charleston Correctional Center in Charleston, West Virginia, for fraudulently obtaining FEMA funds, following a flood in that state. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia found the inmate guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. §1040 Fraud in Connection with Major Disaster, and sentenced him to 2 additional years of incarceration, followed by 4 years of supervised release and ordered to pay \$8,614 in restitution.

Assault

We investigated an immigration detainee for assaulting two deportation officers in Leesport, Pennsylvania, during an attempted removal of the detainee from his dorm room, resulting in injuries to both deportation officers. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the detainee guilty of one count of Title 18 U.S.C. § 153(a)(1)(C) (Failure to Depart) and one count of Title 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (Assaulting, Resisting and Impeding Federal officers). The court sentenced the detainee to 1 year and a day incarceration, 1 year of supervised release, and a \$150 special assessment.

Visa Fraud

Jointly with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, we investigated a non-profit educational institution for committing visa fraud by falsifying visa applications. The non-profit institution signed a civil agreement with the United States Attorney's Office to pay the United States a fee of \$1.17 million.

False Claim

We investigated a DHS contractor for inappropriately billing DHS \$71.9 million in direct labor under an IT service contract. Pursuant to a civil agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Section, the contractor agreed to pay \$6.05 million in settlement, with \$3 million deemed restitution for DHS.

Theft of Government Property

Jointly with CBP Office of Professional Responsibility, we investigated two former employees of a CBP contractor who were responsible for securing CBP seized property. The two former employees stole 292 seized iPhones worth \$218,372. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey found the first subject guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 659 (Theft of Interstate Shipments) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Aiding and Abetting), and sentenced to 8 months of home confinement, 5 years of probation, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$218,372. The court found the second subject guilty of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Theft of

Government Property) and sentenced him to 22 months of probation and \$7,500 in restitution.

Child Pornography

Jointly with ICE HSI, we investigated a TSO for trading and distributing pornographic images of children. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found the former employee guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Possession of Child Pornography) and sentenced him to 48 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release.





Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute

Jointly with ICE HSI, we investigated a Border Patrol Agent for being associated with narcotics traffickers. A jury for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found the former Border Patrol Agent guilty of Title 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Cocaine Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine), Title 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute), and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (False Statement). The court sentenced the former employee to 160 months' incarceration and 5 years' supervised release.

Investigations of Senior Government Employees

This section summarizes each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct by a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This information is provided in accordance with requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.

Senior Government Employee Investigations

	<p>A senior CBP official (SES) for improperly using CBP funds when making unnecessary purchases, using official equipment for personal use, and for creating an anti-enforcement and hostile work environment. We found that the official made unnecessary equipment purchases for personal and official use; however, the purchases did not violate official CBP policy. In addition, we found that the official created a hostile work environment and that the official chose to limit immigration enforcement in the official's district. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.</p>
	<p>A senior U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) official (SES) for carrying an unauthorized weapon while on duty and for improperly accepting complimentary tickets from a USBP contractor. It was also alleged USBP managers participated in a private event requiring an attendance fee which exceeded standards established by the Code of Federal Regulations and that some managers may have committed travel fraud when they extended their government travel after an official meeting to attend the event. We did not substantiate that the fee violated ethics standards nor that the official carried an unauthorized weapon; however, we substantiated that a family member of the official received complimentary tickets from a USBP contractor valued at thousands of dollars with the official's awareness. We referred this matter to the United States Attorney's Office on August 8, 2020, which declined prosecution on that same date.</p>
	<p>We investigated an ICE official (SES) for sending multiple emails containing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and procurement sensitive information to his personal email account. We found that the official sent official emails to his personal email account including official procurement sensitive information, PII and ICE documents marked For Official Use Only and Attorney/Client Privilege. The official resigned from Government service during our investigation. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.</p>
	<p>We investigated a USCIS official (SES) for procurement fraud, transmitting official procurement sensitive information to their personal email account, and for the improper oversight of missing congressionally appropriated funds. We found that although the official emailed procurement sensitive information to their email account, the information was soon outdated and we found no evidence that the official interfered in the competitive procurement process. During the course of our investigation we found that the official failed to obtain approval for outside employment and failed to list it on a financial disclosure report as required. We found that the allegation that the official failed to properly provide oversight to congressionally appropriated funds was unsubstantiated. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.</p>

Congressional Briefings

We briefed congressional Members and their staffs more than 50 times throughout the reporting period. The Inspector General also met with numerous Members who sit on committees with jurisdiction over DHS, and briefed committee staff on DHS OIG’s full portfolio of work, including our oversight work of DHS’ role in responding to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

Other OIG Activities

Oversight of *Single Audit Act*, as Amended by Public Law 104-156

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with *Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards* (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “Single Audit.” Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS. During this reporting period, we completed 145 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by independent public accountant organizations.

Appendix 1: Reports with Monetary Findings

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

	# Reports	# Recommendations	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
Carryover	27	63	\$7,960,470,231	\$7,147,305,098
Issued	4	6	\$98,197,603	\$31,983,647

CURRENT



Reports and Recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use


	# Reports	# Recommendations	Funds Put to Better Use
Carryover	13	29	\$2,971,409,106
Issued	0	0	-

CURRENT




Appendix 2: Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations


Reports & Recommendations, Open > 6 Months



Current Report Inventory



Active Recommendations



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

Appendix 3: Reports with Unresolved Recommendations More than 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	No. Over 6 Months
1	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
2	1/12/2017	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
3	9/27/2017	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	6	TSA	1
4	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2, 3, 4	TSA	3
5	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	ICE	1
6	9/19/2018	OIG-19-17	<i>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable</i>	1, 2	TSA	2
7	2/28/2019	OIG-19-23	<i>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i>	1	CBP	1
8	7/25/2019	OIG-19-54	<i>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a \$706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes</i>	1	FEMA	1
9	7/31/2019	OIG-19-57	<i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i>	5	ICE	1
10	9/30/2019	OIG-19-66	<i>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds</i>	1, 3	FEMA	2
11	11/21/2019	OIG-20-04	<i>Audit of DHS Fiscal Year 2017 Purchase and Travel Card Programs</i>	5, 11	CFO	2
12	11/25/2019	OIG-20-06	<i>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families</i>	3	ICE	1
13	2/28/2020	OIG-20-16	<i>DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification Devices</i>	1, 2	MGMT	2
14	3/24/2020	OIG-20-19	<i>PALMS Funding and Payments Did Not Comply with Federal Appropriations Law</i>	1 - 6, 8, 9	MGMT	8
15	3/23/2020	OIG-20-20	<i>FEMA's Advance Contract Strategy for Disasters in Puerto Rico</i>	1, 2, 4	FEMA	3
16	4/6/2020	OIG-20-23	<i>FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003</i>	1, 2	FEMA	2

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	No. Over 6 Months
17	7/14/2020	OIG-20-52	<i>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border</i>	1, 2, 3	CBP, MGMT, PLCY	3
18	7/27/2020	OIG-20-57	<i>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines</i>	4	FEMA	1
19	8/13/2020	OIG-20-59	<i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	4, 5	ICE, MGMT, PLCY, TSA	2
20	8/12/2020	OIG-20-60	<i>FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003</i>	1, 2, 3	FEMA	3
21	9/15/2020	OIG-0-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina</i>	1, 7	FEMA	2
22	8/27/2020	OIG-20-66	<i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i>	1	CBP, DHS, ICE, USCG, USSS	1
23	9/28/2020	OIG-20-75	<i>CBP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Strategy for Meeting Its LS-NII Needs</i>	1	MGMT	1
24	9/30/2020	OIG-20-77	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i>	2, 4	DHS, MGMT	2
25	9/28/2020	OIG-20-79	<i>CBP's Entry Reconciliation Program Puts Revenue at Risk</i>	1	CBP	1
26	9/30/2020	OIG-20-80	<i>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces</i>	1 - 7	SEC, DSEC, COS, OPS, PLCY	7
					Total	55

Appendix 4: Reports with Open Recommendations More than 6 Months Old

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
2	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	1	-	-	TSA
3	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
4	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	-	-	DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
5	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	-	-	CFO
6	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	1	-	-	PLCY
7	OIG-16-06	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit</i>	15	-	-	CFO, DHS, FEMA, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
8	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	1	-	-	FEMA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
9	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	-	-	CBP
10	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	3	-	-	CBP
11	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	-	FEMA
12	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	2	-	-	TSA
13	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	-	-	OGC, TSA
14	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	1	\$18,443,447	-	FEMA
15	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG Grants</i>	1	\$7,124,893	-	FEMA
16	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	1	-	-	CBP
17	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	1	-	-	MGMT

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
18	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	-	-	USSS
19	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	-	-	CBP, CFO, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
20	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	1	-	-	TSA
21	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	-	-	CBP
22	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	-	-	FEMA
23	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	4	-	-	CRCL, I&A, OGC, PRIV
24	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	3	-	-	ICE
25	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	1	-	-	MGMT

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
26	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	1	-	-	MGMT
27	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	6	-	-	USCG
28	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	4	-	-	TSA
29	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	1	-	-	CBP
30	OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	42	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, USCG, USSS
31	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	-	-	ICE
32	OIG-18-51	<i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	1	-	-	DHS
33	OIG-18-67	<i>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements</i>	2	-	-	ICE

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
34	OIG-18-70	<i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	-	-	TSA
35	OIG-18-71	<i>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
36	OIG-18-73	<i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i>	2	-	-	COS, DSEC, SEC
37	OIG-18-78	<i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	4	-	-	USCIS
38	OIG-18-81	<i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i>	2	-	-	MGMT
39	OIG-18-83	<i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i>	4	-	-	CBP
40	OIG-18-85	<i>Management Alert - Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
41	OIG-18-88	<i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	2	-	-	USCG

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
42	OIG-19-04	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
43	OIG-19-10	<i>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry</i>	4	-	-	CBP
44	OIG-19-15	<i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i>	1	\$1,768,768	-	NPPD
45	OIG-19-18	<i>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards</i>	3	-	-	ICE
46	OIG-19-19	<i>DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs</i>	1	-	-	COS, DSEC, SEC
47	OIG-19-21	<i>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i>	2	-	-	TSA
48	OIG-19-22	<i>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>	5	-	-	USCG
49	OIG-19-28	<i>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens</i>	4	-	-	ICE
50	OIG-19-35	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers</i>	1	-	-	TSA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
51	OIG-19-42	<i>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program</i>	3	-	-	DHS
52	OIG-19-48	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline</i>	6	-	-	MGMT
53	OIG-19-49	<i>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation</i>	3	-	-	CBP
54	OIG-19-52	<i>FEMA's Cost Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
55	OIG-19-55	<i>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs</i>	4	-	-	FEMA
56	OIG-19-56	<i>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement</i>	1	-	-	TSA
57	OIG-19-57	<i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i>	3	-	-	ICE

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
58	OIG-19-59	<i>S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS</i>	2	-	-	S&T
59	OIG-19-61	<i>FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for \$306 Million in Public Assistance Funds</i>	1	-	\$123,011,428	FEMA
60	OIG-19-67	<i>Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics</i>	1	-	-	CBP
61	OIG-20-03	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	-	-	DHS
62	OIG-20-04	<i>Audit of DHS Fiscal Year 2017 Purchase and Travel Card Programs</i>	5	\$41,538	-	CFO
63	OIG-20-06	<i>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families</i>	3	-	-	CBP, MGMT
64	OIG-20-13	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges</i>	3	-	-	ICE
65	OIG-20-15	<i>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey</i>	1	-	\$182,000,000	FEMA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
66	OIG-20-22	<i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Housing</i>	2	-	-	FEMA
67	OIG-20-25	<i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
68	OIG-20-26	<i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Education</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
69	OIG-20-28	<i>TSA's Challenges With Passenger Screening Canine Teams - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	-	\$77,000,000	TSA
70	OIG-20-29	<i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the U.S. Virgin Islands Housing and Finance Authority</i>	3	\$296,000,000	-	FEMA
71	OIG-20-32	<i>FEMA Needs to Effectively Designate Volunteers and Manage the Surge Capacity Force</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
72	OIG-20-33	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System</i>	1	-	-	TSA
73	OIG-20-34	<i>CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States</i>	4	-	-	CBP,TSA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
74	OIG-20-37	<i>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats</i>	3	-	-	CISA
75	OIG-20-38	<i>CBP Struggled to Provide Adequate Detention Conditions During 2019 Migrant Surge</i>	2	-	-	CBP
76	OIG-20-39	<i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the USVI Water and Power Authority</i>	2	-	-	FEMA
77	OIG-20-40	<i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management</i>	3	-	-	DHS
78	OIG-20-43	<i>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i>	3	-	-	PLCY
79	OIG-20-45	<i>Capping Report: Observations of Unannounced Inspections of ICE Facilities in 2019</i>	1	-	-	ICE
80	OIG-20-46	<i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Collier County, Florida</i>	4	-	-	FEMA
81	OIG-20-48	<i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida</i>	9	\$1,076,913	-	FEMA
82	OIG-20-50	<i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida</i>	13	\$62,763	-	FEMA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
83	OIG-20-51	<i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants in Monroe County, Florida</i>	18	\$384,329	\$5,000,000	FEMA
84	OIG-20-53	<i>DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department's Efforts to Defend the Nation's Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism</i>	2	-	-	CWMD
85	OIG-20-55	<i>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE</i>	7	-	-	CBP
86	OIG-20-57	<i>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
87	OIG-20-58	<i>FEMA Did Not Properly Award and Oversee the Transitional Sheltering Assistance Contract</i>	1	-	-	DHS, FEMA
88	OIG-20-59	<i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	3	-	-	ICE, PLCY, TSA

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
89	OIG-20-61	<i>Progress and Challenges in Modernizing DHS' IT Systems and Infrastructure</i>	1	-	-	MGMT
90	OIG-20-62	<i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain</i>	3	-	-	CFO
91	OIG-20-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina</i>	5	\$59,575,020	-	FEMA
92	OIG-20-64	<i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Compliance with Use of Force Policy for Incidents on November 25, 2018 and January 1, 2019 - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	1	-	-	CBP
93	OIG-20-66	<i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i>	1	-	-	CBP, DHS, ICE, USCG, USSS
94	OIG-20-68	<i>FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
95	OIG-20-70	<i>Management Alert - CBP Needs to Award a Medical Services Contract Quickly to Ensure No Gap in Services - Source Selection Information</i>	1	-	-	CBP

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
96	OIG-20-71	<i>Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot</i>	3	-	-	CBP
97	OIG-20-72	<i>Oversight Review of the Office of the Chief Security Officer, Internal Security Division</i>	12	-	-	DHS
98	OIG-20-73	<i>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018</i>	3	-	-	DHS, MGMT
99	OIG-20-74	<i>DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018</i>	4	-	-	CISA
100	OIG-20-75	<i>CBP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Strategy for Meeting Its LS-NII Needs</i>	2	-	-	CBP
101	OIG-20-76	<i>FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria</i>	4	\$50,000,000	-	FEMA
102	OIG-20-77	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i>	3	-	-	CISA, DHS, MGMT
103	OIG-20-78	<i>CBP Did Not Adequately Oversee FY 2019 Appropriated Humanitarian Funding</i>	2	-	-	CBP
		Total	423	\$436,696,206	\$387,011,428	

Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “D” is a grant audit.

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity (formerly known as the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight).

Appendix 5: Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
1	10/22/20	OIG-21-01	<i>DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure</i>	-	-	-
2	10/27/20	OIG-21-02	<i>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry</i>	-	-	-
3	10/27/20	OIG-21-03	<i>ICE Needs to Address Concerns About Detainee Care and Treatment at the Howard County Detention Center</i>	-	-	-
4	10/29/20	OIG-21-04	<i>FIMA Made Progress Modernizing Its NFIP System, but Data Quality Needs Improvement</i>	-	-	-
5	10/30/20	OIG-21-05	<i>Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)</i>	-	-	-
6	11/04/20	OIG-21-06	<i>DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives</i>	-	-	-

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
7	11/10/20	OIG-21-07	<i>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security</i>	-	-	-
8	11/13/20	OIG-21-08	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	-	-	-
9	11/13/20	OIG-21-09	<i>DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment</i>	-	-	-
10	11/16/20	OIG-21-10	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy</i>	\$12,178,970	\$8,701,371	-
11	11/25/20	OIG-21-11	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program – Sensitive Security Information</i>	-	-	-
12	12/18/20	OIG-21-12	<i>ICE Needs to Address Prolonged Administrative Segregation and Other Violations at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility</i>	-	-	-

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
13	12/18/20	OIG-21-13	<i>CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage</i>	-	-	-
14	12/18/20	OIG-21-14	<i>Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning</i>	-	-	-
15	1/13/21	OIG-21-15	<i>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment</i>	-	-	-
16	1/21/2021	OIG-21-16	<i>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs</i>	-	-	-
17	1/29/21	OIG-21-17	<i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019</i>	-	-	-
18	3/26/21	OIG-21-18	<i>CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs</i>	-	-	-
19	2/4/21	OIG-21-19	<i>CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of Its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance</i>	-	-	-
20	2/10/21	OIG-21-20	<i>Better Oversight and Planning Are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program</i>	\$55,800,000	-	-

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
21	2/22/21	OIG-21-21	<i>CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain</i>	-	-	-
22	2/22/21	OIG-21-22	<i>Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch (FOUO)</i>	-	-	-
23	3/4/21	OIG-21-23	<i>FEMA Needs to Reduce the \$579 Million Backlog of Projects in Its New York Public Assistance Grant Program</i>	-	-	-
24	3/3/21	OIG-21-24	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant</i>	\$6,936,357	-	-
25	3/3/21	OIG-21-25	<i>Success of Future Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts Depends on FEMA Addressing Current Vulnerabilities</i>	-	-	-
26	3/4/21	OIG-21-26	<i>FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement</i>	\$23,282,276	\$23,282,276	-
27	3/4/21	OIG-21-27	<i>CBP Faced Challenges in Its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - (FOUO)</i>	-	-	-

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
28	3/11/21	OIG-21-28	<i>FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds</i>	-	-	-
29	3/18/21	OIG-21-29	<i>DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge</i>	-	-	-
30	3/30/21	OIG-21-30	<i>Violations of Detention Standards amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ</i>	-	-	-
Total				\$98,197,603	\$31,983,647	\$0

Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.


(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

Appendix 6: Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
1	11/7/2014	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	\$3,559,067	\$2,838,424	\$720,642	\$956,228
2	6/9/2015	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	\$23,537,386	\$0	\$22,511,051	\$1,026,335
3	1/24/2017	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	\$31,713,569	\$0	\$31,713,569	\$0
4	5/4/2018	OIG-18-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi</i>	\$20,391,686	\$6,950,455	\$13,441,231	\$6,950,455
5	4/23/2020	OIG-20-27	<i>Harris County, Texas, Needs Continued Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant</i>	\$2,429,492	\$56,088	\$2,643,347	\$56,088
Totals				\$81,631,200	\$9,844,967	\$71,029,840	\$8,989,106

Appendix 7: Contract Audit Results



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

During this SAR period, we issued 0 contract audit reports containing unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs.

Appendix 8: Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG Audit Operations



Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

In the past 12 months, DHS OIG’s Inspection and Evaluation Operations, Audit Operations, and Investigative Operations, have passed external peer reviews.

PASS - Peer Review of DHS OIG Inspection and Evaluation Operations

In November 2020, CIGIE peer review team consisting of representatives from four Offices of Inspector General (Veterans Affairs, State, Energy, and Defense), completed a peer review of DHS OIG projects conducted in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*. DHS OIG’s internal policies and procedures generally met the seven covered Blue Book standards addressed in the review, and the four reviewed reports generally met the Blue Book standards and complied with DHS OIG’s internal policies and procedures. The peer review team made no recommendations.

PASS - Peer Review of DHS OIG Audit Operations

In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Education OIG completed its peer review of the DHS OIG audit organization’s system of quality control in effect for the year ended September 30, 2020. The peer review team concluded the DHS OIG audit organization’s system of quality control has been suitably designed and complied with to provide DHS OIG with reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects. DHS OIG received a rating of *pass*.

PASS – INV Peer Review of DHS OIG Investigative Operations

In June 2020, the Housing and Urban Development OIG completed a peer review of DHS OIG’s investigative operations. DHS OIG received a compliant rating with no recommendations.

Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG Audit Operations

DHS OIG does not have any outstanding recommendations from any previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG.

Peer Reviews Conducted by DHS OIG

In November 2020, a CIGIE peer review team led by DHS OIG completed a peer review of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) OIG's projects conducted in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*.

Appendix 9: Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

Allegation	
1	We investigated a DHS official (PAS) for providing false and misleading information, under oath, to the U.S. Congress. We determined that there was no conclusive evidence that the official gave false and misleading statements to the U.S. Congress during testimony, through a written response, or when providing information during two official press events at the White House.
2	We investigated a component manager (GS-15) for procurement fraud and engaging in prohibited personnel practices and for unauthorized purchases using the Government Purchase Card. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated .
3	We investigated a component official (SES) and a former component manager (GS-15, retired) for procurement fraud and the official for improper oversight of a contract. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated .
4	We investigated a component official (SES) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices involving retaliation. The official left DHS before the investigation was completed. We closed the investigation since there were no allegations of criminal activity to investigate, and the component could not administer potential discipline on persons who were no longer employees.
5	We investigated three component managers (all GS-15s) for personal and professional connections to individuals with possible disreputable associations. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated .
6	We investigated a component official (SES) for an improper romantic relationship with a subordinate and for relocating the subordinate's office and engaging in unnecessary official travel in furtherance of the relationship. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated .
7	We investigated an OIG official (SES) for allegedly exhibiting sexist and racist behavior, abuse of telework, and alleged intimidation of a witness. The allegations were unsubstantiated .
8	We investigated an OIG official (SES) for alleged mistreatment of other employees. The investigation was closed without action because the official who oversaw the investigation did not find that the subject committed discrimination or retaliation and did not find that the subject violated any other established standard of workplace behavior; further, the official who oversaw the investigation expressly concluded that there was no basis for taking a performance- or conduct-based action against the subject .
	Total: 8

Appendix 10: Abbreviations

ACAS	Air Cargo Advance Screening
AFG	Assistance to Firefighters Grant
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CISA	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Coast Guard	United States Coast Guard
COS	Chief of Staff
COVID-19	Coronavirus of 2019
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DHSES	Division of Homeland Security Services
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIMA	Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPS	Federal Protective Service
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSPD-12	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IT	information technology
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
LSCMS	Logistics Supply Chain Management System
MGMT	Directorate for Management
MMPC	Major Management and Performance Challenges
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OER	Officer Evaluation Report
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OPA	Office of Public Affairs
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPS	Office of Operations Coordination
OSC	U.S. Office of Special Counsel
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
POE	Port of Entry
PRAC	Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
PREPA	Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PRIV	Privacy Office

QC	Questioned Costs
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	semiannual report
SAVE	DHS Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess Act
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEC	Secretary
Secret Service	United States Secret Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
SSI	Security Sensitive Information
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSO	Transportation Security Officer
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(U)	Unclassified
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USPS	United States Postal Service
USSS	United States Secret Service
USVI	United States Virgin Islands
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit

Appendix 11: Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

Requirement:	Pages
Matters Referred to Federal Prosecutorial Authorities	6
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	7 – 9
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Summary of Significant OIG Activities	11 – 26
Review of Legislation and Regulations	Nothing to Report
Reports with Questioned Costs	29
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	29
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	31
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	33 – 45
List of Audit Reports	46 – 50
Peer Review Results	53 – 54
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	55
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	Nothing to Report
Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information	Nothing to Report
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report

Office of Inspector General

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Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, D.C. 20528-0305

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