

ISP-I-18-19

Office of Inspections

May 2018

# Inspection of Embassy Georgetown, Guyana

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS



ISP-I-18-19

#### What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the executive direction, program and policy implementation, management controls, and resource management operations of Embassy Georgetown.

#### What OIG Recommended

OIG made 29 recommendations to improve Embassy Georgetown operations, including 15 related to improving internal controls in the Management Section and 6 related to the Information Management Section.

In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with all 29 recommendations. OIG considers the recommendations resolved. The embassy's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations section of this report. The embassy's formal written response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B. May 2018 OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs

#### Inspection of Embassy Georgetown, Guyana

#### What OIG Found

- Embassy Georgetown's Ambassador advanced U.S. interests in Guyana, a country that has grown more important to the United States with the discovery of large oil reserves.
- The Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission set a positive and professional tone for the embassy, consistent with the Department of State's leadership principles.
- The Ambassador was inattentive to the embassy's security program. This is inconsistent with the requirement that chiefs of mission advise, protect, and assist U.S. citizens and take direct and full responsibility for the security of the embassy and its personnel.
- Internal controls for some General Services and Facility Management operations did not comply with Department standards and procedures.
- The embassy did not have a consular warden system, and its preparedness for managing crisis situations was poor.
- The embassy's monitoring of defense articles and equipment supplied to the Government of Guyana did not comply with the Department's end-use monitoring requirements.
- The Department should vacate and sell the U.S. Government-owned warehouse.
- The embassy did not manage or document public diplomacy grants in accordance with Department standards.
- Information systems security operations and information technology contingency plan testing did not comply with Department requirements.

#### <u>UNCLASSIFIED</u>

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## CONTEXT

The Cooperative Republic of Guyana, a country slightly smaller than Idaho, is located in northern South America between Suriname and Venezuela. Originally a Dutch colony, by 1815 Guyana had become a British possession. Guyana achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1966 and has been led since then by mostly socialist-oriented governments. Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America.

Three quarters of Guyana's population of nearly 740,000 are descended from either Africans sold into slavery or indentured laborers from India brought in to work on sugar plantations. The ethno-cultural divide between these two groups has persisted and led to ethnically based political parties and turbulent politics. The most recent election, in May 2015, ushered in the first change of government in 23 years.

The Guyanese economy exhibited moderate economic growth in recent years and is based largely on agriculture and extractive industries, such forestry and mining. Annual per capita income in 2016 was estimated at \$7,900. Production of oil reserves estimated at between 2.25 billion and 2.275 billion barrels of recoverable oil off the coast of Guyana is scheduled to begin in 2020. Notwithstanding these resources, the country faces chronic economic problems, including a deficient infrastructure and a shortage of skilled labor due to Guyana's emigration rate, one of the highest in the world. More than 55 percent of Guyana's citizens live abroad and 80 percent of Guyanese with a post-secondary education have emigrated.

The embassy's Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for 2015-2017 focused U.S. efforts on improving governance and rule of law, ensuring responsible management of revenues from extractive industries, and expanding economic opportunities and improving infrastructure. U.S. foreign assistance to Guyana in FY 2016 totaled approximately \$6.1 million, including \$5.4 million for health programs.

At the time of the inspection, the embassy had 42 U.S. direct-hire employees, 143 locally employed (LE) staff, and 10 eligible family members. U.S. direct-hire employees receive a 25 percent hardship differential for service in Guyana.<sup>1</sup> The chancery, constructed in 1990, occupies 1.8 acres near Georgetown's downtown and host government offices. In 2017, the Department of State (Department) completed a \$23.5 million chancery renovation project. The mission's total estimated operating budget for FY 2017 was approximately \$17 million. Non-Department agencies at the mission were the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Peace Corps.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The post hardship differential is designed to provide additional compensation to employees for service in foreign areas where environmental conditions differ substantially from those in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive.

OIG evaluated the embassy's policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.<sup>2</sup> The companion classified inspection report discusses the embassy's security program, including issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities, as well as some aspects of the information management program.

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG assessed Embassy Georgetown leadership on the basis of interviews that included comments on Front Office performance; employee questionnaires; and OIG's review of documents and observations of embassy meetings and activities during the course of the onsite inspection.

The Ambassador, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, arrived in Guyana in September 2015 after an assignment as Political-Military Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. He is accredited to both the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the Caribbean Community, also known as CARICOM.<sup>3</sup> His multiple previous assignments in South America included director of counter-narcotics programs and deputy chief of mission. Embassy Georgetown's Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), also a career Foreign Service officer, arrived in July 2016. He served most recently in Embassy Guatemala City as the Political and Economic Affairs Counselor.

## Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

The Ambassador and the DCM set a positive and professional tone for the embassy, in accordance with Department leadership principles in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214. They formed a leadership team consistent with their roles as outlined in 2 FAM 113. Embassy staff told OIG the Ambassador clearly outlined his priorities for the mission and that his leadership helped them cope with the challenges of serving in a hardship assignment. The DCM's detail-oriented, hands-on style complemented that of the Ambassador's in managing embassy operations. For example, the DCM assisted on a number of occasions with fingerprinting visa applicants in the Consular Section, met regularly with the LE staff committee, and arranged for the Department's Office of the Ombudsman to assist with a workplace conflict issue he encountered on arrival. Embassy staff told OIG that both the Ambassador and the DCM provided guidance and mentorship, critically important in a mission staffed with relatively inexperienced officers and specialists.

The Ambassador named an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor and two LE staff liaisons, consistent with his responsibility in 3 FAM 1514.2 to provide equal opportunity in employment-related decisions. All three received the Department's required training. The embassy posted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Appendix A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> CARICOM has 15 full members and 5 associate members. Its Secretariat is based in Georgetown. It works to advance economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development, and security in the Caribbean.

Equal Employment Opportunity-related materials and contact information for the counselor and liaisons, including a notice regarding sexual and discriminatory harassment.

OIG reviewed all vouchers for Embassy Georgetown's representational events from October 2016 through September 2017 and found no irregularities. The embassy received and recorded gifts in accordance with the Department's guidance in 2 FAM 960 and cable 2016 State 97388.<sup>4</sup> Finally, OIG determined that the Ambassador and the DCM paid their official residence staffs in a manner consistent with Department guidance.

## **Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives**

OIG found that the Ambassador advanced U.S. interests in Guyana. Department officials told OIG of the Ambassador's deep knowledge of Guyanese and CARICOM politics, his strong command of security issues, and his advocacy on behalf of the responsible use of oil revenues. He founded and chaired the Petroleum Donor Coordination Group,<sup>5</sup> which encompasses all relevant multilateral and bilateral missions in Guyana and seeks to avoid duplication of effort and promote coordination among the missions. He led the U.S. effort to support Guyana's application to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,<sup>6</sup> an effort that bore fruit during the course of the inspection, when Guyana became a candidate member. He also encouraged international and domestic stakeholders to assist Guyana in establishing the structure of an independent, transparent, inviolable, and nonpartisan sovereign wealth fund. He directed program and political support to Guyana through the Department-funded Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative to help the country review and prepare its legal and regulatory environment for the new oil and gas industry. He also worked to increase CARICOM's support of U.S. Government positions and policies.

The Ambassador fulfilled his responsibilities under 2 FAM 113.1 to develop close relations with host-government officials, establish relations with leaders from all levels of society, maintain contact with international representatives, and attend and host representational events. From January 2016 through September 2017, he met with Guyana's president 16 times and with host government ministers 41 times. He also maintained regular contacts with local government officials, opposition and religious figures, U.S. and local business contacts, and representatives of international organizations and civil society. He met almost weekly with his counterparts representing the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union to coordinate messaging and schedules and attended or hosted 186 diplomatic and representational events.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Cable 16 State 97388, "Reporting Requirements for Official Donations and Gifts to the Department of State," September 1, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Petroleum Donor Coordination Group supports Guyana's efforts to prepare for future petroleum production. Members include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, Brazil, Mexico, and the United Nations Development Program.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a global standard to promote the open and accountable management of extractive resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals, to ensure that extraction of these natural resources leads to economic growth and social development.

The Ambassador also employed public outreach to explain and promote U.S. interests and policies in Guyana. He made 44 media appearances between January 2016 and the time of the inspection, including speeches, remarks, and radio, television, and newspaper interviews. He addressed such topics as the rule of law, drug trafficking, and environmental and resource management. His social media posts focused on youth audiences, who make up half of Guyana's population. In 2016, the Ambassador recorded a rap song ("More than Visas") with a local artist to celebrate 50 years of the United States-Guyana diplomatic relationship and posted it on the embassy's Facebook page, where it generated nearly 200,000 "likes."

Representatives of other U.S. Government agencies at the embassy told OIG that the Ambassador knew the details of their assistance programs, consistent with his responsibilities under 2 FAM 113.1 to manage foreign assistance and all Executive Branch resources at the embassy. The Ambassador and the DCM met regularly with them to review programs and coordinate U.S. activities, as outlined in 2 FAM 113.1 and 2. The Ambassador also maintained regular contact with the Department through weekly telephone calls and reporting.

## Adherence to Internal Controls

The embassy's 2017 Annual Chief of Mission Management Control Statement of Assurance did not comply with Department guidance. The Statement of Assurance, submitted to the Department on September 5, 2017, identified no significant deficiencies in internal controls. However, the embassy could not provide OIG with documentation supporting its conclusion. In addition, embassy staff told OIG that the internal control review was limited to the Management Section, which is contrary to guidance in 2 FAM 022.8(c)(3) that requires all "assessable units"in this case, all sections within the embassy-to conduct internal control reviews to identify, and take corrective action to mitigate, vulnerabilities. Further, OIG found that the embassy's management control officer did not receive training in internal controls and, as a result, was not fully equipped to direct the embassy's Statement of Assurance process. Chiefs of mission are responsible for developing and maintaining appropriate systems of internal control for their organization, as described in 2 FAM 022.7. Further, the Government Accountability Office's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government<sup>7</sup> requires documentation of internal control reviews and corrective actions. Without a comprehensive system of internal controls, Embassy Georgetown is at risk of not managing its activities and programs effectively, efficiently, economically, and with integrity.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a process for preparing the annual Statement of Assurance that complies with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Embassy Addressed Poor Performance by LE Staff

In an effort to improve internal controls and efficiency of operations, embassy supervisors addressed substandard performance by LE staff. During 2016, the embassy terminated four LE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Sections 17.05 and 17.06 (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

staff for cause and one for poor performance. At the time of the inspection, two LE staff had been placed under performance improvement plans.

### DCM Conducted Visa Reviews in Accordance with Department Requirements

The DCM carried out regular reviews of the Consul General's nonimmigrant visa adjudications, as required by 9 FAM 403.9-2(D) and 9 FAM 403.10-3(D). Specifically, OIG determined that he reviewed 100 percent of required adjudications between January 1 and November 8, 2017.

## Security and Emergency Planning

The Ambassador's leadership of the embassy's security program was inconsistent with the 2 FAM 113.1c(14) requirement to advise, protect, and assist U.S. citizens, as well as instructions in the President's Letter to Bilateral Chiefs of Mission to take direct and full responsibility for the security of the embassy and its personnel. Embassy staff, including consular employees, consistently told OIG they were unprepared to deal with an emergency. The embassy did not have a warden system, an equipped and functioning emergency command center, or an alternate command center, as required by 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-260. This is discussed further in the Consular Affairs section of this report and in the companion classified report. In addition, the Ambassador did not participate in the weekly, mandatory checks of the embassy's emergency and evacuation radio network. The Ambassador told OIG that new equipment being installed at the time of the inspection would improve radio transmission and that he would participate in the future.

Embassy staff described the DCM as actively involved in the embassy's security program. He initiated weekly instead of monthly radio checks on the emergency and evacuation network and followed up with embassy staff who did not participate. He also took part in Marine Security Guard Detachment drills. He chaired meetings of the embassy's Emergency Action Committee, which reviewed potential changes in risk that might affect the health, safety, and security of mission employees and resident U.S. citizens. However, the Emergency Action Committee had not reviewed the Emergency Action Plan since his arrival in July 2016. The plan contained dated information, although the embassy had told OIG the plan was current as of December 2016.

## **Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Professionals**

The DCM oversaw the embassy's First- and Second-Tour (FAST) employee development program, as directed by 3 FAM 2242.4. The six Department FAST employees commented favorably on the DCM's support and mentoring. In the 12 months prior to the inspection, employees met monthly to discuss a rotating list of topics, with some discussions led by midlevel officers. They also attended a roundtable on the topic of leadership with the Ambassador and the British and Canadian High Commissioners. OIG suggested that the FAST employees further broaden their experience though service on embassy committees and panels, contributing to emergency preparedness, and public speaking. OIG suggested the DCM include the responsibility for the FAST program in his work requirements statement.

## POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

## **Political-Economic Section**

OIG reviewed the Political-Economic Section's leadership and management, policy implementation, reporting and advocacy, and commercial promotion functions, and found that they generally complied with Department requirements. The staff collaborated well with other embassy sections and with other agencies regionally and in Washington. OIG also reviewed the conduct of ICS key activities, Leahy vetting,<sup>8</sup> foreign assistance administration including end-use monitoring,<sup>9</sup> and records management, and found the deficiencies discussed below.

## Political-Economic Section Supported Strategic Goals

OIG found the Political-Economic Section made reasonable efforts to conduct its key activities so as to achieve the embassy's political and economic ICS objectives. For example, the embassy aided an election public awareness campaign, engaged public security and defense force officials on Caribbean security issues, and provided technical assistance on petroleum industry tax and resource legislation. Washington consumers in the Department and other agencies consistently praised embassy reporting and advocacy. OIG found embassy reporting to be relevant to ICS goals.

## Leahy Vetting Generally Conducted in Accordance with Department Guidance

Embassy Georgetown's Leahy unit vetted 255 individuals and security units for potential gross human rights abuses in 2016, generally in accordance with applicable laws and Department requirements. The unit vetted an additional 505 individuals and security units through August 2017. Employees from several embassy sections used the Leahy vetting software program, a sharing of duties that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor considers a best practice.

From November 2016 through August 2017, however, the section did not meet the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor's requirement to submit cases for bureau vetting at least 10 days prior to the start of any program activity. Instead, submissions were provided, on average, just three days in advance. Late submissions taxed the bureau's ability to respond to the embassy in a timely fashion. In order to reduce the number of "short-fuse" submissions, the embassy drafted new standard operating procedures, which the DCM, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs approved during the inspection. As a result, OIG did not make a recommendation in this report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department of State from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 USC 2378d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Department requires the monitoring of certain property purchased with foreign assistance funds to ensure it is used for its intended purposes. In general, equipment valued at more than \$2,500 or items designated as defense articles or dual-use items are subject to this requirement. End-use monitoring fulfills the requirements of Section 484(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) and 22 U.S.C. § 2785.

## Embassy Did Not Comply with End-Use Monitoring Requirements

The embassy did not comply with the 2015 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Standard Operating Policy/Procedure for End-Use Monitoring, which requires embassies to annually monitor defense-related property supplied to a host government under a foreign assistance program. The Political-Economic Section, charged with conducting end-use monitoring, incorrectly reported that it had monitored 100 percent of the required items in 2016. OIG found that the section actually monitored 49 percent of the items subject to end-use-monitoring. The embassy had no end-use monitoring plan, no standard operating procedures or checklists for conducting the monitoring, and no electronic shared file, as mandated in bureau guidance. Failure to follow end-use monitoring requirements increased the risk that articles supplied to the host government will go unmonitored and be lost or misused.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Georgetown should comply with the end-use monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping requirements mandated in Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

#### Political-Economic Section Did Not Comply with Records Disposition Requirements

The Political-Economic Section did not meet Department records disposition requirements outlined in 5 FAH-4 H-300, 5 FAM 433, and 5 FAM 434. The section maintained an office safe filled with old, unused, and unorganized classified and sensitive documents, including Department telegrams from the early 1980s, most of which required retirement or destruction. Competing priorities prevented review of the documents, but this is nonetheless an important issue to address. Retention of such files burdens the embassy with unused paper copies of classified and sensitive records that require continuing monitoring and security oversight and deprives the Department of potentially useful archival materials.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Georgetown should dispose of Political-Economic Section paper files, in accordance with Department records disposition requirements. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### **Grants Management**

#### Minor Deficiencies Found in Political-Economic Section Grants Monitoring

The Political-Economic Section monitored three Department-issued grants, generally in compliance with Department policy. However, OIG found minor deficiencies in the grants monitoring process. The grants, totaling approximately \$1.6 million, supported rule of law, civil society, and natural resource management in accordance with ICS goals. OIG found that the section provided Grants Officer Representative and other monitoring reports to Washington on an irregular basis and advised staff to provide them in a more consistently timely manner. OIG also advised the section to consider using commercially available grants management software to improve grants administration.

The Political-Economic Section also administered two embassy-based grants, awarded to the same organization and totaling approximately \$44,000. The section rescinded the second grant before implementation because the organization involved had not submitted a required report at the end of the first project. OIG advised section staff to open a grants file for the second award to document decisions, which the section did during the inspection. The new section chief, who arrived in August 2017, was in the process of securing a grants warrant during the inspection so that she could formally make decisions about the second grant.

## **Public Diplomacy**

OIG reviewed the full range of the Public Affairs Section's operations, including exchanges, media outreach, social media platforms, and educational advising. OIG determined that, in collaboration with other embassy sections and agencies, the section used these tools to promote a better public understanding of U.S. policy and the bilateral relationship, in accordance with Department guidance. Public diplomacy activities built relationships with Guyanese policy and opinion leaders in support of priorities such as entrepreneurship, sustainable development, rule of law, and women's empowerment. The embassy reached 49,000 Facebook followers with direct messages that helped shape a climate favorable to bilateral cooperation and exchange. In the course of implementing these programs, however, the section did not meet some Department public diplomacy program requirements, as described below.

## Public Diplomacy 2017 Program Planning Did Not Fulfill Department Requirements

The Public Affairs Section did not submit a Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan for FY 2017, as required by Department cable 2016 State 114362.<sup>10</sup> The Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan is an annual strategic planning tool that links public diplomacy audiences, programs, and activities with ICS goals and objectives. The section instead relied on a format accessible only to section staff, which limited the ability of Washington public diplomacy offices to understand the embassy's priorities. Prior to the inspection, and prompted by instructions in cable 2017 State 99692,<sup>11</sup> the section began work on the FY 2018 requirements, including consultations with other embassy sections, in order to submit the plan by the November 30, 2018, deadline. As a result, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

### Section Activity Reporting Did Not Meet Department Requirements

The embassy did not report FY 2017 public diplomacy program results through the Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker, as required by Department cable 2015 State 116406.<sup>12</sup> The Mission Activity Tracker is a Department-mandated tool for compiling data on public diplomacy activities that is used by Department leadership and bureaus to prepare strategic analyses, reports, and budgets. In previous years, these reports were drafted and entered by an eligible family member employee, who departed in June 2017. The embassy told OIG that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Cable 2016 State 114362, "Annual Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan (PDIP) Requirement," October 20, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Cable 2017 State 99692, "Annual Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan (PDIP) Requirement," September 28, 2017.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Cable 2015 State 116406, "Announcing Release of the New Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker (MAT 4.0)," October 7, 2015.

Department's hiring freeze<sup>13</sup> prevented it from filling this position. Although the Public Affairs Section provided spot reports to Department offices on different program initiatives and their results, Washington offices lacked Mission Activity Tracker data, putting at risk their ability to analyze and evaluate Embassy Georgetown's public diplomacy programs and to report their results to Department managers and Congress.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Georgetown should report public diplomacy program activity through the Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Public Diplomacy Grants Not Managed in Accordance with Federal Assistance Policy Directives

The embassy did not manage or document public diplomacy grants in accordance with the Department's Federal assistance policy directives.<sup>14</sup> OIG reviewed all 16 public diplomacy grants issued between FY 2015 and FY 2017, totaling \$121,480. Grants files lacked many of the required documents, including the application for Federal assistance, risk assessments and monitoring plans, and verifications that recipients were not on the excluded parties list. Completed projects lacked final financial and narrative reports and close-out documentation. This was due, in part, to a lack of training. This should be addressed, as failure to follow federal assistance policy directives impairs the ability of grant officers to identify and mitigate risk, monitor program implementation, evaluate program results, and ensure accountability for public diplomacy resources.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Georgetown should manage and document grants, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## **Consular Affairs**

OIG reviewed consular operations and programs, including American citizen services, immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, training, crisis preparedness, management controls, communications and outreach, and fraud prevention programs. Consular managers, all of whom arrived in summer 2017, implemented a more rigorous training program to improve officer adjudication skills and cross-train staff in all consular functions to address concerns they had with Consular Section operations. OIG found that the embassy's consular operations and programs generally

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> A government-wide hiring freeze was first announced by the Office of Management in Budget on January 23, 2017. While most positions were frozen and could not be filled if vacant, the Secretary approved specific exemptions to the hiring freeze to ensure the Department was able to meet critical needs. During the inspection, the Secretary announced that beginning in January 2018, he would give greater authority to the bureaus to strategically manage the exemption process and fill vacant positions through lateral reassignments and internal promotions. In addition, he stated he would authorize each of the regional bureaus to fill 1,500 priority eligible family member positions abroad in FY 2018, to meet the Department's security, health, and safety requirements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Grants reviewed by OIG were subject to the Department's annual Federal Assistance Directives and the Procedural Guide for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-Federal Entities Not Recognized as Foreign Public Entities (issued December 2015).

complied with guidance in 7 FAM, 9 FAM, 7 FAH, applicable statutes, and other Department policies, with the exceptions described below.

### Embassy Did Not Have a Consular Warden System

The embassy did not have a consular warden system, as required in 7 FAM 070.<sup>15</sup> According to embassy estimates, approximately 25,000 U.S. citizens live in or visit Guyana annually. Embassy officials were aware of the requirement to have a warden system but had not established one. This weakness should be corrected, as the lack of a warden system could lead to a failure to protect American citizens in time of crisis.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Georgetown should establish a warden system, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### Consular Crisis Preparedness Program Did Not Comply With Department Standards

The Consular Section did not meet Department standards for crisis preparedness. Section employees told OIG they did not consider themselves prepared for a crisis, and several were unfamiliar with the contents of a disaster assistance kit containing the supplies, equipment, and information a consular officer would need in order to function off-site in an emergency. OIG also found that several consular employees did not know how to operate the satellite phones that would be used in an emergency. These deficiencies are inconsistent with 7 FAM 1800, which provides guidance for consular crisis preparedness to ensure the section is able to effectively manage in an emergency situation. Consular Section managers told OIG that, due to their recent arrival, they had not yet addressed the need for a consular crisis preparedness program. This should be addressed promptly, as failure to properly prepare for a crisis could put U.S. citizens at risk during an emergency.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a consular crisis preparedness program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### Consular Managers Did Not Have Line of Sight Control of the Section

Embassy Georgetown's consular managers could not visually monitor the work of section staff, a key internal control measure. Guidance in 7 FAH-1 H-281e states that "the essential element of 'line of sight' is the ability of cleared American supervisors to physically observe work areas." OIG found that the section's original design and construction did not permit line of sight to all interview windows. In addition, workstation partitions for the LE staff exceeded the maximum height of 42 inches called for in 7 FAH-1 H-282(15). Finally, the adjudicating officers' work areas were not interspersed among those used by the LE staff, as required by 7-FAH-1 H-281e. The lack of line of sight increases the risk of malfeasance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A warden system is managed by the Consular Section and consists of private volunteers, usually U.S. citizens, who facilitate communication between the embassy and American citizens and is essential for an embassy to carry out its primary function of protecting U.S. citizens in times of crisis.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Georgetown should correct line of sight issues in the Consular Section to comply with Department guidance for consular officers to visually monitor all consular operations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## **RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

OIG reviewed the overall operations of the General Services, Financial Management, Facility Management, and Human Resources Sections. OIG found that the Management Section implemented some required processes and procedures in accordance with applicable laws and Department guidance. However, insufficient management oversight and numerous internal control deficiencies existed throughout the s section, as detailed below.

## **General Services Operations**

### Embassy Did Not Have an Annual Acquisition Plan

The embassy did not have an annual acquisition plan for procuring goods and services, and management officials did not seek input from embassy sections to forecast contracting requirements for the upcoming fiscal year. Federal Acquisition Regulation 7.102(a), however, requires that acquisition planning be performed for all purchases. In addition, 14 FAM 221.1(b) states that for all acquisitions exceeding \$100,000, acquisition plans must be submitted in advance. During FY 2017, however, the embassy awarded two contracts with a total value of \$250,000 without such advance planning. Without an annual acquisition plan, the embassy cannot determine optimal contracting methods, increase competition, or achieve potential cost savings.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Georgetown should implement an annual acquisition planning process. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### Embassy Did Not Follow Requirements for Use of Blanket Purchase Agreements

Embassy Georgetown did not review all blanket purchase agreements at least annually, as required by Federal Acquisition Regulation 13.303-6(a.)<sup>16</sup> At the time of the inspection, the embassy had more than 40 blanket purchase agreements but lacked standard operating procedures for managing them. For example, the embassy established only one blanket purchase agreement for fuel purchases rather than rotating vendors to provide maximum competition in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 13.303-2(c)(1). The procurement section was unaware of these requirements. This lack of oversight and appropriate procedures increases the risk of misuse of blanket purchase agreements and loss of government resources.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> A blanket purchase agreement is a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing "charge accounts" with qualified sources of supply.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Georgetown should implement procedures to review and manage its blanket purchase agreements, in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Contracting Officer's Representatives Were Neither Designated Nor Certified

The embassy's two Contracting Officer's Representatives were not designated nor certified in accordance with Department standards. Guidance in 14 FAH-2 H-141(b)(4) and 14 FAH-2 H-143 requires that the Contracting Officer designate the representatives in writing, and 14 FAH-2 H-143.1 requires that they be certified and that they maintain their certification by taking required training courses. Failure to properly designate, certify, and train Contracting Officer's Representatives increases the risk of poorly administered and monitored contracts.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Georgetown should designate, certify, and train Contracting Officer's Representatives, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Purchase Card Review Program Did Not Comply with Department Standards

The embassy's purchase card program did not comply with Department standards in 4 FAM 455.3, which requires an annual program review of cardholder training, internal controls, and compliance with Department procedures. The purchase card program coordinator did not conduct a review in FY 2015, and the FY 2016 review was insufficient because the coordinator reviewed only one of the embassy's two purchase cards. This is inconsistent with the Department's Purchase Card Annual Review Policy, which instructs embassies to select a sufficient number of cardholder records to review and, when feasible, strongly encourages the reviewer to check records from 100 percent of the cardholders to ensure compliance by all participants. The coordinator was unaware of these requirements. Failure to perform required annual evaluations of the program increases risks of misuse of purchase cards and loss of government resources.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Georgetown should bring its purchase card program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Embassy Lacked Procedures for Travel Card Program Oversight

The embassy did not conduct oversight of its travel card program from 2011 through 2015 to ensure that all travel card charges were authorized, as required by Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-123, Appendix B.<sup>17</sup> For instance, the embassy did not perform monthly reconciliations or monitor delinquent notices. As a result, Embassy Georgetown incurred an outstanding balance of \$16,672 during this period, which it had started to address. The existence of this balance is inconsistent with Circular A-123, which requires managers to implement risk management controls and policies. These include:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Appendix B, *Improving the Management of Government Charge Card Programs*, Revised January 15, 2009.

- A process with strict internal controls to ensure all charges and payments are timely and accurate.
- Close monitoring of delinquency reports.
- Reviews of cardholder statements of account and supporting documentation to monitor delinquency, misuse, and other transaction activities.
- A policy that ensures administrative or disciplinary actions are initiated in the event cardholders fail to meet their responsibilities with respect to appropriate use and timely payment of charge card debts.<sup>18</sup>

Embassy management did not establish procedures for overseeing the program. Written formal policies and procedures, however, are critical to ensuring that a system of internal controls is followed. Without such policies and procedures, there is increased potential for fraud and misuse of U.S. Government resources.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Georgetown should implement policies and procedures for its travel card program, in accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Outstanding Travel Card Balances Remain

At the time of the inspection, the embassy had reconciled travel card transactions valued at \$5,086, reducing the outstanding 2011-2015 balance to \$11,585. Although the embassy worked to reconcile and verify the remaining charges, the age of the charges made verification difficult or impossible. The Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123 Appendix B states that managers should closely monitor delinquency reports from charge card vendors. Failure to conduct monthly reconciliations increases the risk that unauthorized charges will not be detected. Additionally, failure to pay delinquencies increases the risk that the credit card vendor will cancel the card. OIG advised embassy officials to contact the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services regarding options for clearing the credit card balance.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Georgetown should clear the outstanding balance on its travel card. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Embassy Lacked Control System for Official Vehicle Keys

The embassy did not have a control system for issuing keys for official vehicles. General Services Section staff kept the lock boxes open and did not maintain logs to track vehicle usage. In accordance with 14 FAM 436.3(c), however, the officer accountable for official vehicle use must establish effective management control procedures to ensure vehicles are used only by qualified drivers or other authorized operators. The procedures must include a key control system and a vehicle control log with the operator's name, vehicle identification number, and the date and time keys are picked up and returned. The lack of an effective key control system increases the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Appendix B, Chapter 4, Question 4.4.

risk of theft or unauthorized use of official vehicles and exposes the embassy to potential liability in the event of an accident or other incident.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a system to store, issue, and return keys for official vehicles, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## Embassy Did Not Adhere to the Motor Vehicle Safety Management Policy

The embassy did not adhere to Department's overseas motor vehicle safety standards regarding training and medical clearances. OIG found that 18 of the embassy's 53 professional drivers and incidental (self-drive) operators had outdated safety training and that 9 lacked medical clearances. As stated in 14 FAM 432.4(c), embassies must implement the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program<sup>19</sup> for all professional and incidental drivers under chief of mission authority. Embassy staff told OIG they could not schedule training due to competing priorities and that some embassy sections and agencies did not ensure employees received medical clearances. These weaknesses must nonetheless be addressed, as inadequate oversight of motor pool operations can lead to motor vehicle accidents and increase the risk of liability to the embassy.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a corrective action plan to bring all professional drivers and incidental operators into compliance with the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### No Standard Operating Procedures to Track Fuel for Official Vehicles

The embassy did not have standard operating procedures to account for the use of fuel for all official vehicles. The embassy tracked fuel usage for motor pool and Front Office vehicles but not for vehicles used by the Regional Security Office and other agencies. As stated in 14 FAM 437.1(a), accountability, vehicle use, and maintenance records, including records of fuels and lubricants used, must be established and kept on file for all official vehicles. This data must be monitored for effective fleet management and to identify any irregularities in fuel consumption. Failure to establish standard operating procedures and implement internal controls increases the risk of fuel theft and billing inaccuracies or overcharges.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for fuel usage, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Program, as detailed by Bureau of Overseas Building Operations and updated in June 2016, requires that all chauffeurs and incidental (self-drive) operators receive driver safety training upon initial assignment of an official vehicle and at least every 2 years thereafter. The program also requires all chauffeurs to be medically cleared every 2 years and incidental drivers to be medically cleared every 4 years.

## Property Management Operations Improved

The embassy reported in its FY 2016 inventory certification that property shortages fell within the acceptable range of less than one percent of total value, as defined in 14 FAM 416.5-1(B). However, the embassy also told OIG that internal control deficiencies existed in property management, such as assets with incorrect bar codes or obsolete descriptions, or that were reported as being in "unknown" locations. To rectify this situation, the embassy requested the assistance of property management specialists from the Bureau of Administration Office of Logistics Management. The specialists also helped the embassy identify excess property. As a result, the embassy held three auctions in FY 2016 and FY 2017 that generated \$670,813 for use by the Department and other agencies. The General Services Officer also implemented procedures and controls to ensure accuracy of property records.

The embassy reported in its FY 2017 inventory certification that it held \$5.1 million in nonexpendable property and again reported shortages below the Department's one percent threshold. The embassy moved its storage operations to a new warehouse in June 2017, and OIG advised the section to conduct a thorough inventory of all assets in the new facility.

### **Financial Management**

## Alternate Cashiers Did Not Assume Principal Cashier's Duties on a Regular Basis

Embassy Georgetown's alternate cashier took over cashier duties only during periodic absences of the principal cashier, rather than on a regular basis. The June 2017 Department's Cashier Users Guide, Section 3.6, however, states that the cashier supervisor should schedule the alternate cashier to work as acting principal cashier two to three times per month, assuming all cashier functions and operating the cashier database. This is to ensure that the alternate cashier has the necessary skill to allow for continued operations during the absence of the principal cashier, thereby reducing errors due to inexperience. The Management Officer was aware of this requirement but did not prepare such a schedule. Failure to implement this internal control procedure increases the risk of theft and errors in cashiering operations.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a schedule to ensure the alternate cashier works as the principal cashier, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### Embassy Did Not Pay All Invoices Within 30 Days

The embassy did not consistently pay invoices within the 30 days required by the Prompt Payment Act's implementing regulations and 4 FAH-3 H-311.5. The embassy did not have an invoice payment system to track either the date of invoice receipt or final payment due date, deficiencies attributable to inadequate management oversight. OIG spot-checked 21 of the 490 vouchers paid from July 1 to October 1, 2017, and found that 7 of the 21 were paid later than 30 days after receipt. Failure to monitor invoice payments payment dates is an internal control deficiency that could subject the embassy to interest payments and additional fees.

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a process to monitor and track the payment of its invoices in order to comply with the Prompt Payment Act's implementing regulations and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

#### Post Differential Survey Was Outdated

The embassy's hardship differential survey was 6 months overdue at the time of the inspection. The survey was due in April 2017, according to the Bureau of Administration Office of Allowances website. Per Department of State Standardized Regulation 513.2, conditions at these overseas missions should be reviewed at least biennially to ensure that they have not changed. Embassy staff told OIG that they had not submitted the survey due to the vacancy in the responsible eligible family member position. Notwithstanding this challenge, the survey should be completed, as the absence of timely differential survey reports that do not accurately reflect current living conditions increases the risk of inaccurate employee compensation.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Georgetown should submit the hardship differential survey to the Office of Allowances, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

#### Supervisors Did Not Consistently Authorize Overtime in Advance

American supervisors did not consistently approve overtime in advance, as required by 3 FAM 2332.4 and 2332.5. OIG reviewed time and attendance records for pay periods 20 and 21 (October 1 to October 28, 2017) and found that 17 out of 49 overtime records, totaling 130 hours, lacked the required justification and pre-approval. The embassy did not have a policy for time and attendance and issued its most recent management notice on timekeeping in January 2010. Failure to approve overtime in advance is an internal management control weakness and increases the risk of fraud, waste, and misuse of resources.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Georgetown should require authorizing officials to approve staff requests for overtime in advance, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### **Facility Management**

#### Preventive Maintenance Program Not Implemented

Embassy Georgetown did not implement a comprehensive and routine maintenance program as required by 15 FAM 613. Additionally, 15 FAH-1 H-113.8 states that embassies should periodically inspect and service their equipment. Embassy staff told OIG that they did not implement the program due to understaffing in the Facility Management Section. Without an effective preventive maintenance program, the embassy is less likely to identify major deficiencies and faces an increased risk of equipment failure, which could result in costly repairs.

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a preventive maintenance program, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

## U.S. Government-Owned Warehouse Building Did Not Meet Department Standards

While Embassy Georgetown moved its storage operations to a new warehouse in June 2017, it continued to use the old U.S. Government-owned warehouse for non-storage operations, including Facilities Management workshops. However, the old facility did not meet Department security, fire, and safety, health, and environmental standards and was unfit for occupancy, based on the guidelines in 15 FAM 962(e),(f) and (j). Deficiencies include:

- Electrical code violations as noted in a Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 2017 fire inspection report.
- The absence of a fire alarm, fire suppression system, or nearby fire hydrant.
- Location in a high-risk flood zone.
- An open drainage system surrounding the building, which constituted a health hazard from sewage and was also a breeding ground for mosquitoes.

The embassy did not address these deficiencies because it anticipated vacating the warehouse entirely, although construction defects and the lack of a fire suppression system (sprinklers) in the new building delayed the final move. In June 2016, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations developed a fire risk mitigation plan that would allow the embassy to use the new warehouse temporarily before the sprinklers are installed. At the time of the inspection, though, the embassy was still in the process of implementing the actions called for in the risk mitigation plan. Upon installation of the sprinklers, the embassy can permanently occupy the new warehouse. The embassy should act expeditiously, as the continued failure to relocate employees from the unsafe old warehouse leaves them vulnerable to fire, health, and safety hazards. The companion classified report describes requirements and contains recommendations regarding occupancy of the new warehouse.

When vacated, the U.S. Government-owned warehouse will become excess to Department needs. Department guidance in 15 FAM 512.1 directs posts to review and identify such property annually and report them to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations.

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Georgetown should vacate the U.S. Government-owned warehouse and notify the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations so it can be sold. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

### **Human Resources**

## Embassy's Retirement Plan for Locally Employed Staff Posed an Unfunded Liability

The embassy's defined-benefit retirement plan for its LE staff poses an unfunded liability for the U.S. Government. The plan promises a specified monthly benefit (annuity) or lump sum payment at retirement, with calculations based on the employee's earnings history, length of service, and age. The embassy's contribution amount is determined on the basis of the benefits expected to

become payable. A May 2017 actuarial report determined that, as of May 2016, the market value of the plan's assets was approximately \$595,000 lower than the total expected payout. Subsequently, the embassy paid \$561,661 to make up much of the shortfall. In addition, the actuarial report stated that the plan needed to improve its return on investment and that the embassy needed to increase its contributions from 2.83 percent of LE staff salaries to 15.88 percent to meet the expected future payments. OIG advised the Bureau of Human Resources, Office of Overseas Employment, to determine the best course to reduce the risk to the U.S. Government, which it agreed to do.

## **Information Management**

OIG reviewed classified, unclassified, and dedicated internet network operations; physical protection of information technology (IT) assets; classified communication security; emergency communication preparedness; radio and telephone programs; and pouch services. OIG determined that Information Management staff met the day-to-day computing and communications needs of the embassy, with a focus on customer service. However, OIG found deficiencies in the implementation of effective information security and program management, as detailed below and in the companion classified report.

## Information Systems Security Officers Did Not Perform All Duties

The embassy's unclassified and classified Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) did not use the Department's ISSO checklist, as required by 5 FAH-11 H-116, and thus did not perform all information systems security duties. As a result, OIG found access control and configuration management issues in the unclassified and classified systems operations. These weaknesses included folders with unauthorized users, inactive user accounts, an unapproved wireless router on the dedicated internet network, and servers that were not configured to Bureau of Diplomatic Security standards. OIG determined that these problems occurred because embassy management did not allow ISSOs sufficient time to perform their duties. OIG identified similar issues at other embassies and issued a Management Assistance Report<sup>20</sup> in May 2017 that highlighted widespread failures to perform ISSO duties. In a subsequent Department cable,<sup>21</sup> the Bureau of Information Resource Management requested that embassy management work with ISSOs to ensure performance of their duties by prioritizing resources to ensure that cybersecurity needs were met and documented. A lack of staff, limited time, and the lack of prioritization for cybersecurity needs led to non-performance of these duties, which put the security of the Department's computer systems at risk.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Georgetown should require that Information Systems Security Officers perform information systems security duties, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Non-Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Duties by Overseas Personnel* (ISP-17-24, May 2017).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Cable 2017 State 104970, "Documenting Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) Duties," October 18, 2017.

### Information Technology Contingency Planning Was Inadequate

Section managers did not update their classified IT contingency plan or test the unclassified and classified IT contingency plans, as outlined in 12 FAH-10 H-232.3-1, due to competing priorities. Department guidance requires management to develop and test IT contingency plans annually for effectiveness and to determine the mission's readiness to execute them during unplanned system outages or disruptions. Inadequate contingency planning and testing prevents section managers from mitigating the risk of system and service disruptions.

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Georgetown should update and test the information technology contingency plans, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

#### Information Technology Contingency Plan Training Not Conducted

The embassy did not conduct initial and annual refresher IT contingency training for employees with responsibilities in these areas. According to 12 FAH-10 H-232.2-1, management must ensure that initial and annual refresher IT contingency training is delivered to employees based on their roles and responsibilities, as defined in the IT contingency plans. Section managers did not conduct this training because they did not have current IT contingency plans and were unaware of the requirement. Failure to complete initial and annual refresher IT contingency plan training impedes the embassy's ability to effectively and appropriately respond to unplanned systems outages or disruptions.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a plan for conducting initial and annual refresher information technology contingency training for employees with information technology contingency planning responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

#### Network Cabling Infrastructure Did Not Comply with Department Standards

The network cabling infrastructure in the embassy's unclassified server room and in three of its shared electrical rooms was disorganized and showed evidence of installation practices that did not comply with Department standards. For example, OIG observed excessively long cable runs and improperly labeled cables, as shown in Figure 1, which hindered the Information Management Section staff's ability to troubleshoot outages. This occurred because employees did not use standard operating procedures for installing network cabling system components, as outlined in 5 FAH-9 H-111.1, and from lack of oversight by section managers. The managers told OIG that an incomplete Regional Information Management Center IT infrastructure refurbishment project contributed to this condition. Non-standard network cabling infrastructure hinders maintenance and future expansion of the embassy's network.



Figure 1: Embassy Georgetown Unclassified Server Room (Source: Embassy Georgetown)

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for installing network cabling system components. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Recommendation 28:** Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, should correct the network cabling infrastructure issues. (Action: Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with IRM and WHA)

## Help Desk Did Not Record and Track Service Requests Consistently

The embassy's Information Systems Center staff did not consistently record and track help desk service requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks because they lacked standard operating procedures. According to the Government Accountability Office's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*,<sup>22</sup> documentation is required for effective design, implementation, and operation of an entity's internal control system. Although customers reported that the Information Systems Center met their needs, section managers did not require customers to open service requests for assistance and the Information Systems Center staff did not consistently document their actions. OIG advised the Information Management Officer to use the Department's enterprise service management application (e-Services) to manage help desk service requests. Without documented help desk requests, managers could not accurately capture the Information Service Center staff's workload or monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of help desk operations.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking help desk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> GAO-14-704G, September 2014.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to Embassy Georgetown. The embassy's complete responses can be found in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments that OIG incorporated, as appropriate, into this report.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a process for preparing the annual Statement of Assurance that complies with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the process used for preparing the annual Statement of Assurance.

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Georgetown should comply with the end-use monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping requirements mandated in Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the end-use monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping conducted in accordance with Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs guidance.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Georgetown should dispose of Political-Economic Section paper files, in accordance with Department records disposition requirements. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the Political-Economic Section paper files being disposed in accordance with Department requirements.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Georgetown should report public diplomacy program activity through the Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted a target compliance date of July 1, 2018.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of public diplomacy activities reported through the Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Georgetown should manage and document grants, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the grants being managed in accordance with Department standards.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Georgetown should establish a warden system, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted a target compliance date by the end of FY 2018.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the warden system.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a consular crisis preparedness program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the consular crisis preparedness.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Georgetown should correct line of sight issues in the Consular Section to comply with Department guidance for consular officers to visually monitor all consular operations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the line of sight issues corrected in the Consular Section.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Georgetown should implement an annual acquisition planning process. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the annual acquisition planning process.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Georgetown should implement procedures to review and manage its blanket purchase agreements, in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the procedures to review and manage its blanket purchase agreements.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Georgetown should designate, certify, and train Contracting Officer's Representatives, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the Contracting Officer's Representatives trained and certified in accordance with Department standards.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Georgetown should bring its purchase card program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of a purchase card program that complies with Department standards.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Georgetown should implement policies and procedures for its travel card program, in accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the travel card program policies and procedures.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Georgetown should clear the outstanding balance on its travel card. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted a target compliance date of May 2018.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the cleared outstanding balance on the travel card.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a system to store, issue, and return keys for official vehicles, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the embassy's system to store, issue, and return keys for official vehicles.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a corrective action plan to bring all professional drivers and incidental operators into compliance with the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of a corrective action plan for all applicable drivers to comply with the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for fuel usage, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted a target compliance date of June 1, 2018.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the fuel usage standard operating procedure.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a schedule to ensure the alternate cashier works as the principal cashier, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the alternate cashier is scheduled to work as the principal cashier in accordance with Department standards.

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a process to monitor and track the payment of its invoices in order to comply with the Prompt Payment Act's implementing regulations and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the payment of invoices is monitored and tracked to comply with the Prompt Payment Act.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Georgetown should submit the hardship differential survey to the Office of Allowances, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the hardship differential survey was submitted to the Office of Allowances.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Georgetown should require authorizing officials to approve staff requests for overtime in advance, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of authorizing officials approving overtime requests in advance.

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a preventive maintenance program, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the preventive maintenance program.

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Georgetown should vacate the U.S. Government-owned warehouse and notify the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations so it can be sold. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of that the embassy has vacated the warehouse building.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Georgetown should require that Information Systems Security Officers perform information systems security duties, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of that the Information Systems Security Officers perform information systems security duties in accordance with Department guidance.

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Georgetown should update and test the information technology contingency plans, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the information technology contingency plans are updated and tested.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Georgetown should implement a plan for conducting initial and annual refresher information technology contingency training for employees with information technology contingency planning responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of applicable employees receiving the required training on information technology contingency planning.

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for installing network cabling system components. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the standard operating procedures for installing network cabling.

**Recommendation 28:** Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, should correct the network cabling infrastructure issues. (Action: Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with IRM and WHA)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of that the cabling infrastructure issues were corrected.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking help desk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: In its May 1, 2018, response, Embassy Georgetown concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG's Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of standard operating procedures for recording and tracking help desk requests.

## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Name	Arrival Date
Perry L. Holloway	09/15
Terry R. Steers-Gonzalez	07/16
James M. Grounds	08/15
Jerome N. Epping	08/17
Alexandra J. King-Pile	08/17
Amanda J. Cauldwell	07/16
Josiah T. Keener	06/17
Michael A. White	02/16
Mark Oviatt	02/17
Varough Deyde (Kingston)	
Jeffrey V. Johnson	02/16
Kury W. Cobham	03/17
	Perry L. Holloway Terry R. Steers-Gonzalez James M. Grounds Jerome N. Epping Alexandra J. King-Pile Amanda J. Cauldwell Josiah T. Keener Michael A. White Mark Oviatt Varough Deyde (Kingston) Jeffrey V. Johnson

Source: Embassy Georgetown

## APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted between September 5, 2017, and January 31, 2018, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

## **Objectives and Scope**

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

## Methodology

In conducting inspections, OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews pertinent records, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews with Department and on-site personnel; observes daily operations; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the review. OIG uses professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

In conducting this inspection, OIG reviewed 86 questionnaires completed by American and locally employed staff, and conducted 95 interviews at Embassy Georgetown and in Washington.

## APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES



Embassy of the United States of America Georgetown, Guyana May 1, 2018

#### UNCLASSIFIED

THRU:	WHA - Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary
то:	OIG - Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
FROM:	Embassy Georgetown – Perry Holloway, Ambassador
SUBJECT:	Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Georgetown

Embassy Georgetown has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

<u>OIG Recommendation 1:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement a process for preparing the annual Statement of Assurance that complies with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has notified all sections of the Embassy of their responsibilities for management controls and provided each with a checklist of controls by section. All sections have been notified that they will be required to verify that all management controls in their sections have been performed prior to the annual submission of the COM Statement of Assurance. A binder is also being maintained in the Management Office with copies of all completed management certifications. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

OIG Recommendation 2: Embassy Georgetown should comply with the end-use monitoring, reporting, and record-keeping requirements mandated in Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has retroactively corrected the errors in the 2016 report and submitted the 2017 report in a timely manner and free of errors. Post has already drafted End Use Monitoring Standard Operating Procedures to comply with reporting and record-keeping requirements. Post has sent a record email containing the SOP to all relevant Embassy staff and, going forward, will include a hard copy of the EUM SOP with the folder of handover materials given to new Embassy Pol/Econ/INL officers. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 3:</u> Embassy Georgetown should dispose of Political-Economic Section paper files, in accordance with Department records disposition requirements. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has reviewed all the paper files, destroyed those that warranted destruction, re-organized the files as needed, and created a table of contents for each drawer of the Pol/Econ/INL file cabinet. Post is in communication with the WHA Bureau Records Coordinator and has started the process to retire those documents that must be archived to the Records Service Center. Going forward, the table of contents and a copy of the relevant section of the disposition schedule will be kept inside each drawer, and Post will conduct a semi-annual review of the files. Post has sent a record email to all Embassy Pol/Econ/INL staff detailing this procedure.

<u>OIG Recommendation 4:</u> Embassy Georgetown should report public diplomacy program activity through the Public Diplomacy Mission Activity Tracker. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and will do MAT entries retroactively from January 1, 2018. PAS estimates MAT entries will be current by July 1, 2018. Starting May 8, going forward, activities will be put into MAT within 10 workdays after an activity/event. This SOP has been institutionalized in a record email and as a PDF in PAS's shared drive under "DC Reporting – MAT – Important Information."

<u>OIG Recommendation 5:</u> Embassy Georgetown should manage and document grants, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and the PAO, with the assistance of the PAA who is expected to become a GOR grants officer representative by July 1, 2018, will insert the five page "DS-4012" in the front of each grant file going forward, and check off the required items as they are completed. Post PAS, as of May 8, 2018, has no open grants. This SOP has been institutionalized in a record email and as a PDF in PAS's shared drive under "Grants – Important Information." Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 6:</u> Embassy Georgetown should establish a warden system, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and is currently validating and mapping existing registrants to re-establish appropriate warden zones and identify new wardens. Post anticipates the new system will be in place by the end of FY2018.

<u>OIG Recommendation 7:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement a consular crisis preparedness program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and, since the time of the inspection, has conducted a crisis management exercise with significant consular equities in conjunction with FSI, rewritten the Emergency Action Plan (EAP), including identifying consular responsibilities and incident commanders, updated the Consular Crisis Preparedness Scorecard, added crisis preparedness modules to the planning

schedule for half the monthly Consular Development Days, and memorialized this in a record email (18 MDA 9068), and is working with IRM to train officers and staff on the use of the satellite phone and BIC kit. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 8:</u> Embassy Georgetown should correct line of sight issues in the Consular Section to comply with Department guidance for consular officers to visually monitor all consular operations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has moved around offices to increase officer presence near the American Citizen Services and Fraud Prevention Unit LE staff spaces, prepared a scope of work to add additional interior windows, and is procuring closed circuit television systems to allow remote monitoring of ACS and interview windows of concern. Due to the cost, addressing the issues regarding cubicle height and interspersing officers and staff requires approval and funding of a project via the CA-OBO project process. Post has asked to include these issues in a previously submitted project (18 MDA 9616) and was told via email from the CA/EX OBO liaison on April 6, 2018, that a team will visit before the end of FY2018 to perform a site survey, including addressing line of sight and any other consular internal control issues.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 9:</u>** Embassy Georgetown should implement an annual acquisition planning process.

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and at the end of each fiscal year, the General Services Officer will work with Mission offices to develop their procurement plans for the upcoming fiscal year. As outlined in FAR 7.105, the plan will contain acquisition background and objectives, a plan of action, and proposed timeline. A standard operating procedure is being developed and will be maintained in the Management Office, with completion of the SOP by June 1, 2018.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 10</u>:** Embassy Georgetown should implement procedures to review and manage its blanket purchase agreements, in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has retrained the procurement staff on Chapter 2 of the Office of the Procurement Executive "Overseas Cookbook," who are now aware that a BPA shall not be established for "Exclusive Suppliers" or "Preferred Sources". Post has established multiple blanket purchase agreements for fuel and will rotate orders among BPA holders, whenever possible. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 11:</u> Embassy Georgetown should designate, certify, and train Contracting Officer's Representatives, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

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**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and, since the inspection, has provided training to personnel with COR responsibilities and has received new or reinstated FAC-COR certification from the Office of the Procurement Executive. The Office of Procurement Executive Desk Officer visited Post in late February and provided training to CORs on how to properly administer a contract file. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 12:</u>** Embassy Georgetown should bring its purchase card program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown).

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and completed an annual review for FY2017 per regulation and documented in the PMARS system. The new coordinator is aware of the requirements of the purchase card program. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 13:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement policies and procedures for its travel card program, in accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and standard operating procedures for our centrally billed account were established (i.e., Embassy travel card) in January 2018 and placed on the GSO network drive, as well as sent to all management staff via record email (18 MDA 9618). The General Services Office also modified the position description for the Travel Clerk to ensure adherence to the travel card program. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 14:</u> Embassy Georgetown should clear the outstanding balance on its travel card. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has been reconciling outstanding charges since the OIG visit in Fall 2017. The remaining outstanding balance was written down by Post in April 2018 and will be paid in May 2018.

<u>OIG Recommendation 15:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement a system to store, issue, and return keys for official vehicles, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and installed an additional key management system in April 2018 for keys of official vehicles. The Motorpool supervisor has been retrained to ensure he is receiving OF-108s from all professional and incidental drivers under COM authority and each vehicle has a complete file on a monthly basis per the FAM. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>Recommendation 16:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement a corrective action plan to bring all professional drivers and incidental operators into compliance with the Department's Overseas Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

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**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and Smith Systems training has been provided to all professional and incidental drivers, save one who is still pending and will be scheduled to take the training once Post receives additional training materials. Medical clearances for those drivers whose clearances have expired or are pending are being scheduled.

<u>Recommendation 17:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for fuel usage, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

Management Response: Embassy Georgetown concurs, and the data entry of fuel coupons to Motorpool has been centralized. A standard operating procedure has been drafted that will be finished and cleared by June 1, 2018, and stored on the GSO network drive. The SOP includes that the GSO will review and sign the DS-1775 "Monthly Fuel/Oil Consumption Record" and compare it with the monthly fuel invoice. This will show if any fuel tickets are not recorded in ILMS.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 18:</u>** Embassy Georgetown should implement a schedule to ensure the alternate cashier works as the principal cashier, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and an alternate cashier schedule has been implemented for CY2018, with copies provided to the Cashier, Alternate Cashier, Management Officer, and the Management and Budget & Finance LE staff (18 MDA 9634). An SOP, which annualizes the production of the schedule, is being drafted.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 19:</u>** Embassy Georgetown should implement a process to monitor and track the payment of its invoices in order to comply with the Prompt Payment Act's implementing regulations and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and the voucher examiner has modified the manual spreadsheet to better track invoices. The section also uses the system generated tracking system to monitor payment timing. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 20:</u> Embassy Georgetown should submit the hardship differential survey to the Office of Allowances, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and submitted the Post hardship differential in January 2018. Post requests that this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 21:</u> Embassy Georgetown should require authorizing officials to approve staff requests for overtime in advance, in accordance with Department guidelines. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

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**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and updated and re-issued the Post overtime policy on January 23, 2018. All supervisors have been additionally notified of the need to pre-approve overtime work. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

**<u>OIG Recommendation 22:</u>** Embassy Georgetown should implement a preventive maintenance program, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has reviewed GMMS equipment and PMs. Paperwork has been streamlined by creating standing work orders for multiple pieces of equipment. FAC supervisors' PDs were updated to require that they oversee the completion of 100% of PMs for mission critical equipment and 90% for all other equipment. In addition, Post contracted out BMEs. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 23:</u> Embassy Georgetown should vacate the U.S. Government-owned warehouse and notify the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations so it can be sold. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and all Supply/Warehouse operations have been moved to the new warehouse or the Chancery. No offices, for Supply/Warehouse or Facility Maintenance, remain at the old warehouse. The Facility Maintenance Workshop at the old warehouse will be moved to the new warehouse once the fire suppression system is installed. Appraisals are currently being completed on the old warehouse property in preparation for sale.

<u>OIG Recommendation 24:</u> Embassy Georgetown should require that Information Systems Security Officers perform information systems security duties, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and acquired the latest ISSO checklist on April 12, 2018. Post ISSO is devoting time weekly and monthly to document audits, findings, and responses to ISSO-related situations and conditions. Diplomatic Security Standards for server configuration have been applied and are being monitored to update the specified server settings monthly. There are presently no wireless devices utilized on the dedicated internet network and plans have been made to update the system to current Department standards within the scope of a complete Information Technology Infrastructure Remediation (ITIR) upgrade to be initiated within FY2019.

<u>OIG Recommendation 25:</u> Embassy Georgetown should update and test the information technology contingency plans, in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and since the inspection, has applied real-life experience from two system failures to identify and document

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changes to recovery procedures, which have been added to the Embassy's Standard Operating Procedures. A locally employed staff member was also sent to AVAMAR training to learn how best to utilize this system and the types of backups required to assure a complete and successful recovery following a disaster scenario. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 26:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement a plan for conducting initial and annual refresher information technology contingency training for employees with information technology contingency planning responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has implemented continuing training through exercises to identify proper response to various contingency scenarios. The last such exercise was conducted in March 2018. In addition, a locally employed staff member was sent to AVAMAR training. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 27:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for installing network cabling system components. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has provided a copy of the standards in 5 FAH 9 Cabling Handbook to IRM staff via the IM shared drive. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

<u>OIG Recommendation 28:</u> Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, should correct the network cabling infrastructure issues. (Action: Embassy Georgetown, in coordination with IRM and WHA)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and sent in January 2018 a record email (18 MDA 650) requesting IT Infrastructure Remediation Support (ITIR) services from IRM/ITI/LWS in January 2018. WHA RIMO was looped into the process, and the solicitation is presently awaiting funding. Post notes the condition depicted in Figure 1 was corrected as of December 2017.

<u>OIG Recommendation 29:</u> Embassy Georgetown should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking help desk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Embassy Georgetown)

**Management Response:** Embassy Georgetown concurs, and has added a section to the Information System Center Standard Operating Procedures Guide, requiring customer submission of MyServices requests as a requirement to receive service. Post requests this recommendation be closed.

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## APPENDIX C: FY 2017 STAFFING AND FUNDING BY AGENCY

Agency	U.S. Direct- hire Staff	U.S. Locally Employed Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff	Funding (\$)
Department of State					- unung (+)
Diplomatic & Consular Programs	8	1	8	17	1,452,893
Consular	8	2	17	27	1,019,978
International Cooperative Administrative Support System (ICASS)	e 2	6	63	71	7,420,406
Public Diplomacy	1	0	1	2	95,300
Diplomatic Security	3	1	11	15	464,642
Marine Security	8	0	4	12	432,866
Overseas Buildings Operations	1	0	2	3	1,654,994
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)-State	0	0	1	1	51,755
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs	0	0	0	0	532,750
Subtotal	31	10	107	148	13,125,584
Department of Defense					
Security Cooperation Office	4	0	2	6	62,002
Subtotal	4	0	2	6	62002
Department of Justice					
Drug Enforcement Administration	3	0	0	3	450,000
Subtotal	3	0	0	3	450000
Department of Health and Human Servi	ces				
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	0	0	3	3	509,652
Subtotal	0	0	3	3	50965
USAID	1	0	4	5	589,983
Peace Corps	3	0	26	29	2,454,201
PEPFAR-Navy	0	0	1	1	108,000
Total	42	10	143	195	17,299,422

Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by the Department.

## ABBREVIATIONS

DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First- and Second-Tour
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
LE	Locally Employed

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