



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of the Inspector General

# SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

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APRIL 1, 2018 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2018



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## Message from the Inspector General

It is my pleasure to submit this Semiannual Report on the operations of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which covers the period from April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2018.

The Semiannual Report details the OIG's work over the past 6 months. During this time, we completed several reports pertaining to the Department's law enforcement components, such as a review of Actions by the Department of Justice and the FBI in Advance of the 2016 Election; Gender Equity in the Department's Law Enforcement Components; BOP's Management of Its Female Inmate Population; USMS Hiring Practices; and USMS Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives.

In our ongoing commitment to identify whether federal funds are being used by the Department effectively and efficiently, we conducted dozens of audits and reviews to fulfill this mission, and we recommended improvements to the Department's programs. In particular, over the past 6 months, we issued eight audits of OJP programs and grants that received funding from the Crime Victims Fund.

Additionally, we reviewed contracts awarded by BOP programs that seek to successfully transition federal inmates into communities prior to their release from incarceration. Further, over the past 6 months, the OIG conducted additional reviews of various contracts and grants by the Department and examined the Department's oversight and management of these awards.

In addition, the OIG's Investigations Division closed 141 criminal or administrative misconduct cases, and its work resulted in 29 convictions or pleas and 103 terminations, administrative disciplinary actions, and resignations. The quality of the investigations described in this report demonstrates the importance of effective, fair, and objective investigative oversight conducted by our Office.

This year we mark the 40th anniversary of the *Inspector General Act* and the creation of the original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 1989. Since that time we have been part of a community that has grown to include 73 statutory Inspectors General who collectively oversee the operations of nearly every aspect of the federal government. Every 6 months we provide Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of DOJ during the reporting period. This report is our 59th semiannual report. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to provide independent and effective oversight of the DOJ and working with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our government.

As always, the OIG remains committed to its mission to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct related to DOJ programs, and to promote economy and efficiency in those programs—as is exemplified in our work over the past 6 months. As usual, the Semiannual Report reflects the exceptional work of OIG personnel and their dedication to the OIG's important mission.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Michael E. Horowitz".

Michael E. Horowitz  
Inspector General  
October 31, 2018



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# Highlights of OIG Activities



The following summaries highlight some of the OIG’s audits, evaluations, inspections,

special reviews, and investigations, which are discussed further in this report. As the highlights illustrate, the OIG continues to conduct wide-ranging oversight of Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) programs and operations.

## Statistical Highlights

April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018	
Allegations Received by the Investigations Division <sup>1</sup>	7,485
Investigations Opened	151
Investigations Closed	141
Arrests	55
Indictments/Informations	27
Convictions/Pleas	29
Administrative Actions	103
Monetary Recoveries <sup>2</sup>	\$1,661,748.03
Audit Reports Issued	26
Questioned Costs	\$18,543,956
Funds for Better Use	\$136,847
Recommendations for Management Improvements	181
Single Audit Act Reports Issued	26
Questioned Costs	\$183,327
Recommendations for Management Improvements	41
Other Audit Division Reports Issued	1

<sup>1</sup> These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG’s complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 52,000 additional Hotline, email, and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government.

<sup>2</sup> Includes civil, criminal and non-judicial fines, restitutions, recoveries, assessments, penalties, and forfeitures.

## Audits, Evaluations, Inspections, and Special Reviews Highlights

Examples of OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, and special reviews completed during this semiannual reporting period are:

- [Actions by the Department of Justice and the FBI in Advance of the 2016 Election.](#)

The OIG issued a report examining various actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DOJ in advance of the 2016 election in connection with the investigation into former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server (referred to by the FBI and DOJ as the “Midyear” investigation). The OIG concluded that Comey’s decision to make a public statement on July 5, 2016, that the FBI had completed its Midyear investigation and was recommending that the Department decline prosecution—and to conceal his intention to do so from Department leadership—as well as his decision to send the October 28, 2016, letter to Congress about the discovery of Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing Department practice and protocol. In addition, during the course of the review, the OIG discovered text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers that expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for Clinton. The OIG also identified messages that expressed opinions that were critical of the conduct and quality of the investigation. The OIG included in its review an assessment of these messages and actions by the FBI employees. The OIG made nine recommendations to the Department and the FBI to assist them

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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in addressing the issues that the OIG identified in this review. The Department and the FBI agreed with all of them.

- **Gender Equity in the Department's Law Enforcement Components.**

The OIG reviewed gender equity in the Department's law enforcement components—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)—after receiving several complaints about gender discrimination and harassment at these components. To determine the state of gender equity, the review examined workforce demographics, promotions and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) data, and employee perceptions by conducting an online survey, interviews, and focus groups. The OIG found that while views about gender equity varied by position type and gender, women in Criminal Investigator positions consistently reported distinctly more negative perceptions of equity and experiences with differing treatment and discrimination than other staff in the four components. These negative perceptions may be influenced by the low percentage of women in Criminal Investigator positions, especially in supervisory and leadership positions; promotion selections that reflect underrepresentation of women; and the staff view that personnel decisions are based on personal relationships more than on merit. The OIG also found it concerning that a significant number of women reported that they had experienced discrimination and differing treatment in some form. Specifically, 43 percent of female Criminal Investigator survey respondents said that they had experienced some form of gender discrimination during the previous 5 years. Additionally, staff of all genders, positions, and supervisory statuses had negative perceptions about the EEO

process that included dissatisfaction with, and mistrust about, the EEO process. The OIG believes this may limit the utility of the EEO process as a tool to address discrimination and may contribute to the underreporting of discrimination and harassment.

- **BOP's Management of Its Female Inmate Population.**

The OIG concluded that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has not been strategic in its management of female inmates and that the BOP's programming and policies may not fully consider female inmates' needs. The review found that the BOP only recently formalized a process for overseeing compliance with policies pertaining to female inmates, may not have adequately staffed the office that serves as the BOP's source for expertise on female inmates, and does not require Headquarters officials who develop policy and make decisions that affect female inmates to take training on the needs of female inmates. At BOP institutions, the OIG found that low staffing limited the BOP's ability to provide all eligible female inmates with trauma treatment, that participation in the BOP's pregnancy programs was low, and that the distribution methods for feminine hygiene products varied by institution and did not always ensure that inmates had sufficient access to meet their needs. Additionally, the BOP's practice of assigning Correctional Officers to posts solely by seniority has resulted in an inefficient use of Correctional Officer resources at female institutions because this approach does not take into account federal regulations and BOP policy that prohibit male staff from searching female inmates. Finally, the review found that the BOP's decision to convert Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Danbury to house male inmates resulted in most low security sentenced female inmates being transferred closer to home. However, the OIG found that

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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366 such inmates served a portion of their sentences at a detention center that provided no access to outdoor space, less natural light, and fewer programming opportunities than would otherwise be available to them at BOP facilities designed for long-term confinement. The OIG made 10 recommendations to assist the BOP in exploring options to improve the management of its female inmate population, and the BOP agreed with all of them.

- **USMS Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives.** The OIG issued an audit report that the USMS generally had strong physical controls over its weapons, munitions, and explosives, as well as strong inventory controls over explosives. However, the OIG identified significant deficiencies related to tracking weapons, ammunition, and less lethal munitions, as well as noncompliance with ammunition policy requirements. In Fiscal Years (FY) 2017 and 2018, the USMS purchased 110 firearms that were in its possession for as long as 16 months, but were not recorded in the USMS property management system, which created a risk that the firearms could be lost, misplaced, stolen, or otherwise compromised without detection. Between FY 2015 and April 2018, the USMS reported 23 lost or stolen firearms, but did not track whether the firearms were recovered after the completion of the USMS Internal Affairs investigation. The OIG also identified nearly 2.45 million rounds of ammunition that were not tracked by the USMS prior to the initiation of the audit. Further, the USMS's ammunition tracking requirements are not explicitly stated in its existing policy and the USMS does not currently assess whether its districts and divisions are complying with its ammunition tracking requirements. The OIG also found that the USMS does

not require that less lethal munitions and diversionary devices be tracked and inventoried. As a result, with the exception of flash bang grenades, these items were not being tracked. The OIG also identified areas where the USMS's policies should be strengthened to improve the safeguarding of its weapons and munitions. The OIG made seven recommendations to improve the USMS's controls over its weapons, ammunition, and less lethal munitions. The USMS agreed with the recommendations.

- **USMS Hiring Practices.** The OIG issued a report examining allegations relating to improper hiring practices at the USMS involving senior level officials. The allegations included that former USMS Director Stacia Hylton recommended an applicant for a contractor position with the USMS's Asset Forfeiture Division (AFD), and that, in response, then-Deputy Assistant Director of the AFD Kimberly Beal influenced subordinates to waive contract qualification requirements in order to hire the applicant. Beal allegedly took this action in order to receive favorable treatment from Hylton in Beal's effort to become an Assistant Director. The allegations also included the claim that two USMS officials each hired the other's spouse into his division as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement. The OIG found that Hylton violated the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Ethical Standards) when she took actions that amounted to a recommendation of the applicant for the contractor position, and Beal violated the Ethical Standards when she took actions in response to Hylton's recommendation to manipulate the hiring process to benefit the applicant. The OIG found that then-Assistant Director of the Tactical Operations Division William Snelson committed prohibited personnel actions and violated the Ethical Standards when

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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he took a series of steps to improve the chances that the spouse of the then-Chief of the Office of Protective Operations in the Judicial Security Division was hired into the USMS. The OIG also found that a Department letter to Senator Charles Grassley responding to some of the hiring allegations contained inaccurate information because the USMS relied on an inadequate and flawed process to gather the information used to draft the response, and because the individuals primarily responsible for gathering and providing the information—including Hylton and Beal—failed to exercise reasonable care in investigating the allegations. The OIG did not substantiate the allegation that Hylton promoted Beal to Assistant Director in exchange for Beal’s efforts on behalf of Hylton’s recommended applicant. Nor did the OIG substantiate the allegation that Snelson and the Chief of the Office of Protective Operations each hired the other’s spouse as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement. The OIG referred its findings to the Department and the USMS for appropriate action.


including money and items of value from the CHS, in violation of federal regulations regarding standards of conduct for federal employees and FBI policy. The investigation further found that the Special Agent continued to use the CHS after the CHS had been deactivated by the FBI; protected the CHS and the CHS’s illegal business; misused FBI assets for personal gain; and committed computer security violations, all in violation of federal regulations and FBI policy. The investigation also found that the Special Agent improperly withheld information related to a state criminal investigation from a local police department, and provided false information to the police department regarding the CHS’s status as an FBI CHS, which actions were wholly inconsistent with the Special Agent’s obligations as a federal law enforcement officer. The investigation also found that the Special Agent lacked candor with the FBI and the OIG, in violation of FBI policy. Prosecution was declined. The OIG provided its report to the FBI for appropriate action.

## Investigative Highlights

As shown in the statistics at the beginning of this section and in the chart on the following page, the OIG investigates many allegations of misconduct involving DOJ employees or contractors and grantees who receive DOJ funds. Examples of such investigations are:

- On July 19, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon receipt of information from the FBI Inspection Division alleging that an FBI Special Agent had an inappropriate relationship with a former FBI Confidential Human Source (CHS), including receiving money and other items of value from the CHS. The investigation substantiated the allegations that the Special Agent received gifts,
- On March 26, 2018, a BOP Correctional Officer formerly assigned to the United States Penitentiary Atlanta in Georgia, was sentenced to 20 months of incarceration for deprivation of rights under color of law and falsifying records. The Correctional Officer, who resigned his position from the BOP, was charged in the Northern District of Georgia. According to the Indictment, in March 2016, while acting under color of law, the Correctional Officer physically assaulted an inmate without justification which resulted in bodily injury to the inmate. In addition, the Correctional Officer submitted a falsified written report in an attempt to obstruct the investigation. The investigation was conducted by the OIG’s Atlanta Area Office and the Atlanta FBI.

# Highlights of OIG Activities



Source: Investigations Data Management System

- On June 13, 2018, a BOP Correctional Officer previously assigned to the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, was sentenced to 5 years of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$8,949,025 in restitution pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The Correctional Officer, who resigned his position prior to his OIG/FBI interview, was indicted in the Southern District of Florida. According to the factual statement in support of his plea agreement, between February and April 2017, the Correctional Officer introduced several contraband cellular telephones into the facility where he worked and provided them to a BOP inmate. The inmate utilized the cellular telephones and contacted several luxury retail and jewelry store employees and brand representatives and pretended to be an employee of various entertainment industry companies. The inmate claimed the retail items and jewelry would be featured in music videos, film productions, and promotional materials that were being filmed and produced in Miami, Florida. The Correctional Officer

and other co-conspirators unlawfully enriched themselves by taking possession of stolen jewelry and luxury retail items, valued at \$5,000 or more, and sold the items for profit. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Miami Field Office and the FBI.

- On July 25, 2018, a contract BOP Commissary Clerk previously assigned to Reeves County Detention Center in Pecos, Texas, was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release for sexual abuse of a ward, and an additional 18 months of incarceration (to run consecutively) with a life term of supervised release for failure to appear. The Clerk, who resigned her position following her OIG interview, was charged in the Western District of Texas. According to the Indictment, in May 2016, the Clerk engaged in sexual intercourse with two different inmates at the facility. Later, the Clerk did not show up for her scheduled court hearing and was subsequently indicted for failure to appear. She was a fugitive until she was arrested in March 2018. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's El Paso Area Office.

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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- On May 10, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon the receipt of information from the USMS alleging that a U.S. Marshal (USM) exhibited intimidating and retaliatory behavior towards a subordinate in response to the subordinate's report of misconduct involving the USM. In an earlier investigation, the OIG substantiated the subordinate's report of misconduct by the USM. The OIG investigation found that the USM also engaged in the retaliatory misconduct as alleged by improperly requesting access to the subordinate's work emails, in violation of USMS policy and codes of professional responsibility. The OIG provided a report to the USMS. The subject is no longer serving as the USM.
- In the *Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2017 – September 30, 2017*, the OIG reported on an investigation of a retired DEA Special Agent who pleaded guilty to theft by a government official. On August 10, 2018, the DEA Special Agent was sentenced in the Southern District of California to 3 years of probation and 8 months of home confinement, and must pay a \$5,500 fine and \$60,000 in restitution. According to the statement of facts in support of her guilty plea, the Special Agent admitted that while stationed in Cyprus between 2008 and 2014, she was assigned to help the U.S. government recover the proceeds of an American fraud scheme that had been frozen in the banking system in northern Cyprus. After later transferring to San Francisco and having been instructed to have no further involvement with the proceeds, the Special Agent admittedly returned to Cyprus in October 2015, on personal business, and took possession of \$310,000 of the proceeds without ever notifying anyone in the U.S. government that she had done so. The Special Agent also admitted that, in February 2016, she returned \$250,000 to the U.S. government under a false cover story that she had unexpectedly received it in a package from Cyprus. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Washington Field Office with assistance from the OIG's Cyber Investigations Office.
- On May 23, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated based on information received from the DOJ Office of the Deputy Attorney General in 2012 alleging that an ATF Supervisory Special Agent released information in violation of federal statutes. The OIG found that the Special Agent had indiscriminately provided to his attorney thousands of statutorily-protected documents relating to ATF investigations without authorization, some of which the attorney subsequently provided to selected Members of Congress while acting on the Special Agent's behalf. The materials disclosed included court-sealed documents relating to wiretaps, disclosure of which is punishable under law as contempt of court; documents containing summaries of intercepted telephone calls, which are protected from disclosure under the wiretap statute; and ATF reports of investigation and reports generated by other law enforcement agencies, which contained information about the identities of investigative subjects and witnesses that is protected from disclosure under the *Privacy Act of 1974*. In addition to providing the materials that the attorney had passed on to selected Members of Congress, the Special Agent also transmitted to his attorney records relating to financial transactions of third parties, which are protected from disclosure by federal statute; a document classified as "confidential," which violated a federal statute and executive orders; and certain ATF materials and information, the handling of which was restricted by ATF Orders. Lastly, the OIG found that the

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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Special Agent used unauthorized external devices and personal email to move the documents from ATF systems, networks, and devices and transmit them to his counsel, which conduct violated a DOJ Order relating to information security. The OIG analyzed the Special Agent's claim that his disclosures were protected under the *Whistleblower Protection Act* (WPA). The WPA authorizes disclosures to Members of Congress. However, in enacting the WPA, Congress specified that information specifically prohibited from disclosure by other statutes can only be provided to the Office of Special Counsel, the Inspector General, or an employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures. Accordingly, the WPA does not protect employees for disclosing such information to Members of Congress, even if Congress is authorized to receive the information in other contexts. Therefore, the OIG found that the Special Agent's unauthorized disclosures of statutorily protected documents and information violated federal law. During its investigation, the OIG obtained certifications from the Special Agent and his attorneys that the government records the Special Agent transmitted to his attorneys had been deleted or destroyed. Prosecution was declined. The OIG provided its report to ATF for appropriate action.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG continues its important ongoing work, including the following audits, evaluations, inspections, and special reviews:

- **Examination of the Department's and the FBI's Compliance with Legal Requirements and Policies in Applications Filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to a certain U.S. Person.** The OIG, in response to requests from the Attorney

General and Members of Congress, is examining the Department's and the FBI's compliance with legal requirements, and with applicable DOJ and FBI policies and procedures, in applications filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) relating to a certain U.S. person. As part of this examination, the OIG is also reviewing information that was known to DOJ and the FBI at the time the applications were filed from or about an alleged FBI confidential source. Additionally, the OIG is reviewing the DOJ's and FBI's relationship and communications with the alleged source as they relate to the FISC applications. If circumstances warrant, the OIG will consider including other issues that may arise during the course of the review.

- **DEA's Opioid Enforcement Efforts.** The OIG is assessing whether the DEA's regulatory activities and enforcement efforts effectively prevent the diversion of controlled substances, particularly opioids, to unauthorized users. Specifically, this review will examine the (1) DEA's enforcement regulations, policies, and procedures; (2) DEA's use of enforcement actions involving manufacturers, distributors, physicians, and pharmacists who violate these policies and procedures; and (3) DEA's coordination with state and local partners to combat the opioid epidemic.
- **DOJ Sponsorship of Foreign Nationals for Law Enforcement Purposes.** The OIG is auditing DOJ's sponsorship of foreign nationals for law enforcement purposes. The objectives are to assess: (1) the oversight of the components' foreign national sponsorship programs; and (2) the coordination within the DOJ components and with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure the accuracy of information regarding foreign national sponsorships.

# Highlights of OIG Activities

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- **The FBI's Efforts to Address Homegrown Violent Extremists.** The OIG will review the FBI's homegrown violent extremists (HVE) casework and resource management, evaluate the FBI's coordination with relevant components and its strategic and tactical policies and processes to identify and assess HVE threats, and evaluate the FBI field divisions' implementation of strategic and tactical policies and processes to assess HVE threats.
- **Cyber Victim Notification and Engagement.** The OIG is evaluating the FBI's processes and practices for notifying and engaging with victims of cyber intrusions.
- **BOP's Counterterrorism Efforts.** The OIG is reviewing the BOP's policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring communications of inmates with known or suspected ties to domestic and foreign terrorism and its efforts to prevent further radicalization among its inmate population.
- **The Department's Violent Crime Initiatives.** The OIG is reviewing the Department's strategic planning and accountability measures for combatting violent crime, including coordination across Department prosecution, law enforcement, and grant making components; and strategic planning for providing assistance to communities that are confronting significant increases in homicides and gun violence.
- **Efforts to Protect Seaports and Maritime Activity.** The OIG is reviewing the FBI's roles and responsibilities for assessing maritime terrorism threats and coordinating with the DHS components to ensure seaport security.
- **DEA's Use of Administrative Subpoenas.** The OIG is reviewing the DEA's use of administrative subpoenas to obtain broad collections of data or information, including the existence and effectiveness of any policies and procedural safeguards established with respect to the collection, use, and retention of the data.

The OIG's ongoing work is also available at [oig.justice.gov/ongoing/](https://oig.justice.gov/ongoing/).

# OIG Profile



The OIG is a statutorily created, independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct involving DOJ programs and personnel and promote economy and efficiency

in DOJ operations. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regulations, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of DOJ employees in their numerous and diverse activities. The OIG also audits and inspects DOJ programs and assists management in promoting integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The OIG has jurisdiction to review the programs and personnel of the FBI, ATF, BOP, DEA, U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO), USMS, and all other organizations within DOJ, as well as DOJ's contractors and grant recipients.

The OIG consists of the Immediate Office of the Inspector General and the following divisions and office:

- **Audit Division** is responsible for independent audits of DOJ programs, computer systems, and financial statements. The Audit Division has regional offices in the Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., areas. Its Financial Statement Audit Office and Computer

Security and Information Technology Audit Office are located in Washington, D.C., along with Audit Headquarters. Audit Headquarters consists of the immediate office of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of Operations, Office of Policy and Planning, and Office of Data Analytics.

- **Investigations Division** is responsible for investigating allegations of bribery, fraud, abuse, civil rights violations, and violations of other criminal laws and administrative procedures governing DOJ employees, contractors, and grantees. The Investigations Division has field offices in Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, D.C. The Investigations Division has smaller, area offices in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, El Paso, Houston, New Jersey, San Francisco, and Tucson. The Fraud Detection Office and the Cyber Investigations Office are co-located with the Washington Field Office. The Cyber Investigations Office also includes personnel in the Dallas and Los Angeles Field Offices. Investigations Headquarters in Washington, D.C., consists of the immediate office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and the following branches: Operations I, Operations II, Investigative Support, and Administrative Support.



Source: OIG

# OIG Profile

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- **Evaluation and Inspections Division** conducts program and management reviews that involve on-site inspection, statistical analysis, interviews, and other techniques to review DOJ programs and activities and makes recommendations for improvement. In FY 2019, E&I will begin conducting inspections of individual BOP institutions to examine specific concerns that have been identified or reported.
- **Oversight and Review Division** blends the skills of Attorneys, Investigators, Program Analysts, and Paralegals to conduct special reviews and investigations of sensitive allegations involving DOJ employees and operations.
- **Management and Planning Division** provides advice to OIG senior leadership on administrative and fiscal policy and assists OIG components in the areas of budget formulation and execution, security, personnel, training, travel, procurement, property management, information technology, computer network communications, telecommunications, records management, quality assurance, internal controls, and general support.
- **Office of General Counsel** provides legal advice to OIG management and staff. It also drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG in personnel, contractual, and legal matters; and responds to *Freedom of Information Act* (FOIA) requests.

As required by Section 5 of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* (IG Act), as amended, this Semiannual Report to Congress is reviewing the accomplishments of the OIG for the 6-month period of April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018.

Additional information about the OIG and full-text versions of many of its reports are available at [oig.justice.gov](http://oig.justice.gov).

The OIG has a nationwide workforce of more than 485 Special Agents, Auditors, Inspectors, Attorneys, and support staff. For FY 2018, the OIG direct appropriation is approximately \$97.25 million, and the OIG anticipates earning an additional \$12.5 million in reimbursements.

# Multicomponent

While many of the OIG's activities are specific to a particular component of DOJ, other work covers more than one component and, in some instances, extends to DOJ contractors and grant recipients. The following describes OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, special reviews, and investigations that involve more than one DOJ component.



## Reports Issued

### Actions by the Department of Justice and the FBI in Advance of the 2016 Election

The OIG issued a report examining various actions by the FBI and the DOJ in advance of the 2016 election in connection with the investigation into former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server (referred to by the FBI and DOJ as the "Midyear" investigation).

The OIG concluded that Comey's decision to make a public statement on July 5, 2016, that the FBI had completed its Midyear investigation and was recommending that the Department decline prosecution—and to conceal his intention to do so from Department leadership—as well as his decision to send the October 28, 2016, letter to Congress about the discovery of Midyear-related emails on the Weiner laptop was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing Department practice and protocol. The OIG also concluded that the Department's decision to decline prosecution of former Secretary Clinton was consistent with its historical approach in prior cases under different leadership.

In addition, during the course of the review, the OIG discovered text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers that expressed

statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for Clinton. The OIG also identified messages that expressed opinions that were critical of the conduct and quality of the investigation. The OIG included in its review an assessment of these messages and actions by the FBI employees.

The OIG made nine recommendations to the Department and the FBI to assist them in addressing the issues that the OIG identified in this review. The Department and the FBI agreed with all of them.

### Gender Equity in the Department's Law Enforcement Components

The OIG reviewed gender equity in the Department's law enforcement components—ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS—after receiving several complaints about gender discrimination and harassment at these components. To determine the state of gender equity, the review examined workforce demographics, promotions, and EEO data and employee perceptions by conducting an online survey, interviews, and focus groups. The OIG found that while views about gender equity varied by position type and gender, women in Criminal Investigator positions consistently reported distinctly more negative perceptions of equity and experiences with differing treatment and discrimination

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	ATF	DEA	FBI	USMS	All Four Components
Percentage of Female Staff in GS-15 Positions	28.5	25.8	32.1	18.3	29.4
Percentage of Female Staff in GS-15 Criminal Investigator Positions	10.7	5.8	17.7	8.8	13.3
Percentage of Female Staff in SES Positions	14.6	16.6	22.9	27.8	20.9

**Note:** Female staff in GS-15 and SES positions include 1811 (Criminal Investigation) and non-1811 series.

Source: National Finance Center data and DOJ Employment Factbook, FY 2016

than other staff in the four components. These negative perceptions may be influenced by the low percentage of women in Criminal Investigator positions, especially in supervisory and leadership positions; promotion selections that reflect underrepresentation of women; and the staff view that personnel decisions are based on personal relationships more than on merit. The OIG also found it concerning that a significant number of women reported that they had experienced discrimination and differing treatment in some form, including women in almost all the interviews and female focus groups the OIG conducted and 43 percent of Criminal Investigator survey respondents. Additionally, staff of all genders, positions, and supervisory statuses had negative perceptions about the EEO process that included dissatisfaction with, and mistrust about, the EEO process. The OIG believes this may limit the utility of the EEO process as a tool to address discrimination and may contribute to the underreporting of discrimination and harassment.

The OIG released a [video message](#) and [podcast](#) to accompany this report.

## [Review of the Department's Clemency Initiative](#)

The OIG issued a report assessing the Department's clemency process and handling of pardons since FY 2014, as well as the implementation and management of the Clemency Initiative.

The OIG found several shortcomings that hindered the initial planning and early implementation of the Initiative. First, DOJ leadership did not sufficiently involve the DOJ Office of the Pardon Attorney (OPA), which was responsible for the day-to-day management of the Initiative, in planning the Initiative and it did not provide the necessary resources to that office once the Initiative began. Second, DOJ did not effectively implement a survey of federal inmates that was intended to help identify potentially meritorious clemency petitioners. As a result, attorneys working on the Initiative received numerous survey responses and petitions from inmates who clearly did not meet the Initiative's criteria, which delayed the consideration of potentially meritorious petitions. Third, DOJ experienced challenges working with external stakeholders, particularly volunteer attorneys who were to provide assistance in identifying appropriate clemency petitions for the Initiative. For example, these attorneys were unable to obtain pre-sentence investigation reports from the U.S. Courts for almost a year, which hampered their work. Finally, OPA failed to prioritize petitions as DOJ leadership had directed and instead insisted on providing a response to every petition as it was received.

The OIG also found that by the end of 2015 there was a substantial backlog of petitions pending consideration. However, significant changes by DOJ leadership in the final year of the Initiative enabled the Justice Department

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to meet its goal of making recommendations to the White House on all drug petitions received by the August 31, 2016, deadline and to make recommendations on over 1,300 petitions received by OPA after that deadline.

On January 20, 2017, DOJ discontinued the Initiative. As a result, the OIG did not make recommendations to address the issues the OIG found throughout the course of its review.

## **DOJ's Compliance under the *Improper Payments and Elimination Recovery Act of 2010* for FY 2017**

The OIG issued an examination report of DOJ's FY 2017 compliance under the *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010*. The examination assessed the Department's compliance with the reporting requirements of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix C, Requirements for Effective Estimation and Remediation of Improper Payments. The OIG concluded that the Department complied, in all material respects, with the aforementioned requirements for the FY ended September 30, 2017.

## **Federal Information Security Modernization Act Audits**

The *Federal Information Security Modernization Act* (FISMA) requires the Inspector General for each agency to perform an annual independent evaluation of the agency's information security programs and practices. The evaluation includes testing the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices of a representative subset of agency systems. OMB is responsible for the submission of the annual FISMA report to Congress. DHS prepares the FISMA metrics and provides reporting instructions to agency Chief Information Officers, Inspectors General, and Senior Agency Officials for Privacy. The FY 2018 FISMA results are due to OMB by October 31, 2018.

For FY 2017, the OIG reviewed the security programs of six DOJ components: the FBI, Justice Management Division (JMD), ATF, Civil Division, USMS, and the United States Trustee Program. Within these components, the OIG selected for review the FBI's DirectorNet System and the Background Investigation Contract Service Unit Online Transfer System; JMD's Automated Electronic Guard Information System Upgrade; ATF's Bomb, Arson Tracking System; Civil Division's Mega Network Operations Center; USMS' Property and Asset Control Enterprise Solution; and United States Trustee Program's Means Test Review System. In these audits, the OIG identified weaknesses in all seven of the domains and within five of the seven control areas tested. The OIG audit reports provided 65 recommendations for improving implementation of DOJ's information security program and practices for its sensitive but unclassified, classified, and national security systems. The components agreed with all of them.

For FY 2018, the OIG reviewed the security programs of six DOJ components: the FBI, JMD, Criminal Division, DEA, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys. Within these components, the OIG selected for review the FBI's Administration Support Information System and the Child Exploitation Tracking System; JMD's Justice Security Tracking and Adjudication Record System; Criminal Division's Intellitrax System; DEA's Aviation Division Office Internet System; EOIR's eWorld System; and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys' Victim Notification System. The OIG plans to issue reports evaluating each of these systems as well as reports on each component's information security program.

In addition, FISMA requires an annual evaluation of the information security programs and practices of Intelligence Community agencies. As required, the OIG will submit the FISMA metrics report for the National Security Systems within the FBI to the Intelligence

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Community Inspector General, which in turn will forward to OMB by October 31, 2018.

## **Single Audit Act Reports**

The *Single Audit Act of 1984*, as amended, promotes sound financial management of federal financial assistance provided to state, local, and tribal governments, colleges, universities, and nonprofit organizations. Under 2 C.F.R. 200, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, such entities that expend \$750,000 or more in federal funds in 1 year must have a “single audit” performed annually covering all federal funds expended that year. Single audits are conducted by state and local government auditors, as well as independent public accounting firms. The OIG reviews these audit reports when they pertain to DOJ funds in order to determine whether the single audit reports meet federal requirements and generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition, the OIG reviews single audit reports to determine whether they contain audit findings related to DOJ funds. As a result of the OIG’s review of the single audits during this semiannual period, the OIG issued to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 26 single audit reports encompassing approximately 300 grants, and other agreements totaling nearly \$180 million. The OIG also monitors these audits through the resolution and closure process.

The single audits disclosed that costs charged to DOJ grants were not always related to the grant programs or properly allocated. In addition, some required financial and program reports were inaccurate or not filed in a timely manner, if at all. The state and local government auditors and independent public accounting firms who conducted the single audits also found examples of incomplete or missing records, inadequate segregation of duties, failure to conduct physical inventories of assets purchased with federal funds, failure to submit timely single audit reporting packages to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (an office operating on behalf

of OMB that facilitates federal oversight of entities expending federal money), and failure to reconcile significant accounting records with the general ledger and subsidiary ledgers. They also reported that grantees did not adequately monitor their grant sub-recipients to ensure that the sub-grantees were properly accounting for the grant funds and ensuring compliance with the terms and conditions of the grant. To address these deficiencies, the auditors recommended 41 management improvements and questioned costs totaling \$183,327.

## **Civil Rights and Civil Liberties**

Section 1001 of the *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act* (Patriot Act) directs the OIG to receive and review complaints of civil rights and civil liberty violations by DOJ employees, to publicize how people can contact the OIG to file a complaint, and to send a semiannual report to Congress discussing the OIG’s implementation of these responsibilities. In September 2018, the OIG issued its most recent report, which summarized the OIG’s Section 1001-related activities from January 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018. The report described the number of complaints the OIG received under this section, the status of investigations conducted by the OIG and DOJ components in response to those complaints, and an estimate of the OIG’s expenses for conducting these activities. The report also describes other OIG reviews that are related to potential civil rights and civil liberty issues, but not required by Section 1001.

## **Reports with Outstanding Unimplemented Recommendations**

Every 6 months, the OIG publishes a list of recommendations from the OIG’s audits, evaluations, and reviews that the OIG had not closed as of the end of the semiannual reporting period, because it had not determined that DOJ had fully implemented them. The information omits recommendations that DOJ determined to be classified or sensitive, and therefore

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unsuitable for public release. This list includes the titles of reports with recommendations not closed and the status and descriptions of the not closed recommendations. Hyperlinks to each report are also included in this list.

The most recent report of recommendations not closed by the OIG as of September 30, 2018, is available on the OIG's website [here](#). The recommendations in this report are associated with over \$147.9 million in questioned costs and \$28.7 million in funds that the OIG recommends could be used more efficiently if repurposed by the agency.

## Investigations

The following information about OIG investigations of allegations against senior governmental employees in several components in which the OIG determined the allegations were unsubstantiated is provided pursuant to the IG Act, Section 5, Paragraph (22)(B). The OIG closed these investigations without public disclosure during the reporting period:

- The OIG initiated 13 investigations of alleged misconduct by senior government employees that were ultimately unsubstantiated. Four investigations involved allegations of misuse of position; three investigations were of allegations of conflict of interest; and two investigations resulted from allegations of prohibited personnel actions. Other investigations included allegations of improper release of information, waste/misuse of government property, bribery, off-duty misconduct, security failure, and harassment.

## Ongoing Work

### Sponsorship of Foreign Nationals for Law Enforcement Purposes

The OIG is conducting an audit of DOJ's sponsorship of foreign nationals for law enforcement purposes. The objectives are to

assess: (1) the oversight of the components' foreign national sponsorship programs; and (2) the coordination within the DOJ components and with DHS to ensure the accuracy of information regarding foreign national sponsorships.

### BOP's and USMS's Pharmaceutical Drug Costs for Inmates and Detainees

The OIG is conducting a review of the BOP's and USMS's pharmaceutical drug costs for inmates and detainees. This review will examine the budgetary impact of pharmaceutical drugs on BOP and USMS, as well as their processes for obtaining pharmaceutical drugs.

### Audit of Efforts to Safeguard Minors in Department of Justice Youth-Centered Programs

The OIG is conducting an audit of the efforts to safeguard minors in DOJ youth-centered programs. The preliminary scope includes OJP and Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) youth-centered grant programs involving persons who work directly with minors, for FY 2017. The OIG's preliminary objectives are to: (1) determine whether entities receiving DOJ funds have implemented appropriate controls, such as screening and background checks, for individuals working or volunteering in programs involving minors; and (2) assess DOJ efforts to ensure that grantees adequately mitigate the risk of victimization of minors who participate in its youth-centered programs.

### Review of the Department's Violent Crime Initiatives

The OIG is reviewing the Department's strategic planning and accountability measures for combatting violent crime, including coordination across Department prosecution, law enforcement, and grant making components; and strategic planning for providing assistance to communities that are confronting significant increases in homicides and gun violence.

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## **Cooperation Between the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security in Southwest Border Criminal Investigations**

The Inspectors General of DOJ and the DHS are jointly reviewing cooperation primarily between the FBI, DHS's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the USAOs on criminal investigations along the U.S. Southwest border. This review will focus on deconfliction of investigations and operations, as well as information sharing on investigations conducted by FBI and HSI and prosecuted by USAOs.

## **Audits of DOJ and Select Components' Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 2018**

The OIG is conducting audits of DOJ and select components' annual financial statements for FY 2018. Pursuant to Section 304(a) of the *Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990*, as expanded by Section 405(b) of the *Government Management Reform Act of 1994*, the OIG is required to perform an audit of DOJ's annual financial statements. In addition, the following components will receive a standalone audit for FY 2018: the Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund, FBI, BOP, and Federal Prison Industries.

The OIG is also conducting an audit of the annual closing package financial statements of DOJ in accordance with Volume 1, Part 2-Chapter 4700 of Treasury's Treasury Financial Manual. Its purpose is to assist Treasury in preparing the U.S. Government Financial Report by reclassifying DOJ's general-purpose financial statements into a standard format that will be consolidated with other federal agencies, and by reporting DOJ's intragovernmental balances by federal agency to facilitate elimination of transactions between federal agencies.

## **DOJ's Compliance with the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, as amended by the DATA Act of 2014**

The OIG is examining DOJ's compliance with reporting requirements under the *Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006*, as amended by the DATA Act. Through memorandum M-15-12, *Increasing Transparency of Federal Spending by Making Federal Spending Data Accessible, Searchable, and Reliable*, OMB provided guidance to federal agencies on the requirements that agencies must employ pursuant to the DATA Act. The OIG will review a statistically valid sampling of the FY 2019 spending data submitted, and submit to Congress and make publicly available a report assessing the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy of the data sampled.

## **DOJ's Preparedness to Respond to Critical Incidents Under Emergency Support Function 13**

The OIG is reviewing the Department's ability to meet its responsibilities under Emergency Support Function 13 (ESF-13) and to execute ESF-13 activities in response to natural and manmade disasters. The OIG will assess Departmental policies and guidance; planning, preparation, training, and execution processes; and coordination among DOJ law enforcement components and non-DOJ support agencies in support of an ESF-13 activation.

## **Fiscal Year 2018 – Annual Information Technology Security Evaluation Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2014**

The OIG is conducting the annual FISMA evaluation for FY 2018. The OIG will use independent certified public accounting firms, under its direction, to evaluate the specific requirements of the OMB's FY 2018 guidelines and to complete the DHS's FY 2018 Reporting Metrics. FISMA requires that the OIG, or

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independent evaluators selected by the OIG, perform an annual independent evaluation of DOJ's security programs and practices.

## **Review of DOJ's Implementation of the *Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013***

The OIG is reviewing the Department's actions to implement the *Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013* since the law's enactment in December 2014.

## **The Department's Role in the Institutional Hearing and Removal Program**

The OIG is reviewing the actions taken by the Department, including EOIR and BOP, to expand the Institutional Hearing and Removal Program (IHRP). The review will assess the steps the Department took to expand the number of IHRP sites, enhance video teleconferencing capabilities, and coordinate with the DHS.

# Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI seeks to protect the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; enforces the criminal laws of the United States; and provides criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., coordinates activities of more than 30,000 employees in 56 field offices located in major cities throughout the United States and Puerto Rico; 380 resident agencies in cities and towns across the nation; and 63 legal attaché offices in other countries.



## Reports Issued

### [Public Summary of a Management Advisory Memorandum Regarding Inadequate Actions Taken to Mitigate a National Security Threat](#)

The OIG issued an unclassified, public summary of the OIG's recommendations to the FBI to further mitigate the threat to national security identified by the OIG during an audit of the FBI's efforts to address HVEs. In August 2017, during the audit, the OIG became aware of a national security threat posed by activities of an HVE who is incarcerated at a federal facility outside DOJ's authority. Upon receiving this information, the OIG alerted FBI Counterterrorism Division executive management and continued performing audit work to obtain further information about the significance of the threat and to assess the FBI's handling of it. In response to the notification, FBI executive management took formal steps to coordinate with parallel leadership of the non-DOJ federal entity to mitigate this threat. Given the increased risk that similar circumstances may exist with respect to other individuals, including HVE subjects, in the custody of other non-DOJ entities, the OIG recommended that the FBI work in coordination with appropriate other entities to mitigate the potential national security threats that could arise. Overall, the

OIG made five recommendations to the FBI. The FBI agreed with the recommendations, while noting some disagreements with the OIG's analysis.

### **CODIS Audit**

During this reporting period, the OIG audited Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) activities of the [San Diego County Sheriff's Department Regional Crime Laboratory](#) (Laboratory) in San Diego, California, to determine the Laboratory's compliance with CODIS standards from December 2012 through November 2017. The OIG determined that the Laboratory did not fully comply with National DNA Index System (NDIS) Operational Procedures and certain Quality Assurance Standards that it reviewed. Specifically, the OIG found that the Laboratory did not have adequate security. The Laboratory failed to deactivate keycards of former employees and contractors, did not provide adequate physical security over its DNA data and records, and did not properly secure evidence at the end of the day. Additionally, the OIG reviewed a sample of 100 forensic profiles uploaded to NDIS. Initially, the OIG found that 17 forensic profiles in its sample lacked adequate information in their respective case files to enable the OIG to determine their CODIS eligibility. However, after the OIG's

# Federal Bureau of Investigation

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inquiries, the Laboratory was subsequently able to obtain enough additional information to support each of the 17 forensic DNA profiles' CODIS eligibility. The OIG determined that all of the forensic DNA profiles in its sample were complete, accurate, and allowable for inclusion in NDIS. The OIG made six recommendations to the FBI to address the Laboratory's compliance with standards governing CODIS activities. The FBI agreed with the recommendations. The Laboratory neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations directly. However, it did agree with five of the six report statements upon which the recommendations were made.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 958 complaints involving the FBI. The most common allegations made against FBI employees were official misconduct; and waste, mismanagement. Most of the complaints received during this period were considered management issues and were provided to FBI management for its review and appropriate action.

During this reporting period, the OIG opened 21 investigations and referred 128 allegations to the FBI's Inspection Division (INSD) for action or investigation with a requirement that INSD report the results of its action or investigation to the OIG. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 93 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to FBI employees. The criminal investigations included official misconduct. The investigations involved serious allegations of Official Misconduct.


The following are examples of cases involving the FBI that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- In the *Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2017 – September 30, 2017*, the OIG reported on an investigation into a former Police Officer assigned to an

FBI Task Force who pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled substance. On April 9, 2018, the Task Force Officer was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a \$4,000 fine. The Task Force Officer admitted that in September and October 2016, he provided personal use amounts of heroin and crack cocaine to two women in exchange for sex acts. The investigation was conducted by the OIG New Jersey Area Office and the FBI Philadelphia Division.

- The OIG released its report of investigation that addressed the accuracy of statements made by then-FBI Deputy Director to the FBI's INSD and the OIG concerning the disclosure of certain law enforcement sensitive information to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), which was first published in an online article on October 30, 2016. The OIG opened its investigation of McCabe following INSD's referral of the matter to the OIG after INSD became concerned that McCabe may have lacked candor when questioned by INSD Agents about his role in the disclosure to the WSJ. In addition to addressing whether McCabe lacked candor, the OIG investigation addressed whether any FBI or Department policies were violated in disclosing non-public FBI information to the WSJ. The OIG issued its report to the FBI for such action as it deemed appropriate.
- On June 7, 2018, an FBI Special Agent was sentenced to serve 4 years of probation with 6 months of home confinement and ordered to pay a \$1,000 fine after being found guilty of three counts of making a false statement in an application for a passport. The Special Agent, who has been placed on indefinite suspension, was indicted in the Western District of Texas. According to the Indictment, on or about June 10, 2014, the Special Agent

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Source: Investigations Data Management System

altered her birth certificate by changing her birth date and supplied the false date of birth in her application for a U.S. passport. Further, after she was asked by the U.S. Department of State to supply additional documents as further proof of her citizenship and identity, the Special Agent falsified information relating to her twin sister's date of birth. In addition, the Special Agent prepared and had an older sister sign and notarize an affidavit that the Special Agent's false date of birth was correct. The Special Agent had been convicted following a 4-day trial in March 2018. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's El Paso Area Office and Diplomatic Security Service.

- On April 18, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated after receiving information from the FBI Inspection Division, alleging that an FBI Special Agent, who has since retired, may have contacted witnesses during a federal criminal investigation for an improper purpose. The investigation found that the Special Agent contacted individuals who he either knew were, or had reasonable belief would be, witnesses in the criminal investigation and that the Special Agent's contacts

with several individuals appeared to be designed to improperly influence their prospective testimony. Accordingly, the investigation concluded that the Special Agent's contacts with the witnesses were improper and constituted misconduct. The investigation also found that the Special Agent divulged law enforcement sensitive information to unauthorized individuals; misused his government issued electronic devices; provided misleading testimony during a related civil deposition; mishandled classified information; misused his position during contacts with local law enforcement officers; and provided false information to the OIG. Prosecution was declined The OIG provided its report to the FBI.

- On July 19, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon receipt of information from the FBI Inspection Division alleging that an FBI Special Agent had an inappropriate relationship with a former FBI CHS, including receiving money and other items of value from the CHS. The investigation substantiated the allegations that the Special Agent received gifts, including money and items of value from the CHS, in violation of federal regulations

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regarding standards of conduct for federal employees and FBI policy. The investigation further found that the Special Agent continued to use the CHS after the CHS had been deactivated by the FBI; protected the CHS and the CHS's illegal business; misused FBI assets for personal gain; and committed computer security violations, all in violation of federal regulations and FBI policy. The investigation also found that the Special Agent improperly withheld information related to a state criminal investigation from a local police department, and provided false information to the police department regarding the CHS's status as an FBI CHS, which actions were wholly inconsistent with the Special Agent's obligations as a federal law enforcement officer. The investigation also found that the Special Agent lacked candor with the FBI and the OIG, in violation of FBI policy. Prosecution was declined. The OIG provided its report to the FBI for appropriate action.

## Ongoing Work

### **Examination of the Department's and the FBI's Compliance with Legal Requirements and Policies in Applications Filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to a certain U.S. Person**

The OIG, in response to requests from the Attorney General and Members of Congress, is examining the Department's and the FBI's compliance with legal requirements, and with applicable DOJ and FBI policies and procedures, in applications filed with the FISC relating to a certain U.S. person. As part of this examination, the OIG is also reviewing information that was known to the DOJ and the FBI at the time the applications were filed from or about an alleged FBI confidential source. Additionally, the OIG is reviewing the DOJ's and FBI's relationship and communications with the alleged source as they

relate to the FISC applications. If circumstances warrant, the OIG will consider including other issues that may arise during the course of the review.

### **FBI's Adjudication of Misconduct Investigations**

The OIG is examining whether FBI's misconduct investigations are handled according to policy throughout the adjudication process and how FBI determines when and how to revise its misconduct adjudication policies and process.

### **Confidential Human Source Program**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's CHS Program. The preliminary objectives are to: (1) assess the FBI's management and oversight of its CHS Program, to include the FBI's oversight of payments to CHS's; (2) examine the FBI's CHS policies to ensure consistency with the Attorney General Guidelines; and (3) assess the FBI's process of determining reliability and appropriateness of CHS's.

### **Contract Awarded to EAN Holdings, LLC**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's contract awarded to EAN Holdings, LLC. The preliminary objective of the audit is to assess the FBI's administration of the contract, and EAN Holdings, LLC's performance and compliance with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to this contract in the areas of contractor performance; billings and payments; and contract management, oversight, and monitoring.

### **Contract Awarded to Tuva, LLC**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's contract awarded to Tuva, LLC. The preliminary objective of the audit is to assess the FBI's administration of the contract, and Tuva, LLC's performance and compliance with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to this contract. The assessment of performance may include financial management, monitoring, reporting, and progress toward meeting the contract's goals and objectives.

# Federal Bureau of Investigation

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## **Covert Contracts**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's contracts awarded for covert activity. The preliminary objectives of the audit are to assess the FBI's awarding and administration of these covert contracts and to evaluate the FBI's procedures and processes for ensuring contractor performance and compliance with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to these contracts.

## **Cyber Victim Notification and Engagement**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's cyber victim notification and engagement. The preliminary objective is to evaluate the FBI's processes and practices for notifying and engaging with victims of cyber intrusions.

## **Efforts to Address Homegrown Violent Extremists**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's efforts to address HVEs. The preliminary objectives are to: review the FBI's HVE casework and resource management; evaluate the FBI's coordination with relevant components and its strategic and tactical policies and processes to identify and assess HVE threats; and evaluate the FBI field divisions' implementation of strategic and tactical policies and processes to assess HVE threats.

## **Strategy and Efforts to Disrupt Illegal Dark Web Activities**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's strategy and efforts to disrupt illegal dark web activities. The preliminary objective is to assess the implementation of the FBI's dark web strategy.

## **Efforts to Protect Seaports and Maritime Activity**

The OIG is auditing the FBI's efforts to protect the nation's seaports and maritime activity. The preliminary objectives are to review the FBI's roles and responsibilities for: (1) assessing

maritime terrorism threats, and (2) coordinating with the DHS components to ensure seaport security.

## **Bulk Telephony Review**

The OIG discontinued its Bulk Telephony Review, which has previously been reported as Ongoing Work. The OIG discontinued this review because of significant changes in the law under the *USA Freedom Act*, which effectively ended the government's bulk collection of telephony metadata under the *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)*.

# Federal Bureau of Prisons

The BOP operates a nationwide system of prisons and detention facilities to incarcerate individuals imprisoned for federal crimes and detain those awaiting trial or sentencing in federal court. The BOP has more than 36,000 employees and operates 122 institutions, 6 regional offices, 2 staff training centers, a central office (Headquarters), and 23 Residential Reentry Management field offices. The BOP is responsible for the custody and care of approximately 181,600 federal offenders. Approximately, 153,000 of these inmates are confined in BOP-operated facilities, while the remainder is confined in privately managed or community-based facilities and local jails.



## Reports Issued

### BOP's Management of Its Female Inmate Population

The OIG issued a report assessing the BOP's management of its female inmate population, including the BOP's efforts and capacity to ensure that its policies, programs, and decisions adequately address the distinctive needs of

female inmates. The OIG concluded that the BOP has not been strategic in its management of female inmates and that the BOP's programming and policies may not fully consider their needs.

The review found that at the Headquarters level the BOP could not ensure that its correctional institutions adhered to BOP policies

**U.S. Map Showing Locations of BOP Institutions that House Sentenced Female Inmates**



Source: OIG

# Federal Bureau of Prisons

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pertaining to female inmates because the BOP has only recently taken steps to formalize a process for verifying compliance with those policies. Further, while the BOP established a Headquarters branch that serves as its source of expertise on the management of female inmates, this branch may not have adequate staffing to fulfill its mission. Additionally, the BOP does not require its National Executive Staff to take training on the management of female inmates and trauma-informed correctional care and, as a result, the officials who develop policy and make decisions that affect female inmates may not be aware of female inmates' needs.

At BOP institutions, the OIG identified three areas in which the BOP's programming and policy decisions did not fully consider the needs of female inmates. First, the BOP may not be able to provide its trauma treatment program to all eligible female inmates until late in their incarceration, if at all, because the BOP has assigned only one staff member at each institution to offer this program. Second, only 37 percent of sentenced pregnant inmates participated in the BOP's pregnancy programs between FY 2012 and FY 2016. The OIG believes that participation was low because inmates and staff lacked awareness of the programs and staff may apply eligibility criteria more restrictively than intended by BOP Headquarters. Third, the distribution methods for feminine hygiene products provided to inmates varied by institution and did not always ensure that inmates had access to a sufficient quantity of products to meet their needs.

Further, the OIG found that the BOP's practice of assigning Correctional Officers to posts solely by seniority has resulted in an inefficient use of Correctional Officer resources at female institutions. Male Correctional Officers are assigned to posts at which staff must regularly conduct searches of female inmates. Because the *Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003* and BOP policy prohibit male Correctional Officers from searching female inmates, female Correctional Officers must leave other assigned posts to conduct these searches.

Finally, the OIG examined the effects on female inmates of the BOP's 2013 decision to convert FCI Danbury from a female institution to a male institution. The OIG found that the majority of low security sentenced female inmates transferred out of FCI Danbury were moved to institutions closer to their homes. However, 366 low security sentenced female inmates served a portion of their sentences at Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn—a detention center intended for short-term confinement. The OIG found that at Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn, the BOP offered female inmates no access to outdoor space, less natural light, and fewer programming opportunities than would otherwise be available to them at BOP facilities designed for long-term confinement.

The report made 10 recommendations to ensure that the BOP is better positioned to identify and respond to female inmates' needs at the Headquarters level, provide female inmates with programming that addresses their unique needs, and consider female inmates' needs in policy and operational decisions. The BOP agreed with all of them.

The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

## **[BOP Contract Awarded to Sealaska Constructors, LLC, to Build Facilities at FCI Danbury](#)**

The OIG issued an audit report examining the BOP's contract with Sealaska Constructors, LLC (SCL), to build facilities at the FCI Danbury in Danbury, Connecticut. The contract's period of performance was from June 2015 through October 2017, and had a total value of approximately \$28 million.

The OIG concluded that the BOP solicited and entered into a sole-source contract with SCL in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and that SCL constructed the facilities in accordance with BOP specifications.

# Federal Bureau of Prisons

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However, the OIG identified weaknesses in the BOP's: (1) pre-award project planning, (2) acquisition planning, (3) contractor performance evaluation, and (4) contract pricing procedures. Specifically, the audit found that the BOP did not anticipate significant problems with its plan to convert FCI Danbury's existing federal prison camp to a facility with a higher security level. By the time the BOP identified the problems and implemented an alternative plan, it had already paid over \$1.7 million to construct an entry building that was no longer necessary.

## Entry Building No. 1



Source: BOP

While the BOP's pre-award planning addressed the housing of female offenders, it did not adequately evaluate other critical institutional aspects, such as programming, food services, and health services. Important BOP subject matter experts on these topics were not consulted until after the contract was awarded, and valuable feedback that identified these deficiencies during the planning stage was left unaddressed. The BOP's late addition of a Programs Building to resolve these issues extended the project's ultimate completion date and compromised the BOP's ability to transfer female inmates to FCI Danbury as quickly as possible.

The OIG further found that the BOP's Acquisition Plan for the FCI Danbury project lacked sufficient detail. Further, the BOP did not complete and enter SCL's interim performance results for 2016 into the government-wide electronic contractor evaluation system, as required by the FAR. Lastly, the OIG found that

the BOP generally completed contract pricing in accordance with the FAR, but it did not use a structured approach to determine a profit or fee pre-negotiation objective or to analyze SCL's profit. As a result, the BOP's contract did not provide the proper motivation for optimum contract performance.

The OIG made eight recommendations to assist the BOP in improving contract administration and oversight of its construction contracts. The BOP agreed with all of them.

The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

## **BOP's Contracts Awarded to Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc.**

The OIG issued an audit report on three contracts totaling \$6,949,151 to Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc. (Pacific Forensic), in San Diego, California. The contracts were to provide federal inmates in residential re-entry centers or under home confinement with Community Treatment Services (CTS), which includes substance abuse treatment and mental health services.

The OIG identified significant deficiencies with the BOP's management of its contracts to Pacific Forensic. A lack of clarity in the BOP's Statement of Work resulted in interns and psychological assistants providing CTS to inmates without the in room supervision of a licensed staff member. Additionally, the BOP did not have procedures to notify Pacific Forensic that sex offenders were being referred for CTS, and the BOP did not ensure that the contractor's facility, which operated in close proximity to a business that catered to children, met safety requirements and had safety procedures for handling sex offender inmates. The OIG also determined that Pacific Forensic lacked the proper internal controls to ensure that its contractual obligations to the BOP were being fulfilled, and identified \$22,168 in questioned costs.

# Federal Bureau of Prisons

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As noted in the report, the OIG believes the issues it identified, particularly those related to the BOP's national Statement of Work language and requirements, are potentially occurring on other CTS contracts. Between March 2009 and December 2016, the BOP awarded 446 CTS contracts nationwide, totaling approximately \$392 million.

The OIG made 16 recommendations to the BOP to improve its contract administration and to assist Pacific Forensic in improving its contract management and administration. The BOP agreed with all of the recommendations. Pacific Forensic disagreed with three recommendations and did not explicitly agree or disagree with the rest.

## **Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to Reynolds & Associates, Inc.**

The OIG issued an audit report examining three BOP contracts awarded to Reynolds & Associates, Inc. (Reynolds) to provide residential reentry services for female offenders at its Fairview facility in Washington, D.C. The BOP's Residential Reentry Center (RRC) program seeks to transition federal inmates successfully into communities prior to their release from incarceration by providing a structured and supervised environment. The report focuses on the period of January 2011 through October 2017, for which BOP obligated \$11.4 million.

The OIG identified several concerns with the BOP's contract award procedures and oversight, and with Reynolds' performance and compliance with the contracts' requirements.

The OIG found that the BOP needs to strengthen its process to ensure that price analysis documents show that the contract prices were fair and reasonable. Additionally, the audit found that due to inadequate planning, the BOP awarded a bridge contract and paid about \$1 million more in the first year of this contract than it would have paid for comparable

services under the preceding contract. The OIG further found that the BOP could improve its monitoring of Reynolds' compliance with contract requirements, specifically with regard to tracking repeat deficiencies.

Additionally, while Reynolds met a number of important RRC requirements, its Fairview facility experienced staffing challenges that contributed to recurring BOP-identified deficiencies. In addition, Reynolds could not consistently and completely demonstrate that it delivered certain resident services for which it was paid, and which were required to fulfill the RRC program goal of successfully transitioning inmates into the community.

The OIG also found that Reynolds generally billed the BOP at appropriate contracted rates, but it did not always adequately collect and document subsistence payments made to the RRC by employed residents, which are used to offset the BOP's costs. This led to instances of improper or inconsistent subsistence collection.


The OIG made 16 recommendations to the BOP to improve its RRC contract awarding and monitoring procedures, particularly with regard to Reynolds' Fairview RRC. The BOP agreed with the recommendations. Reynolds agreed with 11 recommendations and disagreed with 5.

## **Investigations**

During this reporting period, the OIG received 4,744 complaints involving the BOP. The most common allegations made against BOP employees included Official Misconduct; and force, abuse, and rights violations. The majority of complaints dealt with non-criminal issues that the OIG referred to the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs for its review.

During this reporting period, the OIG opened 67 investigations and referred 24 allegations to the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) for action or investigation with a requirement that BOP OIA report the results of its action

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Source: Investigations Data Management System

or investigation to the OIG. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 251 open cases of alleged misconduct against BOP employees. The criminal investigations covered a wide range of allegations, including official misconduct; force, abuse, and rights violations; and fraud.

The following are examples of cases involving the BOP that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- On March 26, 2018, a BOP Correctional Officer formerly assigned to the United States Penitentiary Atlanta in Georgia, was sentenced to 20 months of incarceration for deprivation of rights under color of law and falsifying records. The Correctional Officer, who resigned his position from the BOP, was charged in the Northern District of Georgia. According to the Indictment, in March 2016, while acting under color of law, the Correctional Officer physically assaulted an inmate without justification which resulted in bodily injury to the inmate. In addition, the Correctional Officer submitted a falsified written report in an attempt to obstruct the investigation. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Atlanta Area Office and the Atlanta FBI.
- On May 14, 2018, a BOP Contract Correctional Officer previously assigned to the Great Plains Correctional Facility (GPCF) in Hinton, Oklahoma, was sentenced to concurrent 15-month prison terms, for bribery of a public official and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Correctional Officer, who was terminated prior to his OIG interview, was charged in the Western District of Oklahoma. According to the factual statement in support of his guilty plea, the Correctional Officer admitted that between October and December 2016, he conspired with a non-DOJ individual and a BOP inmate to execute a scheme through multiple wire transfers in an effort to smuggle cellular phones, MP3 players, and other contraband into the facility. On April 24, 2018, the BOP inmate was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, to run consecutive to his current sentence, for one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Dallas Field Office and the FBI, with forensic assistance provided by the OIG's Cyber Investigations Office.
- On June 13, 2018, a BOP Correctional Officer previously assigned to the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, was

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sentenced to 5 years of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$8,949,025 in restitution pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The Correctional Officer, who resigned his position prior to his OIG/FBI interview, was indicted in the Southern District of Florida. According to the factual statement in support of his plea agreement, between February and April 2017, the Correctional Officer introduced several contraband cellular telephones into the facility where he worked and provided them to a BOP inmate. The inmate utilized the cellular telephones and contacted several luxury retail and jewelry store employees and brand representatives and pretended to be an employee of various entertainment industry companies. The inmate claimed the retail items and jewelry would be featured in music videos, film productions, and promotional materials that were being filmed and produced in Miami, Florida. The Correctional Officer and other co-conspirators unlawfully enriched themselves by taking possession of stolen jewelry and luxury retail items, valued at \$5,000 or more, and sold the items for profit. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Miami Field Office and the FBI.

- On July 3, 2018, a BOP Correctional Officer previously assigned to the FCI Three Rivers in Texas was sentenced to 15 months of incarceration for bribery. The Correctional Officer, who resigned his position during the investigation, was sentenced in the Southern District of Texas. According to the count of the Indictment to which he pleaded guilty, between December 2015 and March 2016, the Correctional Officer smuggled K2 synthetic cannabinoids into the facility in exchange for approximately \$5,000. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Houston Area Office.

- On July 25, 2018, a contract BOP Commissary Clerk previously assigned to Reeves County Detention Center in Pecos, Texas, was sentenced to 18 months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release for sexual abuse of a ward, and an additional 18 months of incarceration (to run consecutively) with a life term of supervised release for failure to appear. The Clerk, who resigned her position following her OIG interview, was charged in the Western District of Texas. According to the Indictment, in May 2016, the Clerk engaged in sexual intercourse with two different inmates at the facility. Later, the Clerk did not show up for her scheduled court hearing and was subsequently indicted for failure to appear. She was a fugitive until she was arrested in March 2018. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's El Paso Area Office.

## Ongoing Work

### **BOP Counterterrorism Efforts**

The OIG is conducting an audit of the BOP's counterterrorism efforts. The objectives are to review the BOP's policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring communications of inmates with known or suspected ties to domestic and foreign terrorism and its efforts to prevent further radicalization among its inmate population.

### **Contract Awarded to Correct Care Solutions, LLC**

The OIG is conducting an audit of BOP's contract awarded to Correct Care Solutions, LLC. The preliminary objectives of the audit are to assess the BOP's award and administration of the contract, and Correct Care Solutions, LLC's performance and compliance with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to this contract in the areas of: (1) contractor performance; (2) billings and payments; and (3) contract management, oversight, and monitoring.

# Federal Bureau of Prisons

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## **Perimeter Security Contract Awarded to DeTekion Security Systems, Inc.**

The OIG is auditing a perimeter security contract awarded by the BOP to DeTekion Security Systems, Inc. The preliminary objectives are to: (1) determine whether the BOP adhered to federal regulations during the contract award and administration processes, (2) assess the adequacy of the BOP's contract oversight, and (3) determine if DeTekion Security Systems, Inc., properly invoiced the government and complied with the terms and conditions of the contract award.

## **Non-Lethal/Lethal System Updates and Improvements Contract Awarded to DeTekion Security Systems, Inc.**

The OIG is auditing a BOP contract awarded to DeTekion Security Systems, Inc., and the related initial contract actions to install non-lethal/lethal fence systems at nine United States Penitentiaries. The preliminary objectives are to: (1) evaluate BOP and contractor efforts on the design of the non-lethal/lethal fences installed at the nine United States Penitentiaries during the initial and current contract actions; (2) evaluate BOP's price analysis of the fence upgrade contract; (3) assess BOP's oversight of the fence upgrade contract; and (4) determine if DeTekion Security Systems, Inc., is complying with the terms and conditions of the fence upgrade contract.

# U.S. Marshals Service

The USMS is responsible for ensuring the safe and secure conduct of judicial proceedings, protecting approximately 2,575 federal judges and about 26,000 federal prosecutors, federal public defenders, and other court officials at approximately 711 court facilities; arresting federal, state, and local fugitives; protecting federal witnesses; transporting federal prisoners; managing assets seized from criminal enterprises; and responding to major national events, terrorism, and significant high-threat trials. The USMS Director and Deputy Director work with 94 U.S. Marshals to direct more than 5,000 employees at 218 sub-offices and 3 foreign field offices.



## Report Issued

### Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives

The OIG issued an audit report examining USMS controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives. While the audit found that the USMS generally had strong physical controls over its weapons, munitions, and explosives, as well as strong inventory controls over explosives, the OIG identified significant deficiencies related to tracking weapons, ammunition, and less lethal munitions, as well as noncompliance with ammunition policy requirements.

In FYs 2017 and 2018, the USMS purchased 110 firearms that were in its possession for as long as 16 months, but were not recorded in the USMS property management system. This created a risk that the firearms could be lost, misplaced, stolen, or otherwise compromised without detection. Additionally, between FY 2015 and April 2018, the USMS reported 23 lost or stolen firearms, but did not track whether the firearms were recovered after the completion of the USMS Internal Affairs investigation.

The OIG identified nearly 2.45 million rounds of ammunition that were not tracked by the USMS prior to the initiation of the audit. Further, the USMS's ammunition tracking requirements are not explicitly stated in its existing policy and the USMS does not currently assess whether its

districts and divisions are complying with its ammunition tracking requirements. The USMS does not require that less lethal munitions and diversionary devices be tracked and inventoried. As a result, with the exception of flash bang grenades, these items were not being tracked. The OIG also identified areas where the USMS's policies should be strengthened to improve the safeguarding of its weapons and munitions.

The OIG made seven recommendations to improve the USMS's controls over its weapons, ammunition, and less lethal munitions and the USMS agreed with all of them.

The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

### Hiring Practices

The OIG issued a report examining allegations relating to improper hiring practices at the USMS involving senior level officials. The allegations included that former USMS Director Stacia Hylton recommended an applicant for a contractor position with the USMS's AFD, and that, in response, then-Deputy Assistant Director of the AFD Kimberly Beal influenced subordinates to waive contract qualification requirements in order to hire the applicant. Beal allegedly took this action in order to receive favorable treatment from Hylton in Beal's effort to become an Assistant Director. The allegations

# U.S. Marshals Service

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also included the claim that two USMS officials each hired the other's spouse into his division as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

The OIG found that Hylton violated the Ethical Standards when she took actions that amounted to a recommendation of the applicant for the contractor position, and Beal violated the Ethical Standards when she took actions in response to Hylton's recommendation to manipulate the hiring process to benefit the applicant. The OIG found that then-Assistant Director of the Tactical Operations Division William Snelson committed prohibited personnel actions and violated the Ethical Standards when he took a series of steps to improve the chances that the spouse of the then-Chief of the Office of Protective Operations in the Judicial Security Division was hired into the USMS. The OIG also found that a Department letter to Senator Charles Grassley responding to some of the hiring allegations contained inaccurate information because the USMS relied on an inadequate and flawed process to gather the information used to draft the response, and because the individuals primarily responsible for gathering and providing the information—including Hylton and Beal—failed to exercise reasonable care in investigating the allegations.

The OIG did not substantiate the allegation that Hylton promoted Beal to Assistant Director in exchange for Beal's efforts on behalf of Hylton's recommended applicant. Nor did the OIG substantiate the allegation that Snelson and the Chief of the Office of Protective Operations each hired the other's spouse as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

The OIG referred its findings to the Department and the USMS for appropriate action.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 340 complaints involving the USMS. The most common allegations made against USMS employees were official misconduct; and force,


abuse, and rights violations. The majority of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the USMS's Office of Internal Affairs for its review and appropriate action.

During this reporting period, the OIG opened 13 investigations and referred 13 allegations to the USMS's OIA for its review with a requirement that OIA report the results of its action or investigation to the OIG. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 48 open cases of alleged misconduct against USMS employees. The most common allegations were official misconduct and fraud.

The following are examples of cases involving the USMS that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- On May 17, 2018, a Butler County Sheriff's Office Correctional Officer was sentenced in Butler County, Ohio, to 2 years of incarceration and 5 years of post-release control, and was mandated to register as a Tier III sex offender. According to the count of the Indictment to which she pleaded guilty, between October and November 2017, the Correctional Officer engaged in sexual contact and acts with an inmate at the Butler County Jail where she worked. The Butler County Jail is a USMS contract facility that houses federal detainees. The Correctional Officer was terminated from the Butler County Sheriff's Office. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Chicago Field Office and the Butler County Sheriff's Office.
- On April 27, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon receipt of an anonymous complaint that a USM did not regularly work 8 hours each day. USMS time and attendance policy specifically provides that USMs are required to work a 40-hour work week and an 8-hour day reflecting

# U.S. Marshals Service



Source: Investigations Data Management System

the business hours of the district. The investigation conducted surveillance of the USM over a period of 3 days and observed that on each of the 3 days, the USM worked for substantially fewer than 8 hours. The USM's certified time and attendance summary for the relevant pay period shows that the USM certified that he worked an 8-hour day on each of those 3 days. When interviewed by the OIG, the USM stated that he viewed his hours as flexible, and his short work days were more than offset by days on which he worked in excess of 8 hours. The investigation concluded that the USM violated ethics regulations for executive branch employees, regulations relating to leave specifically applicable to USMs, and USMS time and attendance policy. The OIG concluded that the USM had ample notice of USMS policy regarding his expected hours of work. The OIG provided a report to the USMS and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The subject is no longer serving as the USM.

- On May 10, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon the receipt of information from the USMS alleging that a USM exhibited intimidating and retaliatory behavior towards a subordinate in

response to the subordinate's report of misconduct involving the USM. In an earlier investigation, the OIG substantiated the subordinate's report of misconduct by the USM. The OIG investigation found that the USM also engaged in the retaliatory misconduct as alleged by improperly requesting access to the subordinate's work emails, in violation of USMS policy and codes of professional responsibility. The OIG provided a report to the USMS. The subject is no longer serving as the USM.

- On September 27, 2018, a former USMS contract Kitchen Supervisor assigned to the Central Texas Detention Facility in San Antonio, Texas, was sentenced to 40 months of incarceration for attempting to provide contraband to an inmate in prison. The Kitchen Supervisor, who was terminated from his position during the investigation, was sentenced in the Western District of Texas. According to the factual statement in support of his plea agreement, in September 2017, the Kitchen Supervisor met with a confidential human source, accepted a \$1,000 bribe, and agreed to purchase methamphetamine for introduction into the prison facility for an inmate. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Houston Area Office, FBI, and USMS.

## Ongoing Work

### **Management of the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System**

The OIG is conducting an audit of USMS's management of the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). The preliminary objective of the audit will be to evaluate USMS's efforts to achieve its strategic goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of JPATS prisoner and detainee transportation.

# Drug Enforcement Administration

The DEA enforces federal laws and regulations related to the growth, production, or distribution of controlled substances. In addition, the DEA seeks to reduce the supply of and demand for illicit drugs, both domestically and internationally. The DEA has more than 10,000 employees staffing its 222 domestic offices and 91 foreign offices in 70 countries.



## Reports Issued

### DEA Task Orders Awarded to Maximus, Inc.

The OIG issued an audit report examining \$26 million in DEA Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP) contracts awarded to Maximus, Inc. (Maximus), for financial investigative services. The DEA awarded the contracts, or “task orders,” to Maximus to provide personnel responsible for analyzing evidence and information associated with targeted drug investigations to identify assets that were potentially eligible for seizure and forfeiture.

The OIG identified several concerns about the administration and oversight of the task orders it reviewed. Specifically, the OIG found that DEA officials were decisively involved in selecting the contracted personnel who worked on the task orders, and that 40 percent of the personnel working under the task orders were former DEA employees. While the OIG did not find any evidence that the DEA violated ethics rules, these findings highlight the need for JMD to assess the propriety of the DEA’s level of involvement in the selection of task order personnel.

The OIG also found that the manner in which the DEA administered the task orders examined demonstrated several characteristics of a personal services contract. For example, DEA employees directly assigned daily activities to, and approved the timesheets of, contract personnel, whereas Maximus and its subcontractor, Professional Risk Management, Inc. (PRM), had only 1 individual to serve as

contract and project manager for 82 contract workers nationwide. Contract personnel also told the OIG that they had been embedded into DEA Tactical Diversion Squads and Strike Forces. The OIG determined that the DEA needs to strengthen its oversight of AFP task orders to ensure compliance with the FAR.

In addition, while Maximus and its subcontractor, PRM, classified all contract personnel as independent contractors, the OIG found that task order personnel exhibited characteristics with respect to Maximus and PRM that suggested an employer-employee relationship. As noted in the report, PRM advised the OIG that it has reclassified as an employee almost every worker currently performing similar services under the current, follow-on DEA AFP contract.

Lastly, the OIG found that two individuals who were hired as Subject Matter Experts did not meet the contractual requirements for educational qualifications, and the OIG found instances where the DEA paid Maximus for prohibited local travel costs.

The OIG made 11 recommendations to JMD and the DEA to improve how they administer and oversee AFP contract awards and performance. JMD, DEA, and Maximus explicitly agreed with, or identified appropriate corrective action in response to, all of the recommendations, and the OIG has already closed one recommendation based on actions taken by the DEA in response to the draft report.

# Drug Enforcement Administration

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## Investigations


During this reporting period, the OIG received 329 complaints involving the DEA. The most common allegations made against DEA employees was official misconduct. The majority of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the DEA for its review and appropriate action.

During this reporting period, the OIG opened 13 cases and referred 69 allegations to the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for action or investigation with a requirement that OPR report the results of its action or investigation to the OIG. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 52 open cases of alleged misconduct against DEA employees. The most common allegations was official misconduct.

The following are examples of cases involving the DEA that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- In the *Semiannual Report to Congress April 1, 2017 – September 30, 2017*, the OIG reported on an investigation of a retired DEA Special Agent who pleaded guilty to theft by a government official. On August 10, 2018, the DEA Special Agent was sentenced in the Southern District of California to 3 years of probation and 8 months of home confinement, and must pay a \$5,500 fine and \$60,000 in restitution. According to the statement of facts in support of her guilty plea, the Special Agent admitted that while stationed in Cyprus between 2008 and 2014, she was assigned to help the U.S. government recover the proceeds of an American fraud scheme that had been frozen in the banking system in northern Cyprus. After later transferring to San Francisco and having been instructed to have no further involvement with the proceeds, the Special Agent admittedly returned to Cyprus in October 2015, on personal business, and took possession of \$310,000 of the proceeds without ever notifying anyone in the U.S. government that she had done so. The Special Agent also admitted that, in February 2016, she returned \$250,000 to the U.S. government under a false cover story that she had unexpectedly received it in a package from Cyprus. The investigation was conducted by the OIG's Washington Field Office with assistance from the OIG's Cyber Investigations Office.
- On April 17, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated upon the receipt of information alleging that a former senior official of the DEA, who had been receiving disability compensation from the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), failed to properly disclose to OWCP income from post-DEA employment. The OIG conducted a joint investigation with the U.S. Department of Labor OIG of the former senior official's alleged underreporting of income. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation that the former senior official engaged in post-DEA employment while receiving disability compensation and underreported his income to OWCP by more than \$300,000 over a period of several years. Based on the information gathered by the OIG during this investigation, OWCP determined that it had overpaid the former senior official over \$60,000, including more than \$10,000 as a result of the former senior official's failure to accurately disclose employment income. An additional \$50,000 was not properly offset against the former senior official's benefits, due to an OWCP oversight. OWCP has reduced the former senior official's monthly benefits in order to recover the overpayment. The case was referred for prosecution on July 28, 2016, and was declined on August 15, 2016. The OIG provided its report to DEA for its review and action it deems appropriate.

# Drug Enforcement Administration



Source: Investigations Data Management System

## Ongoing Work

### Opioid Enforcement Efforts

The OIG is assessing whether the DEA's regulatory activities and enforcement efforts effectively prevent the diversion of controlled substances, particularly opioids, to unauthorized users. Specifically, this review will examine the (1) DEA's enforcement regulations, policies, and procedures; (2) DEA's use of enforcement actions involving manufacturers, distributors, physicians, and pharmacists who violate these policies and procedures; and (3) DEA's coordination with state and local partners to combat the opioid epidemic.

### DEA's Use of Administrative Subpoenas

The OIG is examining the DEA's use of administrative subpoenas to obtain broad collections of data or information. The review will address the legal authority for the acquisition or use of these data collections; the existence and effectiveness of any policies and procedural safeguards established with respect to the collection, use, and retention of the data; the creation, dissemination, and usefulness of any products generated from the data; and the use of "parallel construction" or other techniques to protect the confidentiality of these programs.

### DEA's Income-Generating Undercover Operations


The OIG is conducting an audit of the DEA's income-generating undercover operations. The preliminary objectives are to evaluate the management and oversight of DEA's income-generating operations with respect to: (1) the initiation and classification of these operations, (2) the controls over and use of funds during operations, and (3) the disposal of proceeds at the conclusion of these operations.

### Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives

The OIG is conducting an audit of DEA's controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives, including firearms, Tasers, ammunition, less-lethal munitions, and diversionary devices. The preliminary objectives are to evaluate: (1) DEA's controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives, (2) DEA's compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives, and (3) the accuracy of DEA's weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories.

# Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

ATF's approximately more than 5,000 employees enforce federal criminal laws and regulate the firearms and explosives industries. ATF investigates violent crimes involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products. ATF also provides training and support to its federal, state, local, and international law enforcement partners and works in 25 field divisions with representation throughout the United States. Foreign offices are located in Mexico, Canada, Europe, and El Salvador.



## Investigation

During this reporting period, the OIG received 196 complaints involving ATF personnel. The most common allegations made against ATF employees were official misconduct, and waste and mismanagement. The majority of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to ATF for its review and appropriate action.


During this reporting period, the OIG opened 9 cases and referred 27 allegations to OPR for action or investigation with a requirement that OPR report the results of its action or investigation to the OIG. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 24 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to ATF employees. The investigations included Off-Duty Violations, and Official Misconduct.

The following is an example of a case involving ATF that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- On May 23, 2018, the OIG completed its report of investigation for an investigation initiated based on information received from the DOJ Office of the Deputy Attorney General in 2012 alleging that an ATF Supervisory Special Agent released information in violation of federal statutes. The OIG found that the Special Agent had indiscriminately provided to his attorney

thousands of statutorily-protected documents relating to ATF investigations without authorization, some of which the attorney subsequently provided to selected Members of Congress while acting on the Special Agent's behalf. The materials disclosed included court-sealed documents relating to wiretaps, disclosure of which is punishable under law as contempt of court; documents containing summaries of intercepted telephone calls, which are protected from disclosure under the wiretap statute; and ATF reports of investigation and reports generated by other law enforcement agencies, which contained information about the identities of investigative subjects and witnesses that is protected from disclosure under the *Privacy Act of 1974*. In addition to providing the materials that the attorney had passed on to selected Members of Congress, the Special Agent also transmitted to his attorney records relating to financial transactions of third parties, which are protected from disclosure by federal statute; a document classified as "confidential," which violated a federal statute and executive orders; and certain ATF materials and information, the handling of which was restricted by ATF Orders. Lastly, the OIG found that the Special Agent used unauthorized external devices and personal email to move the documents from ATF systems, networks,

# Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives



Source: Investigations Data Management System

and devices and transmit them to his counsel, which conduct violated a DOJ Order relating to information security. The OIG analyzed the Special Agent's claim that his disclosures were protected under the WPA. The WPA authorizes disclosures to Members of Congress. However, in enacting the WPA, Congress specified that information specifically prohibited from disclosure by other statutes can only be provided to the Office of Special Counsel, the Inspector General, or an employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures. Accordingly, the WPA does not protect employees for disclosing such information to Members of Congress, even if Congress is authorized to receive the information in other contexts. Therefore, the OIG found that the Special Agent's unauthorized disclosures of statutorily protected documents and information violated federal law. During its investigation, the OIG obtained certifications from the Special Agent and his attorneys that the government records the Special Agent transmitted to his attorneys had been deleted or destroyed. Prosecution was declined. The OIG provided its report to ATF for appropriate action.

## Ongoing Work

### Sole Source Small Business Contracts

The OIG is conducting an audit of ATF's awarding of small business contracts using sole source justifications. With regard to these contracts, the preliminary objectives are to assess ATF's: (1) processes for soliciting small businesses for contract opportunities; (2) procedures and decisions for the selection and subsequent award of contract opportunities to small businesses; and (3) oversight of small business sole source awards.

### ATF's Implementation of the Frontline Initiative

The OIG is reviewing the implementation of ATF's Frontline initiative since it was launched in 2012. ATF established Frontline to standardize the development and execution of agency-wide regulatory and investigative priorities while ensuring that limited resources are effectively focused to accomplish these goals. The OIG's review will examine ATF Frontline operations to assess its implementation, application, and effectiveness in meeting ATF goals and objectives.

# Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

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## **Controls over Agent Cashier Funds**

The OIG is conducting an audit of ATF's controls over Agent cashier funds. ATF field divisions use Agent cashier funds to facilitate the purchase of evidence, procurement of services, and payment for information related to criminal investigations. The preliminary objectives are to assess whether: (1) policies and procedures effectively mitigate the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse in the Agent cashier fund; (2) field divisions comply with these policies and procedures; (3) Agent cashier funds have been accounted for appropriately; and (4) ATF Headquarters and field division management are providing appropriate oversight of the Agent cashier fund expenditures.

# Office of Justice Programs

OJP manages the majority of DOJ's grant programs and is responsible for developing initiatives to address crime at the state and local levels. OJP has six bureaus and program offices—Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics; National Institute of Justice; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; Office for Victims of Crime; and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking. In this section, the report discusses OJP's oversight of grant funds and OIG reviews of grant recipients.



## Reports Issued

### Audits of Grants to State and Local Entities

During this reporting period, the OIG audited 11 external OJP grant recipients, including multi-component and Crime Victims Fund (CVF) grant recipients, as described by the examples below.

- The OIG issued an audit report examining the \$49,900,000 Presidential Candidate Nominating Convention grant awarded to [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania](#), to provide security during the 2016 Democratic National Convention. The OIG found significant deficiencies in Philadelphia's management of the grant funds and identified \$14,876,759 in questioned costs. Specifically, the OIG identified \$7.6 million in questioned costs for law enforcement partner expenditures. Philadelphia did not establish clear guidance for its state and local law enforcement partners as to what could be charged for the convention and did not take adequate steps to ensure that the charges were appropriate. Further, Philadelphia did not reimburse partners on a timely basis and did not have a valid subrecipient agreement in place. The audit also identified \$6.3 million in questioned costs for Host Committee expenditures. The Democratic National Convention Committee was involved in approving the actions of the Host

Committee, a subrecipient of the grant. The OIG found that this involvement could have created an appearance of political influence in managing the grant funds and had the potential to negatively impact the public's confidence in the integrity of the grant program. The audit further identified \$1 million in questioned costs for Philadelphia Fire Department expenditures. The Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD) used a weighted average to calculate overtime rather than actual rates, and was therefore reimbursed for unsupported overtime personnel costs. Further, because PFD used a weighted average, we could not determine whether certain costs were allowable. The OIG also identified instances where PFD's non-civilian overtime was misreported, resulting in duplicate charges. In addition, the OIG found that Philadelphia did not have adequate or effective internal controls, did not properly manage its budgets, did not maintain accountability of funds, failed to comply with DOJ requirements for requesting funds, and did not submit accurate Federal Financial Reports. The OIG made 13 recommendations to OJP. OJP agreed with 12 recommendations and did not agree with one recommendation. Philadelphia agreed with seven of the recommendations, partially agreed with three recommendations, and disagreed with three recommendations.

# Office of Justice Programs

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The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

- The OIG issued an audit report on three awards on three grants totaling \$7,449,929 to the [Research Foundation of the City University of New York](#) (the Foundation) on behalf of John Jay. OJP awarded the grants between 2012 and 2016 to support research related to group violence and drug market intervention strategies, procedural justice, implicit bias, racial reconciliation, and school shootings. As of December 2017, the Foundation had drawn down \$4,356,546. The OIG concluded that John Jay demonstrated adequate progress towards achieving the grants' stated goals and objectives. However, the OIG identified issues related to expenditures made with grant funds. Specifically, John Jay did not adhere to grant conditions related to: approving timekeeping records, managing property and inventory, and obtaining advance approval for conference expenditures. The OIG also identified \$146,575 in questioned costs related to consultant fees that it was unable to determine were reasonable. The OIG made 10 recommendations to OJP to assist the Foundation and John Jay in improving its award management and administration. The OJP agreed with all of them. John Jay agreed with nine of the recommendations and disagreed with one recommendation.

## Investigation

During this reporting period, the OIG received 23 complaints involving OJP. The most common allegation made against OJP employees, contractors, or grantees was fraud.

During this reporting period, the OIG opened three cases. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 15 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to OJP employees, contractors, or grantees. The most common allegation was grantee fraud.

## Ongoing Work

### Corrective Actions to Resolve and Close Audit Reports during FYs 2015 through 2017

The OIG is auditing OJP's corrective actions to resolve and close audit reports during FYs 2015 through 2017. The preliminary objective is to assess and summarize the corrective actions taken by OJP to close OIG audit recommendations issued in audit reports that were closed during FYs 2015 through 2017.

### National Institute of Justice's Grants Management

The OIG is auditing the National Institute of Justice's grants management. The preliminary objectives are to determine whether the National Institute of Justice: (1) used fair and open processes to award competitive grants; (2) properly justified its decisions when awarding non-competitive grants; and (3) managed grant activities in compliance with legal, regulatory, and ethical requirements.

# Crime Victims Fund

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The CVF was established by the *Victims of Crime Act of 1984* (VOCA) and serves as a major funding source for victim services throughout the country. Each year, millions of dollars are deposited into the CVF from criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, penalty fees, and special assessments collected by USAOs, U.S. Courts, and the BOP. These dollars come from offenders convicted of federal crimes, not from taxpayers. OJP's OVC administers the CVF. States receive the majority of CVF funds directly from OVC through the VOCA victim assistance and compensation formula grants. The OVC also awards discretionary grants to state and local governments, individuals, educational institutions, and private nonprofit organizations to support national-scope demonstration projects and training and technical assistance that enhance the professional expertise of victim service providers. Other CVF-funded program areas include USAO victim-witness coordinators who assist victims of federal crimes, and FBI victim specialists who help keep victims of federal crimes informed of case developments and appropriate resources.

Since FY 2015, Congress substantially increased the amount of funding for these Department programs. Specifically, in FY 2015, the Department had over \$2 billion in CVF funding available for programs that support crime victims. This more than tripled the amount of CVF grant funding that was available in FY 2014. From FY 2015 through 2017, DOJ has provided nearly \$8 billion in funding for CVF programs. This increase has translated into commensurate increases in grants to states that manage and subaward the majority of the funds to public and nonprofit organizations that operate counseling centers, domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, and other victim services.

The OIG is committed to robust oversight of the Department's administration of the CVF and of the victim services the Department operates and supports. Our audits of victims of crime programs have resulted in dozens

of recommendations to improve recipients' administration of CVF-funded grants, enhance the performance of its programs, improve monitoring of thousands of subrecipients, and help ensure accountability for billions of CVF dollars. During this semiannual reporting period, the Audit Division issued 8 audits and, at the end of the period, had 17 ongoing audits of OJP programs and grants that received CVF funds. Examples of the audits issued this period are described below.

## Reports Issued

### Audits of CVF Grants to State and Local Entities

During this reporting period, the OIG audited eight OJP CVF-funded grant recipients, as described below.

- The OIG issued an audit report on four Victim Assistance grants and three Victim Compensation grants totaling almost \$120 million to the [State of Georgia's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council](#) (CJCC) in Atlanta, Georgia. OJP awarded these grants between FYs 2012 and 2015 for the purpose of enhancing services for, and providing compensation payment to, crime victims throughout Georgia. As of September 2017, the CJCC had drawn down \$95,400,492 of the grants. The OIG found the CJCC generally used grant funds for the intended purposes, but also identified several concerns with how CJCC managed and administered the grants. Specifically, CJCC's annual certifications for Victims Compensation grants contained errors that caused CJCC to be awarded more funding than it otherwise would have received. These errors resulted in the OIG identifying \$400,000 in questioned costs. The audit also found that CJCC's practice of reclassifying and transferring expenditures between grants in an attempt to ensure that it could draw down remaining funds from expiring

# Crime Victims Fund

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grants resulted in excess cash on hand. In addition, the OIG found issues with how CJCC monitored subrecipients of grant funds, and how it tracked grant spending. As a result of these findings, the OIG questioned \$904,859 in grant costs, and identified an additional \$131,191 in unspent grant funds that it believes OJP could put to better use. The OIG made 19 recommendations to OJP to improve the CJCC's management of grant funds and to address \$1,036,050 in dollar-related findings. OJP agreed with the recommendations. CJCC agreed with 7 and partially agreed with 12 of the recommendations.

- The OIG issued an audit report on four grants totaling over \$105 million to the [Victim and Witness Assistance Board](#) (VWAB) in Boston, Massachusetts. OJP awarded these grants from FYs 2013 to 2016 to enhance crime victim services throughout Massachusetts. As of May 2018, VWAB had drawn down a cumulative amount of \$47,988,055 for all of the grants the OIG reviewed. The OIG found that VWAB used its grant funds to enhance services for crime victims. However, the OIG identified several deficiencies in VWAB's process for subawarding grant funds. Specifically, VWAB did not sufficiently track each award; did not comply with program requirements for the priority funding areas; did not implement adequate subrecipient monitoring policies and procedures; and did not ensure its subrecipients' contributions towards the match requirement were allowable and appropriately supported. The OIG also found that one subrecipient could not support \$331,029 in personnel expenditure and that VWAB's Federal Financial Reports were inaccurate. The OIG made 12 recommendations to OJP to improve the administration of victim assistance grants made to Massachusetts

and to remedy \$331,029 in questioned costs. OJP and WVAB agreed with the recommendations.

- The OIG issued an audit report on three grants totaling over \$39 million made to the [Mississippi State Department of Health](#) (MSDH) in Jackson, Mississippi. OJP awarded these grants between 2014 and 2016 to enhance crime victim services throughout Mississippi. At the time of the audit, MSDH had drawn down \$17,885,618 for all of the grants the OIG reviewed. The OIG concluded that MSDH used grant funds to enhance services for crime victims in Mississippi. However, the audit found that MSDH did not comply with some essential award conditions related to program requirements, performance reporting, and grant financial management. Specifically, the OIG found that MSDH needs to ensure that it completes the required on-site monitoring of all subrecipients at least once every 2 years, and needs to establish and implement procedures to validate subgrant award data entered into the Performance Measurement Tool. The OIG also concluded that MSDH could improve its federal financial reporting and drawdown processes. The OIG made nine recommendations to OJP to assist MSDH in improving its grant management and administration and to remedy \$219,433 in dollar-related findings. OJP agreed with the recommendations. MSDH agreed with one and did not explicitly agree or disagree with eight recommendations.
- The OIG issued an audit report on three grants totaling over \$3.7 million subawarded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) to the [Anti-Violence Partnership of Philadelphia](#) (AVP). OJP awarded these grants between 2014 and 2016 for the purpose of providing direct service to victims of crime. As of October 2017,

# Crime Victims Fund

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AVP had drawn down \$1,753,502 for all of the grants the OIG reviewed. The OIG concluded that AVP provided intervention and support programs for victims of crime, and did not identify significant concerns regarding budget management. However, the OIG found that AVP could improve in other areas. Specifically, the audit found that the AVP did not properly differentiate between grant-funded and non-grant-funded services provided to victims; did not properly record grant expenditures in its accounting system; and charged unsupported and unallowable expenditures. As a result, the OIG identified \$3,563 in questioned costs. The OIG made nine recommendations to PCCD and OJP to assist AVP in improving its award management and administration. OJP and PCCD agreed with the recommendations. AVP disagreed with one recommendation.

- The OIG issued an issued an audit report on three grants totaling over \$2 million to the [Idaho Industrial Commission's \(IIC\) Crime Victims Compensation Program \(CVCP\)](#) in Boise, Idaho. OJP awarded these grants between FYs 2014 and 2016 to provide financial support through the payment of compensation benefits to crime victims throughout Idaho. As of February 2018, the CVCP had drawn down \$984,000 of the grants the OIG reviewed. The OIG found that the CVCP used its victim compensation grant funding appropriately to provide financial support to crime victims. The audit did not identify significant issues regarding the CVCP's intake, adjudication, or appeals procedures for applications and individual claims, or compliance with the award's special conditions the OIG tested. However, the OIG identified issues with how the CVCP performance reports were compiled and found that the CVCP lacked policies and procedures related to program implementation,

state certification, performance reporting, financial reporting, and grant expenditures. The OIG made seven recommendations to OJP to assist the CVCP in improving its grant management and administration. OJP and CVCP agreed with the recommendations.

- The OIG issued an audit report on four grants totaling over \$8.65 million made to the [Wisconsin Department of Justice \(WI DOJ\)](#) in Madison, Wisconsin. OJP awarded these grants between 2014 and 2017 to provide financial support through the payment of compensation benefits to crime victims throughout Wisconsin. As of July 2018, the WI DOJ had drawn down \$4,005,890 for all of the grants the OIG reviewed. The audit concluded that the WI DOJ used and managed its grant funds to enhance its crime victim compensation program. The OIG did not identify significant concerns regarding the WI DOJ's compensation claim payments, use of the administrative funding allowance, performance reporting, or accuracy of its federal financial reports. However, the audit found that the WI DOJ's accounting method of separately categorizing state and federal sources of revenue for victim compensation programs was not the most efficient method and may affect its reporting of these payments. The OIG also identified an area for internal control improvement related to the WI DOJ's compensation claims review and adjudication process. The OIG made two recommendations to OJP to improve the administration of the WI DOJ's crime victim compensation program. OJP and WI DOJ agreed with the recommendations.
- The OIG issued an audit report on two VOCA victim compensation formula grants awarded to the [Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission](#), and administered by the Virginia Victims Fund (VVF) in Richmond, Virginia. OVC

# Crime Victims Fund

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awarded these formula grants, totaling over \$2.5 million for federal FYs 2015 to 2016, from the Crime Victims Fund to provide financial support through the payment of compensation benefits to crime victims throughout Virginia. As of May 2017, the VVF had drawn down the full amount of the grants the OIG reviewed. The OIG found that the VVF used its victim compensation grant awards appropriately to provide financial support for crime victims. This audit found the VVF designed its victim compensation program adequately, and did not identify significant issues with the VVF's process to compile its annual certifications of program-related dollar amounts. The VVF implemented a strong process to assess, pay, and track compensation claims, and the OIG did not identify any significant issues with its financial management of the awards. However, the OIG noted that the VVF could improve how it retains grant-related records. The OIG made two recommendations to OJP to assist the VVF in improving its grant administration. OJP agreed with both recommendations. The VVF agreed with one and disagreed with one recommendation.

- The OIG issued an audit report on three grants totaling more than \$52 million awarded to the [Connecticut Judicial Branch](#) (CJB) in Hartford, Connecticut. The grants were awarded from FYs 2014 to 2016. As of May 2018, CJB had drawn down a cumulative amount of \$30,590,001 for all of the grants the OIG reviewed. The audit concluded that CJB used its victim assistance grant funding to enhance services for crime victims. The OIG found CJB adequately planned and executed the VOCA program, adhered to program and performance reporting requirements, and had adequate grant financial management and subrecipient monitoring. The report did not contain any recommendations due to CJB's compliance with essential grant requirements.

## Ongoing Work

### Efforts to Address Challenges in Administering CVF Programs

The OIG is reviewing OJP's efforts to address challenges in administering CVF programs. The review is expected to include (1) assessing systemic issues facing CVF grant administration and (2) evaluating actions OJP has taken to ameliorate programmatic issues identified through OIG work.

### Updates to Previously Issued Reports

In response to an audit report, OJP made substantial improvements to its management of the John R. Justice (JRJ) grant program, and according to OJP it has collected or referred for collection more than \$1.4 million in repayments it has determined are owed to the federal government by grant beneficiaries. In recognition of OJP's actions, the OIG has closed all 12 recommendations from its audit. In May 2014, the OIG issued an [audit report](#) finding, among other things, that OJP did not closely monitor these awards or the amounts of grant funds awarded to these individuals, and that OJP had not established an effective process for collecting repayments from beneficiaries who left their public service positions prior to completing their 3-year service agreements. The OIG's audit estimated that at least \$1 million in such repayments had gone uncollected. Since the audit, OJP has undertaken significant efforts to clarify guidance on program requirements, improve recordkeeping, and enhance its monitoring of grant spending. For example, OJP has improved its ability to identify and track program participants, awards, and repayments; clarified the respective grant administration responsibilities of the DOJ and of state administering agencies; and enhanced its enforcement of grant requirements. OJP has also received more than \$130,000 in direct repayments from JRJ.

## Crime Victims Fund

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Additionally, the Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (Soboba) of San Jacinto, California, repaid \$353,721 in crime victim-related funding to DOJ as a result of a grant audit. In recognition of these repayments and other corrective actions taken by OJP, the OIG has closed all six recommendations from its audit. The OIG's [April 2014 report](#) assessed an OJP grant to Soboba and found weaknesses in the areas of expenditures, matching, reporting, and program performance and accomplishments. The OIG determined that Soboba's records were commingled and inadequate to determine if it had accomplished grant objectives. Since the audit, Soboba has repaid the federal government \$356,950 to address the portion of its grant expenditures for which it could not furnish appropriate support or demonstrate the accomplishment of grant objectives. In addition, OJP has taken steps that address the OIG's other recommendations, including working with Soboba to implement significant improvements to Soboba's internal controls over accounting records, payroll expenditures, and the preservation of supporting documentation.

# Other Department Components

## Investigation

The following is an example of a case that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

- On June 5, 2018, the OIG initiated an investigation based upon information it received that a Supervisory Attorney (Supervisory Attorney 1) sexually harassed a subordinate employee by making unwanted sexual advances, including physical contact, making telephone calls, sending text messages and emails, and extending invitations. In addition, the information alleged that Supervisory Attorney 1's supervisor (Supervisory Attorney 2) instructed subordinate employees not to discuss certain events, including Supervisory Attorney 1's sexual harassment of a subordinate employee. The investigation found that Supervisory Attorney 1 sexually harassed the subordinate employee by making unwanted sexual advances, including physical contact, making telephone calls, sending text messages and emails, and extending invitations, all in violation of federal regulations and DOJ policy regarding prevention of harassment in the workplace. Supervisory Attorney 1's misconduct created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working environment. Prosecution of Supervisory Attorney 1 was presented on July 14, 2017, and declined on July 26, 2017. The investigation also found that Supervisory Attorney 2 gave a non-specific instruction to a subordinate not to discuss certain events, which the subordinate reasonably understood to relate to his observations of potential misconduct by DOJ employees, possibly including sexual harassment committed by Supervisory Attorney 1. Such an instruction is inconsistent with Department regulations, which require DOJ employees to report misconduct that they witness. The investigation also found that Supervisory Attorney 2



lacked candor with the OIG. The OIG has provided this report to the supervisory attorneys' DOJ division management and to the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility for action they deem to be appropriate.

## Criminal Division

### Reports Issued

#### Equitable Sharing Audit

During this reporting period, the OIG audited equitable sharing revenues received by the [Prince George's County Police Department](#) (PGCPD) in Landover, Maryland. While the OIG found that PGCPD generally used equitable sharing funds for allowable purposes, it identified areas for improvement related to the recording and tracking of equitable sharing funds. Specifically, the OIG found that the PGCPD did not timely submit its Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification reports or timely post its equitable sharing cash receipts to its accounting system; commingled DOJ and Treasury equitable sharing interest incomes; and reported inaccuracies in FY 2015 and FY 2016 Single Audit reports. During the audit period of July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2017, the PGCPD reported a beginning balance of \$5,625,689, received \$2,229,806, and reported spending \$2,393,583 in equitable sharing funds.

## Other Department Components

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The OIG made four recommendations to the Criminal Division to address the issues the audit identified. The PGCPD and the Criminal Division agreed with the recommendations.

### Justice Management Division

#### Ongoing Work

##### Task Orders Awarded to CACI, Inc. – Commercial

The OIG is auditing task orders awarded to CACI, Inc. – Commercial (CACI) under a JMD contract. The preliminary objective of the audit is to assess JMD’s administration of the contract and task orders, and CACI’s performance and compliance with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract and task orders. The assessment of performance may include financial management, monitoring, reporting, and progress toward meeting the contract goals and objectives. The audit scope will cover the period of performance from August 1, 2013, to September 30, 2016.

### Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

#### Reports Issued

##### Audits of COPS Grants

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) provides funding to state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test policing strategies. During this reporting period, the OIG issued an audit report on seven grants totaling \$4,364,219 awarded to the [Blackfeet Tribe in Browning, Montana](#). The grants were awarded between 2012 and 2014 by OJP, COPS, and OVW for various purposes, including supporting law enforcement expenditures, providing services

for victims of domestic violence, and supporting other justice programs. As of August 2017, the Blackfeet Tribe had drawn down a total of \$3,054,041. The OIG concluded that the Blackfeet Tribe did not adequately manage DOJ grant funds and failed to demonstrate achievement of the goals and objectives for six of the seven grants. The audit found significant non-compliance and deficiencies in most of the areas reviewed. Specifically, the OIG found that the Blackfeet Tribe did not document all performance measures; did not comply with all special conditions; charged unallowable personnel and overtime costs, travel, equipment, supplies, contract, and other direct costs; did not adequately document personnel costs, travel, equipment, supply, contract, and other direct cost transactions; and overdraw grant funds on one grant. As a result, the OIG identified nearly \$1.9 million in dollar-related findings. The OIG made a total of 56 recommendations. The COPS Office, OJP, and OVW agreed with all of the recommendations. The Blackfeet Tribe did not agree with portions of 7 recommendations, agreed with portions of 3 recommendations, stated it was researching details behind 25 recommendations, and neither agreed nor disagreed with 23 recommendations.

### Office on Violence Against Women

#### Reports Issued

##### Audits of OVW Grants

The OVW administers financial and technical assistance to communities across the country for the development of programs, policies, and practices aimed at ending domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. The OVW recipients include state and local governments, universities, non-profit agencies, and for-profit agencies. During this reporting period, the OIG conducted five audits of OVW grant recipients, some examples of which are summarized below.

## Other Department Components

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- The OIG issued an audit report on five grants totaling \$2,211,546 awarded to the [Nebraska Domestic Violence Sexual Assault Coalition, dba Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual and Domestic Violence](#) (the Coalition) in Lincoln, Nebraska. OVW awarded these grants between 2013 and 2017 for the purpose of providing services to rural immigrant victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. As of February 2018, the Coalition had drawn down a total of \$1,564,831. The OIG concluded that the Coalition demonstrated adequate progress towards achieving the grants' stated goals and objectives. However, the OIG determined that the Coalition charged to the grants unallowable and unsupported personnel, contractor and consultant, and other direct costs. As a result of these deficiencies, the OIG identified \$171,704 in questioned costs. The audit also identified issues with the support for and accuracy of progress reports, the accuracy of FFRs, compliance with lobbyist disclosure requirements, and subgrantee monitoring. The OIG made six recommendations to OVW to assist the Coalition with managing the grant funds. OVW agreed with all of them. The Coalition partially agreed with one recommendation, and fully agreed with the remaining five recommendations.
- The OIG issued an audit report on four grants totaling \$1,259,185 awarded by OVW to [SAHELI, Inc., dba Asian Family Support Services of Austin](#) (AFSSA) in Austin, Texas. Between September 2013 and December 2017, AFSSA drew down \$736,349 of the grant funds, which were awarded for the purpose of serving victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, and stalking, as well as to provide transitional housing assistance to victims. The OIG found no indications that AFSSA was not adequately achieving the stated goals and objectives of the grants.

However, the OIG concluded that AFSSA did not comply with essential conditions related to the use of grant funds and internal controls. Specifically, the OIG found that AFSSA charged unallowable and unsupported other direct costs to one of the grants, including expenses for promotional items, gifts, trinkets, party supplies, and office decorations, among other items. In addition, the audit found that AFSSA's financial policies and procedures need to be strengthened, and AFSSA did not identify its indirect costs separately on its Federal Financial Reports. The OIG also identified an internal control issue related to the Executive Director's approval of her own expenses. As a result of these deficiencies, the OIG identified \$5,845 in questioned costs. The OIG made five recommendations to OVW to remedy the questioned costs and assist AFSSA in improving its award management and administration. OVW and AFSSA agreed with the findings.

- The OIG issued an audit report on five grants totaling \$2,449,028 to [Women Against Abuse](#) (WAA) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. OVW awarded these grants between 2012 and 2016 to support various programs and services for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking. As of September 2017, WAA had drawn down a total of \$1,095,933. The OIG concluded that WAA demonstrated adequate progress towards achieving the grants' stated goals and objectives. However, the audit found that 30 of the 42 Federal Financial Reports submitted by WAA were inaccurate, progress reports were not always accurate, and some documentation for subrecipient expenditures was missing. The OIG made three recommendations to OVW to improve WAA's management of grant funds and OVW agreed with all of them. WAA agreed with two recommendations, and disagreed with one. The OIG issued

## Other Department Components

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an audit report on a grant totaling \$1,007,441 awarded to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). OVW awarded this grant in 2014 through the Rural Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual and Stalking Assistance Program, which supports activities that enhance the safety of rural victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence and stalking. As of March 20, 2018, MDPH had drawn down a total of \$1,006,010. The OIG concluded that MDPH demonstrated adequate achievement of the grant's stated goals and objectives. The audit did not identify significant concerns regarding MDPH's financial and budget management, grant expenditures, drawdowns, or financial reporting. As a result, the report did not contain any recommendations.

### Ongoing Work

#### Technical Assistance Program

The OIG is auditing the OVW's Technical Assistance Program. The preliminary objectives are to determine whether OVW's controls are effective to ensure: (1) its grant applications meet eligibility requirements and awards are made in accordance with applicable agency policies and procedures; (2) it appropriately monitors awards to prevent project overlap, award duplication, and unallowable or unsupported costs; and (3) that recipients are appropriately progressing on the objectives of the awards.


# Top Management and Performance Challenges

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The OIG has published a list of top management and performance challenges facing DOJ annually since 1998. The list is based on the OIG's oversight work, research, and judgment. By statute, the list is required to be included in DOJ's annual Agency Financial Report.

This year's list identifies nine challenges that the OIG believes represent the most pressing concerns for DOJ. Eight of the nine challenges are issues the OIG identified in last year's report. A persistent theme throughout the challenges we identified is the threats caused by emerging technologies—from the development and distribution of synthetic opioids, to increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks, to drone technologies that threaten the physical security of federal prisons. For each emerging technology, the Department must have a workforce capable of responding to the threat, and the ability to recruit and retain professionals in each of these fields creates its own challenge for the Department.

The new challenge identified in this year's memorandum is an ongoing concern, but one that was highlighted persistently in the OIG's work this year. This is the need for all Department employees to adhere to established policies and procedures. As noted in recent OIG reviews, the actions of a few, especially individuals in leadership positions, can undermine the Department's reputation for professionalism, impartiality, and fairness when policies and procedures are not consistently followed.



## Top Management and Performance Challenges for the Department of Justice – 2018

- *Advancing National Security, Protecting Sensitive Information, and Safeguarding and Civil Liberties*
- *Enhancing Cybersecurity with Emerging Technology and Collaboration*
- *Managing an Overcrowded Federal Prison System in an Era of Declining Resources*
- *Building Productive Relationships and Trust Between Law Enforcement and Communities*
- *Coordinating within the Department and Across Government to Fulfill the Department's Mission to Combat Crime*
- *Administering and Overseeing Contracts and Grants*
- *Effectively Applying Performance-Based Management to Inform Decision Making and Improve Outcomes*
- *Filling Mission Critical Positions Despite Department Challenges and Delays in the Onboarding Process*
- *Ensuring Adherence to Established Department Policies and Procedures*

Detailed information about DOJ's management and performance challenges is available online [here](#).


# Congressional Testimony/Legislation and Regulations

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## Congressional Testimony

During this reporting period, the Inspector General testified on the following occasions:

- “Oversight of the FBI and DOJ Actions in Advance of the 2016 Election” before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on [June 19, 2018](#).
- “Examining the Inspector General’s First Report on Justice Department and FBI Actions in Advance of the 2016 Presidential Election” before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on [June 18, 2018](#).
- “Top Management and Performance Challenges Identified Government-wide by the Inspector General Community” before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on [April 18, 2018](#).



## Legislation and Regulations

The IG Act directs the OIG to review proposed legislation and regulations relating to the programs and operations of DOJ. Although DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs reviews all proposed or enacted legislation that could affect DOJ’s activities, the OIG independently reviews proposed legislation that could affect its operations and legislation that relate to waste, fraud, or abuse in DOJ’s programs and operations. For example, during this period, the OIG reviewed legislation, including the *Anti-Deficiency Reform and Enforcement Act of 2018*, *Executive Branch Waste and Fraud Recovery Act*, *Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act*, *Inspector General Recommendation Transparency Act of 2018*, *IG Subpoena Authority Act*, and *Payment Integrity Information Act of 2018*.

# Whistleblower Ombudsperson Program

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Whistleblowers perform a critical role when they bring forward evidence of wrongdoing and they should never suffer reprisal for doing so. The OIG Whistleblower Coordinator Program (the Whistleblower Program) works to ensure that whistleblowers are fully informed of their rights and protections from reprisal. It is equally important that management officials understand the full scope of whistleblower protections, and their responsibility under the law not to take action against any individual who makes a lawful disclosure of misconduct.

On June 25, 2018, President Trump signed into law *S. 1869, the Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act*. The new law, sponsored by Senator Charles Grassley, renamed the position of OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman to be the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator. Importantly, the Act also made the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator a permanent position, a clear indication of the program’s success throughout the IG community and Congress’ interest in institutionalizing a whistleblower support and education role within OIGs.

In addition to renaming and reauthorizing the Coordinator position, the legislation requires CIGIE, in consultation with the Office of Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection Coordinators, to “develop best practices for coordination and communication in promoting the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures, allegations of reprisal, and general matters regarding the implementation and administration of whistleblower protection laws.” The DOJ OIG Whistleblower Program has been at the forefront of this effort to coordinate best practices within the OIG community, and continues to lead a working group of OIG Whistleblower Coordinators. The working group is currently developing material for a CIGIE-hosted whistleblower web page that will provide information about whistleblower protections to federal employees, contractors, grantees, and employees with access to classified information.

<b>April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018</b>	
Employee complaints received <sup>1</sup>	282
Employee complaints opened for investigation by the OIG	80
Employee complaints that were referred by the OIG to the components for investigation	143
Employee complaint cases closed by the OIG <sup>2</sup>	83

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<sup>1</sup> Employee complaint is defined as an allegation of wrongdoing or misconduct received from whistleblowers, defined broadly as complaints received from employees and applicants with the Department, or its contractors, subcontractors, or grantees, either received directly from the complainant by the OIG Hotline, the field offices, or others in the OIG, or from a Department component if the complaint otherwise qualifies and is opened as an investigation. An employee complaint listed here could also allege retaliation for whistleblowing.

<sup>2</sup> This number reflects cases closed during the reporting period regardless of when they were opened.

# Statistical Information

## Audit Overview

During this reporting period, the OIG’s Audit Division issued 26 internal, contract, and external audit reports, which contained more than \$18.5 million in questioned costs, reported over \$136 thousand in funds to better use, and made 181 recommendations for management improvement.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the Audit Division issued 5 internal audit reports of DOJ programs; 4 audits of contracts funded at more than \$72.3 million; 17 external audit reports of grants and other agreements funded at over \$404.5 million; 26 *Single Audit Act* audits of programs funded at more than \$183 thousand; and 1 other report.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the Audit Division issued one Management Advisory Memorandum and one Notification of Irregularity.<sup>3</sup>

Questioned Costs <sup>4</sup>			
Reports	Number of Reports	Total Questioned Costs (including unsupported costs)	Unsupported Costs <sup>5</sup>
<b>Audits</b>			
No management decision made by beginning of period <sup>6</sup>	0	\$0	\$0
Issued during period	14 <sup>7</sup>	\$18,727,283	\$9,588,733
Needing management decision during period	14	\$18,727,283	\$9,588,733
Management decisions made during period:			
–Amount of disallowed costs <sup>8</sup>	14 <sup>9</sup>	\$12,762,486	\$9,588,733
–Amount of costs not disallowed	1	\$5,964,797	\$0
No management decision at end of period	0	\$0	\$0
<b>Evaluations</b>			
Nothing to report from the Evaluation and Inspections Division.			
<b>Special Reviews</b>			
Nothing to report from the Oversight and Review Division.			

<sup>1</sup> See glossary for definition of “Questioned Costs” and “Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use.”

<sup>2</sup> “Other Reports” are identified in Appendix 3.

<sup>3</sup> Management Advisory Memoranda communicate concerns and issues to DOJ management outside of audit reports for immediate attention. Notifications of Irregularity include instances of Audit Division referrals to the OIG Investigations Division.

<sup>4</sup> See glossary for definition of “Questioned Costs.”

<sup>5</sup> See glossary for definition of “Unsupported Costs.”

<sup>6</sup> Includes reports previously issued for which no management decision has been made. See glossary for definition of “Management Decision.”

<sup>7</sup> Of the audit reports issued during this period with questioned costs, four were *Single Audit Act* reports.

<sup>8</sup> Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken. See glossary for definition of “Disallowed Costs.”

<sup>9</sup> Includes one instance where management agreed with all but one of the audit’s recommendations.

# Statistical Information

<b>Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use<sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Reports</b>	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use</b>
<b>Audits</b>		
No management decision made by beginning of period <sup>2</sup>	0	\$0
Issued during period	2	\$136,847
Needing management decision during period	2	\$136,847
Management decisions made during period:		
–Amounts management agreed to put to better use <sup>3</sup>	2	\$136,847
–Amounts management disagreed to put to better use	0	\$0
No management decision at end of period	0	\$0
<b>Evaluations</b>		
Nothing to report from the Evaluation and Inspections Division.		
<b>Special Reviews</b>		
Nothing to report from the Oversight and Review Division.		

<sup>1</sup> See glossary for definition of “Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use.”

<sup>2</sup> Reports previously issued for which no management decision has been made.

<sup>3</sup> Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.

# Statistical Information

<b>Significant Recommendations for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed</b>			
<b>Report Number and Date</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Rec. No.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>
<b>Audits</b>			
GR-70-18-014 (September 2018)	Audit of the Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Awarded to the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the 2016 Democratic National Convention	9	Remedy \$5,964,797 in unallowable subrecipient expenditures for contracts executed by the subrecipient Host Committee.
17-35 (September 2017)	Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Insider Threat Program	4	The OIG recommended that the FBI conduct a comprehensive inventory of classified networks, systems, applications, and other information technology assets and identify a component responsible for maintaining the inventory.
16-33 (September 2016)	Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Management and Oversight of its Confidential Source Program	1	Examine the practices employed related to Limited Use confidential sources for interdiction operations as described in our report and, in coordination with the Department, perform an assessment of the risks, benefits, and legality of the practices.
GR-60-15-015 (September 2015)	Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Correctional Systems and Correctional Alternatives on Tribal Lands Program Grants Awarded to the Navajo Division of Public Safety, Window Rock, Arizona	9	Remedy \$32,034,623 in unallowable expenditures associated with excessive building sizes for Grant Numbers 2009-ST-B9-0089 and 2009-ST-B9-0100.
<b>Evaluations</b>			
17-05 (July 2017)	Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Use of Restrictive Housing for Inmates with Mental Illness	1	The OIG recommends that the BOP establish in policy the circumstances that warrant the placement of inmates in single-cell confinement while maintaining institutional and inmate safety and security and ensuring appropriate, meaningful human contact and out-of-cell opportunities to mitigate mental health concerns.
17-02 (March 2017)	Review of the Department's Oversight of Cash Seizure and Forfeiture Activities	1	The OIG recommends that the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section work with the ATF, the DEA, the FBI, the Asset Forfeiture Management Section, and the USAOs to develop ways to collect relevant data related to seizure and forfeiture activities sufficient to identify and evaluate whether seizures advance or are related to federal investigations.
16-05 (June 2016)	Review of the BOP's Contraband Interdiction Efforts	3	The OIG recommends that the BOP develop uniform guidelines and criteria for conducting random staff pat searches across all institutions that require a minimum frequency and duration for search events to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff on each shift are searched with appropriate frequency.
15-05 (May 2015)	Review of the Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons	8	The OIG recommends that the BOP consider revising its compassionate release policy to facilitate the release of appropriate aging inmates, including by lowering the age requirement and eliminating the minimum 10 years served requirement.
15-3 (January 2015)	Review of the DEA's Use of Cold Consent Encounters at Mass Transportation Facilities	1	The OIG recommends that the DEA consider how to determine if cold consent encounters are being conducted in an impartial manner, including reinstating the collection of racial and other demographic data and how it could be used to make that assessment.

# Statistical Information

Special Reviews			
17-02 (May 2017)	A Special Joint Review of Post-Incident Responses by the Department of State and Drug Enforcement Administration to Three Deadly Force Incidents in Honduras	7	The OIG recommends that the Deputy Attorney General should determine whether revisions to the post-shooting incident procedures should be made across the Department's law enforcement components to address the issue of shooting incidents outside the United States by a foreign LEO working on a joint law enforcement operation with a DOJ component. We also recommend that the Deputy Attorney General consider whether revisions to the components' post-shooting incident procedures should be made to ensure that the requirements are appropriate and consistent across the Department's law enforcement components.
17-04 (September 2017)	Report of Investigation of the Actions of Former DEA Leadership in Connection with the Reinstatement of a Security Clearance	2	The OIG recommends that the Department amend or supplement the Department Security Officer's delegation of authority to clarify that for the purpose of security adjudications, SPMs report solely to the Department Security Officer, and not to senior officials within the components.

Reports Without Management Decisions for More than 6 Months		
Report Number and Date	Report Title	Report Summary
<b>Audits</b>		
Nothing to report from the Audit Division.		
<b>Evaluations</b>		
Nothing to report from the Evaluation and Inspections Division.		
<b>Special Reviews</b>		
Nothing to report from the Oversight and Review Division.		

Description and Explanation of the Reasons for Any Significant Revised Management Decision Made During the Reporting Period			
Report Number and Date	Report Title	Rec. No.	Recommendation
<b>Audits</b>			
Nothing to report from the Audit Division.			
<b>Evaluations</b>			
Nothing to report from the Evaluation and Inspections Division.			
<b>Special Reviews</b>			
Nothing to report from the Oversight and Review Division.			

Significant Recommendations in Disagreement for More than 6 Months			
Report Number and Date	Report Title	Rec. No.	Recommendation
<b>Audits</b>			
Nothing to report from the Audit Division.			
<b>Evaluations</b>			
Nothing to report from the Evaluation and Inspections Division.			
<b>Special Reviews</b>			
Nothing to report from the Oversight and Review Division.			

# Statistical Information

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## Audit Follow-up

### OMB Circular A-50

OMB Circular A-50, *Audit Follow-up*, requires audit reports to be resolved within 6 months of the audit report issuance date. The Audit Division monitors the status of open audit reports to track the audit resolution and closure process. As of September 30, 2018, the Audit Division was monitoring the resolution process of 191 open reports and closed 77 reports this reporting period.

## Evaluation and Inspections Workload and Accomplishments

The following chart summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Evaluation and Inspections Division during the 6-month reporting period ending September 30, 2018.

Workload and Accomplishments	Number of Reviews
Reviews active at beginning of period	8
Reviews cancelled	0
Reviews initiated	3
Final reports issued	3
Reviews active at end of reporting period	8

# Statistical Information

## Investigations Statistics

The following chart summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Investigations Division during the 6-month period ending September 30, 2018.

<b>Source of Allegations<sup>1</sup></b>	
Hotline (telephone, mail and email)	3,384
Other sources	4,101
Total allegations received	7,485
<b>Investigative Caseload</b>	
Investigations opened this period	151
Investigations closed and reports of investigation issued this period <sup>2</sup>	141
Investigations in progress as of 9/30/18	555
<b>Prosecutive Actions</b>	
Criminal Indictments/Informations <sup>3</sup>	27
Arrests	55
Convictions/Pleas	29
Prosecutions referred to the Department of Justice <sup>4</sup>	158
Prosecutions referred to State and local <sup>5</sup>	24
<b>Administrative Actions</b>	
Terminations	24
Resignations	48
Disciplinary action	31
<b>Monetary Results</b>	
Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Assessments/Forfeitures	\$682,483.21
Civil Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Penalties/Damages/Forfeitures	\$979,264.82

<sup>1</sup> These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 52,000 additional Hotline, email and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government.

<sup>2</sup> At the conclusion of an investigation, one or more type of report is prepared. The prepared report may be an abbreviated report of investigation or a full report of investigation. In addition, an investigative summary for public posting on the OIG public website may be prepared for investigations involving senior government employees. The number of reports issued represents one report for each investigation.

<sup>3</sup> The number of indictments reported include both sealed and not sealed.

<sup>4</sup> This number includes all criminal and civil referrals to DOJ for a prosecutorial decision whether they were ultimately accepted or declined with the caveat that if an investigation was referred to more than one DOJ office for a prosecutorial decision, the referral to DOJ was only counted once. The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and or other legal entities.

<sup>5</sup> The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and or other legal entities.

# Statistical Information

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## Investigations Division Briefing Programs


OIG investigators conducted 96 Integrity Awareness Briefings for DOJ employees and other stakeholders throughout the country. These briefings are designed to educate employees and other stakeholders about the misuse of a public official's position for personal gain and to deter employees and other stakeholders from committing such offenses. The briefings reached 1742 employees.

## OIG Hotline

During FY 2018, the OIG received the majority of its Hotline complaints through its electronic complaint form located [here](#).

In addition, DOJ employees and citizens are able to file complaints by telephone, fax, email, and postal mail. The online access, email, fax, and postal mail all provide the ability to file a complaint in writing to the OIG.

From all Hotline sources during the second half of FY 2018, 3,384 new complaints related to DOJ operations or other federal agencies were entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. Of the new complaints, 2,254 were forwarded to various DOJ components for their review and appropriate action; 470 were filed for information; 575 were forwarded to other federal agencies; and 12 were opened by the OIG for investigation.



Source: Investigations Data Management System

Approximately, 52,000 additional Hotline email and phone contacts were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government and therefore were not entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system.

# Appendices

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## Appendix 1

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFD	Asset Forfeiture Division
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
BOP	Federal Bureau of Prisons
CHS	Confidential Human Source
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CODIS	Combined DNA Index System
COPS	Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
CVF	Crime Victims Fund
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOJ or Department	U.S. Department of Justice
EEO	Equal Opportunity Employer
ESF 13	Emergency Support Function 13
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA	<i>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978</i>
FISMA	<i>Federal Information Security Management Act</i>
FY	Fiscal Year
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
IG Act	<i>Inspector General Act of 1978</i>
IGEA	<i>Inspector General Empowerment Act</i>
JMD	Justice Management Division
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OJP	Office of Justice Programs
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPA	Department of Justice Office of the Pardon Attorney
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OVC	Office for Victims of Crime
OVW	Office on Violence Against Women
Patriot Act	<i>Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act</i>
USAO	U.S. Attorney's Office
USMS	U.S. Marshals Service
VOCA	<i>Victims of Crime Act of 1984</i>

# Appendices

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## Appendix 2

### Glossary of Terms

The following are definitions of specific terms as they are used in this report.

**Clemency:** Inmates may apply for clemency, or pardon, if they meet the following criteria: they are currently serving a federal sentence in prison and, by operation of law, likely would have received a substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) today; they are non-violent, low-level offenders without significant ties to large scale criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; they have served at least 10 years of their prison sentence; they do not have a significant criminal history; they have demonstrated good conduct in prison; and they have no history of violence prior to or during their current term of imprisonment.

**Combined DNA Index System:** A distributed database with three hierarchical levels that enables federal, state, and local forensic laboratories to compare DNA profiles electronically.

**Cooperative Agreement:** Term used to describe when the awarding agency expects to be substantially involved with the award's activities; often used interchangeably with "grant."

**Disallowed Cost:** The IG Act defines "disallowed cost" as a questioned cost that management, in a management decision, has sustained or agreed should not be charged to the government.

**Drawdown:** The process by which a grantee requests and receives federal funds.

**Emergency Support Function 13:** DOJ is designated responsibility for federal public safety and security assistance to local, state, tribal, territorial, and other governmental organizations overwhelmed by the results of an actual or anticipated natural or manmade disaster. In October 2008, DOJ assigned ATF as the lead coordinating agency for ESF-13.

**Equal Employment Opportunity:** DOJ's policy is "to provide, ensure, and promote equal opportunity in employment for all persons on the basis of merit" and "to eliminate any internal policy, practice, or procedure which results in discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender identity, age, disability (physical or mental), genetic information, status as a parent, sexual orientation, marital status, political affiliation, or any other non-merit factor."

**External Audit Report:** The results of audits and related reviews of expenditures made under DOJ contracts, grants, and other agreements. External audits are conducted in accordance with the Comptroller General's Government Auditing Standards and related professional auditing standards.

**Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use:** Recommendation by the OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if management of an entity took actions to start and complete the recommendation, including: (1) reductions in outlays; (2) deobligation of funds from programs or operations; (3) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; (4) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the entity, a contractor, or grantee; (5) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of contract or grant agreements; or (6) any other savings that specifically are identified.

**Internal Audit Report:** The results of audits and related reviews of DOJ organizations, programs, functions, computer security and information technology, and financial statements. Internal audits are conducted in accordance with the Comptroller General's Government Auditing Standards and related professional auditing standards.

# Appendices

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**Management Decision:** The IG Act defines “management decision” as the evaluation by the management of an establishment of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to such findings and recommendations, including actions concluded to be necessary.

**Questioned Cost:** A cost that is questioned by the OIG because of: (1) an alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

**Single Audit Act Audits:** *Single Audit Act* audits are performed by public accountants or a federal, state or local government audit organization in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. They are intended to determine whether the financial statements and schedule of expenditures of federal awards are presented fairly, to test internal controls over major programs, to determine whether the grant recipient is in compliance with requirements that may have a direct and material effect on each of its major programs, and to follow up on prior audit findings. These audits are required to be performed for organizations that expend \$750,000 or more in federal awards in accordance with the *Single Audit Act of 1984*, as amended, and OMB Circular A-133.

**Supervised Release:** Court-monitored supervision upon release from incarceration.

**Unsupported Cost:** A cost that is questioned by the OIG because the OIG found that, at the time of the audit, the cost was not supported by adequate documentation.

**Zero-Tolerance Policy:** In accordance with a “Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement,” on April 6, 2018, the Attorney General directed each USAO along the Southwest Border “to the extent practicable, and in consultation with DHS—to adopt immediately a zero-tolerance policy for all offenses referred for prosecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).

# Appendices

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## Appendix 3

### Audit Division Reports

#### Internal Audit Reports

##### *United States Marshals Service*

Audit of the United States Marshals Service's Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives

##### *Other Department Components*

Audit of the Civil Division's Information Security Program Pursuant to the *Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014*, Fiscal Year 2017

Audit of the Civil Division's Mega Network Operations Center System Pursuant to the *Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014*, Fiscal Year 2017

Audit of the Justice Management Division's Automated Electronic Guard Information System Upgrade Pursuant to the *Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014*, Fiscal Year 2017

Audit of the Justice Management Division's Information Security Program Pursuant to the *Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014*, Fiscal Year 2017

#### Contract Audit Reports

##### *Drug Enforcement Administration*

Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Asset Forfeiture Program Task Orders Awarded to Maximus, Inc., for Financial Investigative Services

##### *Federal Bureau of Prisons*

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contracts Awarded to Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc., San Diego, California

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contract Awarded to Sealaska Constructors, LLC, to Build Facilities at Federal Correctional Institution Danbury, in Danbury, Connecticut

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to Reynolds & Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C.

#### External Audit Reports

##### *California*

Audit of Compliance with Standards Governing Combined DNA Index System Activities at the San Diego County Sheriff's Department Regional Crime Laboratory, San Diego, California

##### *Connecticut*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Assistance Formula Grants Awarded to the Connecticut Judicial Branch, Hartford, Connecticut

##### *Georgia*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims Fund Formula Grants Awarded to the State of Georgia's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Atlanta, Georgia

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## *Idaho*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Compensation Formula Grants Awarded to the Idaho Industrial Commission's Crime Victims Compensation Program, Boise, Idaho

## *Maryland*

Audit of the Prince George's County Police Department's Equitable Sharing Program Activities, Landover, Maryland

## *Massachusetts*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Assistance Formula Grants Awarded to the Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance Board, Boston, Massachusetts

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Rural Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking Assistance Program Grant Awarded to Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts

## *Mississippi*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Assistance Formula Grants Awarded to the Mississippi State Department of Health, Jackson, Mississippi

## *Montana*

Audit of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Office of Justice Programs, and Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to the Blackfeet Tribe, Browning, Montana

## *Nebraska*

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to the Nebraska Domestic Violence Sexual Assault Coalition, dba Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual and Domestic Violence, Lincoln, Nebraska

## *New York*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Awards to the Research Foundation of the City University of New York, New York, New York

## *Pennsylvania*

Audit of the Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Awarded to the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the 2016 Democratic National Convention

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Assistance Grants Subawarded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency to the Anti-Violence Partnership of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to Women Against Abuse, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

## *Texas*

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to SAHELLI, Inc., dba Asian Family Support Services of Austin, Austin, Texas

## *Virginia*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Compensation Formula Grants Awarded to The Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, Richmond, Virginia

# Appendices

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## *Wisconsin*

Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Compensation Formula Grants Awarded to the Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, Wisconsin

### **Single Audit Act Reports of DOJ Activities**

Alaska Native Justice Center, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska FY 2015

Center for Effective Public Policy, Inc., Kensington, Maryland FY 2017

City of Camden, New Jersey FY 2017

City of Columbus, Nebraska FY 2017

City of Downey, California FY 2017

City of Glendora, California FY 2017

City of Sacramento, California FY 2017

City of Simi Valley, California FY 2017

City of Vernon, California FY 2017

City of York, Pennsylvania FY 2016

Commonwealth of Virginia FY 2017

County of Tulare, California FY 2017

DeKalb County, Georgia FY 2017

Department of the Attorney General, State of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii FY 2017

End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin: The Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Inc., Madison, Wisconsin FY 2017

Main South Community Development Corporation and Subsidiaries, Worcester, Massachusetts FY 2017

McDowell County, North Carolina FY 2017

Mending the Sacred Hoop, Duluth, Minnesota FY 2017

National Association of Police Athletic/Activities Leagues, Inc., Wellington, Florida FY 2015

National Domestic Violence Hotline, Austin, Texas FY 2017

Pitt County, North Carolina FY 2017

State of Oklahoma FY 2017

State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations FY 2017

State of Utah FY 2017

Thirtieth Judicial District Domestic Violence-Sexual Assault Alliance, Inc., Waynesville, North Carolina FY 2017

Wiconi Wawokiya, Inc., Fort Thomson, South Dakota FY 2017

### **Other Reports**

Examination of the U.S. Department of Justice's Fiscal Year 2017 Compliance under the *Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010*

# Appendices

## Appendix 4

### Quantifiable Potential Monetary Benefits

Audit Report	Questioned Costs (including unsupported costs)	Unsupported Costs	Funds Put to Better Use
<b>Audits Performed by the DOJ OIG</b>			
Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contracts Awarded to Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc., San Diego, California	\$22,168	\$18,156	\$0
Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Crime Victims Fund Formula Grants Awarded to the State of Georgia's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Atlanta, Georgia	\$904,859	\$504,859	\$131,191
Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Assistance Formula Grants Awarded to the Mississippi State Department of Health, Jackson, Mississippi	\$213,777	\$190,984	\$5,656
Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to SAHELI, Inc., dba Asian Family Support Services of Austin, Austin, Texas	\$5,845	\$218	\$0
Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to the Nebraska Domestic Violence Sexual Assault Coalition, dba Nebraska Coalition to End Sexual and Domestic Violence, Lincoln, Nebraska	\$171,704	\$158,493	\$0
Audit of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Office of Justice Programs, and Office on Violence Against Women Grants Awarded to the Blackfeet Tribe, Browning, Montana	\$1,867,677	\$591,137	\$0
Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Assistance Grants Subawarded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency to the Anti-Violence Partnership of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	\$3,563	\$1,173	\$0
Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Office for Victims of Crime Victim Assistance Formula Grants Awarded to the Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance Board, Boston, Massachusetts	\$331,029	\$331,029	\$0
Audit of the Office of Justice Programs Awards to the Research Foundation of the City University of New York, New York, New York	\$146,575	\$146,575	\$0
Audit of the Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Awarded to the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the 2016 Democratic National Convention	\$14,876,759	\$7,635,591	\$0
<b>Subtotal (Audits Performed by the DOJ OIG)</b>	<b>\$18,543,956</b>	<b>\$9,578,215</b>	<b>\$136,847</b>

# Appendices

Audit Report	Questioned Costs (including unsupported costs)	Unsupported Costs	Funds Put to Better Use
<b>Audits Performed by State/Local Auditors and Independent Public Accounting Firms Under the <i>Single Audit Act</i><sup>1</sup></b>			
Mending the Sacred Hoop, Duluth, Minnesota FY 2017	\$10,518	\$10,518	\$0
National Association of Police Athletic/Activities Leagues, Inc., Wellington, Florida FY 2015	\$15,000	\$0	\$0
State of Utah FY 2017	\$139,194	\$0	\$0
National Domestic Violence Hotline, Austin, Texas FY 2017	\$18,615	\$0	\$0
<b>Subtotal (Audits Performed by State/Local Auditors and Independent Public Accounting Firms Under the <i>Single Audit Act</i>)</b>	<b>\$183,327</b>	<b>\$10,518</b>	<b>\$0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$18,727,283</b>	<b>\$9,588,733</b>	<b>\$136,847</b>

<sup>1</sup> These audits are reviewed by the OIG to assess the quality and the adequacy of the entity's management of federal funds. The OIG issues these audits to the responsible component and performs follow-up on the audit reports' findings and recommendations.

# Appendices

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## Appendix 5

### **Evaluation and Inspections Division Reports**

Review of Gender Equity in the Department's Law Enforcement Components

Review of the Department's Clemency Initiative

Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Management of Its Female Inmate Population

### **Oversight and Review Division Reports**

A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election

A Review of Allegations of Improper Hiring Practices in the United States Marshals Service and Related Matters

# Appendices

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## Appendix 6

### Peer Reviews

#### Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG

##### *Audit Division*

On October 1, 2018, the Department of Labor OIG initiated a peer review of the DOJ OIG audit organization's system of quality control. The peer review will be conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* and guidelines established by the CIGIE.

##### *Evaluation and Inspections Division*

A peer review of the Evaluation and Inspections Division was performed by a team of staff from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau OIG. In the report issued on August 8, 2018, the team determined that the Evaluation and Inspections Division generally met seven of the CIGIE's Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (Blue Book standards) and generally complied with its own internal policies and procedures.

##### *Investigations Division*

The most recent peer review of the Investigations Division was performed by the Department of Defense (DOD) OIG in February 2017. The DOD OIG found that the DOJ OIG is in compliance with the quality standards established by the CIGIE and the Attorney General Guidelines for Inspectors General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority. In an accompanying letter of observation, the DOD OIG suggested that the DOJ OIG: 1) monitor field office implementation of policies issued during the review requiring placement of FBI case notification letters in the official case files; and 2) develop a standard method for recording when management case reviews have been performed. The DOJ OIG agreed with these suggestions and implemented corrective action.

#### Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews of the OIG

There are no outstanding recommendations from peer reviews of the OIG.

#### Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG

##### *Audit Division*

At the request of CIGIE, the DOJ OIG Audit Division conducted a peer review of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), OIG for FY 2015. In this report, issued on December 28, 2016, the VA OIG received a rating of *pass* for its system of quality control.

##### *Investigations Division*

The DOJ OIG last conducted a peer review of the Social Security Administration for the period ending June 2016 and the compliance letter was issued on September 12, 2016.

#### Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG

There are no outstanding recommendations from peer reviews conducted by the OIG.

# Appendices

## Appendix 7

### Reporting Requirements

The IG Act specifies reporting requirements for semiannual reports. The requirements are listed below and indexed to the applicable pages.

IG Act References	Reporting Requirements	Page
Section 4(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	52
Section 5(a)(1)	Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	11-50
Section 5(a)(2)	Significant Recommendations for Corrective Actions	11-50
Section 5(a)(3)	Significant Recommendations for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed	56-57
Section 5(a)(4)	Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities	15, 19-21, 26-28, 31-32, 35, 37-38, 41, 47
Section 5(a)(5)	Refusal to Provide Information	None
Section 5(a)(6)	Listing of Audit Reports	64-66
Section 5(a)(7)	Summary of Significant Reports	11-50
Section 5(a)(8)	Questioned Costs	54
Section 5(a)(9)	Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use	55
Section 5(a)(10)	Prior OIG Reports Unresolved, Uncommented Upon, or Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	14
Section 5(a)(11)	Description and Explanation of the Reasons for Any Significant Revised Management Decision Made During the Reporting Period	57
Section 5(a)(12)	Significant Management Decisions with Which the Inspector General Disagreed	None
Section 5(a)(14)	Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG	70
Section 5(a)(15)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews of the OIG	70
Section 5(a)(16)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG	70
Section 5(a)(17)	Statistical Table Pertaining to OIG Investigations	59
Section 5(a)(18)	Description of Metrics for OIG Investigative Table	59
Section 5(a)(19)	Reports Involving Senior Government Employees Meeting Certain Criteria	15, 31-32, 35, 47
Section 5(a)(20)	Instance of Whistleblower Retaliation	None
Section 5(a)(21)	Attempts to Interfere with OIG Independence	None
Section 5(a)(22)	Inspections, Evaluations, Audits, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Undisclosed to the Public	None

# Report Waste, Fraud, Abuse, or Misconduct

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ programs, employees, contractors, or grants, please go to the OIG website at [oig.justice.gov](http://oig.justice.gov) or call the OIG's Hotline at (800) 869-4499.

The OIG website has complaint forms that allow you to report the following to the OIG:

- General allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse in DOJ programs or by DOJ employees;
- Contract fraud, including mandatory disclosures required by contractors when they have credible evidence of violations of the civil *False Claims Act* or certain violations of criminal law;
- Grant fraud, including fraud, waste, or abuse related to DOJ's award of Recovery Act funds; and
- Violations of civil rights or civil liberties by DOJ employees.

To give information by mail or facsimile, please send to:

Office of the Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Room 4706  
Washington, D.C., 20530  
Fax: (202) 616-9881

For further information on how to report a complaint to the OIG, please call (800) 869-4499.

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